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000 BULGARIA
PAST & PRESENT

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BULGARIA

PAST & PRESENT

BY

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WITH 25 ILLUSTRATIONS & MAPS

> „The true patriotism is the corner-stone of true nternationalism. One often can best serve his country by reminding it of what is due to other nations".
>
> *L. T. Hobhouse in „Morals in evolution".*

piii [piv contains no textual material]

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TIRNOVO: THE OLD CAPITAL

[facing p.iii]

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000 The forbearance of the reader is solicited for the numerous typographical errors, such as the occasional omission or substitution of letters, disseminated throughout the book, and due to the total ignorance of English of the Bulgarian printers.

Page 48, line 9, *for* " 1934-1 " *read* " 1934-5."

Page 54, line 32, *for* " Philippolis " *read* " Philippopolis."

Page 62, figure of imports for 1934 should read 2247.

Page 64, line 19, *for* " frayed " *read* " defrayed."

Page 126, figures in column of exports for 1934 should read 2879.

Page 174, line 25, *for* " they forests b " *read* " the forests by."

Pages 180 and 192, figures in tables referring to areas in hectares should read as if they contained one unit less.

Page 108, line 34, *for* " 26 leva " *read* " high as 26 leva."

Page 222, lines 5 and 6, figures referring to gradients should read per thousand instead of per cent.

Page 233, line 22, *for* " 1931-4 " *read* " 1931-2."

Page 420, line 21, *for* " May 6 " *read* " May 7."

Page 435, line 4, *for* " Secrosanct " *read* " Sacrosanct."

Page 472, line 32, *for* " out of the " *read* " out of the sails of."

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PREFACE

Mr. Compton Mackenzie in his „First Athenian Memoirs“ affirms, not without a certain dose of humour, that: „the Balkan country which really inspires the love of the Englishman is Bulgaria. There is something about Bulgaria which speaks to the very soul of the prosperous and intellectual English Nonconformist. . . there is something respectable about falling in love with Bulgaria“.

Such sympathy is well deserved, for it is a public atonement for the crucifixion Bulgaria suffered at Berlin in 1878 through the unjustifiable and blundering intervention of the British government. Though the Bulgarian people's fondest hopes were then irrevocably shattered, its body politic maimed and crippled, no ill-will is harboured against the English. On the contrary, it is enough to intimate in Bulgaria that one is an American, or an Englishman in order that he be met with effusions of frienship, and overpowered with offers of assistance and attestations of goodwill.

For the Bulgarians recollect that it is mainly owing to the desinterested efforts of such warm-hearted Americans as Dr. Albert Long, Mr. Eugen Schuyler, Dr. George Washburn, and to that of the noble-hearted Englishmen, W. H. Gladstone, and Sir Edwin Pears, that their country owes its emancipation. It is the efforts of these men which brought to the knowledge of European public opinion the existence of Bulgaria and made the Bulgarian question the burning problem of the time. The liberation of Bulgaria, in some form or other, was already a settled matter, before the armed intervention of Tsarist Russia. Gladstone by his untiring efforts had well nigh convinced his more insularly minded colleagues that the best defence of the road to India lay „not in a dying despotism but in the breasts of free men“ and it was only the success of the Russian arms which provoked the regrettable revulsion of feeling that led to the Congress of Berlin.

As a result of the world war Bulgaria has sustained further mutilations. She has been incapacitated and disabled, and turned into a mendicant among the nations. Loans have been floated under the sponsorship of the League of Nations to succour her. The author canvassed at the time all his acquaintances and friends in favour of the loan which was raised on behalf of the Bulgarian refugees. The disillusion and loss this Refugee loan has caused to the author's acquaintances has been the chief moral incentive which has urged him to compile the present book. He feels he owes them a full explanation, and he, in a special chapter, has attempted to give a complete version of the story of these loans so that it may become clear that the responsibility for the partial default of their country does not weigh solely on the Bulgarians.

There are few peoples who have received such a severe bludgeoning from Fate as the Bulgarians. Religion unfortunately sits lightly on them and it is of little consolation to cite to their intent from the Epistle to the Hebrews: „If ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons; for what son is he whom his father chasteneth not? But if ye be without chastisement, whereof all are partakers, then are ye bastards, and not sons".

Sympathy and goodwill for Bulgaria, arising from a full knowledge of the difficulties with which she is faced, may help, however, her people to meet with greater fortitude the heavy task with which they are confronted. This has prompted the writer to enlarge on several little known aspects of Bulgarian life, and he sincerely believes that a perusal of this book, in spite of its manifold shortcomings, will not only enlighten the American and British public on Bulgarian affairs generally, but it will also help them to understand some of the causes which have led to the decline of Parliamentarism in most European countries.

It may also be added in conclusion that a study of the economic situation of Bulgaria will help readers to grasp the problems confronting most of the Danubian States, and will convince them how indispensable is the active participation of Gt. Britain in the economic life of these countries if the results of the present crisis are to be alleviated. Failing this policy, the only alternative remedy is a resurrection in some form or other of the *Mittel-Europa* scheme with all its momentous consequences.

G. C. L.

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THE PASSING OF DEMOCRACY

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The announcement that Bulgaria had abandoned on May 19, 1934 the Parliamentary and democratic system of government and set up in its place a military semi-Fascist dictatorship was received with undisguised regret in countries where the democratic traditions were deep-rooted and traditional., This act of Bulgaria, which was considered as the most democratic country in the Balkans, was viewed with disappointment and vexation, it was considered as an open defection of a minor member of the same confraternity of liberal-minded peoples, to the triumph of whose conceptions and principles of government is due, in the main, the progress achieved by the Western nations.

Such an opinion, however it might appear concordant with outward appearances. does not seem to be justified. For Bulgaria was never a democratically governed country, in spite of its Parliament and Constitution. And as for M. Kimon Gheorghiev and his colleagues, who effected the coup d'état, no one can uphold that they resemble in the least Plato's tyrant who, serves as prototype to modern dictators. This model tyrant was characterised by effecting „Just the reverse of medical purgation. For doctors remove the worst and leave the best; he does the opposite.“ (G. Lowes Dickinson, „The dialogues of Plato“ p. 155). The Gheorghiev government far from putting into practice such precepts, has on the contrary administered the most salutary „purges“ to Bulgaria, which effected a true catharsis, delivering the State from such disintegrating elements as the Macedonian Revolutionary organisation and the political coteries. The military who planned, carried out and imposed the change of government did this much against tneir will, and only after repeated warnings and objurgations to the politicians to mend their ways, had failed to call the latter back to reason and to duty. Far from assuming sole control of the ship of state, they have appealed to men of character and integrity and sought their co-operation and they have even confided to these civilians the direction of some of the most important branches of the administration. This liberal attitude is again in direct contradiction with the traditional behaviour of the model tyrant of Plato, for „he must have a sharp eye also for the man who is courageous or high minded or wealthy; and it is his greatest happiness to have to be the enemy of all such whether he like it or not, and plot against them until he purge the city of their presence.... Apparently he must do it if he is to rule". It is obvious therefore that the semi-military oligarchy which has assumed the reins of power in Bulgaria differs radically from the traditional enemy of democracy. In justice to the men who effected the coup d'état, it must be admitted, that they have never declared themselves admirers or exponents either of Fascism or of Hitlerism, and that they have never impugned democracy for faults which sprang from the abandonment of democracy. Their overt aim was to stave off corruption which was threatening the State with dissolution and to implant civic duties among their countrymen which will eventually render them fit for self-government. In fact by conforming themselves to Lysistrata's recipe they attempted to inculcate among their compatriots the idea of Good Citizenship, (this was according to Meredith the dominant idea of Aristophanes'comedies.).

„ . . . Next, for the clubs, the cabals, and the coteries,
banding unrigtheously, office to win,
Treat them as clots in the wool and dissever them,
lopping the heads that are forming therein!
Then you should card it, and comb it, and mingle it,

> **all in one basket of love and unity,**
> **Citizens, visitors, strangers, and sojourners,**
> **all the entire, undivided community."**

The first effect of liberty on those who are unprepared for it is often confusion, if not license, and the Bulgarian people were never trained to make a judicious use of the rights which the ultra-liberal Constitution prematurely foisted on Bulgaria, conferred on them. So far, Bulgarian political leaders, with some very rare exeptions, though they have masqueraded under every conceivable brand of democracy, ranging from social-democracy to make-believe Liberalism („Conservative" was too unattractive a party name for the astute and cunning Bulgarian demagogues to parade under and even those of conservative tendencies preferred to disguise themselves in the garb of the progressive, or of the populist) have miserably failed to educate the Bulgarians as to the elementary duties of citizenship; on the contrary all they did was to cultivate among them an inordinate sense of their rights, which was fostered by intensive appeals to their egoistic instincts. It is only those who are superficially acquainted with the inner working of parliamentary and democratic forms of government in most European countries that can remain intransigent supporters of all forms of self-government. For the latter often assume the most repulsive aspect of government, that leading to wholesale corruption and to the undermining of the moral fibre of a nation. The unlimited vista of putridity recently revealed in France and Rumania by the Stavisky scandal, and the Scoda affair, which impelled even a former Rumanian Premier, Dr. Vaida-Voevod to make on March 23, 1933 from the tribune of the Rumanian Chamber the astounding admission „that thare was something rotten in the organism of his country which must be amputated and cleansed before it could aspire to health", show that it is paying lip service to

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democracy by taking up indiscriminately the defence of all that styles itself democratic. It is such travesties of Parliamentary government which render the advent of dictatorship both a necessary and a welcome operation in order to stem the process of decomposition and degradation which inevitably flourish in their wake. Dictatorship acts as a cleansing, purifying fire, it purges the ground of weeds and prepares for the sowing of a new crop.

Real democracy can only flourish in an environment in which civic virtues prosper, where there it a deep sense of solidarity among members of the same community. An appropriate moral coefficient is an indispensable prerequisite to its proper functioning. In the absence of these, democracy rapidly degenerates and becomes a forcing ground for every sort of vice and crime. When this stage of degradation has been reached, the only salutary method is to turn to an authoritative form of government which is better suited to carry out a limited mandate, such as that of imposing discripline, order and respect for law, indispensable preliminaries for the reappearance of a rejuvenated and purified form of democracy. When democracy is on the decline an appeal to dictatorship becomes indispensable; it constitutes the necessary corrective for a community which has indulged in too loose living, and whose state of health has become alarming.

As in Yugoslavia, the venality and depravity of politicians prepared and paved the way to the dictatorship, so also in Bulgaria, it is the politicians who were the source of trouble and through their lack of integrity and of public spirit, compelled a section of the people, those preoccupied with the stern rigours of their military profession and with their thoughts concentrated on the national honour and safety, to bring about the fall of that form of pseudo-democracy prevalent in Bulgaria, and which was one of the most repulsive forms of constitutional govenment engendered by unripe democracy and individual rapacity.

THE PASSING OF DEMOCRACY

000 In countries like the United States, or Great Britain, we may scoff at the idea of the military ever teaching the public the arts of government. We are even inclined to share Mr. G. B. Shaw's[1] view about the soldier, namely that such efficiency as he may possess is the result of his dehumanization and mental disablement. But in Bulgaria those foreign observers who take an interest in her welfare were not slow to detect that the suppression of its conscript army as imposed by the Treaty of Neuilly, more than anything else contributed to the rise of crime, to the undermining of virtue, to the spread of Bolshevism, and to the deplorable sagging in public and private morals witnessed of late among its hitherto incorruptible peasantry, once noted for its austere conception of life. This sudden relaxation of morals must be largely ascribed to the eclipse military influence had suffered, and to the suspension of the military training which Bulgarian youth received in pre-war days. Barrack life was a sort of popular university; not only the young peasant learnt anew the rudiments of knowledge which he had imbibed at the elementary school, but which the rude life he led usually made him rapidly forget, but what was most important, such indispensable and fundamental notions as duty to his fatherland, obedience to his superiors, respect for the law, were deeply inculcated in him by his officers; and such ideas, imposed by military discipline during eighteen consecutive months, tended to form the basis on which he built his conception of the system of law which was to direct his relations with other members of his community. The exercise of such military virtues of authority, courage, discipline and tenacity, remained to him until the last. The suspension of this training, so indispensable to the formation of a correct moral outlook in Bulgarian youth

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[1] See G. B. S. ' „John Bull's other island"

000 hastened the deterioration of the standard of morality in Bulgaria. When that benevolent influence which was formerly exerted by the officer corps and initiated the youth of Bulgaria in its primary duty was removed by the underhand machinations of Bulgaria's neighbours, who purposely destroyed this part of the social framework in order better to disable Bulgaria, there was no longer any counterweight to the demoralising influences which demagogic politicians let loose in their blind pursuit of private interests. The dangers inherent in an uneducated electorate are clearly realised even by those who may be considered as spokesmen for the masses. Lord Snowden, in whose enlightened radicalism we may all confide, affirms in his „Labour and the New World“ p. 224: „Government by an autocracy is a danger and a tyranny. But the nominal government of an ignorant democracy may be a greater danger to the State than even the despotism of an autocracy. For behind the power of a nominally enfranchised democracy, there is no stronger force or restraining influence“.

All friends of Bulgaria should therefore feel grateful to that band of altruistic and courageous men who have volunteered to act as a „restraining influence“ and who have rushed in the nick of time to deflect their country from the road to perdition on which her unprincipled politicians were leading her.

661 And as for the record of Bulgarian politicians, and of Bulgarian Parliamentarism, we had better let independent and competent Bulgarian authorities express their views. The veteran educationalist and social writer, the Radical, Ivan Kepov, in one of his most illuminating books on Bulgaria, entitled „Our Actuality“ p. 109, did not hesitate to declare: „From the time of the expulsion of our first prince, the whole system of government became a carrier of corruption. And in this stifling and

661 pestiferous atmosphere only those with an iron will and exceptional moral force evaded the usual fate of the intelligentsia – moral debasement". Dr. Krestnikov, a distinguished psychiatrist, whose scientific works are known as far afield as Germany, in his booklet „On Social Themes", published in Sofia in the year 1926, makes this startling admission: „Of the 96 Ministers who have governed our country since its liberation, 48 have been condemned by State tribunals, while 8 Special Courts have been instituted to inquire into the dishonest acts of Ministers. The behaviour of our politicians has been characterised by hankering after power, and by violence... We led a more virtuous life under the Turks; then mass violence and brutality were unknown among us".

And Stoyan Mihailovski, the poet-philosopher, and certainly the most puissant Balkan genius of modern times, who was a keen observer of public life and a profound moralist, stigmatised in a forceful apophthegm his countrymen's tendency to allow their egoistic impulses to run riot, which may be rendered by:

„Once slaves, now self-enslaved are we,
And from this cursed self-imposed yoke,
Only by our efforts shall we become free".

000 In a backward country nothing can be so demoralising as a bad example set by those at the top. And unfortunately Bulgaria during her brief independent career had seldom an inspiring model set before her. Walter Bagehot's profound wise dictum that „Rigid, definite, concise law is the primary want of primitive societies, that which they need above anything else, that which is requisite before they could gain anything else" seems to have been unknown to, and unheard of by all those who in turn had charge of Bulgaria's destinies. And the Bulgarian, who by nature is an extreme egalitarian, a quality which is certainly not without its attractive sides, must

010 above all have the principle of discipline and that of respect for his superiors inculcated in him, for no well-ordered State can survive without the existence of some form of hierarchy in it.

185 It must be admitted that the circumstances with which Bulgaria has had to contend were exceedingly adverse to the development and uplifting of the mass, necessary preliminaries to the exercise of democracy. The nation, dismembered at Berlin, directed all its energy to its reunion. To effect this purpose, it expended the greatest part of its resources on military preparations, and scant attention was given by the governing classes to cultural enterprise. Though many far-seeing Bulgarians, amongst whom Stoyan Mihailovsky, maintained that the policy pursued was wrong, and that a cultural development was the indispensable prerequisite to territorial aggrandisement. Bulgaria's ethnic unification being more easily attained by a process of evolution, and the establishment of a Balkan federation — these views naturally found little favour or encouragement with the classes which wielded power.

648 Moreover, the ruling classes succumbed to foreign influence, Russian or Austrian, whose object was to keep the Balkan nations in as backward a state as possible, in order to turn them more easily into blind tools for themselves. So that the moral ascendency which the outward world, and especially those great empires with which Bulgaria was in close touch, exerted on her, instead of being edifying and elevating was, on the contrary, demoralising and pernicious in the extreme, Dr. D. N. Popov, the biographer of Kosta Arseniev (1864-1899), an exemplary honest democratic politician, alluded in the following terms to that stormy period of Bulgaria's history. „Demagogy created immorality. Electoral abuses, brigandage below, and corruption above, became endemic. Some would have tied Bul-

648 garia to St Petersburgh, others wanted her chained to London, another party preferred Vienna, while a certain section had preferences for Berlin, and yet another group insisted that Bulgaria's foreign policy should be conducted from Constantinople. Unhappy land, her leaders endeavoured to tie her simultaneously to several mutually antagonistic protectors, and thus unwittingly acted against the interests of their country. Bulgaria suffered not so much from the treason of her neighbours, as from the shortsightedness and lack of scruples of those directing our foreign policy, in association with foreign consuls, whose protegés they were". (Kosta Arseniev, pp. 35-6.).

177 What moral forces remained, having survived Bulgaria's Europeanization, a process which was tantamount to the elimination of the patriarcal traditions of the Bulgarians, and their replacement by what was nothing but a thin veneer of civilization—were wholly absorbed in their conflict with Tsar Ferdinand, that great factor of evil in their country.

661 517 He, in a true Machiavellian spirit, spread corruption broadcast, and vitiated the intelligentsia, in order to render all opposition to him impracticable and impossible. The diabolical refinements with which that process was pursued were set forth by Stoyan Mihailovsky, in his „Book for the Bulgarian people", published in 1897. The ease with which the intelligentsia succumbed to the malign influences which surrounded it, is chiefly due to its extreme poverty. Having sundered all connection with the peasant, artisan or trading class, from which he sprang, the intellectual scorned the idea of obtaining his livelihood by any other means than that of state employ. This desire to get employment under the Government, which is almost a passion among the Bulgarians, could not be satisfied in respect of every claimant owing to the limited number of public posts, and led to the formation of a legion of

661 517 hungry office-seekers. ready to offer their support to any politician, who would hold out to them a promise of a State or municipal office. It is from this class, reckoned to number some 300,000 strong, that every party entrusted by the Crown with the task of government, recruited its staff, dangerously depleted during the lean years the party had passed in Opposition, and replaced all organs of authority, in order to influence and doctor the will of the electorate. A Cabinet would seldom owe its appointment to office to any other consideration than royal favour, for rarely indeed could it prove that it enjoyed the confidence of the people, since such a majority as it secured in the new Chamber was obtained by methods which were a negation of parliamentarism, and a clear violation of the national will.

[642] 661 Party government in Bulgaria was always a disguised dictatorship, which imposed itself by artifices that barely permitted it to save the outward forms of parliamentarism. Except on three occasions; in 1879, 1901 and 1931, there was never a free expression of the national will. The Chamber was maintained merely to save appearances, and in order to give to the people the illusion that it participated in the government of the country. The chief aim of a party, when in power, was the enrichment of its partisans and the constitution of some reserves for the lean years it had to remain in opposition. The more the rapacious instincts of partisans were satisfied. the more would a party prosper and grow powerful. An attempt to restrain the greed of its adherents would inevitably have led to its disruption. Corruption, therefore, was the basis of party life. Such an atmosphere paralysed every spiritual activity, and thwarted every noble initiative. Idealism, in fact, became an obstacle to the progress of a party, and law-breaking and peculation the main springs of its success. Before abandoning office, almost every government would vote

an amnesty commuting or completely abrogating such sanctions as had been inflicted on their partisans for the illegalities committed by them. The Minister of Justice pointed out on December 29, 1931, that since 1881, 35 amnesties had been voted. There was no deterrent to crime, and this is why crime is more prevalent among the State functionary class than among any other in Bulgaria, since the Bulgarians are certainly the most moral and honest people in the Balkans, and it was the perversity, short-sightedness and cynical selfishness of the politicians which was leading them astray. This deplorable state of affairs was the inevitable consequence of the malevolent foreign influences to which Bulgaria was subjected, and of the too-advanced political Constitution, with which she suddenly found herself endowed; for centuries of slavery do not constitute a good training for the rational exercise of liberty. This combination of adverse circumstances has led to a catastrophe, which is at once political economic and moral, and which seems almost complete, for the Bulgarians are beginning to lose faith in themselves. 661

The same portents that heralded the downfall of the first and second Bulgarian empires, became again visible. Antagonism between the people and the State was increasing, the people had lost faith in their leaders, who were incapable of sacrificing their private ambitions for their nation's welfare, or of emerging from that stifling atmosphere of personal squabbles and intrigues, in which they lay enwrapped. The counterpart of the rascally boyars of yore was supplied by the demagogues of the Agrarian party, who, like the tyrant in Plato's „Republic" considered „that it is easiest to rule over a hard pressed community for the taxes they have to pay will impoverish them, so that they will be compelled to give their minds to getting their daily bread, and not to conspiring against him," and who do not scruple to instigate the masses to appropriate 661 641

661 the hard-earned property of their political opponents, thereby
641 driving the more stable elements to aggressive reaction.
The problem of renovation is all the more difficult
owing to the national psyche having been perverted
181 by centuries of slavery. It turned the Bulgarian peasant
into an extreme egotist, into a man who had no notion
of what social solidarity connoted. Excluded for so long
from participation in public affairs, he came to view them
with extreme suspicion, as something separate from his
existence and antagonistic to his private interests. Being
treated by the Turk as he was previously by his own
nobles, and actually by the inteligentsia as an inferior, he
came to consider himself as a being apart, in opposition to
all the world.

Experience taugh him that wealth was the only means by which he could improve his position, and ensure for himself a measure of respect. Hence his grasping and individualistic propensities. His extreme individualism makes him refractory even to Socialism, for he feels that his instincts are in harmony with anarchism, rather than with the methodical theories of Karl Marx.

The Bulgarian has further developed another lamen-
641 table characteristic: that of a boundless disrespect for the
181 law. The law was looked upon as an instrument of extortion,
to be used by those in power for their own ends and
to be modified or broken by them at their own pleasure.
The law has never been for the Bulgarian a system under
which the rights of the individual were safeguarded. The
widely-diffused notion among members of advanced communities
that the law embodies the common conscience
and the common interest, not only has not percolated into
the depths of the nation, but has not even penetrated the
superficial strata of its leading circles, and until recently
one witnessed the most iniquitous illegalities being committed
by the party in power, which abuses, though they

rouse to fever-heat the indignation of the foreigner, leave 641
the Bulgarian indifferent. It is this lack of public spirit 781
and an extreme self-centredness which renders him apathetic to the wrongs inflicted on others, and which prevent the creation of an alert public opinion capable of checking such misdeeds as the country has been suffering from.

Such is the social inheritance of the Bulgarian. It is 181
with such a mentality that he has emerged to free life. It would be erroneous however, to assume that psychically the Bulgarians stand at a lower level than their neighbours, or that being a backward people they deserved the dismemberment they sustained by the Treaties of Berlin and Neuilly, to the profit of the other Balkan peoples who are more or less of the same mentality, and what is worse, do not excel by those stirling household virtues of the Bulgarians, that go some way to counterbalance their shortcomings, which could be eradicated by a proper system of education.

The high level of the spate of demagogy which sub- 661
merged Bulgaria was attained soon after the termination of the world war, when her enemies had disarmed her and when, through the weakening of the military factor, the peasant politician Stambuliiski, secured complete control of the state machine. The country then experienced all the horrors of a jacquerie. The evils engendered by the Agrarian regime are tersely set forth by Kosturkov, the capable and outspoken leader of the former Radical party, in a speech delivered in the Sobranye on Sept. 4, 1925: „With few exceptions every Bulgarian government had sown the seeds of corruption and demoralisation, they also however left some positive creative work to their credit. Stambuliiski's regime, however, has left behind an indelible furrow of corruption which it will take scores of years to remove; it is a moral scar that will be most difficult to cure. Moral perversion has been disseminated by the authorities along

661 the whole length and breadth of our unhappy country and it is the worst form of corruption we have yet experienced for it has revolutionised village life from its very foundations." This depressing diagnosis is confirmed by Dr. Djidrov, a distinguished economist and political writer, who in a speech in the Sobranye on Nov. 16, 1927 characterised the Agrarian regime as „the most destructive Bulgaria had experienced and the one which completed the ruin caused by the war." The nefarious influence which this high flood of demagogy has had on village life in general may be gauged by the concluding lines of M. Petko Rossen's most readable and instructive book „Among the people," and published in 1933: „Every right-thinking man who is capable of observation will be struck with dismay. To-day our village is in the pangs of such a religious, moral and public crisis, that he who entertains the hope of saving the State and public order on this, the thickest layer of our community, is bound to seek refuge in a monastery in his despair."

669 The Ministerial crisis which broke out in May 1934 was pregnant with grave consequences. Bulgaria was faced with the dilemma of placing the Agrarians, the most numerous political party, anew in the seat of power, or of delivering herself up, hands and feet bound to Prof. Tsankov, who had in the meanwhile donned a brand-new black shirt of a Fascist, and was garrulously exhorting his compatriots to adopt the Mussolinian creed. It was a case of Hobson's choise, with the certitude of a bloody trial of strength between the two rival factions, both being resolutely intent to secure control of the administration at all costs. This spelt anarchy and civil war, to avoid which, the military stepped in between the combattants, before the latter were quite ready for the fray. It was neither greed nor ambition which had goaded the military on the high road of politics, but the consciousness that

their intervention was indispensable to safeguard their country and stave off disaster.

Far seeing and patriotic Bulgarians had long since sensed the dangers inherent in the pseudo-democratic system hitherto in force. The master-mind of Stoyan Mihailovski as far back as 1919, in a series of articles published in the *Napred*, launched a campaign in favour of installing in power „an iron-handed saviour". He expounded that there could be no democracy in Bulgaria so long as the soul of the average Bulgarian is not recast and rendered capable of solidarity and love for its fellows, and that it was imperative to teach first what constituted duty and that after that Bulgarians could be initiated as to what rights they possessed as members of the community. The head of the Bulgarian Church, the venerable Excharch Joseph in an interview granted to Richard von Mach, on Feb. 24, 1914, and recorded in the latters' „Aus Bewechter Balkanzeit" likewise stressed the need of a strong and virile leader such as was Stambulov", a purified Stambulov". And Dr. Djidrov, who is a socialist in principles, in a political pamphlet published in 1934, in which he enlarged on the impasse, party government had brought Bulgaria to, could suggest no other course of salvation than that of appealing to Tsar Boris to exert himself autocratic powers, a course which could be followed without violating the Constitution, and by giving a rather elastic interpretation to some of its articles!

The writer, as a pupil of the late L. T. Hobhouse does not wish to be mistaken for an advocate of the authoritarian State. It savours too much of the Hegelian conception of the State, completely demolished by that masterly criticism of L. T. Hobhouse as expounded in the latter's „Metaphysical Theory of the State." The present writer realises the truth of his master's statement that „if efficiency is improved at such cost of freedom as to destroy

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initiative, the community loses by it on balance and will probably decay". But even L. T. Hobhouse, that noble pleader in the cause of freedom, admitted that „freedom is only possible if each man effectually feels the common good to be in some sort his own". Unfortunately the anarchic individualism of the Bulgarian, largely due to his unfavourable environment, precludes him from realizing that his own good depends on that of the community. Five centuries of slavery, preceded by as many years of worse misrule and exploitation by the native Tsars, boliars, and clerics, and finally a brief period of fifty seven years of independent existence characterised in the political sphere by law-breaking, violence and corruption, have confirmed the average Bulgarian in his belief that the State is the arch-enemy and exploiter, against which all deceit is justifiable. The dogma of „voler l'état n'est pas voler" prevalent in France has found large credence in Bulgaria, where French administrative centralisation with all its defects have also deen implicitly copied[1], helping thereby to impart a distorted notion of what constitutes democracy. It is imperative to prove to the long-suffering Bulgarian citizen that the purpose of its existence is his moral and material upliftment. To secure this the whole machinery of the administration has fo be overhauled and a new spirit infused in the civil service. Force has to be used in order to remove the piled up relics of the past which cumber the ground as well as for the purpose of curbing unbridled instincts and restraining rapacity, before the egoistic impulses which have so far prevailed may be deflected to social purposes. When this is finally achieved, and consent, the alternative

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How ill-adapted were the French to instil the principles of democracy into the Balkan peoples may be gauged by Dr. G. le Bon's very judicious remarks on his countrymen. „Le besoin de division et les haines. . . semblent être des éléments constitutifs, de l'âme latine." („La Révolution Française et la psychologie des révolutions" p. 70).

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

VARNA: A VIEW OF THE BEACH

[facing p. 16]

000 to force, may be relied on for the process of government, then it will be time to revert to democratic forms. As L. T. Hobhouse remarks: „If the institutions are sensibly above the intellectual and moral capacity of a people they will break down; if below, they will be broken up." The former phenomenon has occurred of late in most European countries which have adopted too prematurely Parliamentarism They are reverting to simpler forms more in harmony with their mental standing and degree of social development, both of which have markedly deteriorated since the world war. We may be confident that when these communities recover their former psychical health, or attain a more mature state of development and find that dictatorial forms of government are sensibly below their mental capacity, they will break them up and regain a just equilibrium.

643 It would be apposite to add a few lines on some of the patriotic men who undertook on May 19, 1934 the Herculean task of cleansing Bulgaria's Augean stables, for all are equally unassuming and modest, with a profound aversion for the limelight. M. Kimon Gheorghiev had already acted as Minister of Railways in the Liaptsev Cabinet (1926-1931) and owing to his strong disapproval of the financial policy of the government, resigned in protest. This, for a Bulgarian Minister is something untoward; usually their consciences are so elastic that they always manage to jog along together however much they may differ among themselves. It is they, who long before their British colleagues of 1932, evolved the doctrine of the Cabinet's agreement to differ! They only resign in a body and when such resignation is imposed by force of circumstances. In the political annals of Bulgaria there are remarkably few instances of Ministers resigning on a question of principle. The explanation which M. Gheorghiev gave in the Sobranye on Feb. 19, 1929, as to the reasons which

643 compelled him to take this step is characteristic not only of the high spirit of public duty which inspires his acts, but also of the consciousness of his responsibilities when in charge of public affairs. One or two sentences of the speech, suffice to portray the man. „It is," M. Gheorghiev declared, „a nefarious act to allow the public to perceive that the State shows partiality in its treatment of its subjects, and to favour some unduly at the expence of others... The sense of justice is being blunted, and such acts must cease"... and as they did not cease, M. Gheorghiev turned his back on his former colleagues and resigned, while the latter persevered in their campaign of spoliation and embezzlement.

645 663 As for M. Peter Todorov, the writer has nothing to alter in the opinion he expressed of him in a letter to the *Manchester Guardian* on Oct. 6, 1923, the object of which was to correct and mitigate the erroneous impressions the British public was forming of events in Bulgaria owing to the reports of some three misinformed Labour members of Parliament, who had then visited the country. This appreciation of M. Todorov was couched in the following terms: „No words would adequately express the esteem in which he is rightly held by those who have the privilege to know him. His unsparing denunciation of the abuses committed by the former Agrarian government and his scathing exposures of shady affairs are the best proof of his unswerving devotion to high ideals. As long as M. Todorov remains in the Cabinet there can be no fear of Bulgaria pursuing a reactionary policy". To the above may be added M. T. G. Vlaikov's appreciation, so that it may not be thought that such flattering remarks are inspired by the personal esteem the writer cherishes for one of the most stalwart champions of true radicalism in Bulgaria. M. Vlaikov is a distinguished writer, and a political thinker who until lately had played an active and reputable part

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in the social life of his country, and which may be likened to the role of the late much-regretted Charles Masterman in England. In his latest book, „Functionaries and Rulers" in which he related the rich and variegated experiences of his defunct brother in his capacity of a public functionary, and depicts in vivid colours the gradual deterioration of public morals, he lays stress on the fact, that, M. Todorov, on becoming Minister of Finances in 1923 startled all those about him by resolutely insisting that all functionaries in his department should be protected against dismissal and replacement by favourites and friends of the regime in power. That he worked with all possible zeal to render tenure of office secure for functionaries; this uncertainty as to their stability of employment being a veritable bane, and the main cause of maladministration in all Balkan countries. For a whole year there were no changes in the staff and the law relative to the appointment of functionaries in the Ministry of Finance was altered so that no one could be dismissed without the decision of a special disciplinary committee. Thus a dam against favouritism and political corruption had been effectively erected, but, M. Vlaikov, adds, no sooner had M. Todorov evacuated his post, that vents were made in the dam and soon the whole good work was undone. This shows how essential it is to have good men at the top, and all Bulgarians will readily agree that M. Todorov, in his capacity of Finance Minister has so far shown himself a very Cerberus on guard before the public purse, ready to defend it tooth and nail against dilapidations. Changes have occurred during this year (1935) in the composition of the Bulgarian Government, but the successors of M. Gheorghiev have all declared that their programme is identical to that of their predecessors and that they will pursue unflinchingly the task of purifying public life. All good-wishers of Bulgaria should wish them therefore success, for this is a pressing need.

000 661 pressing need. The debasement it[1] had reached spurred Stoyan Mihailovski to castigate in biting satire this remissness of his otherwise over-energetic countrymen. In the epilogue of one of his remarkable books „From Debasement to Dissolution," in which he depicts in masterly fashion the turpitude prevalent among the leading political circles at the time, he identifies the Bulgarian people with an ass, which animal he addresses as follows: „Thou shalt remain to the end a donkey. Such is the decree of providence. Thou shalt serve as an example to other animals, when they perceive thee, they will understand what moral deformity is, and they will guard themselves from such debasement. Do not ask me to flatter thee, for if I were to say in an apologue, that thou art a deft, clever sweet-voiced animal, common folk would begin to make fun of me, and would say that I too am an ass."

000 The above outburst should not be taken too literally[1], and patriotic Bulgarians need not feel uncomfortable. Let

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[1] The state of public affairs in neighbouring countries does certainly not warrant one to conclude that other Balkan countries have reached a higher level, though they were enfranchised long before the Bulgarians. A few years ago a public scandal was caused in Greece by the discovery that the quinine supplied by the Government, (this being a State monopoly) was nothing but an inoffensive powder. This had gone on for a couple of years. A fifth of the population is affected by malaria and one can easily surmise the likely consequences on public health. Some personal friends and prominent supporters of M. Venizelos, were implicated a fact which corroborates the latter's explanation (made in private) as to his loss of popularity in Greece, namely that he was surrounded by a gang of depredators who had compromised his administration. Conditions in Rumania are incomparably worse, and the spoliation foreigners are subjected to beggar description. Arbitrary invalidation of contracts and seizure of property are common grievances and the „Times" did not hesitate to qualify these proceedings as piratical, when the property of a British concern, that of the Galatz Water Supply Co. was thus summarily treated. Some two years ago the present writer published a book on Rumania, with the object of putting investors and

[1] [In public life — Analyst]

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NEW BROOMS SWEEP CLEAN

them remember that G. B. Shaw, another irrepressible wit, 000
who has much in common with Mihailovski, made one of his characters say of the British: „Every true Englishman detests the English. We are the wickedest nation on earth and our success is a moral horror." (Cusins in „Major Barbara.")

NEW BROOMS SWEEP CLEAN

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The most important and the most difficult achievement of the Gheorghiev Cabinet was the suppression of the Macedonian revolutionary organisation. Since the Balkan wars, the Macedonian 'revolutionaries were almost autonomous rulers in the south western districts of Bulgaria, in which they levied taxes and administered summary justice. This region formed a fortress whence no Bulgarian Government had been able to dislodge them in spite of repeated efforts. From this retreat, the revolutionaries were able to control the whole body of Macedonian immigrants in

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exporters to that country on their guard, and in order to bring the book to their knowledge made an application for the insertion of an advertisement on his book in the annual „Report" on that country prepared by the „Department of Overseas Trade" and published by H. M. Stationery Office. The latter, after acknowledging a cheque sent to defray the cost of publication, reimbursed the money three months later, and when pressed for an explanation, the writer received this edifying answer: „the book contained material of a political and critical kind, some of it hostile to the Rumanian Government. It is therefore obvious that in the interest of diplomatic comity such a book could not possibly be advertised in an official publication of H. M. Government." British citizens must obviously congratulate themselves on possessing such internationally-minded public servants who place diplomatic comity before national interest; though this extreme deference to ceremonial forms has cost Lancashire manufacturers dearly. Had the facts exposed in this book been brought to their notice, there is little doubt that a large part of their two million sterling risked lightheartedly since 1932 in Rumania, and now apparently as good as lost, would never have left our shores at all. ✓

669 Bulgaria and keep them in readiness for an eventual military invasion of their native country. It is this latent danger which incited the neighbouring Balkan States to make such persistent efforts at Sofia for the dissolution of the Macedonian organisation. The removal of this ever present peril of war through the sudden incursion of Macedonian bands in Yugoslav, or Greek territory, has vastly increased the chances of a Bulgaro-Yugoslav rapprochement and promoted the work of pacification in the Balkans. Even if the Gheorghiev Cabinet had left no other record of its activities than this suppression of the Macedonian organisation, this would be sufficient for it to have secured a valid claim to the gratitude of all peace loving men and of the Bulgarian people above all. For the activities of the revolutionaries made themselves felt in Bulgaria far more than abroad, frequent murders, blackmailing, terrorism, flouting of justice, disregard for the prestige of the State's authority by the adherents of the revolutionary organisation, rendered its survival in Bulgaria a public danger and a factor of demoralisation, since the crimes and abuses its votaries committed were but very rarely punished.

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Another laudable reform was the reduction of the administrative districts from sixteen to seven, while the rural communes, numbering 2552, were reduced to 800 approximately. This change will not only effect a diminution in the administrative staff and an economy in expenditure, estimated at between 80 to 100 million leva annually, but will also permit of a more rational economic organisation of the country. By regrouping the rural communes
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and lessening their numbers, more resources will be available for the communal autorities to carry on their work with more effectively. The perpetual feuds between villages over the possession of communal lands over which so much treasure and time was spent have ceased as if by

enchantement, since by this reform rival villages have been incorporated in the same commune. These rivalries were encouraged and promoted by the politicians who hitherto made themselves indispensable to the villagers as intercessors with the authorities in their judicial disputes, and constituted a large source of revenue for all political partisans to the detriment naturally of the rural population. Communes henceforth are to have a population of at least 5000 and they will be governed by mayors appointed by the central government, on whom all authority will devolve. Mayors will choose their advisers from amongst the local notables, teachers and priests. The Government has decided to appoint as mayors, men with a university training in law, active and capable who by their example and by their knowledge will be able to raise the cultural level of the villages. They will be empowered to settle all disputes involving sums less than 2,000 leva among the villagers, thus expediting the course of Justice and settling quarrels rapidly. The perpetual drain of intellectual forces from the country to the towns, which had tended to deplete the rural districts of most intelligent forces, and which accounts for their relative backwardness, has now been fortunately reversed and one may hope for a certain improvement in rural conditions as a consequence of this reform.

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This administrative reform had been advocated by many social thinkers but never carried out, for it did not suit the political parties to curtail official posts and functions in which they could accommodate their partisans. M. A. Yaranov in his „Bulgaria to-day and to-morrow," a book published in 1928, recommended for instance the suppression of at least four administrative districts, as likely to secure an economy of some 100 million leva per annum and to render 550 government posts superfluous. Even the Radical party had advocated similar curtailments, but

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631 663 no government had ever decided to apply such a programme of retrenchment voluntarily and deprive itself of the privilege which the dispensation of posts brought to it. For it must not be forgotten that the politicians held the electorate by the hope of office and the civil service by fear of dismissal from their posts.

645 663 Another administrative reform was a decrease in the number of Ministries. That of railways, posts and telegraphs, has been merged with that of Public Works into a Ministry of Communications, while those of Agriculture, and of Commerce and Industry have been fused into the Ministry of National Economy. This change will not only effect an economy in the personnel, but will obviate the necessity of duplicating similar work and services and generally simplify and expedite the work of the institutes. While the placing of the Ministries of Industry and Agriculture under the same management will greatly facilitate the work of reconciling rival and often contradictory policies, which hitherto prevented the adoption of a rational general plan. Cuts and economies were effected in all branches of the administrations, the Ministers themselves setting the example by reducing their salaries by 50%, an example which was followed by managers of both State and private banks and other institutions.

663 475 316 On July 12, 1934 less, than two months from his assuming power, M. Kimon Gheorghiev announced in a public speech that his government had licensed 6220 public functionaries and effected economies in the budget amounting to a minimum of 385 million leva. The efficiency with which the work of overhauling the functioning of the administration was carried out may be gauged by the report on the management of the Pernik coal mine, which is an autonomous institution under State control. The new directors found that the former Agrarian Minister Ghitsev, under whose province came the supervising of

the mine, had nominated 75 partisans as supernumeraries 663
at a daily wage varying between 120 and 150 leva and 475
that these busybodies never presented themselves at the 316
mine even to receive their salaries, but that they had their emoluments regularly remitted to them at their domiciles. Another 170 persons had likewise been appointed in order to receive stipends but without doing any work. The new administration dismissed all redundant functionaries and by the beginning of 1935 the staff had been reduced from 5750 early in 1934, to 5100. The cost of extraction nad been diminisued from an average of 217 leva per ton in 1933, to 193 leva in 1934, and the quantity of coal extracted per day of 8 working hours per miner had increased from 753 kg. to 839 kg. The total output of the mine for 1934 reached the record figure of 1,266,000 tons. A saving of some 30 millions had been realised in the working of the mine, in spite of a decrease of 20°/o in the price of the coal delivered to the State railways and of 10°/o to 16°/o in that furnished to other consumers, which reductions could be estimated as amounting to some 55 millions. The new management likewise attempted to improve the social amenities of the working people and was reported to have provided free meals for the children of the miners attending school, to have opened crèches, and replaced 500 miners, who possessed sufficient incomes to live independently, by others who had no resources whatever, a fact which shows that the colleagues of M. Gheorghiev were decided not only to effect economies, but also to deal out as large a measure of social justice as possible.

Another noteworthy measure passed by the Govern- 426
ment was the law relative to the alleviation of debts, 663
which radically solved a problem which was hanging fire for years. Owing to a drop of about 65°/o in the prices of agricultural produce between 1920 and 1933, the peasantry

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found itself utterly unable to meet its obligations and it became imperative to tackle drastically the question of indebtedness so as to permit debtors to fulfil their obligations and thus reopen the channels of credit which momentarily had become choked, and impart a new impetus to the economic life of the country which was threatening to come to a standstill. The measure aimed chiefly at helping the small farmers, and to a lesser degree the artisans and small traders. They affected debts up to 300,000 leva and contracted prior to January 1, 1931, which were reduced by this decree to the extent of 40% 30%, and 20% respectively for each of these three categories of debtors Certain mitigations were granted to those who had contracted debts as sureties, while debtors owing over 300,000 leva were awarded a reduction in the rate of interest hitherto payable on their debts, as well as an extension of time for their repayment. The losses entailed were to be taken over by a specially created institute to which the State would henceforth affect revenues from certain imposts to the amount of some 220 milions annually which would suffice to meet the liabilities created by this measure. Private debts are estimated at about 12 milliard leva and it is reckoned that about 50% of the total will benefit rom this law. By July 1935, 281,177 claims had been registered with the special „caisse d'amortissement" created for this purpose for a total sum of 6,417,043,822 leva according to the Bulletin of the Agricultural Bank for July 1935. It is interesting to note that some 600 communes were reported as having filed claims, among which figured some municipalities of large towns such as Pleven and Plovdiv, a fact which proves that municipal finances are in a bad state in Bulgaria. For years previously both the Agrarianss and Communists had been making capital of this question of private debts and instigating debtors not to pay, promising the electorate that if it voted for them

they would pass a law abolishing all private indebtedness. 426
It is gratifying to note that in spite of all this arrant 663
demagogy and incitement to default, the peasantry has not deviated from its traditional honesty, and that in spite of the crisis it has done its best to meet its liabilities. The annual reports of the Agricultural Bank show that its advances to the peasants have during the years 1930 to 1933 slowly but steadiilly decreased and that their total indebtedness to the bank had been reduced by 300 million leva at the end of 1933, as compared with the year 1929. In the bank's report for 1933 it is stated that the peasantry has ceased increasing its indebtedness owing to its being conscious of the necessity of adjusting its debts to the present level of their income, a fact which speaks very highly of its common sense as well as of its determination to maintain its standard of integrity by which Bulgarians have so far distinguised themselves from their neighbours.

One of the most active members of the Cabinet was 652
its Finance Minister, M. Peter Todorov, who in a brief 655
period of a few months succeeded in settings order in his department so that the salaries of public functionnaries which were some five months in arrear, began being paid again regularly. Debts to Government contractors which had remained unpaid for years were liquidated and with indefatigable energy M. P. Todoroff set creating new sources of revenue for the State. These were the monopolies of alcohol, tobacco, salt, light mineral oils and school text books. There was an intensive contraband carried on in alcohol, and the State was being deprived of millions of revenue which otherwise ought to have flowed into its coffers. The returns of the Excise on spirituous drinks were yearly diminishing correspondingly with the reported consumption of both beer and alcoholic drinks as may be noted from the following table:

Consumption in thousand of hectolitres

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	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Beer	76.4	46.8	41.7	81,7	52.7
Alcohol	10.2	8.2	8.2	4.9	5

Yet these figures were far from corresponding with the actual consumption, and it was known that a large number of illicit stills were being in operation all over the country. The question of the loss this clandestine trade entailed to the Treasury came up several times for discussion in the Sobranye but so far no government tackled the matter seriously as it was afraid to ruffle certain sections of the electorate which engaged in these operations. Thus deputy Dr H. Mutafov speaking in the Sobranye on June 13, 1932 affirmed that for 1930 the quantity of wine which had been declared to the authorities and on which excise had been collected amounted to 38,822,096 litres, while according to the figures of the Ministry of Agriculture some 108,618,482 litres had been produced. The figures for 1931 showed even a greater discrepancy. It was known also that some 10 million litres of wine had been distilled and transformed into brandy, on which additional excise ought to have been paid, but of this quantity only 42000 litres had been declared. The contraband on tobacco was even more intensive than that on alcohol, for the smuggling of this article was much easier and the profit correspondingly greater. Tobacco in the leaf was sold at about 10 to 15 leva per Kg. while when transformed into cigarettes it was retailed at 150 to 200 leva per Kg. by the tobacco manufacturers who of course refunded to the State the amount of excise chargeable on their sales. The consumption of tobacco on which excise was imputable was yearly declining, and proportionally the State revenue from this head. A former Minister of Finance had declared on May 10, 1932 in the Sobranye that if the excise service could be reorganised and strengt-

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hened some 400 to 500 millions extra annualy would accrue to the State from this source, and he cited figures to show how the consumption of tabacco on which excise had been collected was being anually reduced. 5,214,089 kg. in 1925, dwindling gradually to 3,888,312 kg. in 1931. These figures may be supplemented by the following table which also shows the revenue derived from tobacco.

Tobacco consumption in thousand kg.			Excise duty in million leva	
1931	3,888·3	„	670·4	„
1932	3,506·6	„	642·5	„
1933	3,374·3	„	613·3	„
1934	3,191·0	„	580·2	„

The tobacco monopoly will not only contribute in increasing revenue very substantially, and this will probably be secured by the creation of a special cheap brand of cigarettes to be sold exclusively in rural districts as has been done in Turkey, but will also exert a certain influence in stabilising the price of tobacco and will permit growers to obtain a more equitable price. With the creation of the tobacco monopoly the State will absorb for its proper requirements some 5 million kg. of tobacco and as this amount represents about a fourth of the annual crop, it will be easy for the State to exert a hardening tendency on prices for the benefit of the growers. Another beneficial result which will be derived from the creation of this monopoly is the improvement in the condition of the workers in the tobacco industry which occupies the greater number of industrial workers in Bulgaria. The State owing to its proclaimed policy of upliftment of the working classes is bound to do its utmost to ameliorate their lot, which was far from being enviable as may be inferred from the large number of strikes which occured in this industry,

The monopolies of light mineral oils and of salt do not aim at securing additional revenue to the State, their

652 655 object being mainly to effect a better control and levelling of prices in all parts of the country. The one for school text books has been created in order to reduce prices and to prevent the too frequent change of the books made use of in schools, a practice much in vogue in Bulgaria and by which students were exploited to the advantage of certain publishers closely connected with political circles.

Minister P. Todorov took the initative to fuse into one under the title of „Bulgarian Credit" all the provincial banks of the country in order to strengthen their position and reduce their running expenses. The State provided for this purpose a sum of 50 million leva, while the capital of the amalgamated banks amounts to about 100 millions. Eventually it is proposed to increase the capital to 250 million leva. The two State banks, the „Agricultural" and „Central Co-operative bank" have likewise been merged into one to the great advantage of the State and of the co-operative societies as may be inferred from the writer's notes on the co-operative movement.

654 The Ministry of Finance began to tackle also the problem of the excessive protection granted to the local industry which rendered the prices of all industrial products unapproachable to the impoverished agrarian masses. The advantages and prerogatives hitherto enjoyed by industrial establishments have been curtailed in many directions and the preference they enjoyed over their foreign rivals in so far as supplies to government institution is concerned has in fact been removed.

652 648 Other reforms, having as an object the stabilisation of the civil service, the simplification of judicial procedure, the transformation of the educational system etc, were being studied and would have been shortly applied when unexpectedly the Cabinet of M. Gheorghiev was asked to resign and cease its creative action, on the alleged pre-

tence that some of its members and supporters entertained republican sympathies. Bulgarians who for the first time in their modern history had been at last privileged to witness at home how a decent government should function would if they were free to express their opinion probably demur at the change invoking in support Pope's dictum:

> „For forms of government let fools contest,
> What e'er is best administered is best".

What is not devoid of a certain piquancy is that the Financial Committee of the League of Nations „which had just rapped the late Government smartly over the administrative knuckles" (as stated in an editorial in the *Manchester Guardian* at the end of January 1935) should have provided the opportunity for this stroke. And yet the Financial Committee should above all have been thankful to M. Peter Todorov for his financial measures. Thus the creation of the monopoly of alcohol will vastly increase the revenues affected specially to the service of the Refugee Loan which was issued under the sponsorship of the League of Nations. But of course, the interests of the unwary investors in League of Nations Loans are no longer considered. Those of others take priority. M. Todorov's financial projects apparently were not to the liking of some oil magnates, and of the French, Belgian and Swiss capitalists who have respectively some 377·3, 568·4 and 533 million leva invested in banking and industrial enterprises in Bulgaria. His threat to reduce the tariff, and his creation of a powerful credit institution which would be in a position to compete with the foreign banks naturally provoked a certain amount of wire-pulling and log-rolling as a consequence of which M. Todorov has lost his portfolio.

BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS

647 There are few such morally refreshing writings on Bulgarian politics as the opening chapters of M. T. G. Vlaikov's book „Functionaries and Rulers“ in which the self-sacrificing efforts and the devotion of the freshly appointed civil servants in the newly liberated Bulgaria are depicted. Touching incidents are related which illustrate the high pitch of patriotism and sense of public spirit then prevailing among the more educated classes, who hastened at the time to abandon lucrative professions in order to assume public functions, because there were no other persons capable of carrying on the work of administering the country. If the blight of politics has succeeded in perverting such austere and exemplary virtues, the removal of the baneful influence politicians have so far exerted, may equally result, under proper guidance, in a reversion to the simplicity and austerity which characterised the first appearance on the political stage of their country of the passing generation of Bulgarian public men. Easy is the descent into Avernus, while the path leading to virtue is steep and beset with obstacles, nevertheless when its existence is known, and has been trodden before, there is some hope that it may be travelled on again.

647 661 Since the discarding of democratic forms of government on May 19, 1934 this stupendous problem, on the satisfactory solution of which will depend the success or failure of the new system of government, has only received superficial treatment. The Gheorghiev Government was absorbed in other more pressing matters, and it only issued a decree inflicting draconian sanctions on all public functionaries involved in peculation. A radical overhauling and simplification of the bureaucratic machinery is the most pressing problem at the pressnt time and it remains with M. Gheor-

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

THE BATCHKOVO MONASTERY

[facing p. 35]

647 ghiev's successors to grapple with it and destroy root and branch this foul growth which has so far poisoned public 661 life and undermined morals in the country. By their abillity to deal with this pressing question cabinets will be judged and their fate decided. The urgency of the matter may be gauged by the following illuminating article which appeared in the *Mir* on November 24, 1933, and a summary of which is given below:

> [674] „Official statistics show that criminality has increased from 426 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1910, to 631 in 1923 and to 726 in 1929. Crime has been much more frequent in the urban districts and the class which has been most indicted, excluding that of people without a fixed occupation, is that of State and municipal functionaries. The percentage of crime among this category has been 470 per 100,000 in 1910, 751 in 1924, 1936 in 1926, 2169 in 1927, 1995 in 1928 and 1718 in 1929. The percentage of increase in crime for the whole population between 1910 and 1929 has been 64%, while that for public functionaries, has been 435% during the same period. In 1928, 22.6% of all crimes in Bulgaria had been committed by functionaries of the State or of municipalities (excluding officials in the railway and post-office administrations, whose misdeeds if accounted for would have further increased this figure of 22.6%) and it becomes obvious that our functionaries are corrupt to a frightful extent. The causes are not only the bad economic conditions, but also our political manners.
>
> When a manager of an autonomous institute appoints capable and fit persons in possession of the required training prescribed by the regulations, the Minister in charge dismisses them and appoints in their stead his partisans. Inculpated functionaries who ought to be dismissed and arraigned before a court are maintained and even promoted if they belong to the same party as the Minister in charge".

Instability in tenure of office must equally tend to render officials remiss in their functions, there is no incitement for them to display zeal since they know that they will be evicted as soon as their party is driven from power. According to a statistical table prepared in 1911, the average period of service of State functionaries was only seven and a half years. Out of a total number of

49,683 officials, only 830 had served thirty-one years and over.

A former Minister, M. Madjarov, writing in the *Mir* on October 11, 1934, affirmed that the reason for the increased corruption among functionaries is that the culprits are not found out. The fear of punishment is no longer a deterrent when 90% of the delinquents are not discovered. The well known author, M. T. Vultchev, also wrote on this theme in the *Mir* on October 30, 1933. He opined that the economic crisis was intensified owing to the vices of the administration, and cited in support an article published by a functionary who enlarged on the losses caused to the exchequer through the lack of control and the non-application of fiscal decrees by mayors and functionaries when they were dealing with their partisans. Even conscientious functionaries can not proceed to collect such taxes as are due by partisans of those in power for fear of being dismissed. In February 1934, the organ of certain functionaries in the Finance Ministry, the *Finansova Zastita,* wrote saying that excise controllers were hindered from doing their duty by the partisans of those who were in power and that consequently contraband was increasing. The *Mir* on November 17, 1933 affirmed that financial inspectors had ascertained that during the preceding seven months malversations amounting to 500 million leva had taken place. The *Sofiiska Tribuna* on October 14, 1933 revealed in full detail how the excise had been defrauded of some 2 million leva at Burgas through the complicity of certain State functionaries. The *Narod* on August 1933 reported that a certain sugar refinery was owing 134 million leva to the State, but that with the collusion of certain influential deputies this debt would be written off. The loss to the Bulgarian Exchequer through the pandering to the wishes and whims of partisans had attained tremendous figures. The former

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Minister of Finance, Stefanov, stated in the Sobranye on 647
June 17, 1932 that in 1930 there were 2800 million leva
of uncollected taxes, 75% of which could have been duly 661
collected by the authorities if they had properly attended to their duties! The culpable remissness of the autorities has thus had two results, the disorganisation of public finances and the corruption of the public service.

The bureaucracy is not a native institution. It was set up and organised by the Russians and has inherited all the defects and corruption of its prototype.

M. Symeon Radev, in his most informative work „Creators of Contemporary Bulgaria", pp. 114/5 cited some instances of the deplorable example of corruption set up by the first Russian administrators in Bulgaria. The Russian commissary, Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, farmed out the tithe to a Frenchman at a price which was reported later by the financial authorities as derisively low. According to the contract, the Frenchman bound himself to pay as an advance 3 million gold francs, but this sum was never accounted for in the State acoounts, it had simply been pocketed by the Prince.

In connection with this contract it had been reckoned that there ought to be in the Government warehouses 290,000 bags of wheat and 100,000 bags of other cereals, but when the stock came to be checked, some 100,000 bags were missing. The financial official could get no satisfactory explanation from the Russian authorities in charge, and this colossal robbery had to be passed over in silence.

In Tsarist Russia, the functionary considered himself 647
as all important, a very delegate of the almighty Tsar; he could take any liberty with the public, and the Russian organisers seem to have imparted this spirit to their young Bulgarian colleagues. The latter being inexperienced and uncritical, readily assimilated these vices, believing

they would thereby gain in self-importance. They thus took the habit of looking down upon the civilians with undisguised contempt and often did not hesitate to express resentment at being pestered with requests for advice or guidance. The tribulations of the average Bulgarian in his dealing with the authorities are insufferable, and one may marvel at the remarkable patience which this long-suffering, people displays. An idea of how tax payers are dealt with in Bulgaria will be formed by a perusal of the following excerpt from the *Mir*, published on May 10, 1934: „I went to the office of the Tax-collector to check the figures of an impost I had been asked to pay. The functionary was not there. I returned the following day, he took note of the matter. and asked me to call next day at 11 a. m. I was then informed that details had not yet been obtained from the archivist, and that I should call again at 4 p. m. When I presented myself in the afternoon, I was told that the details could not be found and that I had better go to the Ministry of the Interior and seek there the elucidation I needed. On calling at the Ministry I was asked to visit the Ministry of Public Health. From that department I was sent to a department of the Ministry of the Interior. There they attempted to make me call again at the places I had visited, but when I remonstrated and affirmed that I had visited these places already, one of the controllers took up the matter and was able to give me the information I was after. However this proved insufficient for my purpose and I had to prepare further petitions and start anew on my quest. It appears that all these difficulties are purposely created in order to compel people te disburse without asking for any explanations".

How indispensable it has become to challenge and destroy the existing bureaucratic system, a veritable Laernean Hydra and nightmare to the average Bulgarian, a system which has alienated him more than anything else from public affairs, will be gauged from the following opinions expressed recently by Bulgarian politicians of all parties on the prevailing methods in the public services and the administration.

These excerpts are culled from speeches in the Sobranye as recorded in the Parliamentary minutes and made by both supporters and opponents of previous Governments, all however are equally unhesitating in their condemnation of the system.

T. Kojuharov. June 6,1928, Government deputy:

„People are subjected to much suffering in their everyday dealings with the officials of the administration who torture and harass them. One may be a no-party man and well disposed towards the authorities, but it will be enough for one to have to seek a certificate that one's taxes have been paid in order to come to detest them. For in order to obtain such an indispensable document one will be forced to hang on in turn before twenty box-offices, urged from one office to another and waste fifteen to twenty working days. These are everyday facts, the conviction has become rooted among the people that without the personal intervention of a deputy at a public office it is useless to aply even when it is a case of quite legitimate business. Corridors of public administrations are congested with people, but the functionaries who are being waited for are not busy. On opening the door leading to their offices you will see them drinking coffee while the people outside curse the Government. It is such daily contact of the people with the administrative staff which causes bitterness and undermines the authority of all Bulgarian Governments. Our bureaucracy is frightful, its indifference to public affairs and State interests is simply revolting. It is repugnant even to us deputies who are obliged to be in contact with it."

D. Todorov. March 9, 1927, Government deputy:

„If you go at 8 a. m. (Shops and public offices open at this time in Bulgaria) to a Government office and ask for a functionary, you will not find him. If you ask for an assistant manager, you will be told to call at 9 a. m., if for a manager, at 10 a. m., if for the head, at 11 a. m. It would be an insult to working men if I were to say that these people work. You will see them reading newsparers, illustrated magazines, novels, or talking with friends. Complete chaos rules in the administrations and this will continue as long as Bulgaria can survive with this gangrene in her organism."

St. Kosturkov. June 15, 1932. Minister of Railways:

„There is nothing more terrible in Bulgaria than its bureaucracy, it is a greater plague even than partisanship, for if the latter is not overconfident as to its future, bureaucracy feels deep-rooted and secure, obeys no one, and respects nothing."

Dr. Beshkov. July 10, 1928. Opposition deputy:

„The registers of the financial administration present a veriable chaos. It is impossible to check their figures. Thus properties which have changed hands, still figure in the names of the original owners who are called upon to pay taxes on them. In order to recover their money the latter have to institute proceedings against the new owners. It occasionally happens that the properties have changed hands a third time, in which case the process has to be taken up further. In Sofia alone there are some 842 million leva of overdue taxes which have not been collected"

Unfortunately the situation has not improved in the least since the coup d'état, for the *Mir*, October 25, 1934, in a leader reported:

„The Sofia Tax collecting office is typical of the prevailing disorder reigning in the bureaucracy and illustrates our incapacity to organise a public service. Though great efforts have been made since May 19th to correct the inherent vices in this department there are no signs of any amelioration yet, though it must be admitted that it is impossible to redress in a few months the consequences of years of incapacity and remissness. Fantastic things occur at this office. Citizens can not receive a positive answer as to how much they owe to the State; at every inquiry a divergent answer is given. A few weeks ago taxes on the estate of a man who had died ten years ago were being collected and to the surprise of the heirs, buildings belonging to them for years were included among the property of the dead. For ten years these matters had not been verified! The system is vicious, incompetent and creates a current of dissatisfaction against authority."

The administration seems to take pleasure in creating difficulties and obstructing every branch of activity.

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647 The experience of an acquaintance who attempted to send a consignment of Bulgarian cigarettes to some relatives of the author's in Nigeria, is worth relating. He had to order special tin containers from England to hold the cigarettes. According to the existing customs regulations, all packing materials imported in the country and used as such for goods exported from Bulgaria pay no duty on entry. On the arrival of the tin containers an over-zealous official opined, that they were not, properly speaking, packing material, for they would themselves be packed in cases, and that therefore they were subject to duty. As the duty was prohibitive and amounted to a preposterous figure a petition was lodged with the Ministry of Commerce soliciting that a more liberal interpretation should be given to the existing law. Six months later the answer came, intimating that the matter was in the competence of the Finance Ministry. Another petition was then draffed and submitted. Another problem then arose, namely, which of the various departments in the Ministry was the competent one to deal with this subject. No one would assume responsibility. A whole year elapsed and finally the wiseacres in the Ministry decided that the Minister of Finance himself should cut the Gordian knot. But he too quaked before a matter of such stupendous importance, and he referred it to the Ministerial Council, which decided at last that the containers should be considered as packing material and be exempted from duty. Over a year and a half was needed to solve this complex problem, and in the meanwhile most of the tins had rusted and become useless.

647 661 These difficulties and obstacles one meets when dealing with organs of the administration are not due to mere red tape or to the proverbial bungling of the bureaucracy, they are often created purposely in order to embarass, bewilder and paralyse the applicant and thus

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force him to have recourse to an intercessor, in important cases a deputy, whose services have to be remunerated, and who usually shares with the functionaries the spoils he has squeezed out of his hapless victim.

Thus we find D. Daskalov, July 18, 1928, an opposition deputy, declaring:

„Unparalleled chaos reigns in the Pension Administration. Pensioners living in the provinces have to employ and pay intercessors in order to have their affairs attended to and settled. In many instances and though all the necessary documents have been submitted, cases drag on for two or three years. I know of a teacher from Vidin, who after waiting for a whole year without obtaining satisfaction came specially to Sofia. On inquiring at the Pension Bureau he was told to call again in a week's time. When he retorted that he had specially come to Sofia for this matter and could not afford to wait, he was informed that such was the prevailing order and that it could not be changed."

A Government supporter, N. Padarev, then continued in the same strain:

„I know of an unfortunate widow with four children, whose pension book has been kept back for six months and not returned. Such a state of affairs is as inexcusable as it is unbearable."

G. T. Vlaikov, March 5, 1929, a supporter of the Government, after a long speech on the civil services related the following experience of a friend of his who had the greater part of his estate expropriated, and to whom a compensation of three million leva had been awarded. Though he was in urgent need of the money to pay his taxes and cultivate the remainder of his land, all his efforts to secure payment proved unavailing for eight years. At last he had recourse fo an intercessor who demanded a commission of 12%, but finally he accepted 7%, and in a very short time the money was paid.

Another deputy, H. Baraliev, January 28, 1927, a supporter of the Government, discoursed on the lapses prevalent in the Financial administration. Income-tax declarations of wealthy and influential people went usually astray in tax collectors' offices. A committee of control had unearthed twenty such declarations in one tax-collector's office. A special commission had been appointed to examine the amount of taxes imposed at first hand, and in many instances had made undue reductions from millions to thousands. Obviously bribery had been resorted to.

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The name of a well known Gabrovo manufacturer was given whose tax had been assessed at 800,000 and the amount afterwards reduced to a very small sum. The committee of control was able to prove the partiality of the special commission but its report on these abuses had been kept back by a head of a department whose name was given. Cases of income-tax collectors who had absconded after appropriating public moneys were also cited, and M. Baraliev explained that unworthy individuals were being nominated as tax-collectors owing to their close relationship with those in power. In Sevlievo a conscientious financial inspector was removed from his post because he inflicted a fine on an influential partisan and the fine had not been collected. The services were being demoralised when dutiful men were reprimanded and unprincipled men protected.

Ts. Tabakov, March 14, 1929, an independent deputy, decried the custom of creating sinecures which are filled by partisans. There was not a single chancery where abuses were not committed, bribes openly received, and embezzlements in which the big bosses of the party were participating. Responsible posts were entrusted to unworthy persons.

Another opposition deputy, Dr. N. Dumanov, March 8, 1929 was yet more outspoken: „Our treatment of functionaries is criminal, we choose them mainly as pioneers in electoral struggles, and consequently nominate men who are not fit to serve as civil servants."

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And the following statement made by another Government deputy, V. Marinov, on September 8, 1926 is not devoid of humour owing to its extreme artlessness: „What God gives is for all, but the blessings which the State may confer are first for our kin. That is how we understand democracy. So it was yesterday, is to day and will be tomorrow. It is we deputies who intervene to dismiss or nominate officials. Why should some criticise the system when they did the same thing when in office."

In the customs too, serious abuses occur, and the State loses millions every year by prevarications and collusions between customs officials and importers. One may secure illustrations of these shady transactions by perusal of a pamphlet recently published by a former customs official, C. S. Dobrudjaliev, and also in the above mentioned book of M. G. T. Vlaikov. This will explain the rocket-like ascension of certain commercial firms in Bulgaria. Such a practice is not only prejudicial to the State, which sees its revenues dwindle, but it is also devastating to the commercial community at large. Honest traders are being undersold and ruined by such unscrupulous competition.

Parliamentarism had become a [illegible]esty, and democratic institutions served as decoys [illegible]odwink the people and impose upon them. The public services were purposely demoralised in order that politicians should become the supreme dispensers of all power. Instead of appointing to public functions men suited by their accomplishments and training, servility became the best credential. Far from seeking to stabilise the civil services and render them immune to political influence, functionaries on the contrary were made to feel that both their appointment and promotion depended on the politicians. They therefore obeyed them in everything and looked up to them rather than after the interests of the State which they were supposed to serve.

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Another natural consequence was the undue multiplication of public functions in order to provide for an increase in the number of such docile retainers, who served to strengthen the politicians' hold on the State machinery. The increase in the personnel necessitated the finding of some additional occupation and this was secured by an undue complication of the administration. This too was to the advantage of the politician, it made him indispensable to his electors. The transaction of business in a Government office having been rendered as intricate and puzzling a procedure as possible, the average citizen was forced to resort to the services of a politician to settle such affairs. Political bosses made an easy living by the dispensation of such services, which were far from being gratuitous, and even public functionaries had often to compensate their patrons for the posts to which they had been appointed by sharing with them their meagre salaries.

This explains why, when conscientious deputies like G. Yurtov, who on February 22, 1927 remarked in the Sobranye that half of the functionaries could be dispensed with by simplifying the civil services, or when A. Kantardjiev (November 5, 1931) criticised the system and declared that Bulgaria had the greatest number of functionaries in proportion to her population, namely, 17 per 1000 inhabitants, while England, Switzerland and France had only 3½ to 7 per 1000 inhabitants, such remarks fell on deaf ears.

It may seem strange, yet it is among the higher strata of the bureaucracy that one finds its most perverted members; the rank and file, though wretchedly underpaid are on the whole honest and conscientious, which shows that if a more efficient control was exerted and stricter discipline imposed, the demoralising influence set by those at the top would cease. So far this was not attempted because the top layers of the bureaucracy were in the

647 661 main recruited from the ranks of the politicians. Only twice have efforts been made to stabilise the civil services and put a stop to the abuses it was giving birth to. The first attempt was made in the early years of Tsar Ferdinand's reign and the initiative was due to the then Prime Minister, Dr Danev. But such a measure did not suit the views of the Crown, and the National Liberal party, which was next in office, hastened to rescind it with the approval of Ferdinand who refused to interfere when appealed to by several leading political leaders.

The second attempt was that made by M. Peter Todorov, which has already been mentioned.

000 It is easy to realise that when the Executive and the Legislature become bound by a community of private interests and either fails to control the other then Parliamentarism goes bankrupt. This is what has happened in European countries which have adopted Parliamentary institutions, with the exception of the Scandinavian countries, Holland and Switzerland where its proper functioning has been rendered possible owing to the citizen's high conception of his civil duties. Democratic government is the outcome of a long evolution and there is no room for blind imitation. It took some seven centuries to reach its present state of development in Great Britain, and even there, it is open to lively criticism. Dean Inge has defined modern democracy as "the organised plunder of minorities"; but even this constitutes a vast advance on the level attained in the Balkans where it is still at the stage of the organised plunder of the majorities, judging from the following striking deliverance of Mihailovski: "We are a predatory people... Bulgaria is divided into two halves which have adopted this *modus vivendi:* – one day the first half plunders the second half; the next day, the second half despoils the first". One should admit, however, that it is not reasonable to

expect that in two generations new countries should tread the road to constitutional progress up to the point reached by England. 010

With the advent of an authoritative government this work of reform should be vigorously taken in hand, for those in power can no longer justify themselves by stating that they have their party attachments to satisfy. A radical simplification of the system should be aimed at, and drastic cuts should be applied. M. T. G. Vlaikov admitted (*Radical* March 8, 1929) that though the Liaptchev Government had assumed the obligation towards the League of Nations to reduce the number of functionaries by 10,000, nothing had been done. He further affirmed that directors of departments and superior officials hardly work more than two to three hours a day, and that out of every 12,000 public functionaries there are 1500 who do absolutely nothing and who nevertheless draw the biggest salaries. When the budget for the financial year 1934-5 came up for discussion, an open letter addressed to M. Stefanov, the Finance Minister, appeared in the *Mir* on March 21, 1934 from which it is worth citing the following remarks: "Excessive sums have been provided to defray travelling expenses, commissions etc, Functionaries who are delegated to participate at special conferences should not be entitled to receive additional emoluments. For instance, the Prime Minister who receives remuneration amounting to 665,000 leva a year, can surely afford to travel abroad in order to take up the defence of the country's interests there if this be necessary. Why should he be awarded a supplementary sum of 5000 or 6000 leva a day for this purpose? Other Cabinet Ministers receive 364,000 to 440,000 leva a year and they enjoy many other privileges. They travel in special railway cars and in State-owned automobiles, they even have free boxes at the National Theatre . . . My aim is to draw attention to the

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directors in the Ministries, to the "collaborators" of Ministers, those occupying 'key' posts. In certain departments one is impressed by the fact that there are no subordinate officials. All are directors or inspectors. It appears that every Minister on assuming office creates new posts for directors, and matters have reached such an extreme, that in the ministries only managers are installed, and there are no officials to attend to routine work. In the General Direction of Public Works, the Minister is surrounded by a jurisconsult, a general manager, twelve chiefs of sections twenty six managing engineers and architects who receive monthly salaries of 6000 to 13000 leva. For the entire personnel of this institution a credit of seven millions a year is provided, out of which five millions are affected to the payment of emoluments of the higher members of the staff, who moreover are delegated to participate in conferences and therefore receive extra bonuses.

In the Directions of Public Health, and that of the Home Office, out of the affected credits of 1,976,400 and 1,784,400 leva some 1,200,000 and 1.484,000 are respectively assigned for the remuneration of the "directorate". In the Ministry of Finances out of the 16 million leva of expenditure voted for it, 12 are absorbed by the salaries of the higher staff and the real workers have to be content with the remaining 4 millions etc. It is these "directors" who inflate the budget. They constitute an intolerable burden because they do nothing and in most cases they come and go together with the Minister and the party which has appointed them, for on the whole they are altogether unfit for the posts they occupy. The Bulgarian administration does not require such "budgetivorous directors". Once upon a time each Ministry had only one secretary and the Ministers attended mostly singly to the affairs of the State. Minister Stefanov has declared that the crisis is now beginning for Bulgaria, curtail therefore M. Stefanov your emoluments and the number of your "directors" to the minimum etc".

According to the budget of 1934-5 the number of public functionaries was stated to be 88,000, but obviously without reckoning the supernumeraries. The Gheorghiev Cabinet revised the budget and in August 1934 the number had been restricted to 82,583. In 1908 there were only 35,920, so that there is yet ample scope for further reductions. In Greece, which has about the same population, the number of public servants numbered only 45,523[1]) in 1930 and only 12% of the budget was charged with their remuneration. In Bulgaria, 35·15% of the budget for 1930-1 was earmarked for the wages of some 85,250 functionaries. The *Archive for Economics and Social Politics* in its second fascicule for 1933 contained the following table as to the numbers and salaries of the civil services for the year 1931-2.

DEPARTMENT	Number of functionaries	Total amount of salaries	% of total		Average salary per functionary
Supreme administration	674	33,447,000	1.1		49,625
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	2,750	82,886,000	2.8		30,140
„ of Interior	9,858	247,943,000	8.5		25,151
„ of Education	24,259	798,260,000	27.4		32,905
„ of Finances	4,113	133,484,000	4.5		32,697
„ of Justice	3,843	132,288,000	4.5		34,423
„ of War	6,953	298,806,000	10.2		42,975
„ of Commerce ete	1,833	69,837,000	2.4		39,099
„ of Agriculture	4,432	151,144,000	5.2		34,103
„ of Public Works	2,584	118,769,000	4.		45,963
„ of Railways, Post & Telegraphs	6,800	203,228,000	7		29,886
Administration of Railways.	18,047	616,794,000	21.6		34.266
Commissariats for supervising Treaty. . .	8	486,000	0.1		60,780
Various funds	457	20,827,000	0.7		45.572
Total	86,611	2.908.198,000	100	Average annual salary	33 642

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[1] This figure does not include railway employés who are not State functionaries in Greece.

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An accurate idea however, can not be formed by these figures, for while the hierarchy is well retributed, the lower grades are wretchedly paid and by averaging up the salaries as had been done above, one is likely to infer that the position of the public functionary is satisfactory, this unfortunately is far from being the case. The rank and file are miserably underpaid. Thus according to the figures available concerning the revised budget of 1934-1½[1] out of 82,583 functionaries, plus the 26,189 volunteers employed in the army,

26,303	were receiving emoluments of 1000 leva and under a month,			
55,992	" " " " between	1030	and	1940
11,194	" " " " "	2020	"	2510
1,867	" " " " "	2590	"	2940
5,316	" " " " "	3020	"	3980
1,862	" " " " "	4050	"	4940

while the number of those drawing wages over 5,000 leva a month and rising to a maximum of 20,500 leva, which is the salary of a minister, was only 6,438, while the total sum in the budget affected to salaries amounted to 2,753,946,864 leva. Bulgarian critics are at one to point out that there is a plethora of public functionaries and that the better remunerated posts are really sinecures. It is imperative to reduce the number of functionaries not for the purpose of effecting economies, but in order to increase by the saving thus made the salaries of those who remain, since the State has no other resources from which to retribute the services of its servants adequately. How can a functionary with a family in Sofia, live on a monthly salary of 2000 or 3000 leva, when he needs at least 1000 to 1500 leva a month for rent alone? Is it surprising if he tries to supplement his scanty salary by devious ways since it does not suffice to keep him alive? M. Vlasakov writing in the *Mir* on June 13, 1933 stated that between 1925 and 1932 in those State departments the

[1] [Errata: should be 1934-5. —Analyst]

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accounts of which have been controlled by financial inspectors, it was found that 435,792,881 leva of public money had been misappropriated. He further affirmed that for the last 15 years not a single custom-house, tax-paying office, excise office or industrial enterprise had its accounts properly audited, and if they were subjected to a strict inspection the number of discoveries of peculations which would ensue would be astounding.

What is needed above all is a simplification of the system which can surely be easily attained, for up to the present those in power aimed at complicating the State machine in order to justify the creation of more posts for their adherents. The semi-military government now in power is not handicapped by such an incubus and it is to be hoped that its sense of duty and patriotism will give power to its elbow to carry out this indispensable reform. Should it succeed in carrying this through it will have deserved the undying gratitude of its fellow-citizens.

11: Logio S-4 (no date) 1936 EEI Bulgaria EEI


Railways
Highways
Mineral springs
Ports
RUMANIA
R. DANUBE
YUGOSLAVIA
SOFIA
PLOVDIV
ST. ZAGORA
VARNA
BURGAS
BLACK SEA
TURKEY
GREECE

TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP OF BULGARIA

[Facing p.50]

GEOGRAPHICAL AND TOPOGRAPHICAL NOTES

131 Bulgaria has an area of 103,104,170 square kilometres or of about 42,000 square miles, rather more than a third of the area of Great Britain and Ireland. She occupies the North-Eastern corner of the Balkan Peninsula, between latitudes 41 an 44 and longitudes 22 and 28 east of Greenwich. To the north she is separated from Rumania partly by an artificial frontier 205 klm. in length across the Dobrudja and partly by the Danube for a distance of 397.3 klm. To the east Bulgaria is bounded by the Black Sea for a distance of 311·2 klm. To the south, an artificial frontier separates her for a distance of 234.6 and 485.7 klm. respectively from Turkey and Greece, the boundary with the latter country running along the highlands of the Rhodopes. To the west, the frontier with Yugoslavia runs from the mouth of the river Timok, an affluent of the Danube, southwards until its intersection with the Bulgaro-Greek boundary and is 523.8 klm. in length.

133 Bulgaria is intersected from west to east by the Balkan range, the highest peak of which attains an altitude of 2,373 metres. The Balkans are traversed by several defiles, and also by the river Isker, which rising in the Rila mountains cuts across the Balkans through a deep and picturesque gorge and finally reaches the Danube. To the south of the Balkans extends for a considerable distance a parallel chain of mountains, the Sredna Gora, forming between the two a series of fertile plains, the most famous of which is the renowned Valley of Roses. To the south of the Sredna Gora lies the Thracian plain drained by the river Maritsa and bounded to the south by the Rhodope Mountains which merge on the west with the Pirrin range and the imposing mass of the Rila mountains, the highest peak of which, the Mussala, attains 2,923 metres.

11: Logio S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

GEOGRAPHICAL AND. TOPOGRAPHICAL NOTES

133 In the west, and south of the Balkans lies the Sofia basin, at an altitude of some 580 metres, crowned by the picturesque Vitosh Mountain, reaching a height of 2,287 metres, at the foot of which lies the capital of the country, Sofia. The country to the north of the Balkans forms a table land, intersected by several affluents of the Danube. its eastern part gradually merging into the waterless region of the Deli-Orman, a part of which is now in Rumania. The south western part of Bulgaria is formed by the upper part of the valleys of the rivers Struma and Mesta and constitutes that part of Macedonia which has reverted to Bulgaria.

162 According to the census taken on December 31, 1934, the total population of Bulgaria was 6,090,215, or 59 inhabitants per square kilometre. The vast majority of the population was rural, the urban population being only 21.48% of the total and segregated mainly in the following towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants: Sofia 287,976; Plovdiv 100,485; Varna 70,183; Rustchuk 49,388; Burgas 36,099; Pleven 31,764; Sliven 30,683; Stara-Zagora 29,857; Haskovo 26,622; Shumen 25,734; Yambol 25,125; Pazardjik 23,387; Vidin 18,599; Assenovgrad (Stanimaka) 17,817; Vratsa 16,477; Kustendil 16,386; Pernik 15,977; Dupnitsa 16,071; Razgrad 15,700; Kazanlik 15,097; Lom 14,807; Tirnovo 14,100; Gabrovo 13,823; Svistov 12,112; Tsirpan 11,308; Samokov 11,031; Tirgovishte (Eski Djuma) 10,421; Panagurishte 10,188; Petritch 10,121; Gorna-Djuma 10,028; There are 67 other urban centres of less than 10,000 inhabitants, but which in fa[illegible] are mere villages, the smallest of these is Melnik, with a population of only 548 inhabitants.

133 Bulgaria owing to her extremely variegated structural character offers an astonishing diversity of landscape scenery

133 to the tourist.[1] The Rila mountains with their numerous lakes, Alpine scenery, extensive pine forests, beautiful valleys, and crystal streams, constitute a perennial source of attraction. The famous Rila monastery which is reached 346 by a narrow gauge railway from Dupnitsa, as well as by road from Sofia accessible to motor cars, extends its large hospitality to all visitors and may serve as a hostelry for those intent on indulging in the healthy joys of mountaineering. The monastery deserves a visit by itself; its imposing pile crowned with its domes and cupolas and its battlemented tower, all encased and dominated by a ring of forest clad mountains, leaves a lasting impression of calm and repose on the visitor. The great gate of the monastery leads into a vast pentagonal yard in the midst of which is the church brilliantly decorated with frescoes and stone-work and endowed with a magnificent ikonostasis. By the side of the church is the five storied stern old tower, that constitutes the only remaining relic of the original structure of the monastery built in 1335. The immense yard is surrounded by a number of galleries, giving access to the cells of the monks which now usually serve as lodgings for visitors. These galleries rise in tiers, forming a series of picturesque arcades overhanging the yard with its numerous fountains which fill the air with their endless murmur of running water, all vying to dominate the roar of the swift-flowing stream traversing the mountain gorge in which the monastery is built, and which supplies the enraptured traveller at the rustic restaurant kept purposely for his behalf, with a dish of succulent mountain-trout, such as would have relished even Lucullus himself.

133 To the south of the Rila range rise the Pirrin Mountains and further east the Rhodopes. The little town

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[1] An excellent and profusely illustrated guide-book in English, may be obtained free of charge from the Tourist Bureau of the Bulgarian State Railways in Sofia.

of Razlog on the upper reaches of the river Mesta may 133 serve as a convenient centre for excusions in this maze of mountains mostly clad with pine and fir forests. The three beautiful mountain lakes dominated by the majestic summit of the El-Tepe, the highest peak of the Pirrin range, reaching an altitude of 2684 metres, may be easily reached from the townlet of Bansko, a few kilometres to the south of Razlog. Tourist huts have been erected at 485 several points, and recently excellent roads have been constructed, so that the more adventurous type of tourist, intent on roaming off the beaten track, can indulge in protracted and most enjoyable rambles in what is certainly a *terra incognita,* even to most Bulgarians.

It is astonishing that the Bulgarian Government has 529 done nothing to popularise Sofia as a tourist centre, and yet few towns in Eastern Europe can rival it as such. It is at a convenient driving distance from the Balkan mountains which offer a veritable kaleidoscope of enchanting views. Century old oak and beech forests cover generally the rolling undulating mountain valleys, their shaded glens offering the most delectable relaxation after the heat of the plain. Another attractive forest resort is Tcham-Koria lying on the heavily wooded slopes of the Rila, amid enchanting mountain scenery, at a distance of 69 klm. to the south east of Sofia. The greatest attraction of 312 Sofia is of course its mineral and thermal springs. In the 529 centre of the town is a modern bathing establishment, built on the site ot the ancient Roman thermal baths, and endowed with an electro-therapeutic section. In close proximity to Sofia are a number of other thermal springs most of which are endowed with excellent bathing accomodation and easily accessible from Sofia by either tram, train, or motor bus. Such are the thermal establishments of Bankia, one of the finest in Bulgaria, that of Gorna-Bania, Ovtcha-Kupel, and of Kniajevo. Bulgaria is

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312 5-9 one of the richest countries in the world as regards mineral and thermal springs of all kinds. Among the most noted mineral springs is that of Solu-Dervent, lying at about 72 klm. from Sofia, on the railway line to Plovdiv, it possesses a high radioactivity, 588_{10-10} Curies, and a temperature of 65° centigrade, and is specially recommended for cancer. Another most attractive watering place is that of Hissar, some 45 klm. north of Plovdiv. Within a radius of two kilometres there are twenty springs, all varying in their composition and their temperatures. The present baths are built on the site of the old Roman ones. Tne temperature of the water is 47° C. with a radioactivity of 114_{10-10} Curies; it is noted for its curatice properties for all diseases of the liver and kidneys. Hissar possesses another great attraction, that of its Roman walls, built in the form of a rectangle. It is supposed to be the old Roman town of Diocletianopolis which successfully resisted in 587 the siege of the Avars. The present walls were restored in the reign of Justinian I but there is a Roman inscription at the Momina Baths dating from 308 A. D. Its ruins would form a most interesting source of study to archeologists while taking the waters at this most agreeable Spa. It is surrounded by rose gardens and possesses delightful shaded walks rendering it a most agreeable residence during May and June, all the more so since it 5-9 possesses excellent hotels and pensions. At that time of the year visitors at Hissar can easily visit the famous Valley of Roses without interrupting their treatment, for Karlovo, Kalofer and Kazanlik, the centres of the Attar of roses industry, are all within easy reach. as well as the famous Shipka Monastery. A railway line connects Hissar with Plovdiv, formerly known as Philippolis. This is a town with a most picturesque aspect, being built on five hills of syenite, two of which have been turned into parks. The thickly wooded Sehayat Tepe is unique in its kind, com-

manding a suberb view over the vast Thracian plain with the Maritsa river winding its course through the fertile fields and the majestic mass of the Rhodopes looming large on the southern horizon. Another town which can hardly de beaten for its picturesque appearance, is Tirnovo, the ancient capital of the country, built on the steep banks of the river Yantra which meanders through the town. No visitor to Bulgaria should miss visiting these two towns, which for their quaintness and scenic beauty have few rivals in the Near East. 529

But from the point of view of the holiday maker, the greatest attraction is provided by Varna. A score of years ago it was a squalid, sordid hamlet, an open roadstead at which one could with difficulry land when the wind was blowing from the north or east. Now, it has been transformed into a modern town with wide boulevards and an excellent port. It possesses one of the most beautiful parks in Europe situated on the cliffs overhanging the Black Sea and commanding enchanting views along its littoral. Varna possesses a magnificent beach of fine sand and a most modern and elegant sea-bathing establishment. The town is provided with a casino and comfortable hotels, and actually the municipality is contemplating the construction of a big modern hotel, so as to avoid the shortage of accommodation which is usually felt during the summer months

The creation of this modern town of Varna, with all it amenities and with its unrivalled park, is the best standing testimonial of the Bulgarians' untiring and unrelenting energy. Varna having been despoiled of its hinterland after the transfer of the Dobrudja to Rumania declined in importance as a trading centre and its inhabitants lost their means of livelihood. They set themselves with unremitting toil and sacrifices to transform their town into what is now the premier watering-place on the Black

Sea. Their success is all the more remarkable owing to their extreme poverty, which is still easily discernible, but their indomitable industry and unrivalled assiduity has overcome all obstacles. Of them it cannot be said that:

> „Chill penury repressed their noble rage
> And froze the genial current of the soul."

The Bulgarian is in fact an indefatigable and most perseverent worker with the constructive instinct highly developed, the only thing needed apparently is coordination of individual efforts, as they are usually mutually opposed, and this coordination nas been achieved at Varna with happy results for the town.

The advantages of Varna are becoming known in Central Europe and every summer Hungarians, Poles, Czechslovakians and Austrians flock in hundreds to this sea resort. The municipality has recently converted the monastery of St. Constantine, some nine kilometres to the north of Varna, into a comfortable hostelry. Situated as it is in the midst of an extensive park overlooking the sea, it forms an additionul attraction to visitors, while to the south of the town lie the extensive forests of the Longosa, as well as the estuary ef the river Kamtchia which provide other delightful outings and excursions. To the visitors from Central Europe the greatest attraction is the extremely low cost of living. For a short time they can imagine they have been transformed into American millionaires and indulge in what the Bulgarians consider riotous living. The latter have learnt to act as excellent hosts to their visitors and stop at no sacrifice at making them comfortable. Their honest, and kindly manners are simply disarming and largely compensate for the absence of such comforts as the Westerner has come to look upon as indipensable. The visitor from Central Europe has usually little money to spend, but in comparison with Bulgarian standards he is still a Croesus. However, such income as is derived from visitors does not suffice to cover the outlay of the town. Taxation is extremely heavy, and the inhabitants complain that they can only make the two ends meet with the greatest difficulty. According to a report compiled by Prof. Tsolakov, and published by the Varna School of Higher Studies, the estimated revenue of the Varna municipality for the financial year 1932-3, from the tax on buildings and professions, was respectively 25, and 210 million leva, but the actual revenue was only 13,704,418 and 179,722,752, and other sources of revenue were even less promising. It would be well if the inhabitants of Varna did something to attract a more wealthy *clientèle* than the poverty stricken mid-Europeans. Judging from a series of articles which the French Academician, Louis Bertrand, published in the *Revue des deux Mondes* at the end of 1934, the Italians are developing Cyrenaica as a health resort and endowing it with big hotels in the hope of attracting the wealthy Greeks of Egypt, and they rely to allure them thither largely on the consideration that it was once a famous Greek colony.

> „A Cyrene, on se propose d'attirer pour l'été l'opulente société Grecque d'Alexandrie et du Caire. Les Héllenes. . . trouveront ici plus de fraicheur que dans les petites stations éstivales de l'Eubée ou de l'Attique. . . Enfin les dirigeants italiens comptent sur le patriotisme exalté des Héllenes, qui voudront venir admirer et vénerer ici les véstiges d'une de leur plus ancienne colonie".

Varna may boast of the same privilege, it was anciently known as Odessus and was founded by the Milesians in the year 585 B. C. It was one of the few Greek towns which under Roman rule retained the right to strike coins and this testifies to its importance. It possesses a museum in which a vast number of Greek works of art have been collected and as most of the Bulgarian towns on the Black Sea coast littoral have likewise been founded by Greek colonists, and one of them Mesembria, possesses some remarkable ruins of Byzantine churches, with a wealth of ornamentation and mosaics that have rightly won for it the appelation of "the Bulgarian Ravenna , it would be well if all these facts were utilised for propaganda purposes. Varna possesses a vast advantage over Cyrenaica not only owing to its climate, its luxuriant vegetation and charming surroundings but also in still possessing a small number of inhabitants of Greek origin who may be utilised as a focus for attracting Greek visitors. Nothing indeed will incite Hellenes to visit the Bulgarian Black sea board so much as the knowledge that they will be welcomed in their native tongue, that they will be able to attend divine service in one of their own churches, and have the possibility to ascertain that the spirit of their race survives in spite of the "silent artillery of time .

Surely the inhabitants of Varna can look on good humouredly on a few patriotic manifestations which are likely to follow when "Greek meets Greek , nothing but good will ensue for all the parties concerned from such outbursts, and it will constitute one more excellent proof of the liberalism and tolerance the Bulgarians have always manifested for all ethnic minorities living in their midst.

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The pre-war period

After the amputation inflicted on her by the Treaty 175
of Berlin, it was natural for Bulgaria to devote from the moment of her emergence as a political entity most of her resources and energy to repairing the mutilations she had suffered. She thus diverted to this aim a large part of the vital strength she would under different circumstances have entirely consecrated to her cultural and economic advancement. And if, in spite of this incubus Bulgaria yet attained to such remarkable material development within the six decades of her independent existence it may be surmised with certainty that the progress achieved would have been a record one had she started on her career as a nation under more auspicious omens.

From the very start she was encouraged to spend 175
an unduly large proportion of her resources on the 652
organisation of her army by the Russian officials who supervised the setting up of her administration, and owing to the natural desire of the Bulgarian people to liberate their enslaved kinsmen, who had been thrust under foreign dominion by the bungling politicians at the Berlin Congress, it was extremely difficult to discourage expenditure on this head. This tendency was further encouraged by the armament firms which showed themselves always obsequious and ready to facilitate the securing of the necessary credits for financing the supply of war material and thereby helped to involve Bulgaria into an indebtedness beyond her capacity.

The Bulgarian State was further saddled with heavy 728
obligations such as that of assuming a certain indebtedness 175
towards Turkey in the form of an annual tribute and that of defraying the cost of the Russian military occupation. It was also forced to provide for the construction of those

728 175 sections of the projected international railway which was to traverse Bulgarian territory, an onerous liability for a young State, since such a railway was of little importance to local traffic, and further, it was constrained owing to its political vassalage to maintain a uniform custom tariff with that of Turkey and was thereby debarred from increasing its revenue. The country having been maintained in a most backward condition while under Turkish rule, had to create of a piece a complete administration, organise an army, construct a net-work of roads and railways, build ports, and improvise a minimum of equipment of which it was entirely deficient, possessing few roads and only one railway of international, but of little local importance, namely that between Rustchuk and Varna, of a total length of 224 klm. belonging to an English company and which the Bulgarian government was obliged to buy out a few years later. Towns and villages which had been destroyed during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 and the insurrection which preceded it had to be rebuilt, and even the bulk of the land which belonged to Turkish landlords had to be purchased by the Bulgarian peasantry before the latter could be installed as owners in the fields they cultivated.

453 175 Bulgaria being a pre-eminently agricultural country, with practically no other revenues save such taxation as could be raised from her industrious peasantry was thus faced with the Herculean task of providing out of her meagre means the indispensable equipment of a modern State, and it speaks volumes to the credit of her people that so much should have been achieved within so brief a time, all the more so since the country owing to its undeveloped and backward state had very few resources to draw on. Its main assets being the unflinching laboriousness and the extreme thriftiness of its peasantry.

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It is from 1885 onward that a study of statistics becomes informative and the rate of advance more easily traceable since it was at that date that the first step towards the partial realisation of the national unity was taken, namely the union of the principality of Bulgaria with the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia. The territorial accretion thereby secured was maintained until the Balkan wars of 1912-3, so that it is retatively easy to follow the country's development from a study of the statistics provided after 1885 since no calculations have to be made to adjust numbers to territorial alterations. No such change occurred until the Balkan and World wars, when the area of Bulgaria was increased from 96,345.5 in 1912 to 111,836.8 square klm. in 1913, and finally reduced to 103,146.1 in 1919. 175 [131]

From the following statistical table of exports and imports one may form an opinion of the scantiness of Bulgaria's resourses, since with a few exceptions each year reveals an unfavourable trade balance and Bulgaria never possessed any investments abroad, nor rendered any services, from which she could derive any invisible income wherewith to balance the deficit of her commercial balance.[1] The abrupt increase in the figures cited after the quinquenial period 1916—1920 is due to the gradual depreciation of the leva, which from its equivalent of a gold franc prior to the world war was reduced to the level of only 0.03745 gold franc, or 139 leva to a gold dollar, at which rate it was stabilised in 1928. 175 457

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[1] Before the war a certain number of market gardeners emigrated temporarily to neighbouring countries and remitted their savings home. It may also be presumed that the deficit in the commercial balance was not as large as indicated by official statistics for merchants were occasionally inclined to underestimate their exports in order to pay fewer dues as was revealed by Minister Burov in a speech in the Sobranye on April 1928. The income derived from foreign tourists is reckoned at 40 million leva a year. [167]

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YEARS	IMPORTS in million leva	EXPORTS in million leva	BALANCE in million leva
1885—1890	350	310	— 40
1891—1895	416	386	— 30
1896—1900	337	339	+ 2
1901—1905	474	597	+ 123
1906—1910	699	591	— 108
1911—1915	916	698	— 218
1916—1920	4,002	2,993	— 1009
1921—1925	24,924	22,628	— 4296
1926—1930	32,330	31,064	— 1266
1931	4,660	5,934	+ 1274
1932	3,471	3,383	— 88
1933	2,202	2,846[1]	+ 644
1934	7,247	2,535[1]	+ 88

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From the foregoing figures it becomes obvious that Bulgaria had to have recourse to foreign assistance in order to secure the necessary equipment of a modern State as it was unthinkable for her to raise the requisite capital locally. Tbe following loans were contracted prior to the Balkan wars, the proceeds being used for military equipment, for the construction of railways and ports or the financing of expenses incurred through a rather premature davelopment of the political organisation and occasionally through a not very judicious employment of public funds.

Year	Nominal Interest °/₀	Duration of repayment in years	Nominal amount in million leva	Price of issue	Net amount in million leva	Real interest °/₀
1888	6	33	46,777	at par	46,777	6·
1889	6	33	30,000	86·03	25,650	7·5
1892	6	33	124,962	86·41	107,342	7·34
1902	5	50	106,000	78·32	87,367	6·72
1904	5	50	100,000	75·24	82,383	7·03
1907	4·5	60	145,000	79·91	123,250	5·94
1909	4·5	50	100,000	85·56	86,000	5·56
1909	4·5	75	82,000	at par	82,000	4·75
			734,739		640,769	

The 1888 loan was floated in London, its proceeds being entirely devoted to the purchase of the Rustchuk-

[1] [Errata: should be 224] — Analyst]

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Varna railway line built in 1860 by an English company 175
to which the Turkish government had guaranteed a revenue of 7%, a charge the Bulgarian government considered 457
unduly heavy and out of proportion with the net 652
income derived from the exploitation of the railway.[1]

The proceeds of the 1889 loan were used for the construction of the Tsaribrod—Sofia—Vakarel, and that of the Yambol—Burgas railway lines. The loan was floated in Vienna as the obligation to construct these lines had been imposed by Austria-Hungary at the Congress of Berlin. A mortgage on these railways secured the loan. The subsequent loan was also contracted in Vienna and served to reorganise the army and to construct the Kaspitchan—Sofia railway line and the building of the two ports of Varna and Burgas. A mortgage on both ports and the railway being taken as security for the loan.

The 1902 loan was the first of a series concluded in France, for Bulgaria having in the meanwhile adopted a distinctly pro-Russian attitude, the Paris money market was opened to her at the intercession of Russia, France's

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[1] The capital of the company which constructed this line was represented by 45,000 shares of £ 20 each, or a total of £ 900,000 or 22,500,000 gold francs, and these shares were never quoted above 1/4 of their nominal value. A commission of Bulgarian engineers presided over by the late Serbian Premier, N. Passitch, at the time in the employ of Bulgaria in his capacity of an engineer, had evaluated the line as worth 18,575,000 gold francs, which was a fair estimate, yet the Bulgarian Premier, Stambulov, was prevailed upon to pay more than double this sum. This transaction was strongly resented in Bulgaria, but owing to the censorship little was said about it in the Press at the time; and there were good reasons for such resentment, for Bulgaria had been mulcted out of a considerable sum merely in order to placate certain financial circles as likely to influence British political support at a time Bulgaria was traversing a critical period. A very unfortunate precedent being thus created which has since caused havoc in Bulgarian finances.

175 ally. The proceeds of this loan served to make good the budget deficits of the period 1895-1900 amounting to 53 457 million leva and mainly due to a period of bad crops, to 65 pay off the sum of 17,390,664 to the Turkish and Russian governments, due according to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, to pay for 2,687,515 leva worth of armaments, and reimburse certain advances made to the Bulgarian government by the Bulgarian State Bank. This was the first loan to which a special revenue was assigned as a guarantee and a special controller delegated to Sofia on behalf of the bondholders to supervise the sale of the special revenue stamps affected to the tobacco tax.

In 1904 yet another loan was floated in France to which the surplus of the tobacco tax and the proceeds of revenue stamps were assigned as pledges. Owing to the revolution of 1903 in Macedonia, field artillery of the value of some 25 million leva had been purchased from the French firm of Creusot and other military expenses had been incurred and had to be frayed, the balance of the loan was used for the construction of the railway lines Tirnovo — Trevna, and Sofia — Kustendil. Military expenditure was steadily increasing and proving an intolerable burden to the State, yet owing to the anarchic situation in Macedonia and the prevalent belief that Bulgaria was in duty bound to interfere some day on behalf of her unredeemed kinsmen in Turkey, the Bulgarian people assumed stolidly the financial burdens imposed on them. Thus during the two years 1904 and 1905 some 55 million leva were expended solely on armaments, a sum exceeding half of the budget figures of these years.

It must be admitted that the French armament firms which had found an excellent client in Bulgaria must have largely contributed in persuading French Banks as to the advisability of financing the loans made to Bulgaria, which were being gradually floated at shorter and shorter intervals.

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

VARNA: A VIEW FROM THE PARK

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SOFIA: THE OPERA HOUSE

[Facing p. 65]

ECONOMIC HISTORY

175 In 1907, a further loan was issued in Paris out of which sums of 20,935,000 and 31,584,500 leva were earmarked for the conversion of the 1888 and 1889 loans. 957 The 1907 loan having been issued on a 4·5% basis 652 it was thought that a considerable economy would be effected by reimbursing the first two loans bearing 6% interest. Unfortunately, owing to the fact that the bonds were quoted above par, the Bulgarian treasury incurred instead a loss of some 21·5 million leva in carrying through this operation The balance of the loan was employed, to the extent of 32 millions for the buying of war material, while another 32 millions were allotted to the construction of railways and some four millions devoted to the settlement of a floating debt. The same pledges which had been assigned to the 1902 and 1904 loans were also affected to the service of this loan as the revenues from these sources were quite adequate. Thus the revenues from the tobacco tax and 'mourouriye' yielded 17,677,000 in 1909 and 18,183,000 leva in 1911, while the yield from the revenue stamps amounted to 6,088,000 and 6,638,000 leva respectively, the service of the three loans necessitating in 1909 the sum of only 18,265,000 leva, thus leaving a surplus of some 5 millions at the disposal of the Exchequer.

The elevation of Bulgaria to the rank of a Kingdom in 1908, and the attending political complications which rendered the mobilisation of the army indispensable had caused a heavy drain to the treasury, and in 1909 another loan was contracted, the proceeds of which were entirely absorbed in reimbursing the State's debts to contractors and to the National and Agrarian Banks, a sum of over 58 millions being due to these two State institutions. This loan was floated in Vienna, and no real guarantees demanded by the Austrian banks, a fact which may be explained by the desire of Austria to express her satis-

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faction at the way Bulgaria had arranged for her proclamation of independence to precede Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Simultaneously Bulgaria assumed a liability of 82 millions to Russia, the latter having undertaken to indemnify Turkey on Bulgaria's refusal to continue the payment of her tribute after her proclamation of independence and provided the requisite money (some 42 million leva) wherewith the railways constructed and operated in Southern Bulgaria by the nominally Turkish company of the Chemins de Fer Orientaux were purchased by the Bulgarian government.

By the end of 1911 Bulgaria had a consolidated debt of 603,799,618 and a floating debt of 29,493,524 gold leva which with a population of 4,390,325 represented a per capita charge of 144·25 leva. From the proceeds of the foreign loans some 283,058,566 leva had been employed for the construction or purchase of railways of a total milage of 1,931 klm. and in the building of the ports of Varna and Burgas, 102,670,856 leva had been employed for the purchase of military equipment and the balance was absorbed by budgetary deficits, the liquidation of the tribute payable to Turkey (over 40 millions), and other administrative expenses. It should be remembered that the latter item included the building of schools, the constructions of roads, bridges, telegraph and telephone lines, barracks, government buildings etc. all of which were almost totally lacking, so that on the whole, few of the successive Bulgarian governments can be accused of having unduly wasted public money. The national wealth had been estimated in 1911 by the late Cyril Popov at 10,500 millions and the national revenue at 1,647 millions, equal to 387 gold leva per capita, which could only provide for a very low standard of living, since yet another 20% had to be provided out of it for the defraying of public and municipal taxation.

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The State budgets were approaching the 200 million figure. but were not always balanced. Thus in 1910 and 1911 the revenue figures stood respectively at 181 and 198 millions while expenditure attained 198 and 181, leaving alternatively for each year a deficit and a surplus of 17 millions. The service of the debt required slightly over 36 millions and absorbed 18% to 20% of the annual revenue of the State, while military expenditure required about 44 millions. Unfortunately the trade balance wherewith the service of the foreign debt had to be provided continued to show an excess of imports over exports, the years 1910 and 1911 showing respectively debit balances of 48 and 15 millions, and this state of affairs forced Bulgaria, so long as she was unable to expand her exports to continue borrowing in order to meet her monetary obligations abroad and to pay for the excess of her imports, which were indispensable for her development and the sustainance or her people.

So that even prior to the Balkan wars, when Bulgaria was considered powerful and flourishing and her financial situation inspired confidence she was in fact a very poor country living beyond her means and only able to meet her foreign obligations by indulging in a policy of borrowing abroad which was reckless, but which was indulged in for patriotic motives, because it was hoped that when finally Macedonia would have been incorporated, the increased revenue the State would thereby derive would permit the shouldering of the indebtedness incurred mainly in preparing for this territorial expansion. Bulgaria's reputation of a good payer was due to the scrupulous exactitude with which both private and public debts were being met and the extreme sobriety and parsimoniousness of her people which had enabled them to build up a complete machinery of State not only by borrowing but also out of their hard-earned and slender incomes.

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175 The frugality and thriftiness of the Bulgarian people
457 stood them im good stead for it was thanks to these qualities that they were able to assume practically unaided
652 the financing of the Balkan wars. The 1912 and 1913 budgets closed with deficits of 140 and 181 millions, owing to the falling off of the revenue and the increased military expenditure and were met partly by the expedient of discounting treasury bills abroad namely 75 millions with the Banque de Paris and des Pays Bas, 30 millions with Austrian Banks and 27·7 millions with the Russo-Asiatic Bank, and partly by advances from the National State Bank which attained 142.9 millions by the end of 1913.

Naturally the unfortunate outcome of the Balkan wars found Bulgaria utterly exhausted and in urgent need of funds. An internal loan of 90 millions was inadequate to relieve the pressure on the treasury and as the budget of 1914 was pointing to a deficit of 68 millions, the government was constrained to seek foreign help at all costs. Owing to the pro-Austrian proclivities of the Radoslavov government, the French Banks demanded as a preliminary condition to their granting a loan, that Bulgaria should furnish assurances that she would no longer pursue an anti-Russian policy. Unfortunately these were not forthcoming. On the contrary the Bulgarian government opened negotiations with a group of German and Austrian banks, headed by the Diskonto Gesellschaft, in spite of the violent obstruction of the Opposition and raised a loan from this German banking group. Though the members of the Radoslavov Cabinet have always denied that any political clauses were attached to the loan, this may be considered as forming the preamble to Bulgaria's engagement to the Central Powers, for the Germans have on many occasions declared that the question of Bulgaria's allegiance had been definitely fixed on the conclusion of this loan. The loan was of a nominal amount of 500 million leva. The conditions attached to it were distinctly onerous for they included the cession of the Pernik coal mines belonging to the State, a concession for the construction of a railway line Rakovski—Porto Lagos and the building of its harbour, while specific revenues were affected to it as a guarantee, namely the surplus of the tobacco tax and revenue stamps over the share already affected to the 1902, 1904 and 1907 loans, the proceeds of the State monopoly of cigarette paper and the proceeds of the revenue from the customs. Owing to the outbreak of tne World war the German banks advanced only some 270 millions and though it had been stipulated that the Bulgarian Treasury bonds emitted during the Balkan wars would be reimbursed, only those held by the Austrian banks were paid while the German government placed an embargo on the 27·7 millions due to the Russo-Asiatic bank.

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How Bulgaria financed her participation in the World war.

The cost of Bulgaria's participation in the World war was borne practically unaided, for except for a part of the loan issued by the Diskonto Gesellschaft no other effective aid was received. A convention was signed in September 1915 between Germany and Bulgaria, providing for the granting to the latter of an advances of 50 million leva during each of the four months the war was expected to last, and stipulating for complementary advance should the war last longer. Germany continued to extend these credits only to the end of 1917, so that the total amount secured by Bulgaria on this head attained 1350 million leva. But in fact, not a single penny ever reached Bulgaria, for these monthly advances were deposited in a Berlin bank to the credit of the Bulgarian National Bank which was authorised to issue a corresponding amount

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of paper money which it placed at the disposal of the Bulgarian government. These deposits were to be utilised solely for this purpose, and also for the payment of goods purchased in Germany and with the consent ot the German authorities; but as during the war Germany had little to export, the amount of merchandise thus purchased did not exceed 350 million leva. The balance of about 1,000 millions which had served as cover to the increased fiduciary circulation of the Bulgarian National Bank owing to its being labelled in marks was totally lost to Bulgaria when the mark depreciated after the armictice. The National Bank of Bulgaria attempted to transfer part of this sum to Switzerland, but was precluded from doing so by the initial arrangements entered into by the two governments and subsequently by Article 145 of the Treaty of Neuilly which obliged Bulgaria to transfer to the Reparation Commission any claims she might have to payments or reparations by her late Allies. Besides these monthly credits, munitions and military equipment to the value of 1440 million leva were received from Germany and of 73,398,500 from Austria. Against these sums the Bulgarian government had a larger counterclaim amounting to 2,148,814,923 leva, several items of which represented more tangible value than the nominal monthly German advances, for they represented foodstuffs, raw materials and 240 millions in Bulgarian currency delivered to the German military authorities. It may be affirmed that the only financial service rendered by Germany was that of enabling the Bulgarian National Bank to increase its fiduciary circulation from 369,791,000 leva at the end of 1915 to 2,298,617,000 at the end of 1918, and this was obviously of a very questionable value for in the end owing to the total depreciation of the mark it was the Bulgarian people who had to shoulder the entire loss caused by this inflation. As M. Stefanov the Minister of Finance,

declared in the Sobranye on May 10, 1932: „Bulgaria was 175
the sole country to conclude the war with so few debts,
for she only received 270 millions from the Diskonto 457
Gesellschaft, while she remained a creditor to the extent 652
of 840 millions to Germany." This statement may be compared to the one M. Stefanov made on July 10, 1928, when he maintained that Bulgaria had lived during the world war on her own resources, but had been exploited and robbed by her allies, the latter owing her at the end of the war, 860 million leva.

The budgets for the four years 1915 to 1918, closed with a total deficit of 2,270 millions due in the main to increased military expenditure. This outlay was met by the expedient of increasing the fiduciary circulation and by advances to the State from the National Bank. At the end of 1918 the metallic cover of the bank still amounted to 64 millions in gold and to 19 millions in silver, but as the country's food supply had been utterly exhausted, flour to the value of 27·25 million gold leva in cash had to be purchased in 1919 from the United States and this drain on the gold reserve coupled with the fact that the balances abroad (mainly in Germany) on which the fiduciary circulation was secured had been rendered worthless through the depreciation of the mark, brought about a rapid fall in the value of the leva; and this was further accentuated as the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly became known. Thus the leva fell from 0.19 gold franc, at which level it was quoted at the end of 1919, to 0·07 at the end of 1920, and to 0.036 at the end of 1921.

Part of the military expenditure incurred during the world war was met out of the post-war budgets, so that it is difficult to assess it correctly, but roughly it may be said to be represented by the budgetary deficits of the years 1915-1921, amounting to 5,706 million leva, to which should be added the amounts of the two internal loans

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raised in 1914 and 1921, of 83, and 157 million leva respectively, as well as that of the 270 millions advanced by the Diskonto Gesellschaft, which would bring the total military expenditure up to 6216 million leva, of varying value, however, since the leva had depreciated from the intrinsic equivalent of a gold franc in 1914 to as little as 0.036 gold franc in 1921. These 6216 millions were financed by the expedients of increasing the fiduciary circulation which from 226,615,000 leva at the end of 1914 rose to the record figure of 4,622,833,000 on Nov. 30, 1924, and by the advances of the National Bank which at the end of the financial year 1921-1922 amounted to 4,206 million leva.

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This estimate is for military expenditure incurred by the State during the World war, and it is permissible to presume that even parts of the budgetary deficits of the years 1921 to 1923 represented expenditure on this head. It takes no account of the losses inflicted on the community at large, or of the war pensions the State had to serve subsequently to the disabled and their dependents. The number of killed was according to a statement made by the Minister of War in the Sobranye on Nov. 22, 1927, 53,825 during the Balkan wars and 115,048 during the World war.

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In 1929 there were 98,000 persons receiving pensions as war invalids or as dependents of such, and the amount of the annual charge this constituted to the budget was 372 million leva, or less than a paltry £6 a year per person at the then prevailing rate of exchange. This was all a grateful country could afford to pay to those of her sons who had been disabled in defending her. When such heroic sacrifices are so poorly requited, it is not surprising that its citizens' devotion towards it should perceptively cool and that they should turn for consolation to such subversive doctrines as Communism, which holds out the promise of greater justice and equity.

ECONOMIC HISTORY

According to the latest data, the number of war invalids receiving pensions on April 1, 1934, were 13,014 for a sum of 83,278,502 leva annually, and those of widows and dependents of soldiers killed during the wars 67,763, necessitating another annual outlay of 204,340,386 leva. In spite of the economic straits the Bulgarian exchequer is in, it has yet been found possible to make grants to 77 aged Russian veterans who had participated in the war of liberation of 1878, and who owing to the Bolshevik revolution have sought refuge in Bulgaria. The latter in spite of her difficulties is still harbouring some 19,000 émigrés and providing largely out of her slender means for their upkeep, a fact which inflicts a formal disavowal to the slanderous charges brought against Bulgaria as to her alleged ingratitude towards Russia.

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The Financial burdens of the Treaty of Neuilly.

The amount of the indemnity imposed on Bulgaria and euphemistically termed 'reparations' was fixed according to Article 121 of the Treaty of Neuilly at 2250 million gold francs and decreed payable within 37 years and to bear 5% interest. Article 132 of the said Treaty decreed that the costs of reparations would constitute a first charge on all the assets and revenues of Bulgaria. Article 133 bound Bulgaria to defray the total cost of the Allied armies in occupation of Bulgarian territory until the coming into force of the Treaty, this cost being finally assessed at 25 million gold francs. Article 137 constrained Bulgaria to assume a part of the Ottoman debt, a matter which has not yet been fixed. Another article, 177, provided for the indemnification of the material damage suffered by Allied subjects through Bulgaria's action in the war out of the property of Bulgarian subjects seized in Allied countries. The amount awarded as demages by Arbitral Courts

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specially constituted for the purpose amounted to £ 581,317 for British subjects and to 52,269,771 French francs plus £ 109,210 to French subjects, and smaller sums to Belgian, Italian and Greek subjects.

Articles 125 to 128 ordained other payments in kind which could more aptly figure as reparations than the 2250 million indemnity imposed on Bulgaria, and which amply sufficed to repair whatever damage the Bulgarians might have caused in the territories they had invaded as the writer pointed out in the "*New Europe*" of July 29, 1920 in the following terms:

> "Bulgaria is asked to make reparations for damage, and these are assessed at a figure far exceeding the destruction the Bulgarians might have wrought in the Morava and the Dobrudja. The total value of these regions does not surpass 5,000 million francs, of which land figures for 70 per cent and buildings, cattle, etc. for the balance.
>
> It is obvious that the Bulgarians could not have carried off the land, and it may be taken for granted that the damage inflicted on property is infinitesimal, and represents only a fraction of its total value.
>
> On what grounds then is Bulgaria asked to pay 2¼ milliards as "reparation". The demand for such an indemnity is all the more unjust since the Treaty stipulated for the delivery by Bulgaria of a determined number of live-stock. It is contended that this quantity of cattle represents what the Bulgarians appropriated while in occupation of the regions they invaded. If this were so, it would be just to insist on the execution of this clause; the number demanded from the Bulgarians, however, exceeds all reasonable estimate of the losses in cattle which our Balkan Allies might have incurred. Amongst other things Article 127 provides for the delivery by Bulgaria of 1,000 mules to Serbia, when, according to Serbian official statistics, the total number of these useful animals in the whole of Serbia was only 349 in the year 1910! This example will serve to show that "reparation" is not the appropriate term for our demands on Bulgaria. the latter obviously aim at securing more than what the former designation implies. The Treaty also imposes on Bulgaria an annual delivery of 50,000 tons of coal to Serbia by way of compensation for the destruction of Serbian coal-mines by the Bulgarians. This is an unwarranted and unjustifiable decision, not only because all mines in Serbia were

exclusively worked for and by the Germans, but also because Bulgaria does not produce sufficient coal for her own requirements. Before the war she used to import coal not only from England, but also from Serbia, and this consideration alone ought to have prevented the formulation of demands that clearly seek to cripple the economic organism of a former enemy State.

The punishment already meted out to Bulgaria has been sufficiently severe, as have been the sufferings and losses which the war has inflicted on her population. Our object, therefore, should not be to increase the disadvantages under which Bulgarians toil, nor to force them to slave for others, for this is certainly not Bulgaria's mission in the world. If we wish her to make her distinctive contribution to civilisation, we should rather lend a helping hand to her people, and assist them out of their present difficulties. The laboriousness, sobriety and honesty of the average Bulgarian are virtues which commend themselves to all, and if they could only be made to realise that in the subordination of self to common interests lies the secret of a nation's greatness, then nothing could prevent them from becoming one of the foremost factors in the moral and economic renovation of the Near East."

Article 177 of the Treaty permitted Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia to formulate certain complementary demands for indemnification. An utterly unjustified proceeding in view of the fact that Article 121 had settled the total amount of indemnity to be imposed on Bulgaria. Though the Hague International Tribunal to which the claim of Greece had been referred to had decided on Sept. 24, 1924 in this sense, yet the Bulgarian government decided to meet the Yugoslav and Rumanian claims owing to political reasons and to its fear of a Yugoslav military intervention at the time of the Communist revolt which took place in Bulgaria during September 1923. Thus Bulgaria assumed further liabilities towards Yugoslavia and Rumania amounting to 320 million leva and 110 million lei.

The imposition on Bulgaria of the obligation to defray the cost of the Allied armies of ocupation was equally unmerited and contrary to the spirit of the

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armistice concluded at Salonica on Sept. 29, 1918, since the latter stipulated that Bulgaria was not to be treated as an occupied territory and only provided for the temporary occupation of certain strategical points. In fact the headquarters of the Allied armies only notified the Bulgarian government that they would occupy the port of Varna on March 16, 1919 and its occupation was maintained for a very brief time. The secret annex to the Salonica armistice provided that Bulgaria should be treated as a benevolent neutral, and it even stipulated for the co-operation of the Allied armies with part of the Bulgarian troops under certain eventualities. Had it been possible to resort to arbitration it is more that probable that Bulgaria would have been dispensed from payment on this head. At any rate those in charge of the Allied troops in Bulgaria were perfectly aware that they were not entitled to treat Bulgaria as an occupied country, for if during the three or four days following on their arrival in Bulgaria they affixed at the barracks they occupied a sign-post bearing the inscription "Headquarters of the troops occupying Bulgaria" on the representations of the Bulgarian government they immediately altered the title to "Headquarters of the Allied troops in Bulgaria".

The only sensible provision in the Treaty was article 122 which provided for the Inter-Allied Commission to reconsider from time to time the resources and paying capacity of Bulgaria and empowered it to recommend either a reduction or a postponement in the payment of the sums due by Bulgaria.

It was very unfortunate for Bulgaria that she did not have a strong and popular government capable of defending her interests, and ready to resign in sign of protest whenever she was being bludgeoned and coerced into paying on acount of reparations sums which were crippling her national economy and checking her development. Had her rights been entrusted to more stalwart defenders she would have certainly met with as lenient a treatment as that meted out to Austria and Hungary, but unhappily her rulers' first thought was how to maintain themselves in office and avoid all source of conflict which might jeopardize their posts. This selfish consideration made them always bow meekly before such dictates as were issued by the International Reparation Commission whose sole consideration was to squeeze as much as possible out of Bulgaria. It is not to be wondered that the late Count Apponyi, that untiring champion of Hungarian rights, should have shown his aversion for such servile meekness, by remarking to an occasional Bulgarian delegate at Geneva, a fact which Prof. Gheorgov, a former rector of the Sofia University communicated to the Bulgarian Press: "I am at a loss to understand why your delegates keep silent when such important questions relative to your country are being discussed at the assembly of the League of Nations?"

According to articles 124, 136, 142 and 145 of the above mentioned Treaty, Bulgaria was to be credited with certain sums as against the 2,250 million gold francs of reparations imposed on her. These amounts were computed in a pamphlet issued by the Bulgarian Commissariat of Reparations on Feb. 2, 1923 as totalling 3,857,548,624 gold francs and classified under the following heads:

Relative to Article	124	1,088,957,132
" " "	136	266,274,479
" " "	136	65,635,727
" " "	142	275,473,910
" " "	145	2,148,814,923
Maintenance of the Inter-Allied Commission		3,510,753
Indemnities paid to Allied subjects in territories occupied by Bulgaria		8,881,700

Besides the above, war material of a value of 633,211,117 gold francs had also been handed over to the Allies.

175 128 Though certain items referring to Art. 124 and 145 are disputable, it seems that the Bulgarian government had some ground to insist upon its claims being taken into consideration, yet all the delegates of the Allied Powers did when the protocol of March 21, 1923 which settled the mode of payment of reparations was signed, was to divide into two parts „A“ and „B“ the total sum of 2,500 million gold francs claimed from Bulgaria, decreeing that 550 millions bearing 5% interest, labelled „A“ share should be payable in 60 annuities, the first of which was fixed at 5 millions and was to increase gradually to 43,396,336 in 1934 and continue at that rate until 1983, while the remainder, amounting to 1,700 millions would stand over until 1953 without interest when such sums as Bulgaria had a right to claim would be deducted from it, though the Bulgarian counterclaims largely exceeded this figure.

Apparently little consideration was paid to Bulgaria's condition, to her having been amputated of her wealthiest provinces, to the utter exhaustion of the resources of the peasantry which had bravely shouldered single-handed the whole burden of the world war, and beguiled by the transient prosperity of a section of the population engaged in the cultivation and trade of tobacco which prospered exceedingly during the years 1919 to 1923, owing to the elimination from the European markets of Greece and Turkey as producers of Oriental tobacco, while engaged in fighting each other, and which trade is reckoned to have brought an inflow of some 4,000 to 4,500 million leva to Bulgaria during this period, the delegates of the Allied governments proceeded to bleed Bulgaria white.

Indispensable public services such as education and hygiene[1] were ruthlessly curtailed, the upkeep of railways

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[165] [1] The rate of mortality from tuberculosis in 1928 was 30.53 per 10,000 in Bulgaria as against only 8.28 in Great Britain.

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and highways was completely neglected, nothing was done to reorganise agriculture and thereby permit the peasantry to recuperate after the exhaustion caused by the war, all this in order to economise on the budget and provide for payments to Bulgaria's insatiable creditors.

The callousness and cynicism with which the Allied Powers, great and small, treated Bulgaria at this time is simply revolting and is best illustrated by the manner in which the Des Closières affair was liquidated. Among the documents published by the Bolsheviki were the minutes of the Russian Ministerial Council which revealed that on July 30, 1915 the question of finding 200 million francs wherewith to buy up Bulgarian cereals and at the same time to suborn Bulgarian politicians came up for discussion. Sazonov refused to besmirch his hands in this unclean affair and he left the management to England and France who provided 175 millions necessary for financing this operation, Russia supplying the balance of 25 millions. Several Bulgarian politicians were involved, and the irony of fate decreed that instead of serving the Entente's interests they should have unwillingly helped to consolidate the position of the tottering Radoslavov Cabinet. At the end of the war, the British and French governments demanded the restitution of all sums advanced by their agent, Des Closières, in Bulgaria, not only for the moneys supplied by the latter to various politicians for the purchase of cereals which had been ultimately confiscated by the Bulgarian government, but also for all the sums spent clearly on bribery and which figured in the claim lodged against the Bulgarian government as money spent „on propaganda and publicity". It is doubtful whether one can find another example of such brazen cynicism in inter-State relations and one marvels at the shamelessness of both British and French officials who had the impudence not only to avow that they had bribed, but that they

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should go to the length of demanding the reimbursement of the bribes from the very State the citizens of which they had attempted to corrupt. It is fortunate that the Arbitral Court before which these monstrous demands were formulated adjudged that the only part of the claim which was valid was that relative to the stocks of grain confiscated by the Bulgarian government and for which it was condemned to reimburse £164,264 plus 10,854,854 French francs, though as deputy G. Yurtov had declared in the Sobranye on Feb. 22, 1927, of the 200 millions francs of Entente money spent, only 18 or 20 millions had been used to buy cereals and the balance had been employed in bribing politicians.

The controversy which arose between the Greek politicians Venizelos and Cafandaris over the Greek Stabilisation Loan likewise casts a lurid light on the incentives which actuated Entente politicians when they heaped on Bulgaria the staggering burden of indemnities under which she has collapsed. At a speech Venizelos delivered at Salonica in the summer of 1932, he blamed Cafandaris for allowing himself to be cajoled by the French government into a remission of its war debt to Greece, amounting to 408 million gold francs, in order to secure French support for the flotation of this loan, after Venizelos had arranged in collusion with the French to lump the sum in question into the reparations claimed from Bulgaria! Obviously any stick was good enough to beat luckless Bulgaria with.

The present writer attempted several times from the columns of the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Near East* to point out that this policy of extortion and coercion which was being applied to Bulgaria was threatening to undermine her social structure, that its inevitable consequence would be the pauperisation of Bulgaria, since the country's financial capacity had never been taken into

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THE RISING GENERATION

[Facing p. 81]

175 proper consideration, but unfortunately his efforts proved 128 unavailing. The country, in fact, even before the war, was only able to pay her way by cumulating its foreign indebtedness, it would therefore hardly be expected that after being shorn of its most fertile regions and ruined by the war, the burden of which it had borne single-handed, Bulgaria would be able to meet unaided the problem of her pressing economic re-organisation and at the same time provide for the payment of the crushing indemnities imposed on her.

No wonder that M. Stambuliiski and his peasant colleagues perceiving that the Allied Powers were intent on draining every particle of moveable wealth out of Bulgaria, threw all restraint to the winds, and set themselves to embezzle and appropriate whatever public money they could lay hands on. Quinet's judicious pronouncement: „Otez à une terre toute chance d'avenir, elle enfante d'elle même la barbarie comme les ronces" was thus fully confirmed, for if a feeling of despair had not been instilled in the Bulgarian people by the pitiless and grasping policy of the Allied commissaries, the Agrarian party while it was in office would not have lost all sense of measure and thus hastened by its insensate policy the ruin which loomed large on the country's horizon.

The purblindness of the financial experts who had imposed the colossal burden of reparations became evident a few years later, when Bulgaria in spite of the financial assistance she received in the form of the two loans advanced to her under the auspices of the League of Nations felt unable to continue the payment of the reparation annuities.

By the end of 1929 Bulgaria had paid in annual instalments 41 million gold francs on this head, while the interest on the capital sum of the "A" share of reparations (550 millions) amounted to 125,984,233. So that she

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found herself in the invidious position of seeing her indebtedness grow in spite of the disbursements she was making, the capital sum of 550 millions having accrued to 634,984,233 gold francs by the end of 1929.

The absurdity of the position became so manifest that when the Young plan for Germany came up for discussion it was decided to revise the commitments imposed on Bulgaria, and on Jan. 20, 1930 a protocol was signed at the Hague by which Bulgaria was relieved of the "B" part of the reparations, namely 1700 million gold francs payable after 1953. This was a dubious gain, for Bulgaria likewise was forced to renounce her counter-claims, which an unbiassed arbitrator would have probably found to exceed this sum. Part "A" of the reparations was somewhat reduced and its mode of payment adjusted as follows:

1 annuity payable on April 1930 of 5,000,000 gold francs.
10 annuities payable between April 1, 1930 and March 31, 1940 each of 10,000,000 gold francs.
10 „ „ „ „ 1, 1940 and March 31, 1950 each of 11,500,000 gold francs.
16 „ „ „ „ 1, 1950 and March 31, 1966 each of 12,515,238 gold francs.

Bulgaria then agreed to pay these annuities unconditionally and renounced the right Art. 122 of the Treaty of Neuilly conferred on her, namely to invoke an inquiry into her capacity of payment. The transfer guarantee, however, established in connection with the League of Nations' loans was maintained and this was enough to nullify the promise Bulgaria assumed owing to her manifest inability to balance her international income and outgo.

Great Britain, France and Italy also "magnanimously" waived their claim to the balance due to them for the costs of their armies of occupation amounting still to 11,976,633 gold francs, for 'là où il n y a rien le roi perd ses droits'. The disinterestedness of these Great Powers became even better manifest when they abandoned the quota parts of the problematical Bulgarian reparation which accrued to them to their minor allies, Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia; who being on the spot would better dragoon and coerce Bulgaria into payment by „Balkan“ methods the Great Powers would not dare indulge in. Obviously a most hopeful way of promoting goodwill and reconciliation among the Balkan States and to which may be traced the strained relations between Greece and Bulgaria and the tariff war the former has been waging against Bulgarian products.

The average sum of the reparation annuities which Bulgaria assumed to pay by the Hague arrangement was 11.2 million gold francs. This would have been a reasonable charge if Bulgaria possessed an excess of imports over exports which would have provided sufficient foreign exchange to meet this liability. For the payment of indebtedness requires that the net income of a State from its international trade and service operations should be equal to these outlays. Such, however, was not the case with Bulgaria for the available amount of foreign currency secured by its international income did not even suffice to defray the amortizations of her foreign loans, the payment of reparations was therefore suspended in accordance with the transfer guarantee assumed by the Reparation Commission towards the bondholders of the League of Nations' loans But the latter did not benefit for long from this illusory guarantee, for Bulgaria bled white and exhausted by the senseless financial policy of some of her governments has practically been unable to meet even the annual charges of these loans as is related in detail in the next chapter.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS' LOANS

128 Owing to the non-application of the principle of nationality, regions almost exclusively peopled by Bulgarians were placed under the sovereignty of other Balkan States. The latter though they assumed certain obligations towards the ethnic minorities they incorporated, made light of such safeguards as the Treaties extended to these minorities and by a policv of ruthless denationalisation forced large numbers to emigrate and seek refuge in Bulgaria. A few years after the termination of the war, some 350,000 mostly destitute people had thus come to seek shelter in Bulgaria. They constituted a heavy burden on the country since it had to provide out of its scanty resources for the maintenance of the greater number of these unfortunate people. If the League of Nations had watched and insisted on the carrying out of the obligations imposed by the Treaties, it would have been very easy not only to have stemmed this flow of destitute people into Bulgaria, but to have obliged Bulgaria's neighbours to repatriate most of these unfortunates who had been driven from their homes by persecution.

457 However nothing was done, and the Bulgarian Government finding it difficult to raise the requisite means wherewith to assist this mass of suffering humanity, appealed to the League of Nations for aid. It was reasonable to expect that the League would respond to this appeal and succour Bulgaria without seeking to exploit the misfortunes of a luckless nation, but instead, capital was made out of Bulgaria's helplessness in order to squeeze something further out of her. It is necessary for British and American holders of these loans floated under the aegis of the League, that they should realise how shamefully Bulgaria has been exploited in her hour of need for the benefit of certain International Financiers,

and how these grasping Shylocks have by their disgraceful manoeuvres consummated Bulgaria's ruin and brought about her insolvency. Certainly, this action was rendered possible by the abjectness of certain Bulgarian politicians, who either out of purblindness, astuteness or for personal or party motives, facilitated the spoliation of their country, brought ruin to her and at the same time involved in that ruin a number of well-intentioned people who thought that by subscribing to the loan raised purposely for the settlement of refugees in Bulgaria under the sponsorship of the League of Nations, they were doing a praiseworthy act and at the same time were not exposing their savings to any untoward risk. Sir Arthur Salter in his recent book ''Recovery' p. 106 grandiloquently asseverates:

> ''I venture to challenge a denial from any responsible person acquainted with the public borrowings of the years 1926—28 of the assertion that, with the exception of loans recommended by the League of Nations and the Central Banks, the bulk of the foreign loans in these years to public authorities in debtor countries would better not have been made.''.

Why he excepts League of Nations' loans, it is hard for one to say, but there is not the slightest doubt that if there were loans which ought never to have been made, it is these two loans to Bulgaria.

The financial Committee of the League of Nations as soon as Bulgaria's demand was submitted to it, decreed that as a preliminary condition Bulgaria ought to agree to revalorise gradually her pre-war loans making them reinbursable in gold francs instead of paper francs, in which currency the Bulgarian Government was repaying them. The Bulgarian Government was paying regularly both interest and annuities in full in French francs, the majority of the bonds being labelled in francs, while British subjects who held the same script issued in sterling had been prevailed upon to accept payment also in

French francs so that they might not be unduly advantaged in comparison with their French colleagues whose national currency had depreciated to $^1/_5$th of its original value. This was a sensible arrangement, for if wealthy France was repaying the gold francs she had borrowed from her creditors in depreciated paper francs it could not be expected that Bulgaria after the amputation of her wealthiest provinces should proceed to refund her French creditors on a more lavish scale then they themselves were being reimbursed by their own State. It is really surprising that these gentlemen of the Financial Committee should have never heard of France's behaviour towards British investors in the French War Loans and of the controversy which arose between them and the French Government over the decision of the latter to repay them in paper francs instead of gold francs, which decision was maintained in spite of the repeated protests of the injured party, and that despite the precedent thus created by France they should have proceeded to reverse it in favour of the nationals of the very country which had issued it. Of course, if Bulgaria had adequate resources to pay her liabilities, she would be free to dispose of her money as she liked, but when her obligations to her American and British creditors are left indischarged on the specious plea of an inadequacy of resources, while such available resources as exist are being utilised to pay her French creditors over and above what they ought to receive, American and British bondholders have a right to protest against such unfair discrimination. Why should Bulgaria be allowed to pay her debts to the French in gold francs instead of in paper francs, depriving thereby some of her creditors of their legitimate share of assets in order that some others may be advantaged? The City of Tokio loan contracted in 1912 in francs in spite of all the pother roused in France and her insistance on its being reimbursed in gold francs by a decision of the Supreme Japanese Court taken in December 1934 is to be paid in paper francs.

If Japan is allowed to repay her debts to France in *paper* francs why should Bulgaria be constrained to reinburse hers in *gold* to the manifest prejudice of her other creditors? It is obvious that by advantaging some at the expense of others the Financial Committee of the League of Nations did not act independently in the matter, but that it was biassed in favour of certain French banks which were the principal holders of these Bulgarian bonds. Thus in order to secure the privilege of obtaining the League of Nations' help for her refugees, Bulgaria was constrained to increase her disbursements for the service of her pre-war loans from 81 million leva in the year 1921 to a sum gradually rising to 270 in 1931 and to 486 in 1934. The service of the Refugee Loan demands 186 million leva annually, and bears a nominal interest of 7 %; it is easy to calculate that this extra burden imposed on the Bulgarian Exchequer, the acceptance of which had been made an indespensable preliminary to the floating of the Refugee Loan, brought up in 1931 the interest payable on this Loan to about 10·5 %, the extra 3·5 % being pocketed by people who did not subscribe a single penny of the money handed over to Bulgaria for her refugees! If the Financial Committee was not intent on favouring thus certain particular interests. there was another way of coming to the assistance of Bulgaria, and this was pointed out repeatedly in the Bulgarian Chamber by M. Muchanov, the former Bulgarian Prime Minister and by others. As it is known, Art. 132 of the Treaty of Neuilly imposed a mortgage on all assets and revenues of Bulgaria in order to secure the payment of Reparations and this right was waived by the Reparation Commision so that the two League of Nation loans might have certain revenues assigned to them. This same Commission agreed that the payment of reparations would be suspended entirely if their transfer was likely to compromise the stability of the Bulgarian currency and thus endanger the payment of the service of these loans. So that it would have been quite practicable for the Financial Commission of the League of Nations to have given their support to the suggestions which came from Bulgaria. Thus M. Muchanov speaking in the Sobranye on September 27,1926 affirmed: „To grant such privileges to the pre-war loans and instead of maintaining the existing convention, to accept to repay them on the basis of 100 % in gold is not a humane act . . . if the payment of Reparations had been postponed, Bulgaria could easily have financed the settlement of her refugees by employing for five years the reparation annuities for this purpose without assuming any other burdens such as the upkeep of commissaries and delegates, like M. Charron and other honourable people, whose first thought on their arrival here was to buy a Mercedes car costing 700,000 to 800,000 leva". On December 7,1926 M. Muchanov after denouncing the loan as not a humanitarian one since it increased the amount payable on the pre-war loans and thereby crippled Bulgaria, went so far as to affirm that Bulgaria could have financed if necessary the settlement of the refugees out of her own resources.

> „The State by economising might itself have found adequate means for the refugees. We could raise, 200 millions a year for a period of 6 years or a total of 1200 millions just as previous governments had provided 160 millions during each of the preceeding two years".

Another deputy, M. A. Gospodinov, approving the above added that Bulgaria had been shamefully exploited while she was in a difficult position. In fact M. Muchanov was not very far out in his estimate of the approximate cost of installing the refugees. Out of a nominal sum of 2,246 million leva provided by the Refugee loan, some 1,613 millions only were used for assisting them and the money was expended not in a lump sum but in the course of 5 years in varying instalments. The former Finance Minister, M. Stefanov, speaking in the Sobranye on May 10 1932, affirmed: „We could have avoided contracting the Refugee loan since it was spent in instalments of about 170 millions a year, practically the equivalent of its annual service. It was a huge mistake since it obliged us to accept the revalorisation of the pre-war loans." Naturally the treatment meted out to Bulgaria was strongly reasented and often denounced. Thus M. Ilia Yanulov, a socialist deputy, well known to League of Nations' circles did not hesitate to deliver himself in the following terms in the Sobranye on April 11, 1928:

> „From the proceeds of the Refugee loan only 1450 millions will be used for the refugees, almost a whole million has been diverted to other purposes such as the payment of old debts and reparations and yet this loan was dubbed humanitarian. It was a scandalous proceeding without precedent in all financial history. Owing to the revalorisation of pre-war loans we assume to reimburse within 39½ years a total of 6,624 millions in repayment of the 1,450 millions spent on the refugees. The Financial Committee of the League of Nations was nothing but an advisory body of bankers and not a part of the League of Nations. We should refuse to bow to such an idol. Why should we assume this liability of 6·50 milliard leva? In order to stabilise an international order which permits Serbia to annihilate Bulgarians (in Macedonia), Greece to expel Bulgarians from her territory and Rumania to deprive Bulgarians of the lands they possess (in the Dodrudja)"?

No wonder that Bulgarian deputies seeing the shameless exploitation to which their country had been subjected openly advocated default. Thus on June 9, 1932 deputy P. Stoev speaking in the Sobranye stated:

BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

457 "Russia has renounced her 80 millions we owed her. The masses of the nation desire the complete writing off of all the other State loans".

Another well known deputy M. P. N. Dackalov followed by stating that Bulgeria had already paid two milliard gold francs on behalf of reparations and this was bleeding Bulgaria white. He also denounced the insincerity of the former Minister of Finances, M. Mollov, who at Geneva represented Bulgaria's position as financially good and her budgets as showing surpluses, while at the same time he sent delegates to Paris to show that the contrary was the case. To ease the atmosphere, M. Stefanov, the Minister of Finance, then got up and stated: that Sir Arthur Salter in his report recommended that the loan to the refugees should not exceed 600,000 to 650,000 leva, but every effort was made to increase the total of the loan for which increase there was no justification whatever and this led to the demand for the revalorisation of the pre-war loans. This was confirmed on another occasion by Prof. G. P. Ghenov in the Sobranye on May 16, 1932 who asserted that if the Government had had the courage to reject the Refugee loan, the revalorisation of Bulgaria's pre-war loans would have never been imposed.

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From the above it becomes evident that the Financial Committee of the League of Nations did not act impartially and that it committed an act of favouritism on behalf of the holders of the Bulgarian pre-war loans and grossly prejudiced thereby the interests of the subscribers of these Bulgarian League of Nations' loans floated at its recommendation and under its auspices. There is no doubt that certain members of the Liaptchev Government, which was in power from 1926 to 1931 are also largely to blame for what has occurred and they were overtly accused of benefitting by these transactions, thus deputy T. Tonkov on May 14,1932 did not hesitate to in-

terpellate M. Mollov in the Sobranye in the following terms which can hardly be considered as equivocal:

> "I do not know whether you used the proceeds of these loans to establish yourself or the refugees for the latter still live in huts".

As for the Government's responsibility in saddling Bulgaria with this onerous arrangement, Dr. Beshkov declared on April 20, 1932 in the Sobranye that Liaptchev and Burov were to blame for agreeing in 1926 to reimburse the pre-war loans in gold instead of in paper francs.

When such an example of gross spoliation was set at the top by those who were supposed to supervise and control the funds raised on behalf of the refugees we need not feel suprised that lesser officials manifested little zeal in practising economy and preventing embezzlements. Obviously, the borrowers were encouraged to have a few years of artificial prosperity in order to forget the bitterness engendered by the imposition of such onerous clauses.

Thus in July 1933 the Bulgarian Press cited the names of certain architects and engineers employed by the State in supervising the settlement of the refugees, of having embezzled some 15,000,000 leva, and it was further stressed that out of the construction of 264 houses built at Kavacli for housing the refugees some 5 millions had been misappropriated by them. These malversations were first denounced by M. Vlassakov, a courageous outspoken journalist, and he continued his campaign of denunciation in the *Mir* in spite of M. Charron's (the League of Nations' delegate in Bulgaria) efforts to hush up the matter, and the menaces and threats of the incriminated parties. For a time he was even prevailed upon by official circles to cease writing as he was assured that a commission of inquiry had been appointed to examine into these peculations, but as little was done and the

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culprits remained as active as before, he returned to the charge and continued his exposures. He affirms that over 18,000,000 leva were embezzled by two persons alone who had issued paying orders without adequate justification.

Another revelation as to the improper use of the money provided by the Refugee loan was made by the "Radical" December 6, 1932. This paper being the mouthpiece of M. Kosturkov, former minister of railways, was qualified to know how matters stood. 300 millions from the proceeds of the Refugee Loan were earmarked for the construction of the Rakovski-Mastanli railway but a large part was dissipated in a spirit of levity that illustrates the utter disregard shown by the Liaptchev administration for the obligations it assumed in formal protocols to private creditors. It shows at the same time to what extent M. Kosturkov was vigilant and anxious to cut down expenses in his department. In this he holds a record, for in the two years of his administration he reduced its expenditure by 500 millions. It was his parsimony and scrupulousness which incited his more. profligate colleagues to organise the political cabal which caused his overthrow and brought just and swift retribution in the coup d'état of May 19. 1934. Thus the paper stated: "The bridge over the river Arda cost 10 millions while the one over the Sutliika though one fourth the size cost 9,800,000 leva. The discrepancy was due to the bad administration of the Democratic Entente, this will also explain why this railway line is the most expensive one in Bulgaria, costing 4,150,000 leva per kilometer". What many of us will resent even more than the improper use of of our money was that the houses destined for the refugees were very badly built and M. Vlassakov in one of his numerous articles in the *Mir*, August, 1,1933, affirmed that in the Burgas districts hundreds of thousands of leva had to be spent on repairing these houses within

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a year of their termination, as 20 % to 50 % of the bricks employed in their construction were of too inferior a quality. And these imputations levelled by M. Vlassakov as to the bad housing of the refugees are well founded for deputy N. Traikov speaking in the Sobranye on March 17, 1932, complained that though these houses cost each 35,000 leva they were badly built, and the people cannot stand erect in them.

What speaks volumes for the honesty of the masses and contrasts strongly with the behaviour of its leaders is that the refugees to whom this deputy refers after complaining to him of their difficulties, of the impossibility of refunding the cost of their lands and homes to the government, expressed their readiness to evacuate them. For the lands and houses were not presented free to the refugees, but were to be bought by them on easy instalments, the State retaining a mortgage on them until fully reimbursed, The sums thus obtained are to serve for the reimbursement of the loan. By August 31, 1934 the sum of 20,203,733 leva had been reimbursed by the refugees; it is owing to the drop in the value of agricultural produce that proceeds from this head have been so scanty. Some of the funds set aside for the establishment of refugees were specially ear-marked for the draining of marshes, for Bulgaria had not sufficient land to provide for all their requirements. Apparently certain sums so destined were most uneconomically employed, provoking the righteous indignation of a talented deputy, who in his much commented and appreciated book "Among the people wrote as follows on the subject (p. 64):

> The authority in charge of the settlement of refugees has bragged a lot about its efforts to drain the Indjekoy marsh (near Mesembria) and proclaiming that it had thus reclaimed a vast track of land. In fact ³/₄ of this area was grazing land equally as valuable as the arable land into which it will now be converted; as to the remaining part, it is below sea level and without resorting to pumping

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it will remain a marsh. For the conversion of this area of 1000—1200 hectares from pasturage to arable land, 15 million leva[1] have been spent, or 15,000 leva per hectare! (the price of arable land, is less than half this figure in Bulgaria), as to the annual cost of maintaining the drains, the future alone will enlighten us. But this is not all! In order that the cattle of the future settlers may be led to pasture, six huge concrete bridges each capable of sustaining a load of twenty tons were constructed. Will they start breeding Brobdingnagian cattle in these newly opened lands, or is it in tanks that they will transport their harvest? — six bridges costing six million leva. If this is not waste I do not know what else it may be called. At a short distance, all in a group, six colossal bridges, while along the whole lower course of the Kamtsia, that of the Taka Dere and the Karabounar river there is not a single bridge, so that whole districts remain isolated, as if in foreign territory. Thus insensately millions out of this much advertised refugee loan have been dispersed. Let us pray these millions will soon be exhausted in order that these mad acts may also cease."

In the face of these facts are not American and British bondholders entitled to call to account the Financial Committee of the League of Nations and to ask for an explanation not only of their own behaviour but of that of their delegate in Bulgaria, M. Charron, who apparently was too engrossed in contemplating the natural beauties of that country while rolling along in his luxurious Mercedes car, provided as M. Muchanov stated at the cost of some 700,000—800,000 leva out of the moneys subscribed by the bondholders of the Refugee loan?

The debates in the Sobranye on the so-called Stabilisation Loan raised in 1928 reveal that the same policy of exploiting the difficult position Bulgaria was in continued, naturally with the connivance of the same ministers and in spite of public opinion, as far this may be ascertained in Bulgaria, which was decidedly against the conclusion of the loan, as it could be clearly foreseen

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[1] This is an underestimate, according to an official report dated March 24, 1933 the sum expended on draining this marsh was 19,230,866.

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that it would bring no relief, but that on the contrary it would only involve fresh burdens for the country. The triumvirate, Liaptchev-Mollov-Burov which was in charge of the government had come to the conclusion that the more commercial and private debts Bulgaria concluded the better, for they would certainly get precedence over the political, and that the payment of the latter would be suspended in order that Bulgaria might pay the former. It was thus good policy to run into debt in order to avoid paying indemnities, and in the meantime Bulgaria in her turn had the satisfaction of squeezing something out of her exploiters. It was an astute deal, and the disappointment and loss subsequently inflicted on the financiers who undertook the underwriting of these loans was fully deserved by them. What one regrets is the small investor who fell a victim to the intrigues and cupidity of these two rival camps of astuteness and rascality. When taken subsequently to task in the Sobranye for his financial policy, the late M. Liaptchev attemped to vindicate himself by hinting that default on a large scale would ensue, thus turning to his successor in office, M. Muchanov he made this illuminating remark:

> There will be no loss to Bulgaria. The Prime Minister affirmed in the Committee of Foreign Affairs that he would buy up all the bonds of these two loans for 500 millions. Is it not so M. le President?

M. Muchanov's answer is not recorded in the Parliamentary minutes (Sept. 6, 1932), evidently it was not politic to dilate on such a thorny matter for... "taisez vous, mefiez vous, les oreilles enemies vous écoutent!"

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British investors who subscribed to these loans did so because they inferred that their Government which was represented on the Council of the League of Nations which had approved them, had likewise done so. Their savings were supposed to be safeguarded from improper

457 use by international control in which their own Government was to participate, and if there has not been proper supervision it should shoulder its share of responsibility. In 1933 the British Government went out of its way and paid £5,500,000 in order to meet "a moral obligation" on its dollar bonds of 1917, though there was no legal obligation upon it to assume a liability of which it had been relieved by the action of the United States when it went off the gold standard and abrogated the gold clause. The Chancellor of the Exchequer championed with considerable warmth the rights of these bondholders "until a short time ago" he said, "they had every reason to suppose that those rights were valid. In these circumstances we came to the conclusion — indeed, we could not resist the conclusion — that we had some moral obligation towards these people etc". Sir Stafford Cripps and others denounced in very plain language:

> "We do very strongly resent this special finding of £5,500,000 for the City of London, because that is what it comes to. . . If we were going to embark on that principle there were better recipients of our bounty than the bondholders of this particular issue. The vast majority of these bonds were now in the hands of quite different people from those who originally lent the money".

Nevertheless the measure was passed and a precedent created which may be usefully invoked by British holders of these Bulgarian loans, who if they cannot secure an indemnity from their own Government should at least secure its support for obtaining a more equitable share in the distribution of the available assets.

However some people may criticise this act of the British Government it serves to emphasize one principle, namely that investors who have suffered a loss through depreciation of currency are entitled to some compensation. This must have been acknowledged even by the

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Bulgarian Government when it agreed to repay its pre-war French loans on a gold basis instead of in paper francs. What is somewhat disconcerting however, is that having shown itself so punctilious towards its French creditors it should have failed to comport itself in the same manner towards its American and British creditors, who more gentlemanly, and imbued with a greater sense of fair play, had not attempted like the French to make Bulgaria shoulder the loss which their own governments had inflicted on them by decreeing the depreciation of their respective currencies.

As has been explained, a preliminary condition for the conclusion of the Refugee loan was that of Bulgaria's acceptance of the revalorisation of her pre-war debts, a condition which was clearly a case of favouritism at the expense not only of the Bulgarian public, but also of *bona-fide* investors in this loan. This same policy, though on a smaller scale, was also pursued in connection with the 1928 loan. In order to secure the necessary revenue for the payment of the service of the loan, the Reparation Commission agreed to waive its rights on the customs revenues of the State and assign them specially to this purpose. Art. 132 of the Treaty of Neuilly had pledged all assets and revenues of Bulgaria to this Reparation Commission. The rights of the latter on this branch of revenue were implicit and indisputable for whatever claims German nationals may have had on this particular item they had renounced them, as becomes clear by art. 139 of the same Treaty which plainly stipulates: "If, in accordance with articles 235 and 260 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, all rights, interests and securities held by any German... national under the contracts and agreements regulating the loan concluded by Bulgaria in Germany in July 1914, are taken over by the Reparation Commission, the Bulgarian Government undertakes to

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

SOFIA: THE ALEX. NEVSKI CHURCH

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A GROUP OF PEASANTS

[facing p. 97]

457 do everything in its power to facilitate this transfer". This loan alluded to, had been contracted by the Diskonto Gesellshaft, but as this German bank had not fulfilled its part of the contract with the Bulgarian government, all its rights had lapsed; besides the Bulgarian Government had a formidable range of claims against the Germans, so that there was not a ghost of evidence to show that there was the slightest justification for raising this veritable skeleton in the cupboard. As M. Liaptchev himself admitted in the Sobranye on June 28, 1928. „We appointed a judicial commission to consider the Diskonto Gesellschaft's claims and it has reported that it had no legal ground whatever for them". Nevertheless the Financial Committee of the League of Nations thought that this question of the Diskonto Gesellschaft's lapsed rights might serve as a colourable pretext for extorting from the wretched Bulgarian peasantry a few hundred millions. As to the motives which inspired this sudden solicitude for the German bank no one can be so artless as to entertain any doubts. As the Sobranye would have rejected outright the loan if this proposed indemnification of the Diskonto Gesellschaft had been divulged this was judiciously hidden from the deputies as becomes evident from a passage in the interpellation addressed by the veteran Bulgarian parliamentarian, M. Ilia Gheorgov, to the Government on March 16, 1928,

> "It is rumoured that Bulgaria will be forced to assume certain engagements towards the Diskonto Gesellschaft. A parliamentary regime demands that the Chamber should be consulted and not placed before a *fait accompli*".

When later it became known that the Liaptchev administration had accepted to satisfy the Financial Committee's demand on this subject a chorus af denunciations arose in the Sobranye, M. Muchanov, the leader of the Opposition declared on June 28, 1928: "Since the

Government knew that this question had to be settled before securing the loan, it ought to have asked the Sobranye's opinion prior to accepting the loan protocole." M. Pastuhov, one of the leaders of the Socialist party added:

> "This secret should not have been kept from the Sobranye by the Minister of Finance so that the acceptance of the loan protocol might be made easy. His assurance that nothing is to be paid to the Diskonto out of the loan is humbug; the latter bank being now in close association with English and other banks, its claims will be considered".

While M. Gheorghov again denounced the unparliamentary attitude of the government in mystifying the Chamber and insisted that at least the question of Bulgaria's claims against Germany should be simultaneously discussed with those of the Diskonto Gesellschaft. The voting of this loan caused an uproar in the Sobranye and what proves its unpopularity was that it split the Government majority, usually a body characterised by extreme docility and keen attentiveness to the behests of those on high. The feelings of every independently minded and intelligent Bulgarian were correctly interpreted by Dr. Beshkov, an Opposition deputy, when he affirmed in the Sobranye on November 14, 1928:

> "With an annual deficit of some 500 millions in our balance of payments increased by 170 millions of the annuity of the Refugee loan and by 250 to 260 millions that of the new loan, all the reserves at the National Bank will soon be exhausted and a new loan needed. The present loan will only serve to stabilise temporarily the party in power but not our national economy. We shall not vote for it".[1]

Another deputy. M. G. Petrov was equally outspoken:

> "In a few years the funds provided by the loan will be exhausted and we shall find ourselves in the same situation as now The deficits in the budgets arise from the payment of political debts; by

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[1] Both the former Prime Minister M. K. Gheorghiev and Minister of Finance, P. Todorov, who were deputies and nominal supporters of the Government voted against the loan.

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457 balancing them with loans we simply transform political indebtedness into commercial or private indebtedness".

It is idle to contend that the Financial Committee of the Leangue of Nations was not aware of the state of affairs in Bulgaria and that it allowed itself to be hoodwinked by that quintessence of diplomatic finesse, the triumvirate Liaptchev—Mollov—Burov. It bears even a greater share of responsibility than these Bulgarian Ministers, for the loss investors in these loans have suffered, since it cannot even offer the same justification for its acts as the latter, who as several Bulgarian deputies affirmed, contracted the loans in order to stabilise, at least temporarily, their seats on the Ministerial bench. What greater condemnation can there be of this insensate policy than that contained in the utterences in the Sobranye of M. Stefanov, the succeeding Minister of Finances, on June 17, 1932 and July 10, 1932:

> "Bulgaria could have done without any loans these last years, in such a case she would have had to provide 600 million less annually, this being the amount she has to disburse now on account of the last two loans and for the revalorisation of the pre-war loans. This would have constituted a great relief, and would have allowed Bulgaria to live without worries... The burden of the reparations has not worsened our condition as we ourselves have worsened it by our financial and other transactions. It is true that the reparations constituted a heavy charge but this imposition can not serve to disculpate us for our errors".

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652 In fact as soon as the proceeds of these two loans became available, the Liaptchev administration began indulging in an orgy of squandering in order to placate its adherents and to show that it could act with munificence worthy of a great government. If we turn once more to M. Stefanov's speeches we shall find him relating:

> "In 1928 there were over two milliards of uncollected taxes which in the next two years had increased to 2800 millions, 75% of which could have been collected if the Government had so wished, but there was no effort to do so. No measures were taken to stop in

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time the drain on the gold reserves of the National Bank and to-day we are obliged to cut down ruthlessly imports into Bulgaria for we only have foreign exchange enough to meet the requirements of 10% to 30% of our indispensable imports. There has been waste in every direction; in order to show the electorate that the Government had not forgotten it, the construction of railway lines and public works had been started in all directions and had to be suspended later for lack of funds. It will take 12 years to terminate these lines. There was no system, no policy whatever.

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In another speech, on June 1, 1932, M. Stefanov informs us that the Liaptchev administration was equally prodigal in the matter of granting loans to towns and communes out of the State Exchequer, or with the State's guarantee; 2744 millions had thus been advanced of which only 400 millions had so far been reimbursed. Many communes were not paying even interest on these advances and the money might well be considered as good as lost.

Concerning the indefensible prodigality the Liaptchev administration displayed in its public works policy it is not necessary to turn to its successors in office in order to find it criticised. It was condemned even by its supporters at the time while it was still indulging in this phenomenal profligacy. Thus in the Parliamentary minutes (June 28, 1928) we read of M. D. Neikov, a government supporter who proceeded to lecture the Government in the following terms:

"The Government has no plan in railway construction and complete anarchy prevails. Eighteen lines are being constructed simultaneously. We start constructing and then suspend work. The earthworks of the Tserven Breg-Teteven line had been completed but the work stopped and the elements have washed them away. If the line is to be constructed the work will have to be done over again. It is the same with the Panagurishte-Plovdiv line. What are we to say however about the fact that, having already a railway between Sarambey and Tsepino, the Government starts constructing a parallel line Tatar-Pazardjic-Tsepino. Does this not prove that we are

457 actuated not by our country's interest but by those of our partisans or by our own private ones?"

652 This speaker was succeeded by another Government deputy, M. G. T. Popov, who confirmed his colleagues' recriminations in the following rejoinder:

> "Whoever passes by Tatar Pazardjic sees that money is spent uselessly. . . This railway line is a monument of waste and extravagance".

457 Similar criticisms might be quoted ad infinitum, they came both from official and unofficial circles and bondholders may well ask what was the delegate of the League of Nations doing? True, his functions were to see that the Bulgarian Government made arrangements to pay the annuities of the loans, but it was easy to foresee that the wastefulness of the Government was rapidly exhausting the resources of the country and that it would be impossible to provide for the payment of the coupons in a few years. But apparently there was a cordial entente between the custodian and those who had been confided to his custody. Obviously, if the Financial Committee had imposed on the Bulgarian Ministers the acceptance of the revalorisation of the Bulgarian pre war loans entailing a supplementary charge of 8500 million leva (see M. Yanulov's speech in the Sobranye (Feb. 12, 1929) to the Bulgarian Exchequer, such generosity had to be requited by the Financial Committee blinking at the intensive "affairisme" of their clandestine associates. This occult fraternisation lasted sometime, for the Bulgarian Ministers equally agreed to raise no opposition about the resurrection of the Diskonto Gesellschaft's untenable claims solemnly abrogated by Articles 235 and 260 of the Treaty of Versailles, and Article 139 of the Treaty of Neuilly. This shady transaction resulted in Bulgaria being saddled with a further total charge of 20,825,000 gold francs, repayable in annual instalments until 1944. In this case no French

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politicians, ever alert to denounce threatening infringements of their sacro-sanct Treaties, denounced this gross violation of both Treaties of Neuilly and Versailles. Of course it was a mere matter of fleecing some Bulgarian peasants, or of relieving some American and British investors of a part of their superfluous wealth so why bother about such trivialities! This harmonious co-operation between the Financial Committee of the League of Nations and the Liaptchev Government would have gone on still, for the gullibility of the investing public is well known, and the sign-post of the League of Nations as an association of underwriters is bound to inspire greater confidence than that of a Hatry or a Krüger.

The floating of loans presupposes the existence of needy borrowers, spending therefore required encouragement, for if borrowers did not spend the money they raised, they would have no need to resort anew to the bankers. This is self evident and explains the profligacy of the Liaptchev administration, which turned a deaf ear even to the disapprobatory remarks of its more parsimonious supporters. As Prof. G. P. Ghenov affirmed in the Sobranye on May 16, 1932:

> " Its policy was to govern the country by concluding loans every three or four years. It had prepared the preliminary steps for the conclusion of a loan destined to foster Bulgarian co-operative societies".

But those Bulgarian peasants proved too suspicious; the members of the co-operatives gave the alarm. The contents of this cornucopia which the Government wanted to empty on them must contain mixed blessings, it smacked of *"timeo Danaos et dona ferentes"*, for surely foreigners were not going to shower their gold on Bulgaria for nothing! So that when the electorate was consulted in 1931 M. Liaptchev's applecart was upset to his immense surprise and dismay. This was a stroke of luck for the

457 would-be investors in that prospective Bulgarian Co-operatives' Loan which the League of Nations was preparing to patronise; for those would-be investors might now have been in the same fix as the bondholders of the two other loans floated under the alluring and alas! delusive aegis of the League of Nations.

457 65 The Refugee Loan floated in 1926 was labelled in pounds sterling and dollars and was in its great bulk subscribed by American and British investors. It was repayable in 40 years, the price of issue was 92 and the yield 7%. The nominal amount was £ 3,300,000 and $ 4,500,000 but the net proceeds available to Bulgaria were £ 2,112,000 and £ 3,915,000 for some £ 625,889 were employed for the reinbursement of the Bulgarian Exchequer bonds issued in 1912-1913 to the French Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas. The money borrowed had been in French francs and the bank was repaid in the current rate of the franc and not in gold and though this arrangement seemed quite fair, yet there were Bulgarian deputies who considered that the Bank had been unduly favoured. (See Prof. P. Stoyanov's speech in the Sobranye Sept. 24, 1926). But when, one comes to consider the case of the revalorisation of the pre-war loans, it is apparent that it was a case of swallowing the camel and straining at its tail. Specific revenues were assigned to its service such as the excise on salt and alcohol and the proceeds of the match monopoly. Further, the Reparation Commission agreed to suspend the payment of reparations if such transfers were likely to affect the stability of the Bulgarian currency. A further security was provided by the fact that the State had undertaken to place at the disposal of the refugees 132,000 hectares of land, and the refugees were to refund both the value of the land and of the houses to be built out of the funds provided by the loan. The money to be

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derived from this source was to be earmarked for the repayment of the loan. For this purpose the farms of the refugees had been mortgaged to the Bulgarian Agricultural Bank, which was to supervise the refunding of these sums by the refugees. To all intents and purposes there was full security, the special revenues assigned to the service of the loan providing three times the amount needed for its service though recently the yield of these taxes has slightly decreased. Repayments by the refugees have dwindled, for owing to the fall in the price of agricultural produce they are not in a position to continue the reimbursements of their mortgages. A large number of them had been expelled from Greece, but by the Kalfov-Politis and the Mollov-Cafandaris protocols, which received the sanction of the League of Nations, Greece had undertaken to indemnify them for their possessions which they had left behind. Bulgaria had likewise bound herself to indemnify such Greeks as emigrated from Bulgaria. As the number of Bulgarians who were forced to leave Greece was far in excess of the Greeks leaving Bulgaria, there was an outstanding balance due by Greece to Bulgaria of 1,030 million leva, which sum had it been transferred to the Bulgarian refugees (See M. Smilov's speech in the Sobranye May 5, 1932) would have served for the paying off by them of their mortgages to the Bulgarian Agricultural Bank, and the money would have been used for the gradual repayment of the loan. Nothing, however has been done to compel Greece to carry out her obligations on this head. The Kalfov-Politis agreement admits that the obligation is of a private character, and that the balance arising from the exchanged properties should be handed to the refugees. This stipulation however is not reiterated in the Mollov—Cafandaris agreement which superseded it and Greece now takes advantage of the moratorium on inter-government liabilities to put off the settlement of this debt claiming that it is not a private matter but a governmental one. Prof. G. N. Ghenov speaking in the Sobranye on March 16, 1932 on this matter stated:

> "The Hague Court to which the matter had been referred found that it was not within its province, but the case of the Hungarian optans proves the rectitude of Bulgaria's point of view, namely that it was a case of private debts which should be respected. Bulgaria had concluded a loan to enable these people to settle, if she receives money from Greece she will reimburse the loan, if she is not paid why should she be bound to pay in her turn"?

A perfectly judicious remark, though hardly reassuring to the bondholders who had better see that justice be done to Bulgaria if they wish the latter to do justice to them.

According to official data, a total of 1,619,064,310 leva provided by the State had been expended on the winding up of the department entrusted with the settlement of refugees, on the housing and assisting the refugees, draining marshes, constructing roads, and the railway line Rakovski—Mastanli etc., according to the summary appended below:

	Leva
Preparatory work on lands	77,879.200
Seeds etc.	75,167,806
Cattle	182,097,700
Agricultural implements & carts	81,026,153
Construction of houses	657,692,692
Draining of marshes	122.584,359
Railroad line Rakovski-Mastanli	324,872,617
Roads	13,971,109
Hygiene, Anti-malaria campaign etc.	18,220,905
Water adduction and improvements	36,330,852
Accountancy & general expenses	53,589,570
Total. . .	1,643,432,963

According to a statement by M. Gr. Vassilev in the Sobranye (Feb. 3, 1932) 30,099 families had been financially assisted and settled in rural districts and 7,896 in urban localities. The majority had come from Greece;

7,896 from Western Thrace and 11,705 from Greek Macedonia, 1,240 from Serbian Macedonia, 1856 from the west confines of Bulgaria which had been ceded to Serbia, 3,748 from the Dobrudja, and 15,802 from Turkey. There were a few thousand families which had not been in need of State help.

The balance of the loan over and above the 1,643,433,963 leva was not used for productive purposes; it served to pay reparations and debts, a matter which was strongly criticised in the Sobranye and which has been referred to.

The Stabilisation Loan floated in 1928 was labelled in pounds sterling, dollars, and French francs and was issued for the nominal amounts of £ 1,800,000. $ 13,000,000 and Frs. 130,000,000, the net proceeds being £ 1,616,713-13-0, $ 11,910,750 and Frs. 116,350,000, or a total of 3,370,065,553 leva. The price of issue was 96 in England, 97 in the United States and 98·20 in France, and the yield 7·5%.

The revenue from customs affected to the service of the loan was far in excess of the amount required, and although there has been a marked falling off in custom dues, yet the amount raised annually is still sufficient (774 millions in 1932-3 & 514 millions in 1933-4) to provide twice over the requisite sum. The proceeds of the loan were utilised as follows: £ 1,500,000 paid to the National Bank in partial reimbursement of its advances to the State, £ 500,000 and £ 150,000 each to the Agricultural and Co-operative Bank, so that their scope of action might be extended, £ 1,100,000 were used to wipe off budget deficits, £ 1,250,000 employed for the overhauling of railways, roads and ports, and £ 500,000 for repairing the damage caused by the earthquake in the Plovdiv region. Simultaneously the sphere of action of the National Bank was rigorously limited and defined so as to shield it from all interference from the State.

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Thus the amount of exchequer bonds it was allowed to discount was limited to 400 million leva and a foreign counsellor was appointed to supervise its accounts and report to the League of Nations on its activities.

Bulgaria, like other countries, has been severely hit by the fall in the price of agricultural produce which has happened since 1929. There has been a marked drop in the State revenues with the result that the budget has continually been closed with deficits, but owing to the draconian measures adopted since 1929 with the object of curtailing imports and thus restricting the outflow of gold from the country, the government has succeeded since 1930 in transforming an almost perpetually passive commercial balance into an active one (except for the year 1932 which showed an excess of imports over exports of 88 millions). Unfortunately, owing to the existing system of clearings and quotas, the realised surplus from excesses of exports over imports to and from one country is not always available for the discharge of a debt towards another country. The principal creditor countries, Great Britain, France, and the United States continue to export to Bulgaria far in excess of what they import from her. Especially this is so in the case of England, for until quite recently Bulgaria used to buy from her six to seven times as much as what she sold. It is obvious therefore that Bulgaria was not in a position to transfer sufficient sums with which to pay her excess of imports over exports, and at the same time to effect the service of her debt towards these States. It devolves on these countries to furnish greater trading facilities to Bulgaria, in order that she may be in a better position to discharge her obligations. This is especially incumbent in the case of Great Britain, which is in the course of losing one of her most valuable clients in the Near East, her exports to Bulgaria having gradually dwindled from 738.9 in 1929

to 152.2 in 1933 and 143 million leva in 1934 while her 457
imports were reduced from 100.08 to 49.8 million leva 652
between 1929 and 1933 (53 millions in 1934).

The surplus from the commercial balance is the only source from which external debts may be paid, since the gold resserves of the National Bank can not be further drawn upon without compromising the stability of the currency, and Bulgaria has no foreign investments providing other invisible resources. Owing to the continuous shrinkage of the exports and the consequent reduction of this surplus (160.1 million in 1930, 1,274 millions in 1931, a deficit of 88 millions in 1932, a surplus of 644 millions in 1933 and of 288 in 1934) the Bulgarian Government has found it impossible to meet its liabilities, notwithstanding the fact that owing to the moratorium on inter-governmental debts, it has been relieved of the obligation of providing annually some 10 million gold francs under the head of reparations. Thus in 1932 it was obliged to demand a partial suspension of its payments abroad, and this was conceded in the form of a reduction on the interest of its exterior debt to the extent of 40%. But this concession proved insufficient, and by an agreement signed in May 1934 the percentage of the interest payable was further reduced to 32.5% of the original sum for a period of two years, expiring on April 1st, 1936. By the end of 1934, however owing to the shrinkage of the excess of exports over imports, the Bulgarian Government declared itself unable to carry it out, and demanded that the rate of interest payable on its exterior debts should be reduced proportionately to its available resources. Its request is justifiable; since the creditor countries refuse to buy Bulgarian produce wherewith to provide their debtor with the means with which it can discharge its obligations, Bulgaria's creditors must bow to the inevitable. American and British bond-

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holders of the two last loans, however, are entitled to insist on a better repartition of the available surplus, for in this matter they have been wronged. Owing to the depreciation of their national currencies they were being paid 40 % less by the Bulgarian Government than what the latter was paying to the French subscribers of the Stabilisation loan.

In fact while the latter received 32 1/2 % of the original amount of interest due, American and British bondholders were only receiving 19 %. But what seems ~~a far~~ greater injustice is that while American and British bondholders have forfeited 40% of what is due to them, owing to the depreciation of their national currencies, holders of the Bulgarian pre-war loans, labelled in francs, in spite of the fact that the currency in which their bonds are labelled has depreciated to the extent of 80%. should be receiving preferential treatment in the form of a gradually appreciating payment which will shortly attain gold parity. If American and British bondholders were being paid in full in their national currency, there would be no cause for complaining, but when Bulgaria who has taken full advantage of the depreciation of the pound sterling and of the dollar, and proceeds to reimburse her French creditors not in their national currency but in gold, and using for this purpose a portion of the available sum which is the common property of *all* her creditors, it is high time that a halt should be called. Naturally French bondholders who are always strongly backed by their government, will exert the utmost pressure on the Bulgarian Government in order to maintain their present position of vantage and it is useless to appeal to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations which has itself sanctioned this favouritism. The latter really represents the interests of International Finance and these birds of prey have shared the booty plucked from hapless Bulgaria, by ceding the spoils derived from

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the revalorisation of her pre-war loans to the French group 457
while reserving the proceeds of the opportunely resurrected
claims of the Diskonto Gesellschaft to the Anglo-American 652
or British groups. These are matters which even peasant deputies are conversant with in Bulgaria,[1] and which are powerfully working to poison public opinion against the West which alas! has distinguished itself rather by its rapacity than by anything else, and contributel to turn the country Bolshevik.[2]

The only hope for American and British bona-fide 000
investors in these loans to better their position, is to organise themselves into a committee and take up the defence of their own interests. If they insisted on a more equitable distribution of the available surplus, not only they would get as much as they were receiving under the agreement of May, 1934, but they have a chance of bettering their position. The amount needed for the annual service of Bulgaria's foreign debt by this convention is some 236 million leva, while the available surplus of exports over imports for the year 1934 is 288 millions. It would seem therefore that the paltry 19% (instead of 32½%) of the interest originally due to them and which was served out to them by the above mentioned convention could be substantially increased. It lies also with the

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[1] While the Stabilisation loan was discussed in the Sobranye, M. H. Baev, a peasant deputy, got up and in a vigourous invective denounced the Government for endeavouring to bamboozle the opposition by assurances that no promises had been given to consider the defunct claims of the Diskonto. "These" he said," had been bought for a mere song by English bankers and Bulgaria would be made to pay for them through the nose."

[2] One may well sympathise with Prof. F. Soddy when he proceeds to denounce the doings of international bankers and financiers and exhorts us to do away with "a hierarchy of impostors and humbugs whom it is the first task of a sane civilisation to expose and clear out". ("The role of money" p. 214).

000 bondholders to propose another method which would secure for them a more advantageous return. For if they can not be better paid in their own currencies owing to the latter's shortage in Bulgaria, they may insist on being paid in Bulgarian currency which is more plentiful, for the special revenues affected to these loans provide several times over the amount needed for their services. The Bulgarian currency thus obtained may be used by bondholders for defraying their holiday expenses which they can take in Bulgaria. Sofia within two and a half days from London, possesses all the amenities of a holiday resort, an excellent climate, a plentiful water supply, cheap and comfortable hotels, mineral, thermal and radio-active springs with an extensive range of curative properties, as well as modern thermal baths, beautiful scenery and an excellent opera. Those who indulge in sports will rejoice to know that a magnificent open swimming pool is available as well as a stadium and that mountaineering can be indulged in in its immediate vicinity. Those again who have a predilection for the sea may resort to Varna, which in natural beauty rivals Biarritz, while the cost of living will be found to be a bare fraction of that in the fashionable French resort. As for the majority of bondholders to whom the taking of their holidays in Bulgaria is not practicable, they may advantageously dispose of their Bulgarian currency in another way. They can come to an understanding with the Bulgarian Co-operative societies and in association with them open a distributing centre for Bulgarian produce in London, and there in exchange for their Bulgarian currency acquire for their personal use an immense range of goods at competitive prices, such as tinned vegetables, fruit and meats, cheese, prunes, cigarettes, bacon, hams, poultry, flour, eggs, perfumes, rugs, etc. etc. There will be no difficulty whatever for an average British householder to spend thus in a year the re-

venue he may derive from an original investment of a couple of thousand pounds in Bulgarian League of Nations' Loans. Such an arrangement would not only bring relief to British investors, but would be of inestimable advantage to the Bulgarian Co-operative Societies, which would get a footing in the English market and secure the patronage of a numerous class whose interests would coincide with theirs, since the cost of running such a distributing centre would be shared by both parties. For diplomatic reasons the Bulgarian Government may consider it impolitic to espouse outright such suggestions, however it may approve of such a scheme. Britain's detachment from European affairs obliges Bulgaria to manage French susceptibilities to the utmost, and France will disapprove of a scheme likely to be disadvantageous to her nationals, for no government backs its bondholders so fervently as the French. But if Anglo-American investors league themselves together and insist on their rights being respected, championing at the same time Bulgaria's interests, which after all are identical to theirs, they are bound to carry the day, for the average Bulgarian is quick to grasp where his interests lie.

American and British investors in the Refugee Loan, were largely actuated by their sympathy for Bulgaria when they proceeded to subscribe to it; (the writer knows something about this, since he himself invested a couple of thousand pounds and canvassed all his friends in his native Lancashire, inviting them to do likewise). They in common with Bulgarian ratepayers have been disgracefully exploited; but they can prevent being sponged upon in the future by joining hands. To persist in the present passivity is merely to encourage spoliation. Since the pledges given as security to these loans provide a sufficiency for the integral payment of its service, it is preposterous that subscribers should renounce their rights without ade-

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000 quate reason. It would certainly be unfair and injudicious on their part to insist on exacting their full pound of flesh, such a strangulation of Bulgaria in the interests of a creditor minority would not be tolerated. But a demand
457 on the part of Bulgaria for an alleviation in the charge of
435 the actual debt is justifiable in view of the fact that the fall in world prices has increased the burden of the world's debts very considerably, and has therefore correspondingly improved the position of all creditors.

The extent to which this burden has increased, owing to the fall in agricultural produce in respect of these two League of Nations' Loans may be gauged by a very instructive article published a few years ago by the Association of Bulgarian Economists, which shows the respective values of the loans in tons of wheat at the time of their conclusion, and in 1930. It was thus explained that the total proceeds of the two loans at the time of their subscription was equivalent in value to 957,066 tons of wheat, while by 1930 owing to the fall in the price of commodities, Bulgaria would have had to provide 2,638,317 tons of wheat to raise the same amount of money wherewith to repay her debt. This shows to what extent Bulgaria's paying capacity has been impaired, but even if we adjusted it on this basis we should find that she should pay 35% of the original interest instead of the paltry 19% which she taking advantage of the depreciation of the American and British currencies has been serving out until quite recently to the American and British bondholders.[1] This

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652 [1] By an arrangement arrived at in April 1935, the Bulgarian government will continue paying 32½% of the interest due on these loans until Sept. 30, 1935. but of this amount only 15% will be transferred abroad for distribution, while the balance of 17½% will be placed to the credit of a blocked account. Discussions as to subsequent payments are to be resumed in October 1935. The dividend distributed during July 1935 on the Refugee Loan amounted to £5—5—0 per

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is hardly fair and if this be brought to the knowledge of the Bulgarian public, it will itself protest against the discrimination which is being exhibited towards a section of its creditors. But unfortunately both the Bulgarian Government and public are helpless, they are bound by the shackles of the Treaty of Neuilly, they are not masters in their house. they are precluded from redressing the wrongs they suffer from, and which are inflicted on others in their name. It is rather on the American and British bondholders that this duty devolves, and when the latter decide to demand a more equitable treatment, let them realise that it entails also a larger share of justice to Bulgaria. For if the revalorisation of the pre-war debts

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£1000 of nominal capital, but if the depreciation of the dollar and pound be taken into consideration, this was tantamount to a rate of 0·7% per annum. It will be of interest to bondholders to know that payment at the rate of 15% of the sums due on its foreign debt involves a total charge to the Bulgarian exchequer of 105,667,655 leva apportioned as follows among its foreign committments:

On the pre-war loans	40,735,216
„ „ two L. of N. loans	42,346,464
„ „ upkeep of the delegates of the pre-war loans & of the commissary of the L. of N.	4,674,236
„ „ 6½% 1923 loan	3,063,128
„ „ sum due to the Diskonto Gesellshaft .	3,616,440
„ „ 7% 1923 loan (utilised for settlement of the des Clusières affair . On the amount due to the Jonction Salonique-	640,594
Constantinople railway (paid integrally 100%)	10,561,387

Bondholders should note that if interest on the pre-war loans were paid in paper francs, the amount to be disbursed would be about a third of the 40.735,216 earmarked for this purpose. It would be well if explanations were asked as to why the Bulgarian gorernment is burdened with the upkeep of a special delegate of the holders of these loans, for the commissary of the L. of N. could attend to this job and a saving of over two million leva would thereby be effected. An explanation is likewise due as to why the railway Jonction-Salonique is receiving preferential treatment.

457 435 and the payment of an indemnity for the fictitious claims of the Diskonto Gesellschaft be suspended, this means a considerable alleviation of the charge laid on Bulgaria's shoulders They could equally raise the question of the payment of the sums outstanding to the refugees, for whenever, and if, these unfortunate people recover their due, they will hasten to refund the mortgages on their houses and the money thus recovered will be at the disposal of the bondholders. It should not be forgotten that the sums outstanding are not negligible, 1,030 million leva from Greece and almost ten times as much from Turkey. Let it be remembered that Bulgaria can not recover this money without international support because she has been disarmed and rendered helpless mainly at the instigation of her despoilers. Such interference, it is true, implies the exploding of the existing fiction of a nation's sovereignty but it is high time that this outgrown conception should be set aside. When a State has recourse to financial assistance abroad, it converts itself into a sort of limited company, and extends in a sense its citizenship to its creditors. The latter are as anxious as the natives for its welfare and there should be no resentment if they proceed to flash theirh searchlights into hidden places and call to account the directors of the „company" when things threaten to go astray. This is the prerogative of all shareholders in public companies and it has proved an excellent corrective to abuse. Such interference in local affairs by foreigners has been often resented, because it is usually inspired by selfish motives, but occasionally it may be ascribed to altruistic incentives, for all investors are not Shylocks. Especially this is so with the majority of bondholders of the Refugee Loan, who, when investing in this script were under the impression they were helping a distressed country, and many of whom, when the ravages of the earthquake of 1928 became

known, hastened to offer what help they could to the sufferers without having to be goaded on by violent or explosive methods.[1] Surely such bondholders need not be treated with suspicion as harbouring mischievous schemes 000



Българско Дружество „ЧЕРВЕНЪ КРЪСТЪ“

Квитанция № 1183

ЗА ЛЕВА 40000

Постъпило отъ г. Георги Клементъ Лог...

Манчестеръ

лева четиридесетъ хиляди

помощь за пострадалит[ѣ] отъ земетресението

гр. София 20 юний 1928 г.

Счетоводитель-Касиеръ:

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ONE OF THE DONATIONS MADE BY THE AUTHOR ON BEHALF OF THE EARTHQUAKE SUFFERERS.

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[1] Certain opulent Bulgarians refused to contribute to the earthquake fund[7] whereupon Sofia students proceeded to place bombs in the houses of these recalcitrant millionaires. They became more amenable to persuasion after the explosion of the bombs, and one of them, a well-known banking manager and plutocrat disbursed as 731

[7] [Of 1928 — Analyst]

000 detrimental to Bulgaria. On the contrary they may be credited with manifesting a solicitous concern for Bulgaria's development and of taking a pride in her legitimate successes to which they are as keen as the natives to contribute. In a future and more rational society such people would be granted equal political rights with the natives, but for the moment all they can hope for is that they should be treated as shareholders desirous of defending the common property of „Bulgaria Ltd" both against outside spoliators, internal depredators, and the unholy alliances between them which in the past have so often checked Bulgaria's vitality and progress.

731 much as 25,000 leva. In refusing to help however they may have been responding to other motives than mere avariciousness. They may have thought that their money might not reach its destination. The former Finance Minister S. Stefanov affirmed in the Sobranye on Dec. 9, 1931 that there had been undue dissipation in this case and some 200 to 300 million levas wasted. However, external help was badly needed. for according to M. Liaptchev's statement in the Sobranye on Nov. 29 1928, 74,568 buidings had been destroyed & this entailed a loss of 4534 million leva, besides this, the State had to dispense collecting 435 milions of revenue in 1928. Voluntary contributions to the earthquake fund amounted to 46,720,000 leva from Bulgaria & to 44,790,000 from abroad. The £ 500,000 provided by the Stabilisation loan hardly sufficed to restore $7^1/_2\%$ of the damage & it is the local residents who had to raise the requisite funds in order to repair the ravages of this scourge.

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STATE FINANCES

The budget, National Revenue, Balance of Payments & Public Debt

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Budgetary deficits have become a perrenial manifestation in spite of the drastic efforts to curtail expences. These deficits for the last five years have amounted to 1,366 millions for 1931/2, 752 millions for 1932/3, 233 millions for 1933/4, 332 millions for that of the year 1934. (Coinciding with the calender year and covering revenue & expenditure for 9 months.)

The budget for 1935 has been fixed at 5,695,120,000 leva, an apparent increase of 183 millions on that of 1934, but in fact it shows a noteworthy compression since it covers a full year instead of nine months. It provides for the first time for a credit of 200 millions for the "Caisse d'amortissement" which is to carry through the partial cancellation of agrarian debts etc, and a sum of 80 millions on behalf of the compensation deal concluded in 1934 with Germany and Austria, by which 908 millions worth of materials were provided by these States in exchange for 5500 million kg. of tobacco and of certain sums of money to be paid in instalments. The Exchequer has also had to make provision for the payment of 16 million leva to Greece in settlement of the dispute about the Rhodope forests, to allot an extra 20 millions for education owing to the natural increase in the number of children, and also to assign a sum of four million leva to the Agricultural Bank an behalf of certain co-operative societies which were unable to meet their obligations which the State had guaranteed.

There is no increase in taxation, as it is recognised that the maximum of imposition has been reached; on the contrary the tax on sheep and goats has been reduced from 60 to 40 millions and that on buildings, from 25 to

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BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

External debt

a) consolidated

		Original amount
Pre-war loans of 1892, 1902, 1904, 1907, 1909	in gold francs	575,942,500
4 ½ % loan of 1909	„ French „	82,000,000
Occupation debt of Eastern Rumelia	„ roubles	10,618,250
6 ½ % loan of 1923, for payment of Entente Subjects (Enaux) in Fr. francs		58,815,000
Advances by National Bank for payment ot indemnity on Des Clusières affair	in Fr. frcs	2,659,200
	in pounds sterling	109,200
7 % Refugee loan 1926	„ „ „	2,400,000
	„ dollars	4,500,000
7 ½ Stabilisation loan 1928	„ pounds sterling	1,800,000
	„ dollars	13,000,000
	„ Fr. francs	130,000,000
Reparations, accordiug to Hague covention of Jan 20 1930 in gold francs		171.637,915

b) non-consolidated

Debt owing to the Jonction-Salonique Railway Co.	Fr. francs	27,500,000
„ „ to Diskonto Gesellshaft, according to agreement of May 4, 1929	dollars	4,018,253
„ „ to Rumania. according to Hague convention of Jan 20. 1930	lei	110,000,000
„ „ to Italy, for the repatriation of Bulg. prisoners of War	It. lire	471,473

Internal debt

a) consolidated

6 % State loan of 1914	leva	85,552,000
6 ½ % „ „ „ 1921	„	204,899,100
6 % „ „ „ 1923, according to Greco-Bulgarian convention for exchange of refugees	„	2,804,910,000
6 % Treasury bonds 1933	„	59,896,336
6 % Promissory notes 1934	„	230,000,000
Total internal consolidated debt		3,385,257,436

b) non-consolidated

Debt to National Bank . . . .
„ „ „ „ against-Treasury bonds . . . .
„ „ Agricultural & Co-op. Bank „ „ . . . .
„ „ Mortgage Bank „ „ . . . .
„ „ various funds & various Treasury bonds . . . .

Total internal non-consolidated debt
„ „ cousolidated & „ „

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STATE FINANCES

	Nominal outstanding balance	Equivalent in leva
	396,180,500	9,796,025,711
	78,783,945	43[illegible],523,858
	3,618,250	—
	50,487,000	277,173,630
	2,170,500	11,916,045
	89,120	37,385,840
	2,230,200	935,568,900
	4,115,000	345,660,000
	1,779,100	746,332,450
	12,848,500	1,079,274,000
	128,485.000	705,382,650
	170,805,565	4,601,501.921
Total external consolidated debt		18,968,745,000
	8,193,750	44,987,687
	2.436,036	204,627,024
	55,000,000	46,090,000
	471,473	12,701,483
		308,402,194
Total external consolidated & non-consolidated debt		19,277,147,199
	47,041,800	
	182,826,800	
	2,256,905,500	
	59,896,336	
	210,850,000	
	2,757,522,936	
. . . . leva	2,727,819,485	
. . . . •	345,000,000	
. . . . •	525,000,000	
. . . . •	15,000,000	
. . . . •	794,307,455	
. . . .	4,407,216,940	
. . . .	7,164,739,876	7,164,739,876
Total external and internal debt		26,441,887,075

Expenditure

Supreme Administration . . .	46,497,000
Central & Regional Audit Courts	21,433,000
Ministry of Foreign Affairs . .	158,241,000
» » Interior.	393,422,000
» » Education.	785,400,000
» » Finance.	2,210,640,000
» » Iustice	167,725,000
» » War[1]	1,010,000,500
» » Public Economy. .	365,003,500
» » Communications .	536,758,000
	5,695,120,000

Revenue

Direct Taxation.			432,000,000
Indirect	»	Customs	945,500,000
»	»	Excise	1,375,000,000
»	»	Taxes	198,000,000
»	»	Revenue stamps . .	370,000,000
»	»	Fines	92,000,000
Contribution of the Railway administration as amortisation of its debt to the State			163,982,420
Post Office, Telegraphs & Telephones			280,000,000
Revenue from State Properties . . .			331,250,000
Communes' contribution to teachers' salaries			320,000,000
Various items of revenue			251,481,580
Revenue from various funds.			185,000,000
Arrears of taxes			320,000,000
Non-transferred sums from service of external debt			430,806,000
			5,695,120,000

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[1] Expenditure on the army is comparatively high because Bulgaria according to the stipulations of the treaty of Neuilly is debarred from utilising a conscript army and is obliged to employ mercenaries.

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6 millions. Receipts provide for about 320 millions of very uncertain revenue and doubts may be entertained as to the budget being balanced. Among these is an item of 83 millions of revenue anticipated from the exchange of refugees between Greece and Bulgaria which is of a very problematical nature.

The various items of expenditure and revenue for the 1935 budget will be found on page 122.

The attempt of the State to buy cereals at enhanced prices in order to assist the peasantry has constituted a heavy drain on its resources for the last few years. The bulk of the grain thus obtained was disposed of abroad at the parity prevailing on the international markets, which naturally caused a serious loss, while only a part was sold locally for consumption. As the quantities bought ranged round about 250 million kg. a year and the difference between the local price and that obtained abroad was about 2 leva per kg., the loss on the cereals exported was serious and accounts to some extent for the deficits in the budget. Deputy P. Denev stated in the Sobranye on Nov. 18, 1933 that the losses amounted to 346,341,228 leva during 1930, to 558,507,600 for 1931, and to 36,722,000 for 1932. The quantities of grain bough up by the State in 1933 and 1934 were respectively 266,800 and 111,693 tons. [1]

The State budget does not comprise the total amount of expenditure for the social services. There is the budget of the autonomous administration of the State railways which for the year 1935 amounted to 1,454,031,412 leva and those of municipalities, and communes which provide for another two milliard leva of expediture, bringing up the total of expense for the public services to about 9 milliards.

The national revenue before the Balkan wars was

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[1] It is computed that during the last four years the State disbursed 2500 millions in the form of such subsidies to the peasants.

652 assessed at 1,647 million gold leva, or 44,469 million paper leva. In 1929 this was computed at 46.000 millions and in 1932 at 26,300 millions according to Dr P. Kiranov former head of the Statistical Bureau, and was made up of the following items:

	1929	1932
Agriculture	21,402,700,000	9,872,200,000
Forests.	320,000,000	195,000,000
Cattle raising etc	2,196,000,000	1,502,000,000
Mines & quarries	359,400,000	298,800,000
Industry (fostered by State privileges)	2,199,349,000	2,413.086,000
„ not eujoying privileges . . .	1,099.600,000	1,206,500.000
Public Buildings	550.000,000	350,000,005
Home Industries	5,490,000,000	3,666,000,000
Transport & Communications	1.107,000,000	1,027,000,000
Commerce	11,600,000,000	4,800,000,000

The national revenue has continued to contract, particularly that derived from industry. In a speech delivered in the Sobranye by Prof. G. P. Ghenov in the middle of March 1934, the latter estimated that it had sunk below the 20,000 million figure, so that actually the social services absorb about 50% of the national revenue, which is an altogether disproportionately heavy burden for a community to bear, especially in view of the fact that the per capita revenue does not even reach 3,300 leva, and after deduction of the expenditure on social services only 1650 leva would be left over for sustenance to each individual. It is obvious that this sum, equivalent to 61 gold francs, is far below the minimum required for this purpose, since this minimum has been estimated at 260 gold francs for industrial and at 144 for agricultural countries. The disastrous consequence of this dire state of poverty are making themselves manifest. Bulgaria in fact heads the list among nations as to the percentage of tuberculous among her population, mainly due to malnutrion.

The country's balance of payments continues to close adversely as may be seen by the data given below, which were compiled by Dr A. Tsakalov, former director of the National Bank, and which were published in the Journal of the Society of Bulgarian Economists on April 1934. The figures are in million leva:

	Revenue		Ehpanditure		Plus		Minus	
	1931	1932	1931	1932	1931	1932	1931	1932
Foreign Trade	5,229	3,096	4,549	2666	680	430		
Services	376	286	230	201	146	85		
Participations	38				38			
Revenue of foreign capital	15	10	310	93			295	83
Other private payments	132	145	246	192			114	47
Public payments	591	156	1,233	604			642	448
Short term loans			450	200			450	200
Increase or deccrease of long term credits	114				114			
Decrease of liabilities of private enterprises abroad without merchandise credit . .			50				50	
Equalisation items								
Decrease of foreign currency held by National Bank	573	178			573	178		
Foreign currency secured by National Bank locally		85				85		
	7,068	3,956	7,068	3,956	1551	778	1551	778

Dr Tsakalov adds the following explanatory notes: Though the commercial balance for 1931 and 1932 showed respectively a surplus of 1,274 millions and a deficit of 88, if only those imports and exports which were paid be accounted for, each year will show a surplus, namely 699 and 430 millions. Most of the imports were not paid for, but were received on credit, thus out of 4,600 millions imported in 1931, only 4,549 were paid, and in 1932 out of 3,471 millions, only 2,666.

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BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

652 In another paper published by the same journal on Feb. 1932, the same writer shows that for the period 1924—30, Bulgaria had an annual deficit in her balance of payments of 1 to 1·5 milliard leva, which was partially met out the loans floated after the war.

In spite of favourable trade balances during the past two years the drain on the resources of the National Bank continues, owing to the fact that the balances derived from clearings are not available for use by the Bank. The following table gives details as to the entries and exports of currency during recent years:

Entries (in million leva) 1932	1933	1934		Exports (in milion leva) 1932	1933	1934
2,576	1,108	744	Free currencies and banknotes	2751	1,227	905
648	1,439	1513	Clearings	607	1.301	1,372
320	231	602	Compensation dealings	320	231	602
3,544	2,773	2.859		2,678	2,759	1,879 2/1

On pages 120/1 will be found a table giving particulars of the Public Debt on Dec. 31 1934, totalling 26,441,887,075, of which 19,277,147,199 represent the external debt payable in foreign currency. The *per capita* indebtedness on the basis of a population of 6 millions is therefore 4407 leva, an apparently light burden when compared with the public indebtedness of other countries, but unduly oppressive if the resources and the national income of Bulgaria be considered.

2/1 [Errata: should be 2879 —Analyst.]

BANKING

The banking facilities extant in Bulgaria were too large for the available volume of business and the crisis which survened after 1929 has affected all credit establishments very severely. In order to parry to the further falling off of the already limited volume of business, a policy of fusioning the banks has been embarked on, which will obviously help to consolidate their position.

According to an article published by the Journal of the Society of Bulgarian Economists in Dec. 1934, the total number of banking establishments in the country (including branch offices) at the end of 1931 numbered 2,673, with a total capital of 5,389 million leva, deposits 16,016, and advances amounting to 15,746 millions. This revealed a level of liquidity which is well above the point of safety, but which does not seem to have been maintained, in the case of certain banks.

The following table was appended, giving details of the distribution of the capital among the various groups of banks at the end of 1932.

	Capital	Deposits and moneys confided to them	Advances Current accounts discounted bills etc. (in million leva)
a) Government Banks . .			
Agricultural Bank . .	802	5,374	5, 09
Co-operative " . .	164	659	769
National " . .	1,691	464	717
Post Office Savings " . .		877	730
International " . .	40	123	124
b) Co-operative Banks .			
Agricultural	450	1,394	1,185
Popular	790	2,465	2,505
Others	189	440	425
c) Private Banks			
Mortgage Bank	92	440	435
Large Sofia Banks . .	606	2,779	2,262
Other Sofia " . .	250	385	309
Provincial " . .	504	687	591
Total	5,578	16,106	15,761

453 The figure of 16,016 million leva of deposits, is likely to give an erroneous estimate as to the financial strength of the country. Properly speaking, deposits, or savings, do not reach even half this figure, and according to the latest data they were reckoned to have been apportioned at the end of 1933 among the following banks. Agricultural Bank, 1,496, P. O. Savings Banks 1,171, all Co-operative Societies, 3,020, Private Banks 806, Foreign Banks in Bulgaria 450 millions, or a total of 6,943,000,000 leva. The tendency has been during the last few years to transfer savings from the private banks to the State banks and P. O. Savings banks, as presenting greater safety for the depositors. The uncertainty of the situation was increased owing to the pending voting of a Law aiming at alleviating indebtedness, the need of which law became imperative owing to the drop in the prices of agricultural produce, as a consequence of which farmers were no longer able to meet their obligations and credit had come to a standstill. It was rumoured that even savings at banks might be affected and owing to this apparent insecurity of capital, building operations have been indulged in out of all proportion to the present requirements of the country and a great amount of capital has been needlessly locked up. During 1933 some 9,161 buildings have been erected, of a total value of 1,313 million leva, about double the number and value of those constructed in 1931. (The value of the amount spent in Sofia on this head reached 800 million leva in 1933).

Already the disastrous effects are apparent, prices of buildings have depreciated by 30%, while the number of unlet flats and dwelling houses in Sofia is estimated at between 2900 and 3000.

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453 The National Bank of Bulgaria is the sole central issuing bank, the main activities of which are centred round the aim of maintaining the stability of the national

currency. It controls the sale of exchange and fixes the quotas of imports.

The Agricultural Bank and the Co-operative Bank which have now been fused into one, exert a preponderating influence in the economic life of the country and have contributed immensely in assisting farming operations and the development of rural credit. The guiding principles of these institutions was to come to the relief of the local population and not the pursuit of profit, with the result that very often less circumspection than the situation warranted was shown in the granting of credits. In the balance sheet of the Agricultural Bank published at the end of 1933 figured a sum of 924,631,000 leva advanced to the State for financing the Cereal Board and to municipalities for the construction of schools.

A sum of 2,553,606,000 leva was owing by farmers, 80% of which liabilities were overdue. A sum of 1,831 millions advanced to co-operative societies either cannot be considered as capable of quick realisation. [1] The bank, owing to the difficult position in which the peasantry find themselves, will be obliged to extend further facilities to its clients in order to enable them to rationalise their farms and initiate other methods of cultivation, for if this is not done, they will not be in a position to reimburse their debts to the bank. The position of the bank unfortunately does not permit it to undertake such a course and the only hope is that the State will eventually facilitate it to inaugurate such a forward policy.

The Popular Banks, to the number of 247 at the end of 1933, with a total capital and funds amounting to 930 million leva (The corresponding figure for June 1935 was 972 millions). are exerting a growing influence. They are

[1] At the end of 1934 Public Institutions and individual farmers were owing to the Bank 3,188,566,436 leva and the co-operative societies 1,894,064,482 leva.

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[Facing P.129



HISSAR: A VIEW TROUGH THE OLD ROMAN WALLS run on co-operative lines, having a total membership of 180,366. Their aim is to obtain credit facilities for their members and profit making is a secondary goal. The net profit shown during the year was 4°/0, which would have been by far higher if a more rational policy had been followed and new banks had not been opened in districts in which similar banks were already operating.

In Sofia there were in 1932, 25 Popular banks and in the course of 1923 seven more were founded. These 25 Popular Banks had an aggregate capital and reserves amounting to some 250 million leva and deposits of about double this figure. The staff of these 25 banks numbered 585 people, costing an outlay of 15·3 million leva annually, which was an unneedful luxury. This has apparently been perceived, whence the policy of bank fusioning which has been initiated by the government. The crisis has equally affected the Popular Banks, it was stated that 142 of these banks had a proportion of their advances to their members „frozen" to the extent of 50°/0 to 80°/0 and over, while in the case of the remainder, the percentage varied between 5°/0 and 50°/0. The principal foreign Banks operating in Bulgaria were four and their capital and reserves attained at the end of 1931 the following figures: Banque Generale de Bulgarie 60,46; Banque de Credit 72,80; Banque Comerciale Italienne et Bulgare 62 and Banque Franco-Belge 170,86 million leva. Of late their activities have been very much restricted and the amount of their deposits singularly reduced from 2170 million in 1931 to 450 million leva at the end of 1933. The amount of foreign capital engaged in credit operations conducted by limited societies was reported to be 442·5 million leva, according to the Bulletin of the National Bank of Bulgaria (Jan. 1935), and this explains that besides the above mentioned four banks, several Bulgarian Banks such as the Banque Bulgare de Commerce were mainly operated by foreign money. The main countries having invested capital in banking institutions in Bulgaria were: Belgium (66·9), France (92·2), Germany (53·4), Italy (53·3), U. S. A. (41·3), Holland (28·2), Hungary (26·8), Czechoslavakia (26·7) and Gt. Britain (24) million leva. Among the principal Bulgarian joint-stock banks are the Banque Bulgare de Commerce and the Union des Banques Bulgares possessing a capital and reserves amounting to 90 and 110 million leva respectively at the end of 1931. With the policy initiated by the government of fusioning the Bulgarian banks, it is probable that one, or both these two institutions will be merged in the newly created banking institution of the Credit Bulgare. 453

Among the credit establishments enjoying the greatest confidence are the Post Office savings banks, and the rapid growth of their deposits at a time these last were rapidly dwindling at other banks testifies to this.[1] The depositors are mainly women, householders (12.77%), farmers (15%), artizans (13·36%), workmen (7·29%) and functionaries (7·22%), and 37·85% of the depositors have only sums varying between 10 and 500 leva to their credit. This percentage of small deposits represents 4·14% of the total savings entrusted to the banks. If the deposits be divided into two categories, namely 10 to 1000 leva, and 1000 to 10,000 leva, the former belong to 57·43% of the depositors and represent 10·89% of the total sum confided to the savings banks, while the figures for the second category would be respectively 42·57% and 82·11%. The popularity of these banks is due in part to the facilities they extend and to the fact that 555 post offices are authorised to receive deposits and make payments. The savings banks have invested the major parts of their deposits with the Agricultural Bank (1.321,333,545 leva, at the end 454

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[1] These had increased from 173 millions at the end of 1925 to 2006 million leva at the end of 1934 and to 2097 in June 1935.

454 of 1932) and in view of the difficult position the latter finds itself, it would not be an easy matter to find liquid funds to appease a panic should a run on the banks be experienced.

453 The great problem facing the banking institutions in Bulgaria is the providing of cheap long termed credits to the rural population so that it might be able to transform its methods of agricultural production. Until presently, the rates of interest charged to farmers by the Agricultural Bank were 8% to 10% and it is obvious that in the present circumstances it is impossible to expect that capital invested in agriculture would be profitably employed at such rates.

It is an imperative necessity to find means wherewith the rates of interest on advances to the peasants should be reduced to about half this figure, failing which there is little hope of securing an improvement in the economic conditions of the country. This is a matter which of course transcends the limited resources of Bulgaria and it would be well if an international institution took a hand in solving this problem on which hangs the future welfare of the country.

INDUSTRY

433 Bulgaria, like all the Near Eastern States has indulged in a policy of extreme industrialisation which has proved an excessively onerous burden to the community and which with the exception of a few directly interested individuals has brought no benefit whatsoever to the masses. The adoption of this policy is all the more regrettable since it has tended to widen the cleavage between the rural and the urban sections of the population, the former rightly claiming that the increase in the price of industrial articles which this policy involved tended to increase their

cost of living and therefore to handicap them in their efforts to lower their costs of production. 433

One of the reasons given for establishing native industries is that in case of war, a country would find itself less dependent on foreign supplies, but in the case of Bulgaria even this plea can not be maintained, for not only is Bulgaria disarmed and not likely to be drawn into a war by herself, but her industry is almost entirely dependent for its raw materials, and largely for its driving power (oil) on foreign supplies and would come to a standstill in case of war breaking out.

Naturally the extreme protectionism adopted by successive Bulgarian governments elicited very strong protests from the masses and these were voiced by their representatives in the Sobranye, but without avail, for most political groups did their utmost to further the interests of the industrialists who knew how to win over to their cause influential politicians. 433 651

A crushing indictment of this protectionist policy is contained in a most lucid and interesting booklet, written by T. P. Karatsorov in 1932, who has no difficulty in proving to the hilt his contention fortified by statistical data, that protectionism has had on Bulgarian economy ruinous consequences, and in his concluding remarks he adds that it has equally proved morally disastrous among governing circles. He cites in support the case of a prominent politician who in 1931 declared: "These parasitic industries are a terrible evil. Our industry is unduly favoured at the expense of our national economy", and who, on becoming a Cabinet Minister did not hesitate to affirm a month later: "Our industry is not yet sufficiently protected, the State must make further sacrifices for it." This complete *volte-face* being obviously due to the bribes which he received in the meantime while his former declaration may be assumed to have been an attempt to blackmail industrialists.

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The local industry enjoys on the whole a tariff protection of 100 % to over 200% against imported foreign goods. Raw materials utilised in the local industry were liable to an ad *valorem* duty of 3 %, increased to 8% in 1931 on their entry. The loss to the State accruing from applying this extremely reduced import duty, instead of the full tariff had gradually increased to as much as 450 million leva in 1929 and had surpassed 500 millions in 1930.

M. Karatsorov gives many examples of the parasitic industries which have been fostered in Bulgaria. The details relative to one will amply suffice to illustrate all and sundry. Thus five workshops were established to manufasture nails from imported steel wire. The total annual consumption of nails in Bulgaria is 5 to 6 million kg, the import duty 7 to 8 leva per kg., or about 150% of the cost of foreign nails f. o. b. a Bulgarian port. (about 4.50 leva per kg.) The price of the local article was, on an average above 10 leva a kg., so that the profit realised by the local makers was at least 120%. The number of workmen employed was 200 and the amount disbursed in salaries does not exceed 3 to 4 million leva a year. The State loses 30 million leva a year, through levying a duty of 8% on wire, instead of a duty of 150% on 5 to 6 million kg. of nails, and except for the wages paid to the workmen all this sum of some 26 million leva, is divided among the owners of the 5 workshops, and is obviously provided out of the pockets of the population. This was so self-evident that deputy, I. Kurtev, intervened in the Sobranye on April 5, 1928 and demanded: "That this industry be withdrawn from the list of those which are being favoured", but in vain. An example of how a high tariff barrier encourages the building up of redundant manufacturing plant is furnished by the sheet-glass industry. The consumption of this article amounts to 80,000 cases a year. F. o. b. prices of Belgian glass were 260

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leva per case, and the duty 600 leva per case. As the cost of erecting a glass factory was computed at 30 million leva, and the profit to be realised by the non-payment of duty on the locally manufactured sheet-glass was 48,000,000 leva (80,000 cases×600 leva) and would have permitted a profit of 150% to be made during the opening year, work on three different factories was begun in 1930. The creation of such industries, as M. Karatsorov shows, would even have an adverse influence on the country's balance of payments. Thus if 80,000 cases of sheet-glass were imported, currency to the amount of 20 million leva would be exported, while when the factories would begin operating, the owners being foreigners, the amount of currency which would be exported would be equal to the sum of 48 millions of profit made minus the local expenses of the factories.

M. Karatsorov affirms that in most cases the creation of local industries has increased adversely the country's balance of payments, and he cites in support not only the above instance, but also that of the sugar industry and also the textile. Local textile weaving sheds often paying more for their imported yarn than what would have been paid if the corresponding woven fabric had been imported instead from a country the industry of which had been thoroughly modernised and was producing on a large scale like Japan.

The opinions of the above writer were often re-echoed and punctuated by such remarks as these in the Sobranye. "The law fostering industry has cost two milliard leva which the people had to find". (Dr I. Karadjov. March 26. 1926). "By purchasing materials and machinery abroad the loss to the national economy will be as great as if foreign goods were bought, and besides, protection will give free play to speculation". (G. Zivkov, April 3 1926). "The parasitic industries live on the back of the people, who

433 are robbed in order that 1200 to 2000 industrialists and
651 their bankers may profit" (S. Petkov, May 12 1932). "The loss to the revenue through exempting from duty raw materials is 500 million leva a year; these privileges must be put a stop to" (G. Zeliabov, June 8, 1932).

This system of importing semi-manufactured materials practically free, in order to convert them into manufactured articles in Bulgaria, also led to grave abuses. Several unscrupulous manufacturers imported materials and often sold the greatest portion of them secretly. Thus S. Stefanov, subsequently Minister of Finance, declared in the Sobranye on Dec. 8 1927. "Big frauds are committed by pseudo-industrialists who dispose on the market of materials imported duty free for use in their factories. In big factories control is possible but the 800 workshops set up since the war are never inspected. A huge army of inspectors is needed to supervise 1100 industrial establishments and there are only 4 or 5 inspectors affected to this job." Another deputy, S. Boyadjiev, dwelt on the following day on the same abuses, cited instances, and then made the following just criticism: "The law grants to any seven persons the privilege to form a cooperative society. There are several persons who have thus grouped themselves together, and who import materials duty free for alleged industrial purposes, and then sell them secretly, undercutting honest traders who have paid the legal duty on their stuff." Another trenchant attack on protectionism was delivered by deputy K. Manolov on Dec. 15, 1927, who among other things stated: "Experts affirm that the subsidies granted to industry up to the present date amount to 4000 million leva. Is this justified? It should have cheapened the cost of living but the contrary has taken place and foreign articles, inspite of the duty, still compete with the locally manufactured ones. Our balance of payments has not improved, and

our industry is hardly any stronger. Even labour has not 433
been advantaged. In 1909, a workman was paid two gold 651
leva a day, equal to 54 paper leva, and to day he only receives 47 leva. We should not go on dissipating our vital forces in this way or we shall degenerate as a nation... The financial cartel which controls most industries enjoys the sympathies of government circles etc".

How the community was exploited in order that a few favoured individuals might amass wealth is also clearly described in the party organ of the Radical party in its issue of Feb 20 1931: "According to the information we possess the Granitoid Cement Manufacturing Co. Has realised for the year 1930 a profit of 180 million leva, a sum which considerably exceeds the capital invested in this concern. How are such profits possible at this time of crisis? This is quite plain. A ton of cement costs 500 to 600 leva, but the duty on it is 800 leva. Consequently foreign cement can not be sold on our market for less than 1450 leva a ton, and this has permitted the Granitoid to sell its locally made cement at about this figure, realising a premium of about 800 leva a ton. Is it not outright robbery to mulct people out of their savings in order that this company might make a profit of 145%, instead of contenting itself with a benefit of 12% to 15%? Cement is an article of prime necessity, both the State and the public buy large quantites of if. Until when will this criminal policy continue?"

These details seem fully to confirm M. V. Novicov's 000
pronouncement on protection, namely: "Tout industriel protégé est un parasite. Et chose étrange, tandis qu'on considere le parasitisme comme un mal, les gouvernements considèrent jusqu'à présent le parasitisme provenant de la protection comme un bien... Un tarif protecteur, n'est autre chose que le gaspillage économique érigé en système de gouvernement. Il a la prétention

000 d'enrichir la société, il n'a d'autre résultat, en réalité, que d'arrêter le developpement de la richesse. Le système protecteur c'est une récompense donnée à l'imbecillité, au desordre, à l'incurie, et une punition infligée à la capacité, à l'économie, à l'intelligence." ("Luttes entre sociétés humaines" p. 117/8). They also fully support Mr J. A. Hobson's affirmation in his "The New Protection" p. 113–7 that: "Protection is a crime for its effect as its intention is to perpetuate strife by stamping divisions ... whereas the whole trend of civilisation has been to bind the peoples of the world into closer unity of interests and activities by the growing of interpendence of commerce, protection would reverse the movement .. Cobden was mistaken in thinking that the perception of their obvious self-interest must rapidly lead all nations to adopt Free Trade. His error lay in failing to perceive that, though the interest of each people as a whole lay in freedom of commerce, the interests of special groups of traders or producers within each country would continue to lie along the line of privilege and protection, and that until democracy became a political reality these organised group interests might continue to mould the fiscal policy of their several States".

651 435 In fact protectionism in Bulgaria has contributed in intensifying the existing antagonism between the rural and urban classes, the former bitterly complaining that they were being exploited in favour of the latter. If they were unable to make themselves heard it was because "democracy had not become a political reality" and that "organised group interests" in league with the political flunkeys who bossed Bulgaria, "continued to mould the fiscal policy of the State".

The recriminations of the peasantry were fully justified for if the prices ruling in 1929 be taken as a basis (100) those of agricultural products had sunk to the level

of 34.4 at the beginning of 1934, while those of locally 651
manufactured articles had only been reduced to 88.1, and 435
those of imported industrial goods to 81.8, mainly on account of the high protective duties which remained constant owing to the specific tariff in force.

As the above figures are based on wholesale prices, it may be assumed that the peasants had to pay 10% to 15% more for their purchases from retail stores, and that they had to give 2½ times as much of their produce as they were accustomed in order to obtain in exchange the manufactured articles they had been used to buy.

The discrepancy between agricultural and manufac- 652
tured goods has to some extent been reduced since the 435
abrogation of the parliamentary regime, for the military seem to have had a clearer conception of their duties as rulers. This they achieved by drastically curtailing the privileges enjoyed by local manufacturers on the one hand, and by the State intervening as buyer of several agricultural articles, such as wheat, rye, cotton, rice, tobacco etc, and fixing enhanced prices for them. The government attaching less value to the cheapness at which the consuming public might obtain its food than to the maintenance of a level of prices at which the peasants are able to live. This seems to forebode a return to sanity, for level-headed men like Prof. G. P. Ghenov, often laid stress on the necessity of Bulgaria reducing her tariffs if she were not to see foreign markets closed to her produce, and that it was indispensable to buy if she sought to sell. His speech of May 16 1932 in the Sobranye in which he exposed the inanity of subsidising an industrial system which cost one milliard leva annually to the State, was very favourably commented on at the time.

What seems difficult to explain is how the wiseacres 454
of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations 651
should, on the floating of the Stabilisation loan of 1928

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have granted Bulgaria a free hand to raise her tariff, on the pretext that this step would increase the revenues earmarked for the service of this loan, a prognostication which was radically contradicted by subsequent events since the increase of the tariff which followed in 1930, imparted a further impetus to the creation of local industries, reduced imports and diminished very considerably the custom dues raised from them. But the Financial Committee was not so obtuse as it would appear at first sight. Its secret desire was not to strengthen either the position of the bondholders, or that of Bulgaria, but rather to grant increased facilities to certain financial interests for exploiting the Bulgarian consumer through the dominant position these occupy in industial, banking and commercial enterprises, and which position they hitherto managed to exploit to the full owing to the venality and flunkeyism of the politicians, who did not hesitate to sell themselves to these occult influences. According to the bulletin of the National Bank of Bulgaria of Jan. 1935, the total fully paid up capital of industrial limited companies during 1934 was 3,202.4 million leva, of which 1631.3 millions were foreign, so that it is obvious that protection favoured more foreign interests than Bulgarian, and explains why the Financial Committee was so prodigal in extending to Bulgaria the right to increase its tariff. The participation of foreign capital can only be traced in limited companies, and the above mentioned bulletin specified that 325.9 millions of foreign capital were invested in banking establishments, 281.3 in commercial, 11 in transport enterprises, and 30.7 in insurance companies. No particulars are obtainable about the foreign capital in private firms, but it must be as much, if not more, for deputy C. Petkov affirmed in the Sobranye on Feb. 26, 1932, that annually as much as 650 million leva are remitted abroad as interest on foreign capital invested in Bulgaria, and 800 millions as its participation in profits. These figures are not likely to be far out since another deputy, M. Dotchev, stated on March 4 1932, that during the financial year 1928/9, over one milliard leva was remitted abroad as dividends and profits of the foreign capital invested in industrial and commercial enterprises in Bulgaria. 454 651

Some preliminary statistics have been published as to the state of industry in 1930/1, but most of these figures refer to those workshops which enjoy privileges extended to them by the law fostering industry, and are necessarily incomplete. These establishments numbered 1250, had a capital of 7500 million leva, used 115,000 H. P., employed 36,000 workmen (the total number of workpeople employed in all industries fluctuates round about 75,000) and had an annual output of 6850 million leva of manufactured goods. The principal branches of industry were: 433

	Number of establishments	Capital in million leva	H. P. employed	workpeople employed	% of local raw materials used
Textile	214	1390·8	19,197	14,641	13·6%
(In 1933:	231	some working, with 2 & even 3 shifts		17,976)	
Food & drink . .	172		27,653	4579	
Metallurgical . . .	142	417·3	10,998	4084	14%
Ceramic	110	774	22,604	3382	48%
Chemical	117	397·8	6,707	2031	35%
Leather	52	162·3	4,721	778	18%
Timber	55		2,726	1643	
Paper	4	99·3	2,210	443	38%

There are two other important groups of industries not included in the above table, the tobacco manipulating and cigarette manufacturing in which some 20,000 workpeople are almost permanently employed and the milling industry. In the latter, a capital of 786.^{2} million leva is invested. There are 307 flour mills, employing 2579 workpeople and possessing machinery developing 21,637 H. P. This was a thriving industry in the past as deputy

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BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

433 Neitsev remarked in the Sobranye on May 12, 1932, for Bulgarian flour was largely exported. 67 million kg. having been shipped in 1911 as against only 1,265,000 kg. in 1929. Actually $^{2}/_{3}$ of the existing flour mills are redundant and can be bought at a quarter of their cost. This seems to be the case with most industries, for it was reported in 1933 that the mean output was only 45% of the normal.

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433 There exists a scheme to develop anew copper mining in order that the 5 million kg. of copper sulfate needed annually for spraying the vines and which is obtained from Great Britain at a cost of 50 million leva may be produced locally. This plan may eventually materialise for the existing local copper mines produced as much as 31,310 tons in 1919 and the only product which would then be needed to import would be 700 to 800 tons of sulfuric acid at a cost of 5 million leva. Even this could be manufactured on the spot by utilising the local pyrites when the chemical industries are further developed.

The mineral resources of the country seem to be considerable, but they have not been properly exploited except in the case of the State-owned coal mine of Pernik the output of which reached 1,266,540 tons in 1934. There is a large lignite bed in the valley of the Maritsa, and recently it was reported that an extensive coal field had been discovered near Lom, on the Danube. The production of the mines in work during 1931, in tons was as follows:

Copper	Lead (1929)	Zinc (1929)	Mixed Zinc & Lead (1929)	Mixed Lead & Copper (1929)	Aluminium
900	3985	1925	11396	9923	1,382

Owing to the fall in prices most mines have closed. Salt is extracted from the saline marshes in the neighbourhood of Burgas, production varying from 35 (1932) to 19·5 (1933) million tons annually according to the state of the weather. Local requirements amount to about 60 million tons.

of the weather. Local requirements amount to about 60 million tons. 000

The tendency of the government which assumed power on May 19 1934 was to put a stop to the existing abuses and restrict the privileges granted by the State to such industries as could utilise and transform local raw materials. Their efforts will be facilitated if outlets for Bulgarian produce are secured, and compensation for this facility will no doubt be given in the form of a lowering of the present high tariff. If foreign countries, however, persist in their determination to maintain a policy of autarchy, there will be nothing left for Bulgaria but to follow suit and persist in a policy that is mutually undermining the economic fabric of all the nations. 654

Mr. J. A. Hobson's remarks on protection, cited above, are well worth pondering over, for its apparent triumph coincides with the decline of democracy and the growing inability of the will of the masses to find expression. 000

TRADE

Both the commodity composition and the geographical distribution of Bulgarian exports has undergone a considerable transformation since the war. Thus cereals, which until then had figured first as to value on the list of exports, representing as much as 66.6% of the total during the quinquennial period 1908-12, fell to 18.9% for the corresponding period of 1926-30, and to only 10% during 1934, The proportion of tobacco exports on the other hand, has increased from 1.28% to 38.47% and 40%, for the corresponding dates. The Near Eastern and west European markets which in 1911 absorbed respectively 25.09% and 49.53% of Bulgarian exports, in 1931 took only 4.97% and 35.37%. On the other hand exports 439

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to Central Europe have increased from 20.40% to 73.14%, during the same years. Imports were subject to lesser variations except for a slight decrease of those of Near Eastern and western European origin, to the benefit of Central European, the percentage of the latter increasing from 49.68% to 61.94% between 1911 and 1931.

There has been a noteworthy decrease in the value of Bulgarian trade since 1929, exports falling from a total of 6,397 million leva, to 2,535 millions in 1934, though in weight there was an increase from 313,000 to 396,000 tons, by which may be gauged the effect of the reduction of prices of agricultural produce on the country's economy.

The table on page 145 gives details as to imports and exports from and to the principal countries trading with Bulgaria during recent years. The figures are in million leva.

It is well worth noting that the chief creditor countries of Bulgaria, France, Great Britain and the United States, show a permanent debit in their trading balance with Bulgaria and that it is indispensable that these countries should do something to assist the access of Bulgarian goods to their markets as otherwise they run the risk of seeing not only their exports to Bulgaria further reduced, but the payment of the interest on the debts owing to their nationals being further curtailed, or totally suspended. Bulgaria has no other resources wherewith to pay her obligations than her exports, and with the system of barter and clearings which is being increasingly applied, there is a growing difficulty ot utilising the surplus trade balance of one country for paying the debit balance due to another. It may be taken for granted therefore, that the surplus balances Bulgaria may have with Germany are only partially available.

The chief products exported from Bulgaria in 1934 were:

	6 months ending June 1935					1934				
	Imports	°/₀ of total	Exports	°/₀ of total	Balance	Imports	°/₀ of total	Exports	°/₀ of total	Balance
Austria	69	5,0	86	6,3	+17	107	4,8	135	5,3	+ 2
Belgium	26	1,9	12	0,9	−14	167	7,5	89	3,5	7
Czechoslovakia	110	8,0	92	6,7	−18	85	3,8	91	3,6	+
Danemark	1	0,1	16	1,1	+15	1	0,0	59	2,3	+ 5
Egypt	8	0,6	51	4,3	+43	13	0,6	98	3 9	+ 8
France	25	1,9	30	2,2	+ 5	86	3,8	53	2,1	3
Germany	662	48,4	698	51,0	+36	902	40,1	1,083	42,7	+18
Gt. Britain	90	6,6	32	2,3	−58	143	6,4	53	2.1	− 9
Greece	6	0,4	15	1,1	+ 9	21	1,0	18	0,7	−
Holland	25	1,8	17	1,2	− 8	28	1,2	79	3,1	+ 5
Hungary	18	1,3	42	3,0	+24	23	1,0	11	0,4	− 1
Italy	65	4,7	110	8,0	+45	176	7,8	233	9,2	+ 5
Palestine	3	0,2	38	2,7	+35	3	0,1	50	2.0	+ 4
Poland	13	0,9	2	0,1	−11	47	2,1	40	1.6	
Rumania	31	2,2	6	0.4	− 25	95	4,2	19	0,7	− 7
Spain	39	2,8	17	1,2	−22	51	2,3	80	3,2	+ 2
Switzerland	99	7,2	20	1,5	−79	132	5,9	122	4,8	1
Turkey	7	0,5	4	0,3	− 3	30	1,4	36	1,4	+
U. S. A.	25	1,8	15	1,1	−10	51	2,3	16	0,6	− 3
Yugoslavia	3	0,2	10	0,7	+ 7	9	0,4	5	0,2	−
Other countries	44	3,5	56	4,0	+12	77	3,3	165	6,6	+ 8
Total	1.369	100	1,369	1.00	—	2,247	100	2,535	100	+28

[Facing P.145]



THE RILA MONASTERY

BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

Tobacco, 982 million leva worth, eggs 341, cereals 261. (mainly maize 182), grapes 140, dried hides 114, poultry 114, cattle 65, oil cakes 51, haricot beans 43, attar of roses 36, Cheese 35, and sunflower seed 31. Imports consisted of textile materials (wool & cotton) 580 millions in value, metallurgical products 163, machinery 130, mineral oils 93, Chemical products 130, medicinal products 66, hides 61, vegetable oils and fats 18, rubber 32, etc, About 50% of the exports are shipped by way of the Black Sea ports, the other 50% being forwarded in about equal quantities either overland by rail or by the Danube. Imports on the other hand are more evenly divided among the three different ways of access. Exchanges between Austria and Bulgaria are practically all made by way of the Danube, exports to Germany are sent to the extent of 1/8 by this river fairway, while 1/4 of the German imports into Bulgaria also borrow the same route.

Bulgaria's trade with the neighbouring countries is insignificant and is not likely to develop. Her exports to them approximate 2.5% of the total, while her imports from them slightly surpass 5% of her total imports and this mainly owing to her purchases of mineral oils from Rumania, but there is a probability that this custom will be transferred to Russia, as the latter country offers a greater possibility of interchange of commodities than Rumania. How tariffs may affect trade between countries may be illustrated by the abrupt fall of Bulgarian exports to Greece, which from almost one milliard leva in value in the years, 1926 and 1927 have contracted to 4 millions in 1933, owing to the tariff war Greece had declared on Bulgaria in 1930.

The huge preponderance of Germany in the total trade of Bulgaria (40% of total imports & 42·7% of total exports) shows the capital role Germany plays in the economy of the Danubian States and the impossibility of reckoning on their recovery so long as Germany does not return to normalcy. All the pother made about economic conferences and programmes concerning the Danubian countries is empty prattle, and does not deserve to be taken seriously, for neither France nor Italy are in a position to help. The former country, especially, though she holds $^{3}/_{5}$ of the Bulgarian State debt, and possesses considerable private investments in Bulgaria does nothing to assist Bulgarian trade. but on the contrary does not hesitate to have recourse to political pressure in order to exploit to the utmost Bulgaria, to the obvious detriment of the latter and of her other creditors.

British Commercial and Financial circles would do well to consider the advisability of increasing the sale of Bulgarian products in Great Britain, for Bulgaria is still buying three times as much as she is selling to Gt. Britain (a few years ago the ratio was seven to one) and if the proportion is not righted, British exports to Bulgaria run the risk of being further reduced. There is yet another forcible reason for encouraging Bulgarian imports into Gt. Britain and this is in order to provide Bulgaria with a surplus wherewith she might be enabled to discharge her liabilities to British bondholders. If this is not done Bulgaria will very soon be in the material impossibility of paying interest on both the two loans floated under the sponsorship of the League of Nations, a large proportion of which are held by British investors.

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

The growth of the co-operative movement in Bulgaria and the enthusiasm with which it has been supported by a large number of intellectuals is one of the most hopeful portents in the country, not only because of the material benefits which the peasantry will derive from it, in fact it may prove the only avenue of salvation to the majority of smallholders, but also on account of the ethical training it involves, and the lesson of solidarity and mutual help it teaches its members. In a country where anarchic individualism, and envy of one's neighbour, usually prevail, no propaganda would be more useful to bridle and tame these unsocial propensities than that on behalf of the idea of co-operation. It is therefore highly satisfactory to record that the co-operative movement has met with a great success in Bulgaria in comparison with other countries in the Near East. If it were not for that scourge of politics which has made itself unduly felt also in this branch of social activity, the achievements of the co-operative movement would have been phenomenal and might have equalled those attained in Denmark.

The history of the co-operative movement in Bulgaria is mostly that of the struggle between a few idealists trying to preach coordination and harmony, and the body of intriguing politicians endeavouring to sow discord in order to insinuate themselves in the co-operatives and render them subservient to the political parties; and strange to say, there was no greater sinner in this respect than the Agrarian party, which ought above all to have fostered the growth of the co-operatives since on their success depended the welfare of the peasantry. As M. Petko Ditsev, one of the leaders of the co-operative movement stated in his voluminous memoirs (p. XVIII) published in 1933:

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

In the course of 24 years, I was in continuous conflict with the Bulgarian political parties because their representatives would not remain impartial to the co-operative movement, but always endeavoured to subject it by force or ruse, or demanded leading posts in it when wielding authority". 474

M. D. Berov, a deputy, speaking in the Sobranye on July 17, 1928, also expressed himself in the same way.

"Party influences diverted our co-operatives from their goal a few yeare ago and turned them into party clubs. Until recently in the statutes of the Bulgarian Co-operative Bank figured article 15 which stipulated that no one was to be assisted if he did not agree to become a member of the Agrarian party. The Co-operative Central Syndicate with a capital of 1,502,000 leva owes eight millions to the Agricultural Bank. All this money was employed to build a party club and a printing press for the Agrarian party, or distributed among various leading Agrarians (a list of names and sums cited). All this money is as good as lost. This is the crown of co-operative activity of the Agrarians".

In whatever Bulgarians undertake they infuse such a tremendous amount of energy that even if a fraction of it happens to be well directed, the goal aimed at is attained. Most often however thay are incapable of coordinating their efforts and their exertions are wasted in counterchecking each other's activities. This will be plainly illustrated by the methods adopted in fostering the co-operative movement and if it has nevertheless survived and prospered, this, proves that local conditions constitute an extremely congenial environment for its development, and that if it be protected from the bane of politics from which it has so far suffered, and if something be done to coordinate and harmonise the forces that have so far impelled it, it is bound to prove an immense and unparalleled success in the country's history. The movement so far has suffered from too great a division of forces, and even governing circles are to blame for setting an 'example of disunion'. Thus instead of confiding to one central bank the

11: Logio S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

Thus instead of confiding to one central bank the
474 task of financing the co-operatives, two government institutions
453 were entrusted with this aim, with the result that
each attempted to detach from the other as many of its
clients as possible, and the nefarious example set by these
government institutions was followed down the scale by
many co-operatives which seemed to take pleasure in tresspassing
on each others activities. To crown all, the fissiparous
tendency which characterises the growth of every
intellectual manifestation in Bulgaria split many groups
into rival factions that wasted their means in fighting rather
than in helping each other. The recent decision of the
Government to amalgamate the Agricultural with the Cooperative
Bank, the two governmental institutions financing
the co-operatives, ought therefore to be applauded for it
will tend to put a stop to the insensate rivalry between
the two banks and facilitate the exertion of stricter supervision
on their activities since they supply the bulk of the
operating funds of the co-operative societies, for after all,
it is the one who pays the piper who should call the tune.
As the agricultural co-operatives, the popular banks, the
producers' societies and the associations of consumers will
each be represented by a delegate elected by them in the
council of administration of the fused banks, it may be
assumed that their respective requirements will be duly
474 studied and attended to. Thus one of the recommendations
set forth in the Report prepared by the experts of the
League of Nations in 1930 as to the Co-operative movement
in Bulgaria has been realised. Any one interested in
the state of the country should read this document for in
it one will find a plethora of data which will permit one
to form a general idea of the prevailing conditions which
the experts do not view very optimistically, for according
to them:

> "The burden of taxation threatens to undermine the whole economic development of the country. The situation is difficult, but

better prospects may be secured if the natural capacity, the laboriousness and enterprise of the people are seconded from outside".

These foreign experts further criticised the tendency of Bulgarian co-operative societies to extend their activities in too many directions instead of specialising in one line. This apparent defect however, seems an unavoidable necessity owing to the restricted field of operation of each society, though on the other hand much could be done to prevent one co-operative from impinging on another's radius of action in order that a local society may not be atrophied by its natural field of activity being too circumscribed and its resources tapped by a distant and more enterprising rival. Thus M. T. G. Vlaikov, another pioneer of the co-operative movement, in one of his works (volume VI) dilates on the rivalry between Agricultural co-operatives and the Popular banks, the latter intruding in villages where the former already function, a policy which he strongly condemns, The experts of the League of Nations were only six weeks in the country and naturally they could not fathom every question, or grasp the extreme penury of the resources of most co-operative societies since it was natural that they should visit first the most progressive and most promising establishments. An average Agricultural credit co-operation has about a hundred members and disposes of a capital of some 100,000 to 200,000 leva, bringing an annual income of 20,000 leva. The advances it secures from either the Agricultural or Co-operative Bank will amount to 800,000 or one million, and this will yield an extra interest over that which it pays of 2 °/₀₀, so that its total income will amount to 36,000 leva, if it restricts itself to purely credit operations. What can it achieve with such meagre means, and how can it defray its running expenses, since it has to provide out of them for rent and at least one man's salary? It cannot hope to expand locally, for the

474 average village contains 100 to 200 houses; for this reason pioneers of the co-operative movement, such as P. Ditsev, suggest that two or three villages should be grouped together and pool their resources.

In order to supplement its revenues such village 474 credit co-operatives are obliged to engage also in retail 45✓ distribution of commodities and other activities so as to bring down the running costs while the addition of a distributive branch helps them to increase their membership for the apportionment of the "dividend" forms a very alluring attraction, and accounts for a large percentage of adherents though not to the extent prevalent in England where it explains the adherence of three fourths of the co-operative membership (see an Article by Edwin C. Fairchild in the "19th Century and After", August 1934, p. 179) In Bulgaria however, the divident is paid only partially to purchasers, and usually half of it is retained and placed to the credit of the new customer as his share in the capital of the co-operative society. The great inducement to join a co-operative society is the credit facilities which it accords to its member, for capital is scarce in Bulgaria and rates of interest remain unduly high in spite of the various laws which have been passed to suppress usury. The penury of capital accounts to a large extent for the develoment of the Popular banks which to some extent increase their roll of membership from among those soliciting advances, the latter being granted only after the applicant agrees to subscribe to the bank's share capital, whereupon his indebtedness to the bank figures partly as money loaned by the bank, and partly as capital of the bank; thus one is often induced to form an erroneous estimate as to the soundness of these banks by assuming that their capital is fully paid up. It also often happens that co-operatives are formed mainly owing to the additional credit facilities which will accrue to their members, their founders being solely instigated by this very utilitarian motive which naturally leads to abuses and to the discrediting of the co-operative idea. This might be ascribed to the undue facility with which State funds were placed at the disposal of the co-operative societies by both the Agricultural and Co-operative banks, especially when an influential politician would discreetly hint that a certain „co-operative“ society, often composed exclusively of his own supporters, deserved financial assistance. The present arrangement by which a more effective control will be exerted by the banking authorities which grant these credits will, it is to be hoped eventually eradicate these methods which in the past have allowed several unscrupulous individuals to play ducks and drakes with State funds.

There seems to have been an undue duplication of the granting of credits as well as of the means of placing savings in the rural districts. Thus, a peasant could secure an advance both from the local credit co-operative, as well as directly from the Agricultural bank, and as the interest he had to pay on loans from the latter was lower he preferred having recourse to it. He also patronised the bank rather than the co-operative when it was a question of confiding his savings, because the Agricultural Bank naturally presented a far better security. If it could be arranged for both operations to de restricted to the co-operatives, and if the Agricultural Bank could be eliminated from granting personal credits to peasants, the scope of the co-operatives would be immensely extended and their position correspondingly strengthened as they would be made an indispensable adjunct of village life. All parties would gain by it, for the local co-operative would be better acquainted with the individual needs of its members and better suited to proffer help and advice. This naturally is not so easy to realise, since according to M. I. Nikolov only 160,000

474 452 peasant proprietors out of a total of 800,000, are members of co-operatives

474 The disability arising from the exiguity of means under which the individual co-operative society labours, and which equally prevents the formation of several distinctive co-operative societies in one village capable of ministering to the various major needs of its inhabitants has been circumvented by the creation of regional co-operative centres at convenient localities which by concentrating certain operations are able to provide the needed machinery and render its utilisation remunerative. By such concentration a further economy is effected by a reduction in the staff, for the various activities are seasonal, and occur at various times of the year, and the same personnel can be made co attend to them in turn. These regional centres also serve to concentrate the produce collected by the village co-operatives affiliated to them and help to dispose of it more advantageously than could be done in remote villages; they further serve as local wholesale Societies supplying the retail distributing branches with their requirements which they themselves could not obtain direct. Unfortunately such attempts as have been made to coordinate the activities of these regional centres do not seem to have succeeded so far, for there have been repeated complaints of one underselling the other in the open market and thus contributing to the lowering of prices. This has been particularly manifest in the marketing of tobacco, rival co-operatives undercutting prices whenever foreign buyers made their appearance

This antagonism which arises from a lack of understanding of co-operative principles is responsible in many instances for the injudicious utilisation of the limited funds at the disposal of co-operative societies; thus instead of two or three neighbouring village co-operatives pooling

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their resources to build one flour mill, or one oil-crushing plant, or one wine press. each co-operative will on the contrary endeavour to construct them independently without taking into consideration that such a plant cannot be provided with a sufficiency of work to render its employment remunerative. Thus losses are incurred through a desire to emulate one's neighbours and capital is locked up unecessarily when it could be profitably utilised elsewhere. There is no doubt that if all these disunited and often warring forces could be better coordinated an immense advantage would accrue to the country. Such a consummation would facilitate the pursuance of a more coherent and better defined policy and favour the growth of reciprocal relations with foreign wholesale co-operative societies and the International Union of Co-operatives, the support and aid of which could be solicited more advantageously and more authoritatively than by the existing undisciplined and composite body of some fifty various „Centrals" and „Unions", both General and Regional. The extremely difficult task of harmonising their divergent interests and views has been entrusted to a former Radical deputy, M. Ivan Harizanov, whose conscientious devotion to the cause of conciliation renders him well adapted to bring such trying negotiations to a successful end.[1]

It is held that co-operation is essentially based on voluntary association, that State control is likely to injure it, and that every form of compulsion from above will destroy it. But in a backward community it is impossible to bring together a mass of isolated individuals in a common economic object, and lay the foundation of a new and better rural society by mere persuasion. The State has to provide solid inducements in the form of the indispensable capital which otherwise would be lacking, and it should be in duty bound to exert a strict supervision of its utilisation even if this entails a certain restriction of individual freedom.

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[1] Unfortunately he has been releaved of his post after the fall of the Gheorghiev Cabinet.

Of course mistakes often occur, such as were committed in the case of the compulsory transfer of the attar of roses industry to the co-operative societies. The individual traders were prevented from continuing their activities and as a consequence the export of this product has considerably diminished, since the foreign connection the individual firms had built up could not be utilised by the co-perative societies.

Judging from the variety of co-operative societies in Bulgaria, one may justly infer that it is an extremely popular and attractive form of association, for it has been put to some unique experiences. Tenements have been built on a co-operative basis, several individuals pooling their resources to construct a building in which each would possess a flat. Rose growers and vine growers have grouped themselves together to build a distillery or a wine press and cellar, and there is even a sugar beet factory run on these lines. The Bulgarian is an indefatigable constructor, he revels in hard work, but the only thing which he has not yet learnt is how to coordinate his exertions in order that one individual's efforts may not be directed to counterbalancing or undoing the labour of some one else. Hitherto this is what has been happening, but the co-operative movement is beginning to open the eyes of many and eventually it will prove an excellent lesson in disciplining these antagonistic tendencies.

As has been stated, all the co-operative societies were financed and supervised either by the Agricultural or the Central Co-operative Bank. Those affiliated to the former on December 31, 1933 consisted of:

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

Agricultural Credit Co-operatives	1,474
Consumers Distributive Co-operatives	6
Tobacco Marketing „	35
Timber „ „	48
Wine and viticultural Co-operatives	19
Milk and Dairy „	7
Vegetable and Tinning „	2
Sericultural „	1
Fishing „	3
Water-power Syndicates „	12
Federations & Co-operative Syndicates	41
Various	10
Total	1,658

The total capital of the above co-operatives figured at 580,358,299 leva their reserve funds at 250,033,020, their depositors at 519,330,713, their advances to members at 1,010,490,147 and their debt to the Agricultural Bank at 1,831, 389,502.[1] They possessed an inventory valued at 222,567,836, buildings estimated at 277,109,226 and land at 40,549,954 leva. Their Roll of membership attained a total of 237,627 individuals and 2981 collective members.

The Central Co-operative Bank on the other hand was assisting the following co-operative Societies at the same date:

Popular Banks	247
Consumers & Distributive Co-operatives	64
Artisans „	85
General Suppliers „	61
Building and Dwellers „	52
Insurance „	2
Credit „	8
Co-operative Syndicates „	5
Total	524

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[1] At the end of 1934 this sum had increased to 1,898 millions but by June 30 1935, the advances by the now fused Agricultural and Co-operative banks, to all co-operative societies were reported to amount to 2,648,913,900 leva.

The capital and funds of these 524 Societies amounted to 2,289,870,000 leva, their deposists at 2,004,000, and their debt to the Central Co-operative Bank to 1,456,815,009. Their roll of membership attained 418,879. The co-operative societies affiliated to the Central Co-operative Bank were mostly operating in urban centres, while those connected with the Agricultural Bank were mainly established in rural districts This explains why each of the former has on an average five times as many members as the latter and disposes of greater capital resources. The limited number of distributive societies is explained by the fact that most of the credit societies, as well as the popular banks, have branches engaged in the retail distribution of commodities and that they do not limit their activities solely to credit operations. The co-operatives affiliated to the Agricultural Bank, judging from the data supplied by the latter seem to be extremely short of capital, the average loan alloted to an individual member is not even a bare 4,000 to 5,000 leva, and this can hardly satisfy the requirements of a farmer. Occasionally there seems to be an undue discrimination in the apportionment of the Agricultural bank's advances, some co-operatives being favoured at the expense of others. Thus at the and of December 1932 the Tobacco Co-operatives which had a capital of 45,534,409 and funds 26,239,495 leva, owed the Bank the colossal sum of 407,984,625, (at the end of 1934, this sum had increased to 476, million leva) which must be admitted was altogether out of proportion with their capital, all the more so, since this seems to have been altogether locked up; 101,516,990 leva figuring on their balance sheets as buildings and warehouses.

This exaggerated spending on buildings is noticed also in the balance sheet of the viticultural co-operatives which with a total capital of 8,833,354 leva and funds 3,431,316, have an entry of 23,732,780 leva under the

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heading of buildings etc., obviously a part of the 21,384,478 leva advanced by the Agricultural Bank having been utilised in their construction. It was reported that they suffered a loss of five million leva during the year. On December 31, 1934 these co-operatives were reported as numbering 17 with a total capital of 8.6 millions and a membership of 2,108. They owed to the Agricultural Bank 21 millions and had a stock of 3.6 million litres of wine. The position of these co-operatives seems to have been rather critical for on June 1935 they were owing to private creditors 6,641,500 leva and the Agricultural Bank was forced to assume the payment of these debts taking over as security all the buildings of the viticultural co-operative societies.

It would seem that the eventual recovery by the Agricultural Bank of its advances to these particular co-operatives is rather problematical. Apparently the 476 millions advanced to the Tobacco co-operatives include the 150 millions due by the "Asenova Krepost" Co-operation about which one read in the Agricultural Bank's Bulletin published in the summer of 1934 the following avowal: "A great share of responsibility for the catastrophe of this co-operative and of that of some others, likewise credited by the Agricultural Bank, devolves on the managing board of the bank between 1921 and 1925. This has been ascertained by a commission of inquiry which has shown that there was too much thoughtlessness in financing the co-operatives, and a lack of system in the policy they followed at the time. This was an attempt to screen some very disagreeable facts namely that there had been collusion between functionaries of the Agricultural Bank and of the above mentioned co-operatives to defraud the State by presenting and passing doctored accounts as Dr. Tsirpanliev showed in the Sobranye on April 15, 1926."

Another "bad egg" in the co-operative basket is

474 the „Vutsa“ which according to the bulletin of July 1935 owes to the Agricultural Bank 538 million leva and to various other persons 272 millions, while its gross income is only 20 millions a year. Over 700 million leva have been engulfed in this enterprise which was planned to harness the waters of the Kritsim river, a few miles to the south of Plovdiv, and provide with cheap electric power the whole of South Bulgaria. Unfortunately the original estimate of the cost of this has been exceeded several times, and finally an auxiliary steam generating station had to be erected in order to satisfy the more pressing demands of the town of Plovdiv, and until such time as the water storage works and the hydro-electrical plant on the river Kritsim are completed. This non-realisation of the hopes placed in this enterprise has caused deep disappointment and has been a blow to the co-operative idea, but such mistakes occasionally happen as has been the case with the Shannon scheme in Ireland, which was estimated to supply the entire Free State with its power and lighting requirements at a cost of £5,260,000, and though twice as much has been spent, and another two or three million sterling is to be spent on it, it has now been realised that the supply is insufficient and that an auxiliary scheme must be provided On the whole it may be said, that the employ by the co-operatives of the funds placed at their disposal by the State has not been as judicious as it might have been. Bulgarians are noted for their parsimoniousness and economy in their private affairs, but unfortunately, when it comes to handling public money they exaggerate in the opposite extreme. There have been complaints of lack of loyalty among co-operators for their readiness to transfer their patronage to private traders whenever the latter offer more profitable terms, but similar remonstrances have often been made also by the directors of the English Wholesale Society at their meetings, and obviously a

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A PEASANT GIRL PICKING ROSES

[Facing p. 161]

Bulgarian peasant co-operator can not be expected to set an example to his British colleagues on this head, but what should be expected of him however is that he should show greater consideration for the means which are placed at his disposal by the community as a whole, and that he should not proceed to dissipate them without regard for their consequences. The following excerpt from the "Artisans' Co-operative Movement", 2nd year, № 4, reveals the mentality prevailing among certain co-operative circles and the editors of the review should be congratulated at reading such salutary lectures to their subscribers:

> "During 1932, fifty eight producers societies have shown a loss of 3,502,958 leva, or each co-operative a loss of 60,596 and each co-operator a loss of 3,849. Nevertheless certain co-operators and especially those belonging to the societies least well off, draw daily wages of 175 leva. It is not a question as to whether this is too much but when the money is being withdrawn out of the capital and the sums borrowed by the co-operative, this is a crime. It is strange indeed that these same co-operators when working on their own behalf should have lived within their means, but now they seem to have lost all sense of measure".

Similar abuses were extant among the timber and fishing co-operative societies according to a report the former Minister of Finance, M. Stefanov had communicated to the Ministerial Council and which was commented on by the newspaper *Zora* early in September 1933.

One may form a general view of the activities of some co-operative societies by examining the data for 1933 of the 64 Consumers'Distributive Co-operatives affiliated to the Central Co-operative Bank. These were grouped into two syndicates, 56 belonging to the "Napred" Syndicate, a Social-Democratic body, and the remaining 8, directly affiliated to the Central Co-operative Bank. The groups had memberships of 62,191, and 7688, share capital 13,369,567 and 3,503,911, reserve funds and loan capital of 16,472,194 and 2,291,416. Advances in goods and money

474 of 110,622,277 and 14,481,696 leva respectively. The sales for the year were estimated at 376,289,157 and 37,964,023, and the profit for the "Napred group" was 583,107 leva, showing a diminution of 294,138 on the previous year, while the remaining eight co-operatives had sustained a loss of 4,229,855 leva, this being an increase by 1,729,028 on the loss sustained in 1932. The loss however was not equally apportioned, two co-operatives having incurred a loss of 4,792,880 leva, and six having realised a profit of 752,025. The average purchases per member of the second group was about 4,935 leva or approximately £11·75, while its profit and loss account figured at 5,862,346 and 10,083,209 respectively, disbursements on salaries accounting for 22%, interest for 12% loss on merchandise for 29% of this latter figure, while 97% of the former figure was ascribed to profit on the sale of merchandise.

474 456 The most remarkable success registered among co-operative societies is undoubtedly that of the "Functionaries' Insurance Association", and as M. T. G. Vlaikov pointed out, this result has been secured by its directors' rigorous abstention from politics, honest management and devotion to the aim of the association. Its growing importance may be gauged by the fact that of the total insurances on life in force during 1931, namely of a value of 3,601 million leva, policies to the value of 1424 millions had been issued by this association alone. Its success is well deserved for it has been most generous in dispensing grants to its sick members and it even maintains sickhouses and sanatoria for the construction of which it has spent several million leva.

474 In conclusion the following table may be given of the total number of co-operative societies functioning at the end of 1933 according to the official statistics.

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

	Number of Associations	Members
Credit Co-operatives	1,940	367,345
Consumers' "	142	81,033
Buildings & Dwellers' Co-op.	289	10,160
Mutual furnishing "	359	73,740
Insurance Co-op. (mainly for insuring cattle) .	1,135	182,835
Producers' Co-op.	289	76,163
Unions & Centrals Co-op.	42	16,198
Total	4,203	807,474

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Of these Societies 3,165 operated in rural districts and 1,038 in towns. 58% of the members belonged to societies established in urban districts and 41% to societies established in rural districts. This figure of 807,474 is certainly excessive, but is to be explained by the fact that the same individual may figure in several co-opetatives, and it is computed that there are only about 600,000 distinct members. The total capital and funds of these societies amounted to 4,347 million leva and deposits to 2,849 millions, their liabilities amounted to 4,456 millions, while their net profit for the year was reported to have reached 110,366,000 leva.

THE OBLIGATORY LABOUR SERVICE

Owing to Art. 65 of the Treaty of Neuilly abolishing military compulsory service in Bulgaria, those attaining military age are now being utilised to carry out various public works. A special law was voted rendering all men between the ages of 20 and 40 liable to serve during a term ot eight continuous months in the labour corps, and subsequently they are liable to be called upon for temporary service for a term of 21 days every year within the communes in which they are domiciled. Exemption from service may be secured through the payment of a

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466 tax, but owing to the poverty of the masses only about 10%, of those liable to serve avail themselves of this opportunity to affranchise themselves, though the percentage of the older classes which liberate themselves from temporary incorporation for 21 days reaches 20% to 25%.

[461] The aim of the law is not merely economic, but also aims at instilling among the conscripts of the labour corps a better comprehension of their duty towards the community, a sense of solidarity, and also a liking for manual work, and open air living, especially among the intelligentsia, who considered any sort of field work beneath their dignity. Originally the law did not provide for exemption by payment, as M. Stambuliiski, who was its chief inspirer, pursued at the same time, another object, that of humbling and persecuting all his bourgeois opponents, but the representatives of the Entente Powers intervened and succeeded in introducing certain modifications which rendered the application of the law much more lenient.

466 653 The State has derived substantial help from the utilisation of the labour corps, and it must be admitted that the condition of both the railways and roads on the repairing of which the labour corps was largely employed would have been infinitely worse off, since the State would not have been in a position to defray the work accomplished on them.

Between the years 1921 and 1931, the annual contingent of youths called upon to join the labour corps varied between 12,000 and 19,000; all those liable to service were not utilised, there not being a sufficiency of work for all, owing to the lack of resources and absence of a plan. It was for the first time in 1932 that as many as 20,750 were incorporated, the number being increased to 26,000 in 1933. The greater part of these labour conscripts were utilised for the construction of railways and

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roads as may be seen from the following table which also gives an estimate of the value of the work accomplished:

Year	Work days employed for the construction of railways and roads	Work days utilised on other work	Total work days	Value of the work carried out in leva
1922	2,271,579	322,131	2,593,710	77,811,210
1923	1,345,936	191,069	1,537,005	93,940,134
1924	1,055,789	112,909	1,168,698	66,058,916
1925	962,361	151,473	1,113,834	75,111,237
1926	710,835	201,225	912,060	68,083,877
1927	1,336,980	234,820	1,571,800	135,450,983
1928	1,310,178	214,299	1,524,477	142,075,936
1929	1,310,166	158,553	1,468,719	154,381,307
1930	1,261,359	190,317	1,451,676	142,082,059
1931	1,236,346	167,893	1.404,239	131.858,836
Total	12,801,529	1,844,689	14,646,218	1,086,854,595

To the labour of these conscripts may be ascribed the construction of some excellent highways traversing the Balkan mountains, such as those between Gabrovo and Shipka, Elena and Sliven, and from Troyan southward along the Boyanski Pass, as well as a road some 50 klm. in length along the banks of the river Kritchim to the hamlet of Duvlen in the Rhodopes. It is reckoned that 49·2% of the total labour was absorbed in the construction and reparation of roads, 3.420 klm. of new roads, as well as 436 bridges, having been constructed, and 2,315 klm. of roads repaired. Railway construction and work on ports absorbed 19.2%, and 21·4% was utilised in industrial enterprises, special workshops having been constructed such as a brick factory, a clothing and shoe factory in the vicinity of Sofia, and a timber exploitation works in the State forest of Titsa, in the region of Varna, where the available timber resources were rationally exploited, sleepers for the railways, pit-props for the

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mines and telegraph poles being prepared, as well as lumber for building purposes. The balance of the available labour was employed in agricultural work, excavations, construction of aerodromes and dams, reparation of thermal bathing establishments, drainage, afforestation, water adduction etc.

The most impressive work undertaken by the labour contingent was the erection of two large dams along the banks of the Danube namely between the mouths of the rivers Isker and Vit, and near the mouth of the river Yantra. The former one 28·3 klm. in length, has secured an area of some 17,000 hectares from the annual floods of the Danube, and the latter which is a massive dam 17 klm. in length, 24 m. wide at its base, and 5 to 7 m. in height, bearing an excellent road on top has served to reclaim 1,100 h. of marsh land and protect another 1,250 h. from floods. The total cost of this last dam at the mouth of the Yantra to the State was 32 million leva.

Certain other workshops which had been opened at Shumen and Radomir as well as certain agricultural enterprises, and cattle ranches have not proved successful and were closed.

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The financial results of the experiment may be gauged by the folloving table compiled by the Direction of the Labour Service and which coves the whole period of its functionment from its inception to March 31st 1932.

Disbursements cover: salaries and office expenses of the permanent staff, food, medical attendance, clothing, equipment, general expenses, depreciation of machinery etc. Under the heading of receipts figure, the sums paid for exemption from service, proceeds from the sale of various materials, as well as reimbursements by the various ministries of a nominal wage per man, for the number of labour conscripts affected to their services. This last practice was initiated in the financial year 1924/5 in order

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that the budget of this department might not be deficitary; the wages per day paid by the various ministries have varied between 30 and 60 leva and are substantially under the average wage of manual workers hired in the open market. It is reckoned that the upkeep of a labour conscrips costs 15 leva per day to the State, and that the value of his work is on an average about 30 leva. If it were not for the subsidy furnished by the various ministries, the scheme would not even be self-supporting, and as no remuneration whatever is given to the labour conscripts whose labour would certainly be worth semething in the open market it would not appear that this plan of employing labour is on a whole economical to the community, though it may be so to the State or the municipalities. As it should be expected, every man cannot be utilised in his profession and as a consequence the output of his work on the particular job he has been affected to is not a record one; as M. I. Detchev, a radical deputy, stated in the Sobranye on Dec. 34, 1926, the work of 14 labour conscripts equals that of one skilled workman.

The data on page 168 do not refer to the temporary service which is carried out by the communes or municipalites independently. The latter have the right to call up every year for twenty one days all men up to the age of 40, and exceptionally up to 50, who are domiciled within their precincts for the purpose of carrying out any public work which has been decided upon. It is estimated that some 800,000 men are liable to this temporary service and if their daily wage be reckoned at 40 leva per man and per day, this would represents a possible saving of 672 million leva a year on the wage bills of the municipalities employing labour and would permit them to undertake public works which otherwise would never have been contemplated owing to the precarious state of their finances.

Years	Receipts from exemptions	Receipts from subsidies paid by Ministries	Receipts from goods sold	Various Receipts	Nett Loss	Gross disbursements
1920—21	16,465				7,475,850	7,492,315
1921—22	2,941,071		1,580,664	37,838	48,709,284 *	53,268,855
1922—23	49,908,210		29,278,321	507,642	98,084,065 *	177,778,237
1923—24	85,463,762		63,757,598	803,678	24,783,318	174,808,356
1924—25	26,202,847	67,223,163	50,340,817	12,785,405		147,384,287
1925—26	36,882,768	80,802,373	66,108,120	10,692,529		182,944,747
1926—27	37,119,522	72,744,526	51,208,024	1,220,288		146,548,629
1927—28	45.542,866	143,751,752	41,389,855	2,524,909		154.388,922
1928-29	77,845,990	173,601,206	50,594,311	8,324,177		164,482,237
1929-30	101 649,332	195,795,776	65,853,521	7,048,642		188,061,303
1930—31	46,169,921	211,843,934	48,699,040	10,169,179		198,413,223
1931—32	35,478,757	184,630,035	46,481,683	9,942,087		173,334,375

* According to a statement by Minister Vassilev in the Sobranye on June 19, 1928 the Direction computes that the loss is smaller, but accounts for the difference by entering a certain sum as extra profits „not figuring in the budget" or, in other words, a subsidy of some sort

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Bulgarian foresters are unanimous to deplore the unbusinesslike manner in which the magnificent forest domains of the country have been treated as well as in the irrational way they have so far been exploited. The lack of interest shown in this branch of national wealth may be gauged from the fact that though a quarter of the country's surface was covered with forests, yet until 1930 almost the totality of the lumber needed for building purposes was imported from abroad and it was only by imposing a very heavy duty on foreign timber that imports from abroad were reduced by $^{4}/_{5}$ in 1931 and an impetus given to local lumber industries. According to the official statistics the total area covered by forests amounted to 2,698,000 hectares in 1933, of which 321,000 hectares were coniferous and 2,297,000 hectares deciduous, (mainly oak and beech) while ownership was apportioned as follows:

State	644,000	hectares
Monasteries	42,000	„
Municipalities	1,484,000	„
Private	528,000	„

The principal varieties of trees found in Bulgaria are — The oak, ash, elm. Extensive forest of resinous trees are to be found also in the Rhodopes, Pirrin and the Rila mountains and they are mostly composed of the varieties: Pinus sylvestris, pinus Austriacus, picea fectinata and picea excelsa.

According to M. D. Vessov's book on Bulgarian forestry, the State and municipal forests represent a capital of 20,000 million leva. About 20% of the total area of the country is covered with forests, this sylvan area being mostly mountainous and not fit for any other cultivation. If the forest were rationally exploited a yield of

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six million cubic metres of rough wood per annum could be secured, and as the average price it fetched was 500 leva per cubic metre for conifers, 200 leva for beech or oak, and 50 leva for brushwood and loppings, a minimum yearly revenue of one milliard leva could easily be reckoned upon, though eventually as much as six milliards annually might be secured, a sum which seems somewhat exaggerated, since official statistics show that the State receives less than a hundred million and the municipalities 150 million leva annually from their forests. There is therefore a tremendous amount of lee-way to be made up. For the year 1931 it was reported that the State forests supplied 571,000 cubic metres of wood and that their upkeep costs about 60 million leva. The main cause of neglect was the absence of transport facilities and lack of capital. The primitive saw-mills in work were too wasteful, from one cubic metre of wood only 50 % was turned out as lumber, while with modern machinery the wastage would not surpass 30 %, besides the planks sawn were of uneven thickness and did not compare favourably with those imported from abroad. M. Vessov finds that so far the concessions given to small traders for exploiting the forests have proved ruinous, as the concessionaires cut down the trees without discrimination. They usually had also to contend with the hostility of the local population and failed owing to their inability to secure enough labour. An attempt was made to create co-operative societies among the inhabitants of forest districts, but owing to their lack of means and the unsympathetic attitude of the official foresters, they do not seem to have been very successful. They generally launch into undertakings altogether beyond their resources, attempt extensive clearings, and then being unable to transport the felled wood, leave a large percentage of it to rot. The main reason for their creation was to satisfy the cravings of certain political par-

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tisans and hangers-on and as a consequence these societies have not manifested any co-operative spirit so far. The State has derived no profit from them and they have been combatted alike by capitalists and the forestry personnel. According to the official statistics there were in 1932, 102 such co-operative societies engaged in forest exploitation, their roll of membership was 8,492, their capital 15,805,640, funds 8,202.908, deposits 5,929,955, capital invested in sawmills 15,787,715. They owed 10,736,478 to the Agricultural Bank and 14,981,228 to private traders. According to a recent decision of the government, the State will assume the exploitation of the forests for its own account, in view of the unsatisfactory results obtained so far. 313 137

According to this author, the best form of exploiting the forests has been that of granting large concessions to societies possessing adequate capital, and as an example the exploitation of the Rila forests was cited which has proved exemplary. Another successful enterprise organised by the State with the help of the compulsery Labour Corps was that of the Titsa domain, south of Varna, in which the State had invested some 29 million leva. M. Vessov considered that it was indispensable to increase the means of transport in order to develop the timber industry and permit it to compete with foreign imported timber. He recommended that cattle should be rigorously prevented from grazing in the forests, a desideratum which unfortunately cannot be fulfilled because the population of the mountainous districts has no other grazing lands; his suggestion, however, of curtailing surreptitious felling of trees, by rendering compulsory the sawing of all wood in controlled modern saw mills built outside the forest areas, seems a judicious one and worth considering, owing to the vast amount of contraband which takes place. 313

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313 137 An interesting paper was read by M. Taslakov in February 1933 at a meeting of the Society of Bulgarian Economists, from which the following data are worth quoting: 35% of the timberlands consisted of heavy forests and 65% of scrub forests. From the former an annual yield of 1,008,000 cubic metres of prepared timber for building purposes could be secured, the price of which was 2000 leva per c. m. or some 907,200,000 leva, while the output from the latter would amount to 2,600,000 c. m. fit only for fuel and priced at 125 leva and would attain 325,000,000 leva. The revenue from forests would therefore reach 1,232,200,000 leva per annum.

The forests contained 50% oak, 25% beech, and 25% various conifers. The annual arboreal growth per hectare of beech was 3·6 c. m., of oak 2·8 c. m. and of the conifers 6·2 to 6·6 c. m. The total arboreal growth available for felling would be estimated at 10,294,380 c. m., half of which would cover the local requirements and the balance would be available for export.

313 661 There is another highly interesting book on Bulgarian sylviculture by M. Ch. Gruev, who was a forester and consequently fully qualified to write on the subject. His exposures of the abuses committed by successive Governments in the administration of forests, constitute a most damning indictment of the pseudo-democratic form of government so far extant and show to what extent politicians are responsible for the annihilation of the forests and how they contributed in demoralising the people by their cynical disregard of the law. The only conscientious Minister in the charge of the forest domains were D. Christov, who was a member of the Gueshov Cabinet during 1911—1912 and the Agrarian leader Draghiev. He speaks highly also of Stambulov who passed excellent measures to preserve the forests, but unfortunately under his successor, Stoilov, everything was undone. He nar-

rates at length how the late Minister Ghenadiev ordered the forest guards to inform the population of the Batak region that whoever voted for his brother would be alloted several cubic metres of timber free of charge. The same Ghenadiev repaid his electors at Stanimaka by making them a present of the Tsepelare forests belonging to the State and worth many hundred millions. In order to secure his return at the elections of 1903 he allowed his intended electors to fell undiscriminately as many trees as they wished within his constituency and in order that they might not be prevented by the forest guards, who would have demurred at this patent violation of the forest regulations, he summoned temporarily most of them to Sofia pending the elections. Whenever a forester manifested some initiative and prevented adherents of the party in power from cutting down trees, he would at once be removed from his post. (p. 137-144).

M. Liaptchev who succeeded Ghenadiev, is as violently taken to task. He is accused of preventing foresters accomplishing their duty and ordering them to let the people dispose freely of the forests until the elections were over in order to secure their votes for the Government. As a result entire forests were ruthlessly cut down, in the region of Varna, and these disafforested tracts are now known locally as Liaptchev's fields. (p. 172—3). He adds :

> "But the most anarchic Government Bulgaria had seen was that of the Agrarians, it was characterised by the greatest corruption bribery became a system". (p. 267).

M. Gruev reveals astounding facts about the Agrarian Minister Obov, who completely demoralised the forestry personnel by acceding to all the solicitations of provincial deputies. All conscientious functionaries in the administration were dismissed or threatened with dismissal and ordered to shut their eyes to the abuses committed by Government supporters. Obov was perpetually pestered

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by feminine petitioners for grants of forest clearances. Some 4000 hectares of forests on the Danube islands were handed over to villagers in order to win their votes. 90 pseudo-co-operative societies were created to exploit the forests but they disappeared as if by a miracle as soon as the Agrarian regime fell on June 9, 1923. The Agrarians in short, had proved the greatest enemies of the forests. (p. 297– 8). Unfortunately Minister I. Mollov, who took over this department after 1923 did not put a stop to the abuses, he dismissed the competent staff and nominated in its stead relatives and friends. (p. 326).

The above charges against the Agrarian regime are more than justified. A perusal of the minutes of the Sobranye reveal that several deputies impugned the Agrarians with extensive misuse of the authority they wielded when in office. Thus in the sitting of February 4 and 10, 1925, deputies related how in 1922 in order to win over 250 voters the Ministry had permitted them to cut down 6500 cubic metres of lumber, but not satisfied with this, these prospective supporters of the Government having a higher estimate of their value, proceeded to cut down 14000 cubic metres, and when the forester in charge protested, the local grandee had him arrested. The Agrarian Minister prior to the elections had openly incited the people to plunder they forests b asking „Who is the forester who dare prevent you from exploiting the forests which are yours"? Minister Obov had made a present of 46,000 hectares of forests, valued at 158 million leva to villages near Svistov and some 3800 hectares worth 175 millions to three other villages in order to secure their votes. Omartsevski who replaced Obov for a short time, disposed of some 120 hectares from the Ivanova forest in the same manner. On August 5, 1926 deputy Ts. Bratanov gave a further list of illicit felling of forests by the Agrarians whom he accused of destroying even part of the pine forest in the vicinity of Sofia with the intent of grabbing the timber. 313 661

With the re-apparition of the Agrarians in the Government presided over by M. Muchanov, the same methods were noticeable. Thus the „*Burgaska Poshta*“ of March 11 and 18, 1934 refers to extensive illicit felling of forests in the region of Aitos, the Plovdiv „*Borba*“ in April of the same year complains that the then Minister of Agriculture proceeded within 7 or 8 months to replace all the forest guards with his own partisans etc,

The aftermath of the devastation of the forests was 313 a great deterioration of the climate as a result of erosion 132 and denudation. The Journal of the Society of Bulgarian Economists for September 1933 published an article by M. Ts. Doutsev, giving certain illuminating figures. The forest belt which in 1,900 covered 32 % of the country, had diminished to 27 % in 1912 and to 19 % in 1926. Observations gathered from 67 meteorologigal stations reported that while the annual rainfall averaged 820 litres in 1900, it had decreased to 690 in 1919 and to 490 in 1921. The more impressive figures were those of the stations at Yambol and Nova Zagora which had recorded in 1900 and 1921, of 818 and 364 respectively for the first, and of 825 and 530 litres for the second. The Maritsa basin recorded a rainfall of only 500 litres per sq. metre and this was the cause of the recent poor harvests.[1] An affluent of the river Maritsa, the Topolnitsa, which had a flow of 700 to 800 litres per second, now had only 250 to 300, and this falling off could be traced to the destruction of the forests in its catchment area. M. Doutsev demanded that the 313 Sylvan administration should be freed from political in-

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[1] M. D. Christov, a former Minister of Agriculture declared in the Sobranye on December 11, 1928 that the rainfall in North Bulgaria averaged 600 to 650 litres per sq. metre while in the Plovdiv district it was only [illegible] litres.

3/13 fluences in order that the forests might be efficiently protected and he advocated the militarisation of the foresters as the best way of achieving this aim. The grazing of [137] cattle in the great timber forests accounted for their gradual deterioration and transformation into stunted brushwood. This was due to the shortage of pasture land, of which there was only enough for feeding four million head of cattle, while the number of cattle in Bulgaria was fourteen million. The requirements of this head of cattle is about five million kilogrammes of fodder, 4/5 of which is supplied from the forests, the foliage of the trees being used as such. Goats did the greatest harm, there were 250 of them per thousand inhabitants in Bulgaria, 750 in Greece, 150 in Serbia and 25 in Rummania. By these ratios one could also gauge the relative condition of the forests in these countries.

132 The gradual decrease in local precipitation which is 731 of such importance to the cultivator, as well as the resulting inundations, with the appaling destruction they cause in the fertile valleys, all of which may be traced to the unchecked felling of the forests has begun to make itself felt. We thus find deputy N. Terkalanov declaring in the Sobranye on December 11, 1928, that the yearly loss from drought could be reckoned as amounting to a reduction of the crops by 180,000 tons of cereals, 20,000 tons of industrial cultures, 10,000 of vegetables and 100,000 tons of fodder, of a value of two milliard leva. The loss caused by drought during 1934 was estimated at five milliard leva, though the harvest was an average one. Big losses were also incurred through inundations, the river Kamtsia alone caused damage amounting to 3·5 millions annually.

313 Travellers in the Balkan regions cannot help noticing 134 how vast expances of once fertile land are getting buried deep beneath tons of rubble and sand, sent down by

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

SORTING TOBACCO LEAVES

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KARLOVO WITH THE BALKANS IN THE BACKROUND

[facing p.177]

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mountain torrents, this being plainly attributable to the extensive disafforestation of the mountain ridges of this chain. The gorge of the river Isker, which might rival in scenery certain parts of Switzerland, has been largely denuded, with the consequence that extensive damage is being done yearly to the road and railway running through it by floods. The trains are often held up for hours by the boulders and debris washed down. It would be well if the slopes of the denuded mountains were afforestated anew with conifers which the herds of grazing animals would not attack, for in spite of regulations, the peasantry possessing cattle far in excess of the grazing capacity of the region will persist on sending them to graze in the forests. The afforestation of the Isker gorge would be well worth undertaking in view of the thousands of tourists who visit it every holiday during summer, special excursion trains being run from Sofia, providing as it does most charming outings for excursions and walks.

Investigations into the not very remote past history of Bulgaria, establish that the devastation of forests are comparatively of recent date. The French traveller Ami Boué records in 1854 that the Vitosh mountain overhanging Sofia was covered with thick forests; these have been cut down and it only sustains a meagre growth of shrubs, though steps are being taken to afforestate it anew. According to M. A. Ihtchiev, Turkish judges mention in their notes that the highway from Slivnitsa to Sofia ran through alleys, and big trees, and that rice and the vine were cultivated in the region at the time. This is no longer possible now owing to a change in the climate since then, and as for the big trees, not a vestige of them has been left. The region of Pleven was at the time of the Russo-Turkish war fairly thickly wooded, but now it is practically denuded.

BULGARIA PAST & PRESENT

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In view of the construction of an excellent road from Kritsim to Duvlen along the banks of the river Vutsa, the forest administration would do well to keep an open eye on the way the forests in that region are being exploited, for if they are heedlessly cut down as has happened in the Tsepelare district, a few miles to the east, following on the exploit of the late M. Ghenadiev reported above, the Vutsa river will dry up almost to the extent the Tsepelare has done, and all the millions spent on the hydro-electrical plant by the Vutsa co-operative society will have been in vain.

It would seem that the rational exploitation of the Bulgarian forests would prove a lucrative operation, large masses of lopping and inferior wood would be converted into charcoal for which there is a large market in Constantinople, Greece, Egypt and Italy. An important firm possessing adequate means with which to provide for the building of roads and railways through the forest regions, which would also assume the task of afforestation conjointly with the Government, would probably realise a fair return. Under the present circumstances the Bulgarian Government would probably be disposed to grant such a concession, as it can hardly sclicit a loan for the development and exploitation of its forests, since it will be unable to pay interest on it in foreign currency, and there is little chance of financiers considering a financial operation based on the principle of repayment in kind, which is the only method by which Bulgaria can for the present, at least, discharge her obligations. The new Government has made it known that it will re-afforestate at the earliest some 300,000 hectares and will replant another 32,000 hectares of forests which have been destroyed by fire. It seemed firmly decided to put a stop to the abuses which have hitherto prevailed.

AGRICULTURE

It is impossible to treat adequately in the limited space of a chapter a subject of such capital importance for Bulgaria as its agriculture, which is its staple industry and which forms the occupation of some 80% of her popopulation, and only a brief and superficial survey can be given To those who are interested in the subject, the works of Prof. N. V. Dolinski, of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales of Varna are recommended, who has treated this theme with an insight and comprehension worthy of the savant he is. Prof. Dolinski, being a Russian and former professor at the Polytechnical Institute ot St. Petersburg, has studied thoroughly every aspect of this subject and the conclusions he has arrived at as to the future of Bulgarian agriculture are not optimistic. He thus differs from most Bulgarians, who being temperamentaly over-confident, and somewhat unconscious of their limitations, take an over sanguine outlook as to the future, believing as they do, that persevering and unremitting labour can surmount every obstacle. 241

Bulgaria, as is well known, is a country of small holders; according to the census of 1926, the 4,469,987·02 hectares of cultivated surface was divided among 734,191 individual farmsteads, each of an average area slightly over 6 hectares[1]. The tendency however has been towards further subdivision. In 1929 the number of independent holdings had grown to 807,309, and by 1931 to 840,900. The progressive segmentation of the farmsteads is an evil which eventually will have to be stopped through the adoption of the right of primogeniture concerning landed property, or by some other means. As matters stand, there are very few sons of farmers willing to continue their 241 423

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[1] The following table gives detailed figures as to the size and number of the holdings:

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Area of farmsteads	Number of owners	% of total	Number of hectares	% of total
1 to 2 hectares	86,323	11.8	429,153	0·9
2 to 3 „	90,418	12·3	1,326,784	3
3 to 4 „	88,064	12	2,166,102	4·8
4 to 5 „	72,011	9·8	3,211,065	7·2
5 to 6 „	59,714	8·1	3,250,262	7·3
6 to 7 „	49,287	6·7	3,178,436	7·1
7 to 8 „	39,480	5·4	2,946,641	6·6
8 to 9 „	32,614	4·4	2,777.252	6·2
9 to 10 „	25,462	3·5	2,408,585	5·4
10 to 15 „	68,724	9·4	8,260.854	18·5
15 to 20 „	23,281	3·2	3,976.965	8·9
20 to 25 „	9,092	1·2	2.001,162	4·5
25 to 30 „	3,605	0·5	1,034,139	2·3
over 30 „	4,766	0·6	4,974,404	11
Total	734,191	100	44,693,987	100

parents' calling because they know that at the latter's death, the farmstead will have to be divided among all the members of the family, and that the portion which will revert to them will be too small to support them; hence their unwillingness to remain on the land, and their efforts to become State functionaries. This is also why the secondary agricultural schools have comparatively few students, the majority of whom become eventually functionaries instead of settling on the land. This explains why the progress of farming has not been commensurate with the strenuous efforts made by the government for its promotion.

A peculiar feature of these holdings is that they are often divided into ten or even more different strips, scattered about in various places, often far apart from one another, and of the most surprising dimensions. Thus a great deal of land is wasted on roads and boundaries. This intense subdivision militates against the introduction of rational methods of cultivation, and causes a huge waste of time to farmers who have to trudge from one strip to another in rotation along pathways which are well nigh impassable after heavy rains. One of the causes which led to the dividing up of the farmstead into several strips was to provide against the danger of loss-by hail which is frequent in Bulgaria. Scattered holdings considerably reduced the risk from such loss, for only some of the strips belonging to one farmstead could be so affected. But this custom has outlived its usefulness, for the State now insures farmers against such loss,[7] at a very slight charge, and it has wisely embarked on a policy of encouraging the unification of holdings; even a law has been passed, rendering this obligatory in any commune, 50% of the inhabitants of which express a desire to have their scattered strips unified. Unfortunately little progress has been made so far in this direction owing to the extreme diversity of the quality of the soil in most localities and to the fact that the peasantry is over-conservative by nature, and this is apparent from the comparatively few farmers who insure against loss by hail. In 1934 their number was stated to be 99,600, the premiums collected 22 million leva, and the disbursements made by the State for losses by hail sustained by 25,000 farmers amounted to 25 millions. The average annual loss caused by hail is estimated at 500 millions. Even as regards their cattle, farmers appear equally conservative, for in 1934 out of a total head of large cattle numbering 3 millions, only 105,000 head of cattle vere insured.

If this policy of unifying the scattered strips could be carried through, some 400,000 hectares would be rendered available for cultivation which are now occupied by roads, pathways. boundaries, hedges etc. T. At. Yaranov in his "Bulgaria to-day and to-morrow" estimates the cost ot carrying out this unification of the various strips at 1,584 million leva, or roughly at 4000 leva per hectare and as the actual price of farm land devoted to cereal cultivation averages 5,000 to 8,000[1] leva, the operation would be practicable. The advantages to be derived from

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[1] The pre-war price ranged between 1000 to 1500 leva (gold) per hectare.

[7] [i.e. hail damage,181 see cat. 116, p. 180-181—A.]

241 423 the application of this measure would be multiple. It would increase the available surface for cultivation by 10°/o. It would effect a great saving of time to the farmers, who would no longer be obliged to waste their time by visiting scattered holdings, but who would then only have to attend to one. It would permit the rationalisation of agriculture by making feasible the use of agricultural machinery. So far this extreme parcellation of the land has proved an unsuperable obstacle to the employ of modern implements. Thus during the period 1925—1930 some 2620 tractors were bought, at a cost of 1000 million leva, but it has been found impossible to utilise them for ploughing, and the only use they have been put to was to make them work the threshing machines.

However alluring this prospect of regrouping the holdings may be, it is regrettable that it can not be realised for lack of funds. As matters stand an extensive use of expensive agricultural machinery is not likely to prove profitable when there is plenty of cheap labour available and imported oil fuel is dear; besides, the smallholder would scarcely possess sufficient means to acquire them and would not know how to keep them in good condition.[1] 241 243 The utilisation of machinery on the farms could be lucratively carried out only if it mere undertaken on a co-operative basis, but in such a case it would be necessary to found co-operative societies in every village before proceeding with the wholesale employ of machinery. However, even with such improvements, Bulgaria could not hope to compete in cereal growing with transoceanic countries, and the only advantage to be derived would be to continue raising the same amount of cereals on a more restricted area by employing more advanced methods of cultivation, in order that more land be diverted to other crops demanding more labour and skill.[1] The table on page 184 gives particulars as to the main varieties of cereals cultivated, and their respective yield during the last years

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[1] During the Liaptchev administration the government undertook to introduce by hook or crook modern machinery, and a large number was foisted on the peasantry but never utilised. Many complaints were made as to the peasantry having been encouraged to run into debt merely in order to buy machines. The exposures made by certain deputies on May 22 and 30, 1932, on this subject are not at all edifying.

The harvest of 1934 was affected by drought in the early part of the summer, and the yield was considerably under the average of recent years as may be gauged by the following figures:

	Average yield per hectare during 1930—1934	Yield in 1933 per hectare	Yield in 1934 per hectare
Wheat	1157 kg	1204 kg	902 kg
Rye	1092 „	1180 „	868 „
Mixture of barley and wheat . . .	1228 „	1248 „	993 „
Barley	1240 „	1441 „	806 „
Oats	816 „	983 „	578 „
Maize	1232 „	1309 „	1221 „

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[1] Cereal growing is not a renumerative occupation and can only be carried on thanks to the subsidies offered by the State. It has to be carried on however, because Bulgaria can not afford to pay for imported cereals. Their production therefore should be adjusted to local requirements in order to restrict the amount of subsidies disbursed to the minimum.

The cost of wheat may be computed at 2·77 leva per kg., the following items entering into the cost of production per hectare: Ploughing and sowing 2,100, harvesting 300, transport to threshing machine and threshing 400, transport to market 100, seed 250 kg. at 1·25 = 321 25, total 3212·5 leva. Average production per hectare 1157 kg.

In transoceanic countries the cost of production is about 1·25 leva per kg., with a tendency for a further reduction judging from

	Annual average for period 1927—1931		1931		1932		1933		1934	
	Area sown in 1000 hectares	Output in 1000 quintals	Area sown in 1000 hectares	Output in 1000 quintals	Area sown in 1000 hectares	Output in 1000 quintals	Area sown in 1000 hectares	Output in 1000 quintals	Area sown in 1000 hectares	Output in 1000 quintals
Wheat	1,159·9	13,470·6	1,247	17,507·5	1,256·3	13,903	1,246	16,166	1260	11,382
Rye	222·1	2,318	232 9	2,705·9	220·1	2,575	212	2.760	192 4	1,670
Mixture of barley & wheat .	99·1	1.128·6	104·6	1,413	89·8	951	88	1,165	85·6	850
Barley	243·2	3,204	244·8	3,453·1	230·3	3.070·3	234	3,599	230·2	1,855·4
Oats	133·2	1,065	118 6	1,024·7	113·8	1,128·7	134	1,556	126·4	730·3
Millet	13·9	141·1	8·5	118·8	12·5	156·5	7	87	7·7	67·5
Maize	698·4	7302	680·4	8,887	740·1	10,544 2	713	10,430	670 9	8,194·9
Rice	7·4	102·6	6·9	90·5	5·4	89·4	6	88	5·9	87·8
Total . .	2,577·8	287,33·8	2,655·1	35,201·2	2,658·3	32.419 8	2,640	35,851	2,578·4	24,837·9

the following passage in Viscount Astor's „Land and Life" p. 55 „Costs of many producers in North America are appoaching 24/—per quarter, while one farming 30,000 acres, expects to be able to sell, with substantial profit at less than 17/—" (about 0·95 leva per kg).

AGRICULTURE

The yield per hectare has been increased, thanks 243 to the efforts of the State Agriculturists and those 242 of the experimental stations. It is affirmed that for about 1/3 of the area sown to wheat selected seed has been utilised from certain new varieties of wheat from which as high a yield as 2650 kg. per hectare has been obtained at the experimental stations, but only 1675 to 1766 kg. when sown in the average farmsteads. This has contributed in raising the yield from about 1000 kg. per hectare during the pre-war period to 1157 kg. at the present time.

Though about 3/4 of the cultivated land is devoted 243 to cereals, 90% of the total output is absorbed locally, [439] and only 10% is available for export in ordinary circumstances. Often, when the harvest is below the average there is little or nothing to export. The last international wheat Conference held in 1932 fixed Bulgaria's annual export quota of cereals at 2,500,000 quintals, or 236,000 tons, but in the export campaign of 1933/34, the quantity available for export did not reach this figure, and in the following season the cereals exported amounted to some 175,000 tons, so that it may be reckoned that Bulgaria has ceased counting as a grain exporting country. In fact the average 243 Bulgarian farmstead does not produce sufficient grain for 433 its own requirements, and it is only the larger ones, those of over 10 hectares, that have a surplus for disposal. This renders the majority of farmers unaffected by the fluctuation of prices since they consume their own produce, and strange as it seems, the fall in the prices of agricultural produce must on the whole be beneficial to them, since Prof. Y. Mollov, former Minister of Agriculture, affirms in the Annuaire of the Sofia University for 1933 (Agricultural Dept.) that the peasantry on the whole buy more than they sell, the proportion of their purchases to their sales being the following:

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	Year 1929—30	Year 1930—1	Year 1931—2	Average
North Bulgaria	171,06%	146,01%	110.70%	142.59%
Sofia region	179.90%	158.43%	158.28%	165.53%
South Bulgaria	119.60%	125.60%	186.23%	143.81%

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This of course has been possible owing to the credits which they have been able to raise from the Agricultural Bank, and to their not applying them to the specific purposes for which these loans were granted; the Agricultural Bank having extended to the rural population credits amounting on an average to 7360 leva per hectare for the smaller category of farmsteads. It must not be thought however that the peasantry has been living wastefully, and has run into debt owing to its being profligate. Very often in periods of drought the Agricultural Bank, under pressure from the State, has been compelled to come to the assistance of the peasantry and to supply them with seed and food, practically with no guarantee. This will largely explain the excessive advances which the Bank has made to the rural population, which, if it were not for this timely aid would have literally starved.

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The source of the trouble is that the available land is unsufficient to support the population, and that if it be not provided with more land in order to increase its production up to its requirements, or if it be not assisted financially in order to modernise its methods of cultivation, and thus be able to raise a larger quantity of products on the land it actually possesses, there will be grave danger of a dislocation of the present social fabric

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Prof. St. Tsolakov, a colleague of Prof. Dolinski, has published a most interesting essay in the 1934 Annuaire de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, of Varna, on the position of the farmers in the Varna region, and on their indebtedness to the State. It is certainly representative of the whole country, and the study of the figures he supplies will convince any one that the problem

of the reorganisation of agriculture in Bulgaria is a most 241
pressing one if a social upheaval is to be avoided at no 434
distant date.

Prof. Tsolakov has carefully calculated the revenue of all items of income of farmers from the various cereals, vegetables, fruit, poultry, cattle etc. they raise, as well as the disbursements they make for the purchase of similar articles for their personal requirements in cases where they do not produce one, or several of these articles on their own farms and have to sell certain surpluses, if they have such, in order to buy what they do not produce, and he has come to the conclusion that farmers possessing up to 2 hectares have an annual deficit as regards their needs in agricultural produce of 4,226 leva per farmstead, those possessing 2 to 5 hectares have a surplus of 402 leva, those with 5 to 10 hectares a surplus of 7,103, those with 1 to 15 hectares a surplus of 15,632, and those of over 1 hectares a surplus of 19,919. However, the rural population has other needs besides agricultural produce, which mainly represents food, namely: clothing, light, fuel, etc., and if these requirements be taken into consideration the farmsteads would show the following position as to revenue and expenditure:

Farmsteads up to 2 hectares:	Annual	deficit	7,226	leva
„ from 2 to 5 „	„	„	4,598	„
„ „ 5 to 10 „	„	surplus	103	„
„ „ 10 to 15 „	„	„	5,632	„
„ of over 15 „	„	„	6,919	„

As a consequence, farmers have been unable to pay 241
their taxes, or to refund their debts. Prof Tsolakov has 651
appended the results of an examination into the accounts
of 487 individual farmsteads in the region of Varna, and 426
gives these most impressive data as to the hopeless position in which the peasantry finds itself. Arrears of unpaid taxes have been accumulating for the past years, and there

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is practically no prospect of their ever being met. The following figures are self-explanatory:

Cases	Area of farmsteads		Arrears of taxes 1925—6 to 19.2—3		Tax for 1933—4		Fines		Total mount of taxes owing	
					(forx each category		of		farmsteads)	
144	up to 1	hectare	79,943	leva	12,016	leva	10,200	leva	102,150	leva
79	1 to 2	„	97,232	„	20,368	„	20,661	„	138,311	„
75	2 to 3	„	132,317	„	31,883	„	29,498	„	193,698	„
83	3 to 5	„	236,560	„	53,260	„	54,575	„	334,495	„
65	5 to 10	„	229,741	„	75,310	„	49,575	„	354,626	„
33	10 to 20	„	132,250	„	73,650	„	55,799	„	261,699	„
8	over 20	„	241,675	„	32,683	„	126,358	„	400,716	„

The amount of individual indebtedness has also been inquired into, and this has been computed as follows.

Farmsteads of			To Agricultural bank	To Co-operative bank	To the State (taxes mainly arrears)	To Municipality	To Private persons	Total
up to	2	hectares	7,360[1]	1,710	970	170	12,050	22,260
of	2 to 5	„	3,820	600	530	60	4,410	9,420
„	5 to 10	„	2,930	580	360	50	2,370	6,290
„	10 to 15	„	2,950	440	220	—	1,600	5,210
„	over 15	„	2,800	290	400	40	1,190	4,720

From the above data it will be evident that the smaller farmers are hopelessly insolvent since the actual value of arable land is between 5,000 to 8,000 leva per hectare.

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With regard to the production of cereals Prof. Tsolakov calculates that the average deficit of farmsteads

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[1] According to a statement made in the Sobranye on Feb. 26 1932, peasant indebtedness to the Agricultural Bank amounted to 4,096,043,000 leva at the end of 1931. Farmsteads of 10 hectares owed it 3360 per hectare, and those of 10 hectares and over, 2170 leva per hectare. The total value of the 4,469,987 hectares under cultivation was estimated in 1927 at 83,933,620,000 leva, rural buildings at 34,845 millions, the live stock at 19,927,205,000 leva and agricultural inventory at 4,760,149,000 leva. By 1932 values had fallen by 60% so that the value of farm property was estimated at only 50,000 millions and the debts of the farmers then amounted at only 12,000 millions. The total revenue from agriculture, had dwindled from 23,347 millions in 1929 to under 13,000 millions in 1930, as the Minister of Agriculture affirmed in the Sobranye on March 6. 1932.

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having an area of up to 2 hectares, is 2,510 kg., that of 2 to 5 hectares 1,570 kg., and that of 5 to 10 hectares 149 kg., and he estimates that at the present state of development of agriculture, farmsteads of less than 2 hectares in area can hardly absorb the labour of two persons, those of 2 to 5 hectares of 3 persons, those of 5 to 9 hectares of 4 persons, those of 10 to 30 hectares of 5 persons, and those of over 30 hectares, of 6 persons and over. Consequently there are 1,214,766 persons too many on the land, and it is indispensable to transform agricultural methods to absorb profitably their labour. This could be done by developing orchard and vegetable growing, dairy farming, cattle raising, as well as by the cultivation of industrial and oleaginous plants. Prof. Tsolakov's figures are in no way biassed; deputy Dr. Assen Tsanov, affirmed in the Sobranye on May 18 1933, that farmsteads having an area of 5 hectares and under, could not support their owners, that there was a shortage of land, and that this forced the rural population to migrate to the towns where likewise no work could be found for it. In another speech, on March 8 1932, he explained that farmers owning 2 to 6 hectares could barely eke out a living and that they were utterly unable to pay their debts. Farmers and the Agrarian party have been most vociferous in stressing the necessity of bringing down the level of prices of industrial articles to that of the agricultural, for with the fall in price of the latter, the rural population had been precluded from buying even the most indispensable articles for lack of means. A most informative article in the guise of an open letter addressed by a farmer in south-west Bulgaria to the editor of the *Vetser* was published by the latter newspaper on Oct. I, 1933. The farmer after complaining that peasants had to exchange 2 kg. of grain for a box of matches, 4 kg. of grain for a kg. of salt, 40 kg. of grain for a pair of primitive boots, and that after satisfying

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their most essential needs there remained nothing over for the payment of taxes and interest on debts, he proceeded to give a detailed list of the expenditure and revenue of his farm, which had an area of 10 hectares and which he had bought for 200,000 leva in 1927. He had further acquired 2 oxen for 10,000 leva, 1 cow for 6,000 leva, 20 sheep for 10,000 leva, implements for 50,000 leva and had erected a cottage for 5000 leva, bringing up the total amount invested on the farm to 241,000 leva.

Revenue: 4 hectares sown to wheat=600 kg wheat at 1.50 leva	=9000	leva
1/2 „ „ „ barley=500 „ barley at 1 „	= 600	„
[1] 20 sheep, 600 litres milk at 3 „	=1800	„
1 cow 600 „ „ at 2 „	=1200	„
1/10 hectare planted with potatoes=300 kg at 1 „	= 300	„
1/10 „ „ „ vegetables	= 300	„
3/10 „ sown „ sunflower & beet	=1800	„
1 „ „ hay	=1500	„
(4 hectares lying fallow)		
Net revenue	16,800	„
Expenditure. Food for family of 5, 1825 kg of grain at 1.50 leva	=2738	leva
Corn seed for 4 hectares 1000 kg. „ „ „	=1500	„
Threshing 6000 kg wheat	= 900	„
„ 6000 „ barley	= 60	„
Milling wheat for food	= 436	„
Clothing & boots	= 800	„
Light	= 400	„
Salt, sugar rice & wine	= 500	„
Soap, brushes etc.	= 200	„
Repairs to buildings & instruments	=1200	„
Medical assistance	= 200	„
School fees & extras	= 500	„
Fodder for oxen and cow, 1080 kg. of grain at 1.50 leva	=1620	„
„ „ 20 sheep 3240 kg. of hay at 1 leva	=3240	„
Insurance against hail	= 720	„
Total disbursements	=17,514	„

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[1] The wool from the sheep was not accounted for as it probably served for making homespun cloth for the farmer and his family. It would have amounted to 46 kg at 40 leva =1840 leva The quantity would hardly suffice a household of five.

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Thus even a farmstead of 10 hectares, according to the above figures showed a deficiency, though it was exploited by its owner and family without any hired labour. And it must be noted that in the above figures no allowance is made either for payment of taxes, debts depreciation or remuneration for labour, and that further, the yield per hectare of wheat is calculated at well over the mean figure attained, this being 1157 kg. per hectare and not 1500 kg. as on this particular farm. No wonder that the land tax fell in arrears, and only yielded a fraction of the 350 million of revenue, which was the annual forecast in the budget. Thus in 1926—7 the yield from it was 187,755,000 leva, in 1927—8, 150 millions, in 1928—9, 32 millions, in 1930—1, 83 millions, until it was finally suppressed in 1932.

The inability of the smaller farmers to provide for their own maintenance was concretely affirmed by Prof. Dolinski, in one of his works published in 1931, when he also asserted that 38·40% of the farmers were only slightly affected by the drop in the prices of cereals. The following figures were given in support, as well as a table showing the distribution of the arable land among farmsteads cultivating cereals. The average monthly consumption of cereals was stated to be 20 kg. per person in the urban districts, and 30 kg. in rural areas. The average farmstead had 5·351 members, and its annual requirements in cereals was 2015·165 kg. The production of cereals per hectare during the quinquennial period 1925—9, averaged 1009 kg. If 153 kg. for seed per hectare were deducted, this left 856 kd., a quantity which was raised from 2.354 hectares. Therefore farmsteads of $2^1/_2$ to 3 hectares, produced just enough grain for their owners, and had no surplus wherewith to pay taxes and renovate their implements.

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Categories aud numbers of farmsteads		Area owned Hectares	Area devoted solely to cereals. Hectares	Percentage
Self-sufficing in cereals	41,297	1,125,443·7	818,798 9	3·64
Buying cereals	236,047	3,050,087·6	2,259,841·1	9·76
Having a surplus of cereals	439,235	28,845,318·9	20,064,752·3	86.70

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What has so far been advanced is, it is to be hoped, enough to show that on one hand the lesser farmsteads are scarcely self-supporting and that on the other hand the larger farms, owing to the fall in the price of cereals, are unable to meet their liabililies. If 80°/₀ of the population is therefore in such a state of indigence and unable to pay any taxes, one can easily surmise in what poverty the whole nation must be struggling since its entire economic structure is based on agriculture, which has ever been its mainstay. This most regrettable state of affairs is largely due to those who drafted the Peace Treaties. Obviously, it was nothing short of a crime to deprive Bulgaria of such land as was indispensable for her population, and which had been in her possession, or was mainly inhabited by a Bulgarian population, and transfer it to her neighbours, all of whom had received vast increases in territory, and [illegible]n no need of further land. This wilful pauperisatio[illegible] a people which was not only despoiled of its most fertile provinces, but obliged to house and feed some 400,000 destitute refugees, driven away from the territories so thoughtlessly transferred to the neighbouring States, is undoubtedly one of the causes which led the American people to wash its hands off European affairs in disgust, and this may be easily understood, for the American delegation at the Peace Conference in its desire to secure a just and enduring settlement, most sturdily upheld the cause of Bulgaria. Nor can the politicians responsible for these obtuse arrangements of the Peace Treaties plead in extenuation that they were actuated in their drafting by the biblical

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

TROYAN

[facing p. 193]

000 precept of "Unto him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath", which, as far as Bulgaria is concerned, they applied in the letter, for Chistian considerations seldom sway them. The present writer well remembers Prof. H. Laski, affirming some fourteen years ago at the London School of Economics, that a certain Cabinet Minister had confided to him, that for ten years he had never heard a Christian thought expressed at the deliberations of the Cabinet! (Obviously not a Labour one).

24/ Though amputated of her richest cornland, the Dobrudja, which represented 12% of the total cultivated 311 surface of Bulgaria, and accounted for over 20% of her grain exports, as well as of western Thrace, which produced the finest brands of Oriental tobacco, the peasantry reacted, as any vigorous organism would do, and, sought by superhuman efforts to adapt itself as best as it could to its new restrained conditions It brought into cultivation hilly and less fertile land, and converted into tilled fields crazing land and forest, so that the surface devoted to cereal cultivation which averaged 2,460,447 hectares during the quinquennial period 1908—12, increased to 2,640,003 hectares in 1933. Owing however, to the increase in 24/ population, the per capita production of cereals substantially diminished, and consequently the surplus available for export decreased from 609,169 tons in 1914, to some 120,000 tons for the season 1933—4, and even this result was achieved by underfeeding the cattle, which deprived of pasturages, mostly converted into cornfields had to

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[1] Of the total area of Bulgaria, 6,157,000 hectares, was considered as unfit for tillage, the remaining 4,157,620 hectares, was arable land which was utilised as follows in 1933:

Tilled fields	3,220,013	hectares
Fields lying fallow . .	402,920	„
Vineyards & orchards	125,699	„
Natural prairies . . .	307.766	„

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241 subsist on short rations, being fed on 4800 million kg. of fodder, instead of 12,000 million kg., which quantity is said to represent its normal requirements. The inability to keep up her position as a grain exporting country, constrained Bulgaria likewise to undertake the transformation of her agriculture and to give an impetus to fruit growing and the cultivation of industrial and oleaginous plants. These latter kinds were cultivated during the period 1908/12, in the mean, on an area of 25,759h. a year, while by 1933.[1] This had increased to 154,000 hectares, which were apportioned among the following plants:

		Area in thousand of hectares		**Yield in thousand of quintals**	
		1933	**1934**	**1933**	**1934**
Rape seed		0.6	16.085	7.543	10.7
Sunflower seed		81	105.123	929.832	980.
Tobacco.		23	19.869	175.140	149.1
Cotton	Seed	20	38	89.607	89.923
	staple				
Hemp	seed.	5 3	5 668	38.940	50.923
	fitaments			18.291	23.2
Sugar beet		11		22.938 1856	31.5
Various		13		58	

In the latter figure of 58,000 quintals are included 42,296 quintals of sesame (1934: 27,214) 7,309 quintals of aniseed (1934: 14,178) Flax: 2,798 quintals seed and 864 filaments (1934: 8,556 seed and 5,76 6filaments). Opium poppy seed 1,993 quintals (1934: 3,693). Pea nuts 2,862 quintals (1934: 8,514) and a quantity of soya beans, with which 15,500 248 hectares have been sown in 1935. Cotton seems to be the most promising among the industrial plants, and it is hoped that eventually sufficient will be grown to provide all the

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[1] For 1935 the area devoted to them has been increased to 241,777 hectares while the area sown to cereals had decreased to 2,419.377.

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cotton needed for local consumption and for the spinning of yarns up to № 24 counts. In 1932, 3,756 tons of raw cotton was imported, plus 6,355 tons of yarn up to 24's. It is reckoned that the annual requirements in cotton and cotton yarn amount to 12,000 tons and that in a couple of years it will be possible to devote some 60,000 hectares to cotton growing in order that Bulgaria might dispense with the importation of cotton, cotton yarns up to 24s and most cotton textiles as are made from such yarns. It is believed that by a rational utilisation of the existing 82,514 spindles and 3,218 cotton weaving looms, no new machinery will be required. The cotton grown in Bulgaria is a short staple variety of an average length of staple of 21 millimetres and 0.0218 millimetres in thickness and in this it resembles Indian cotton. The yield per hectare is 200 to 220 kg. which also corresponds to the mean Indian yield of 86 lbs to the acre. It is a much more remunerative crop than cereals for the government fixed a buying price of 30 to 34 leva[1] per kg, which allows for a return to the farmer of 200 kg × 30 leva = 6000 leva, plus 400 kg. of cotton seed × 2 leva = 800 leva, or a total of 6,800 leva per hectare, from which some 700 leva should be deducted for the cost of ginning and 50 kg for seed × 2 leva = 100 leva, leaving a revenue of 6,000 leva per hectare, which on an average is three times as much as that from most cereal crops[2]. The cultivation of cotton however, can only be carried out in certain regions, mainly in south Bulgaria, and entails more labour than cereal

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[1] The price of foreign cotton at about 6 per lb. if imported in Bulgaria would correspond to 36 –38 leva a kg. for its cost would have been increased by 50% to 55% owing to the premium which would have to be paid on foreign currency and other expenses.

[2] The gross revenue per hectare of the various plants, based on the prices prevailing during 1932 was calculated to be: wheat: 2561 leva, maize: 1629. sunflower seed: 2096, Cotton: 5147, Flax: 8552, Hemp: 4355, Sugar beet: 10,066.

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248 cultivation, but the peasant does not grudge this extra work, for the smallholder has plenty of time at his disposal. Prof. Dolinski in fact showed that small farms up to 1. 9 hectares absorb only 61.4 working days of a man, and 28.3 of a woman, and farms of 2 to 9.9 hectares require the labour of a man for 213.1 days and that of a woman for 86.2 days, so that the farmer is usually glad to find extra occupation when this is likely to bring some recompense.-

248 288 The other, textile plants grown in Bulgaria are flax and hemp. Of the latter as much as 2,320,000 kg of filaments were produced in 1934 and it is hoped that even a larger quantity could be locally utilised, if, as is contemplated, hemp were used in place of the 1,200,000 kg of jute yarns and fabrics which are imported. It is affirmed that there are 3367 spindles and 459 looms which could be adapted to the manufacture of textiles from hemp and that they would suffice for this purpose. Over a million kg. of hemp is used annually for the manufacture of cordage and string, and a smaller quantity for hand-woven fabrics. It was stated that there is a surplus of about one million kg of hemp left over from the 1934 crop, and that the production for 1935 will be curtailed. The cost of hemp is reported to be 17 leva per kg and the yield 800 kg and over of filaments and seed per h.

249 258 The oleaginous plants cultivaled are rape seed, mainly exported, and sun flower seed, which is absorbed locally for the production of comestible oil, which has now completely replaced the oils hitherto imported. The oil obtained from sun flower seed il also utilised for industrial purposes and the residue, in the form of seed oil cakes is exported as cattle food. In 1933 of the total crop only 10,768,175 kg., or about 10% was exported, the balance having been bought up by the local oil-crushing mills, while the quantity of seed oil cake exported rea-

ched 25,411,022 kg. valued at 45 million leva. Experiments 249
have also been made with another oleaginous plant, the
Ricinus Communis, from which castor oil is extracted, with 258
excellent results, a yield of 1500 kg. of seed of superior quality having been obtained per hectare sown.

Tobacco has come to replace cereals in importance 249
as an article of export. In 1934 it represented 40% of
the total exports, and the quantity marketed abroad was 439
valued at 982 million leva. In 1933, 22,531,439 kg. of a value of 1,174,511,061 leva were export. In 1934 the respective figures were 20,830,000 and 982,000,000. Prices have been very much affected by the prevailing crisis, as may be inferred by comparing the above with the figures for 1932, when 22,452,752 kg. were exported, but were priced at 2,654,238,438 leva. It was after the war that tobacco cultivation was particularly fostered, the quantity exported rising from 7,355,448 kg. in 1919 to the record figure of 33,647,241 kg. in 1925. After this date both Greece and Turkey reappeared on the world market as producers of Oriental tobacco and the proportion of Bulgarian tobacco sold abroad fell off, though on the whole it maintained its position in Germany, which buys steadily about half of the amount exported, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia etc., where its qualities have been thoroughly appreciaded. It would appear that the average quantity of nicotine found in it varies from 0·5% to 1%, when according to Kissling, the contents in nicotine of Virginia tobacco are 4·3% to 4·8%, of Kentucky 4·5%, of Sumatra 4·1% and Samsoun (Turkey) 2·5%. German chemists have characterised Bulgarian tobacco as poor in nicotine and have approved the manifacture of cigarettes made from it which are designed as containing the "minimum of nicotine".
Tobacco forms one of the chief items of revenue to the 249
State, some 650 million leva being annually derived from 651
the tobacco monopoly. The State also raises a tax of 1

249 to 2 leva per kg. of tobacco exported, while the amount of wages disbursed for the manipulation of tobacco was
651 reckoned to reach an annual average of 559 million leva during the period 1919—1931, the number of workmen engaged in the manipulation of tobacco being 86,000. This however is a seasonable occupation and less than 20,000 workpeople are permanently engaged. The number of farmsteads mainly cultivating tobacco is reckoned at 127,000.

In contrast with tobacco, which now forms the staple
249 product of Bulgarian agriculture, and the main source of revenue, the cultivation of sugar-beet, in which some 100,000 formsteads are mainly engaged, has caused, and is causing an important loss to the State. In Great Bri-
000 tain also the subsidising of the sugar industry has led to lively debates, and Sir Herbert Samuel, as recently as Feb. 5, 1935 appealed in the House of Commons that „this colossal, wasteful and scandalous expenditure should be brought to a speedy end". In a world suffering from a collective attack of aberration, all its members more or less, show the same symptoms. It is not surprising therefore that even the levelheaded Bulgarians, endowed with no little common sense, should not have managed to keep themselves exempt from the universal malady.

257 Under the protection of a high import duty, amounting actually to 11 leva per kg., five sugar refineries were established in Bulgaria at a cost of 1,347,226,037 leva. Their united capacity of production is annually 63 million kg, but consumption a few years ago was only half this figure, and owing to the steadily diminishing buying power of the population, this has decreased to 21.6 million kg. in 1933, for the State imposes sugar also with excise, and a communal tax and the sale price of sugar is as 26 leva per kg., while the price of sugar on the world market is under 5/-per cwt, or 2 leva per kg. It was af-

firmed by a deputy in the Sobranye on March 25 1932 that the five refineries which had formed a syndicate in order to keep up prices were making an annual profit of 320 million leva, another deputy, M. P. Denev, had asserted on Dec. 12 1931 that this attained 270 millions. That the profits made were inordinately high may be proved by the fact that the shareholders of the one at Gorna Orehovitsa received a dividend of 25% in 1926, and of 50% in 1927, on their invested capital. (These details were published in the bulletin of the Prague Credit Bank which holds most of these shares).

It may be easily seen that this large profit realised by these five sugar refineries could have been secured instead by the State if it imported sugar from abroad and proceeded to sell it at the prevailing price, and that the profit it would have realised would have been enough to permit the State to pay to the farmers for the whole production of beet necessary to manufacture 30 million kg. of sugar, without their engaging in its cultivation. (Namely 200 million kg. ot beet at the rate of 600 leva per ton.) The profit derived by the State would also suffice to defray the whole wage bill of the workmen employed in the industry, namely about 40 million leva annually, as their number does not exceed 2000, and it would also be possible to provide out of it for a bonus of 10% on the capital invested in the factories. and yet leave a substantial balance. Protectionists would argue that such a policy would necessarily tend to increase imports, and create an adverse balance of payments to the extent of 60 million leva (30 million kg of sugar × 2 leva), but as matters stand, the capital invested in the sugar refineries being foreign, the profit the factories realise is remitted abroad, and as this exceeds very substantially the cost of the sugar which would have been imported, the country's balance of payments is adversely affected to a greater extent than it would have been by the importation of sugar. The financial experts of the League of Nations, who are supposed to watch over the economic welfare of Bulgaria might well have intervened on this question and relieved her of a burden equal to that of the reparations imposed on her, but as foreign interests are involved which have powerful backers among international financiers, nothing was ever mentioned about this dissipation of public money except occasionally by some deputies in the Sobranye. The existence of the industry is an incubus to the country, for not only does it cause a yearly loss of over a quarter of a milliard leva, but owing to the high cost of sugar it has militated against the creation of a fruit canning and jam industry. There is not the slightest doubt that if sugar were procurable at the price ruling on the world market Bulgarian fruit, such as apricots, peaches, plums, pears, cherries, strawberries, raspberries etc, which are as luscious and delectable as those grown in California, could be preserved and a large export industry built up. Under the prevailing system this is impossible, and only prunes, and strawberries in pulp, are exported, the former to Germany, and the latter to England, where they are converted into jam. It would be a sensible plan to reduce the protective duty by 75%; even then, the factories would be sufficiently protected against foreign sugar, all the more so, since the price of beet has been recently reduced from 600 to 400 leva per ton. The margin of profit would still remain more than adequate, and would be increased by an expansion in consumption which would inevitably result by lowering the price of this essential commodity. This is certainly capable of being trebled, which would then permit the factories to work full time, and produce more economically for the consumption of sugar has fallen as low as 3½ kg. per head per annum, compared with 40.6 kg. in Great Britain

and 23·8 kg. in France. which constitutes yet another sure 257
sign ot the pauperisation of Bulgaria, since in Greece and Yugoslavia the consumption of sugar is about three times as high as in Bulgaria. Another article which during recent 245
years has achieved a record success, is the cultivation and 439
export of dessert grapes which as to value are now classed third in the list of Bulgarian exports. Owing to the careful sorting and packing to which the grapes were subjected by government controllers and to their perfection they have been able to secure an easy preeminence on the Central European markets, and even in England.

The variety chiefly exported resembles somewhat in appearance the Spanish grapes of Almeria, but is less sweet in taste, has a thinner skin, and the bunches are larger. The just appreciation which these grapes have achieved in Central Europe may be gauged by the rapid increase of the quantity exported, which from a mere 52 kg. in 1925, reached 21,223,030 kg. or 3740 truck loads of a value of 140 million leva in 1934. In 1932 some 92,094 hectares were devoted to viticulture, of which about 10% were table or dessert varieties, the remaining being chiefly cultivated for the production of wine, of which 142 million litres were produced in the same year[1]. Recently several co-ope- 274
rative societies have installed modern wine presses and cellars, and are now producing wines according to the latest technique several standardised types of wine having been put on the market which are not below the average grades of those produced in France and Spain, even a variety of champagne wine being on sale. Hopes are entertained that eventually a market for wine will be found abroad, as local requirements are much below production The con-

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[1] The production of grapes is computed at 400 million kg. of which 120 millions are consumed locally, about 20 millions are exported, and some 260 millions used for wine. In 1935 the quantity exported is expected to be as much as 30 million kg.

274 sumption of wine is about 23 litres per capita yearly, as against 153 in France and 101 in Italy. Owners of vineyards were complaining that they could not meet their expenses as grapes grown for wine were a drug on the market. It was stated in the Sobranye on Dec. 8, 1931 that while revenue from vineyards was 600 millions, expenditure on them was 720 million leva, while the capital they represented was 13,000 million.

245 [242] [439] Concurrently with the vine, orchard planting has received a great impetus, the State having established 39 nurseries and experimental stations from which young fruit trees are supplied to farmers at a nominal price. Apples and plums are being exported in increasing quantities, as well as walnuts, of which 2083 tons were exported in 1934. The area occupied by orchards was stated to be 19,420 hectares in 1932, of which 12,030 hectares were planted with plum trees, 919 with apple trees, 122 with pear trees and 6,349 were described as mixed orchards.

247 303 [439] Bulgaria is renowned for its attar of roses; unfortunately the world crisis has affected to a great extent this industry, and the area planted with rose bushes (6800 hectares in 1931) is consequently being reduced since the export of this product has declined from 3,157 kg. valued at 240 million leva in 1928, to 1218 kg. valued at 36 millions in 1934. Consequently a surplus stock of some 3000 kg. has accumulated and this has affected prices, which from 80,000 leva per kg. in 1932, have declined since to about a third of that figure One of the reasons of this falling off in the quantity expor[illegible]d, is the relative high cost of the attar of roses, due most likely to the unduly large amount of capital invested in the distilleries, the capacity of which is disproportionately great to the roses available for distillation, and which moreover work for only one month in the year. In fact, the 32 distilleries which were operating in 1931 were stated to have cost

145 million leva, of which 64 millions were represented 247
by machinery and buildings while their output for the 303
year was given as 1,773 kg. of attar of roses, estimated at 43,876,966 leva. It would be well if the cultivation of other aromatic plants were fostered in the valley of roses, in order that the existing distilleries could be more rationally utilised. M. Gheorghiev, the capable director of the Kazanlik State experimental station assured the writer that about forty such plants had been experimentally grown for a number of years and had given excellent results, among the most easily acclimatized were the *mentha piperita*, the hyssop, lavender, verbena and especially the pyrethrum, from which, as it is known, insecticides are
manufactured. This certainly confirms a very witty remark 000
made by the well known economist, T. At. Yaranov, namely, that every plant and animal which had been brought over from its native habitat into Bulgaria had thrived better, and improved by the change, he was sceptical however as to whether this generalisation held good for the genus „homo sapiens" about which he would not confidently assert that those of its members who had come over from the banks of the Volga, were as good as those who had remained behind!

A branch of agriculture in which Bulgarians excel is 244
market gardening. Not only vegetables grown in Bulgaria 167
are equal, if not superior to those grown in France and Italy, but Bulgarian gardeners have for years emigrated to adjoining countries, as well as to Russia before the revolution, and undertaken in these countries the growing of vegetables on a large scale, as the following excerpt from the Czechoslovak nerspaper, the *Prajka Zadgradnitska Boursa—Slovo* of May 14, 1932 testifies:

The Bulgarians have done us this great service that they taught us how to grow vegetables on our own soil. What our vegetable specialists were unable to

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244 167 accomplish was done by Bulgarian gardeners. Ten years ago no one among us knew that it was possible to produce tomatoes, peppers and other vegetables in our land. To-day, however, this is a fact, thanks to the ingenuity of the Bulgarians"

Of fresh vegetables 55 truck loads were exported in 244 439 1933 to Central Europe, and of these the most appreciated were the tomatoes grown in south Bulgaria, which many experts affirm to surpass in quality even those of Italy. During the summer of 1935 some 2750 tons of fresh [255] tomatoes were exported to Central Europe. No serious efforts have been made to develop the export of tinned vegetables, though in price they are 50% cheaper than similar ones sold in France, and in every respect as good. Lack of capital, and of commercial connections abroad have prevented the few canning factories to launch in a forward policy which necessarily involves risks and losses at the start. The only leguminous plant which has been exported on a large scale was haricot beans, of which Bulgaria was always a large exporter, the high quality of this product having secured for her a certain preeminence among Near Eastern countries The area devoted to this crop was 73,162 hectares and the yield 74,677,000 kg. in 1933 of which 32,568 tons were exported. The area planted with pulse, vegetables, potatoes and that set aside for market gardening was estimated respectively at 95,000, 13,500, 14,000, and 38,000 hectares in 1932.

241 312 A great impediment to the steady development of agriculture in Bulgaria is the periodic drought which completely undermines the economic position of the small holders, which even without this scourge, is never too bright. The mean annual rainfall for the period 1920—1930 was 578·2 litres per square metre, but this unfortunately is not evenly apportioned, the mountainous western and south western parts of the country having a much hea-

vier rainfall than the eastern part, in which the rainfall is 241 often deficient. For this reason schemes for storing up 312 rain water which is carried off too rapidly by the rivers without benefitting sufficiently agriculture have always engaged the attention of Bulgarian agriculturists and engineers. One of the latter, M. I. I. Mavrov prepared a comprehensive survey which was published at the expense of the government, in which full details are given as to the possibilities of regulating the water supply. 250,000 hectares could be brought under irrigation in the bassin of the Martsa, 150,000 hectares in the region of Stara Zagora, Sliven and Yambol, 100,000 hectares in the neighbourhood of Kustendil, Radomir and Dubnitsa, and smaller areas in the valleys near Zlatitsa. Kazanlik, Gorna-Orehovitsa, as well as a large part of the Danubian plain By constructing dams and correcting the channels of the Maritsa, Tundja, Isker and Yantra rivers. these could be rendered navigable for a part of their courses, and hydraulic energy of about 2,300,000 H. P. could be rendered availlable, which could be utilised for the production of calcium carbide, aluminium, (bauxite is found in the Rhodopes) nitrates and the delopment of a wood-pulp industry. Since the publication of this work, the subject of irrigation has often been discussed, and less ambitious plans have been put forward. In 1926, the American Yulen Co., offered to construct a dam on one of the affluents of the Maritsa at a cost of 1200 million leva which would have provided enough water to irrigate 130,000 hectares, but negotiations fell through. Actually the possibility of irrigating some 21,000 hectares by constructing two dams to store up the waters of the Mutavir and Luda-Yana, two small tributaries of the Maritsa, is being closely studied, and as this undertaking would only cost about 250 million leva it is possible that it might materialise, for it is reckoned that the yield of irrigated land increases three

241 fold, and its market value fourfold which would render the
312 execution of this plan profitable. In south Bulgaria two crops instead of one could be grown annually on irrigated land which moreover would be safeguarded against drought The Ministry of public works also contemplates the harnessing of the river Ossem in north Bulgaria. that some 42,000 hectares may be irrigated in the region of Lovets. This scheme would render available hydraulic energy to the amount of 38,000 H. P. which could be utilised for pumping water from the Danube and in order to water certain parts of the Danubian plain. A smaller scheme, that of bringing about 6000 hectares under irrigation near Nevrokop, in south western Bulgaria, by utilising the river Mesta is also receiving attention and will be carried out in the near future. From a close study of the data collected, it would appear that the irrigation of south Bulgaria is quite feasible and economically sound. The difficulty which stands in the way is the remuneration of the capital invested in the undertaking which could be secured under the present circumstances only by payment in kind, a consideration which is likely to discourage would-be promoters.

312 Concerning irrigation and water-adduction plans, it would be pertinent to mention the efforts which have been made to supply the waterless area of the Deli Orman in north-eastern Bulgaria with a supply of water. In this area of some 600 square klm. wholly devoid of springs and rivers, a network of water mains has been recently laid in order to supply some 569 villages with water, a considerable achievement in view of the financial stress in which the country finds itself. A similar noteworthy work was the adduction of water from the Rila mountains to Sofia, a distance of 82 klm. at a cost of 740 million leva completed in 1933; the difference of altitude being utilised to generate electric energy of 15,000 H. P.

231 Cattle raising and aviculture are fairly well developed, eggs figuring after tobacco as the second item on the list

of exports as regards value. According to the census of 231
1926, the livestock population was composed as follows:

		Per 1000 hectares	Per 1000 habitants
Horses.	482,180	46,75	87·94
Asses & mules .	212,371	20·59	38·74
Horned cattle. .	2,265,657	219·65	413·20
Sheep	8,739,769	847·32	1,593·94
Goats	1,260,647	122·22	229·91
Pigs	1,002,089	97·14	182·76
Farm birds. . .	10,117,874	980,94	1,945·28

The large number of sheep are mainly kept for their 236
wool; the consumption of which amounts to 2.3 kg. per head annually, owing to the fact that the peasantry spin and weave their own clothing from this wool. The local supply does not suffice and about 2 million kg. of foreign wool and 300,000 kg. of woollen yarn are annually imported. Successful attempts have been made to cross the local breed of ewes with Hungarian rams and it is said that the weight of the fleeces of the cross-bred sheep weigh one to two kg more than the average weight of 2.3 kg. of the native sheep, and that the quality of the wool is superior, fetching 20 to 30 leva per kg. more than that of the local breed. In 1934 the amount of wool produced reached 11,892,421 kg.

The value of the above head of cattle was estimated 231
at 10,000 to 12,000 million leva at the end of 1934 and the annual income derived was computed at 5,800 million leva, this last figure being made up of the following items:

Milk. . .	600	million	litres	at 4	leva	=	2,400,000,000 leva
Meat. . .	220	»	kg.	» 10	»	=	2,200,000,000 »
Wool . .	10·5	»	»	» 40	»	=	420,000,000 »
Hides . .	20	»	»	» 20	»	=	400,000,000 »
Eggs . .	508	»	at 0·80	leva each		=	400,000,000 »

The value of the livestock can not he assessed merely by the income which is directly derived from it as it

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231 is also employed almost exclusively for ploughing and as draught animals, their manure being also used to fertitise the fields.

235 439 The export of eggs has been steadily diminishing owing to the poverty of the peasantry who can not provide for the proper feeding of ther farm birds, exports of poultry, however, have maintained themselves as may be seen from the following figures:

	1932		1933		1934	
	Quantity kg.	Value in million leva	Quantity kg.	Value in million leva	Quantity kg.	Value in million leva
Eggs. . . .	18 804,000	624	15,670,000	457	14,534,000	341
Live poultry	1,103,027	47	1,089,766	34	1,040,146	34
Poultry in cold storage	1,831,000	73	1,640,030	48	2,699,116	80

231 439 The export of cattle is very limited, only 2067 horned cattle and 3700 sheep, valued respectivery at 10 and 3·7 million leva having been exported in 1932. Efforts are actually being made to export bacon to England, and the few trial consignments sent are reported to have been successfully marketed. Certain varieties of cheese much appreciated in the Near East continue to be exported to that part of the world to the extent of 1,202 tons, worth 35 million leva in 1934.

246 The scarcity of fodder militates against a rational development of the cattle raising and dairy industries. The government is making strenuous efforts to increase the area of artificial prairies (32,000 hectares in 1934) and foster the cultivation of clover etc, but so far little headway has been made owing to the shortage of land. The annual supply of fodder is computed at 4800 million kg., when as much as 12,000 millions are necessary. In 1932 592,000 hectares were planted with hay and grass as against 649,000 hectares in 1934, of which 281,000 hectares were described as natural prairies. The most easy solution of

the problem is the utilisation of the fields lying fallow by sowing them with clover and similar plants, and this is being increasingly done, thus in 1932 the total arable land lying fallow had decreased to 434,000 hectares from 665,000 in 1910. 246

Sericulture too was once another promising branch of agriculture, as may be gauged by the fact that as many as 4600 hectares were planted with mulberry trees (1932) on the leaves of which the silkworms are fed. Unfortunately the decline in prices has discouraged production. In 1935 1,456,924 kg. of silk cocoons were produced all of which were bought up by the local silk weaving workshops. In order to protect the industry, a tax of 600 leva per kg. is levied on artificial silk produced in Bulgaria. 231

Apiculture is another side line in which farmers take a live interest. There are as many as 257,672 beehives in the country, the production of honey having attained in 1933 2,392,000 kg. and that of wax 114,399.

However persevering and laudable may be the efforts of the Bulgarian people to extricate themselves from their difficult position, these can only be crowned with success if markets can be found for their produce. France and Italy, despite their efforts to solve the difficulties facing the Danubian States can do little to assist them, for from the agricultural point of view both these States are practically self-sufficing, and they even antagonise Bulgaria as purveyors of fruit, poultry and eggs in the markets of Central Europe. England and Germany alone can help. The former country sells three to four times as much as she buys from Bulgaria, and it would not only be a matter of fairness, but even of foresight if she allowed a broader access to her markets to Bulgarian produce, if the Bulgarian market is not to be definitely lost to British manufacturers. Germany on the other hand is in the throes of an ever- 439

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439 deepening economic crisis, and though she remains the best purveyor and client of Bulgaria, such commerce as is carried on is mainly in the form of barter and is yearly becoming more difficult. So long as England seems disinclined to lend a helping hand to Bulgaria and the other Danubian countries in order to facilitate the marketing of their produce on the British market, the only alternative which would bring relief to these hard-pressed communities, is the restoration of prosperity to Germany, which alone seems capable and willing to interchange its products with those of the Danubian countries, for the mutual advantage of all the parties concerned. As prosperity seems to have taken leave of Germany, and England shows little desire to assume the role of a good European, prospects for recovery in Bulgaria and the neighbouring countries can not be said to be bright.

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Railways

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655 The Bulgarian State railway system at the end of 1933 consisted of 2,800 klm. of single track normal gauge railway lines, including the section Plovdiv-Panagurishte, 70·88 klm. in length opened to traffic in December 1933, 162 klm. of narrow 76 cm. gauge, and 250 klm. of 60 cm. gauge. According to a statistical report issued during the financial year 1932-3, the capital invested in the railway system amounted to 13,514,847,000 leva (or, 450,494,900 gold francs) and was made up of the following items:

Railway lines (all gauges)	3,085 klm.	value 350,375,520 gold francs
Locomotives	597	„ 100,119,380 „
Passenger cars	621	
Tenders	205	
Postal cars	43	
Goods trucks	10,901	

COMMUNICATIONS

THE BULGARIAN RAILWAY SYSTEM


R. DANUBE
VIDIN
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PLEVEN
CHUMEN
VARNA
VRATZA
TRNOVO
SOFIA
ZLATITZA
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ST. ZAGORA
NOVA ZAGORA
JAMBOL
BURGAS
PLOVDIV
HASKOVO
KUSTENDIL
PETRITCH
NEVROKOP
PACHMAKLI
MASTANLI
Narrow gauge rlys
Normal ,, ,,
Projected rlys
Frontiers

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BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

Year	Normal Gauge Milage	Train klm. per year	Receipts in leva from Passengers	Parcels and baggages	Goods	Various
1929—30	2438	9,893,375	450,710,177	29,269,236	784,330,428	1,186,024
1930 - 31	2582	10,018,327	404,119,328	16,127,156	751,281,848	5,874,707
1931—32	2656	10,366,382	387,282,126	12,129,671	728,877,237	21,241,717
1932—33	2664	10,426,764	372,950,000	10,240,000	750,903,000	9,717,000

Year	Expenditure in leva Salaries	Various	Excess of receipts over expenditure in leva
1929—30	421,515,136	473,459,617	370,221,112
1930—31	512,574,702	544,330,600	124,489,737
1931—32	510,000,000	450,000,000	189,510,651
1932—33	530,000,000	435,000,000	168,000,000

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Of all East European States, Albania excepted, Bulgaria has the smallest milage of all, 2·2 klm. of railway track per 100 sq. klm. of territory. The ratio being 2·5 for Greece, 3·7 for Yugoslavia, 4 for Rumania, while the proportion for Austria, Hungary and Switzerland, are respectively 8, 10·2, and 14. In spite of this evident inferiority, construction since 1918 has been very restricted, averaging a bare 44·3 klm. a year, owing to the depressed State of the country's finances. The railway administration is an autonomous institution and since 1929 has had its own distinct budget. The railway department had the great advantage of having for a number of years a most energetic, progressive and honourable engineer at its head, M. Morfov, who was subsequently nominated to the post of Bulgarian Minister in Paris, it also had in recent years the good fortune to possess as titulary chiefs, in the person of the Ministry of Railways, such active and honest men as MM. Kimon Gheorghiev and Stoyan Kosturkov, all of whom did their best to avoid the mistakes committed by their predecessors, a few examples of which are narrated further on.

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The table on page 212 will give an idea of the intensity ot the traffic and of the rentability of the system during the last few years.

The intensity of the traffic in comparison with Western European countries is very light, as may be seen by comparing the relative data for the year 1931 relative to Belgium and Bulgaria:

	Average milage	Number of passengers carried	Passengers per klm.	Goods carried	Tons per klm.
Belgium .	4800 klm.	221,303,000	1,209,000	79,535,000	1,433,000
Bulgaria .	2600 klm.	7,680.000	204,000	3,480,000	250.000

From the above table it will be seen that the traffic in Belgium is on an average 6 times as intense as in

Bulgaria, the capital outlay however in Belgium per klm. of railway is about 15 million leva, while in Bulgaria it is only 4 millions, and this permits the Bulgarian railways to be operated more economically than those of all other continental States, the ratio of the cost of running them to gross receipts being 71.05 % in Bulgaria as against 101.49 % in Yugoslavia, 102.2 in Germany and 106.8 % in Belgium (1932).[1]

The Bulgarian railways are most economically run, thus the outlay on salaries amounts to only 53 % of the total expenditure, as compared to 57.4 % in Yugoslavia, 68.60 % in Greece, and 70.7 % in Germany. The railway rates are the cheapest in Europe as may be seen from the following comparative table. A journey of 50 klm. costs:

	Ist class	2nd class	3rd class	
In Bulgaria	103	75	52	leva
„ Yugoslavia	122·5	105	70	„
„ Rumania	232·5	178·5	116·45	„
„ Czechoslovakia . . .	285·6	158·76	105·84	„
„ Austria	231·8	166.15	92·75	„

Better financial results could have been obtained if some limitation were put to the excessive number of people travelling on the railways at reduced fares, a large proportion of them doing so out of favouritism. Important rebates too are allowed on the transport of most products of local industries as may be gauged by a statement of M. Kosturkov in the Sobranye on June 14, 1932: "Last year some 8,121,953 passengers were carried, 25 %, of whom benefitted of reductions varying between 50 % and 75 %. Half of the goods carried were transported at rates 10 % to 35 % below those of the ordinary tariff." Dr. B Yantsulov some time ago estimated the loss which these reductions entailed to the revenue to as much as 109 million leva a year and apportioned the loss as follows:

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[1] The railway administration, having assumed to repay gradually to the State the total cost of the railway lines, as well as to set aside annually a certain amount for depreciation has been closing its yearly balances since 1930 with deficits. Namely 30,926,000 leva in 1930, 119,508,000 in 1931, 108,178,000 in 1932, 100,070,000 in 1933. In 1929 it showed a surplus of 122,190,000 leva.

Free tickets	20	million leva
Free transport of mails	19	" "
Rebates on goods to and from sugar refineries	19	" "
" " " " " " flour-mills	10	" "
" " " of local industries	41	" "
Total	109	" "

The contraction in the receipts due to the rather excessive granting of bonuses which have hitherto been granted on too generous a scale is now likely to cease, for one of the decisions of the new government installed on May 19th 1934 was that both the free issue of tickets was to cease and that most of the products of local factories would be transported at the usual rates and would no longer benefit of rebates.

Tho total tonnage of goods carried during the financial year 1932-3 was 3,317,692 tons, of which 340,947 tons were cereals, 134,778 flour, 149,176 sugar-beet, 22,102 sugar and 809.520 coal. The transport of the bulk of these goods is of a seasonable character, being mainly transported in the late summer and early autumn months, and this explains the shortage of trucks during this period of the year. The total number of functionaries, including the central administrative staff was 16,563. According to M. A. Yaranov's view as expressed in his book "Bulgaria to-day and to-morrow" this was en excessive number, for according to him in 1912 when the milage was only 1948 klm. with 125 stations, the total number of functionaries was 4878. By 1927-8 the milage had increased to 2231 klm, normal, and 416 klm. narrow gauge with 225 stations, while the number of the staff had reached 16,164 and this tremendous increase in the personnel was obviously

497 not justified. By the year 1931-2 the number of stations had increased by 30%. plus another 195 small stations, or halting places and though the milage had also augmented, nevertheless the staff numbered 16,602, so that M. Yaranov's criticism seems to have been well-founded so far as the year 1927-8 is concerned, this may be said also of his remarks about the stopping places being too numerous and involving a tremendous waste of energy to the trains having to pull up and start at very brief intervals.

499 653 Owing to the lack of funds, special measures had to be devised in order to provide the requisite means for the construction of the new railway lines. Thus a special tax was imposed on the inhabitants of communes through which new railway lines were laid and municipalities had to expropriate land and provide labour at their own cost. The compulsory labour service was utilised, and it may be said that without the help of this institution little of what was done would have been accomplished.

An idea of the cost of the new lines and of the repartition of the expenses may be formed by studying the data relative to the Plovdiv-Panagurishte line of 70·880 klm. in length, which cost a total of 117,458,474 leva, or 1,640,010 leva per klm. Eventually it is proposed to join up this line with the projected trunk line Sofia-Pirdop-Kazanlik-Sliven-Burgaz, parts of which have already been built.

20,937,003	leva	Work furnished by temporary labour conscripts (defrayed by communes)
14,668,896	„	Work furnished by regular labour conscripts (defrayed by the State)
2,120,985	„	Land and building expropriated by the communes
1,543,525	„	Sum provided by the State budget
556,910	„	„ „ „ „ „ extra-ordinary budget.
39,123,615	„	Sum provided from the Railway special construction Fund (Amounting to 408 millions in 1932.
10,000,000	„	Sum provided from the Railway special Fund for embellishments and Station installations (Amounting to 221 millions in 1932)

COMMUNICATIONS

20,820,000 leva value of materials furnished by the State Railways

7,687,550 „ Various

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The average cost seems to range between 1½ and 2 million leva per klm. Thus the line Plovdiv-Karlovo, 77·530 klm. in length cost 152 millions or slightly under 2 million leva per klm., while the line Levski-Lovets cost only 1½ millions per klm. It may be added that it took 12 years to complete the building of the line Plovdiv-Panagurishte and this tardiness is due to the fact that instead of concentrating all efforts on one or two lines, some 21 lines were being constructed simultaneously. This was anything but a sensible plan, in view of the utterly inadequate means at the disposal of the railway administration. In many instances earthworks which had been completed were washed away and had to be constructed anew before the ballast, sleepers and rails could be laid.

The general plan of construction of railways was set forth in a Bill passed by the Sobranye on May 9, 1925 and provided for the construction of the following lines:

Normal gauge

1. Rakovski—Haskovo—Mastanli
2. Radomir—Gorna-Djuma—Simitli
3. Yambol—Elhovo
4. Lovets—Levski
5. Dabovo—Sliven
6. Plovdiv—Karlovo (with branch to Hissar)
7. G. Orehovitsa—Elena
8. Sofia,-circular
9. Kritsim—Pestera
10. Sofia—D. Kamartsi—Pirdop
11. Plovdiv—Panagurishte,

Narrow 76 cm. gauge

12. Tatar Pazardjik,—Ledjene—Nevrokop
13. Bela Slatina -Orehovo
14. Preslav—Verbitsa
15. Tserven Breg—Lukovit—Teteven
16. Burgaz—Anhiallo.

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On the completion of these lines, the bill provided for a further plan of construction which comprised the laying of lines between:

17. Simitli—Petrich
18. Rakovski—Mihailovo
19. Shumen—Smedovo—Karnobat
20. D. Kamartsi—Orhanie—Yablanitsa—Sevlievo—Tirnovo · Osman-Pazar—Eski Djuma
21. Orhanie—Mezdra
22. Levski—Trembesh
23. Kostenetz Bania—Samokov—Dubnitsa- Bobov Dol
24. Stanimaka -Tsepelare—Pashmakli
25. Popovo—Razgad—Kemanlar
26. Batanovtsi - Breznik—Tren
27. Boitsinovtsi—Glozene- Kozlodyi
28. Vidin—Kula
29. Pirdop—Karlovo—Kazanlik
30. Zimnitsa—Kotel
31. Somovit—Nikopol
32. Pleven—Lovets
33. Lovets—Trojan (eventually to be prolonged southwards to Karlovo
34. Kirdjali—Ortakey
35. Drenovets—Belogradchik - Stakevski
36. Dolen Tsiflik—Staro Orehovo
37. Zlaten Dol—Kavakli—Elhovo—Burgaz.

Narrow 76 cm. gauge

38. Anhialo Mesembria
39. Malko Tirnovo—Vasiliko
40. Razlog - Simitli.

Of the above programme, lines, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 13, 16, have been completed, while work on lines 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 19, 25, 29, 21, 33, and 36 has been started and is being continued but at a very slow pace. Owing to the extremely difficult position of the Exchequer only 17,050,000 leva were provided in the 1934 budget for railway construction, and it had been decided that work should be concentrated on the completion of the Radomir-Dupnitza-G. Djuma, Mihailovo-Rakovski, Sofia circular line, and the 76 cm, narrow gauge railway Tatar-Pazardjik-Yakoruda-Nevrokop. The Mihailovo-Rakovski line is likely to prove of some importance for international traffic, as it is proposed to organise a service of through trains running from Poland by way of Rumania via Rustchuk-Tirnovo-St.-Zagora to Constantinople, which will necessarily borrow this connecting link, shortening very perceptibly the distance St.-Zagora-Constantinople by avoiding the long loop round Plovdiv.

The technical committee of the railways has made certain alterations in the original construction plan of 1925 and these modifications have been set forth in a protocol dated January 1929. Thus line № 20 is to be deflected in its eastward part more to the south, avoiding Osman Pazar and Eski-Djuma, in order to pass through Zlataritsa — Elena — Titsa and join the line № 14 Verbitsa-Preslav, which will be constructed as a normal gauge line instead of as a 76 cm, narrow gauge line, as originally projected. It is surprising that this scheme has not been a little further modified so that Sevlievo might be joined to Gabrovo and the already existing railway line Gabrovo—Drenovo—Tirnovo utilised, instead of leaving Gabrovo as a terminus of a blind-alley railway line despite the industrial importance of this town. Another decision taken was that of modifying line 38, (Anhiallo — Messembria) to a normal gauge, though the construction of this particular line seems utterly purposeless, there being no traffic to justify such expenditure, besides the fact that both termini are ports and that communications between them are always available by boat or by road vehicles.

There are about 19 lines of an approximate legth of 790 klm, on which work has been started; they are estimated to cost about 1,450 millions, there being some 9.750 klm. of tunnels to be bored. But in order to complete the programme which has been set forth some 210

499 653 klm more have to be constructed, necessitating a further outlay of 1684 millions, for in this section the length of tunnels is estimated at 20.900 klm. These 30.650 klm. of tunnels will require some 1150 millions for their completion. The money can not be provided out of local resources, and since the new lines which are now being constructed can only be exploited sectionally and therefore uneconomically, so long as the whole programme of construction is not completed it would be judicious to seek outside help instead of exploiting for a series of years various unconnected branch lines at a clear loss. With the existing competition of motor vehicles it seems now senseless to run trains on small branch lines of 30 or 40 klm in length; which will eventually be joined up to form a big trunk line. So long as they are worked in sections they cannot attract much traffic and are unable to cover expenses, while if they were to be joined up, they could be exploited more rationally and made to pay, besides contributing to the development of the region they traverse. As an instance, lines 10 and 29 may be cited. They are planned to link up and be joined to the existing branch line Kazanlik—Tulovo which has been connected with the newly constructed branch line № 5 (Dubovo—Sliven) already extended to Zimnitsa, a station on the railway line St. Zagora—Burgas On this proposed trunk line between Sofia and Burgas there are already three sections which are being axploited, namely the ones between Sofia and Makotsevo,[1] Kazanlik and Tulovo, and Dubovo and Sliven. Several complete trains are being daily run on them, apparently at a loss, for most often the passengers using them may be counted on one's fingers, For on such short distances trains are always at a disadvantage as compared with motor vehicles, which,

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[1] The unfinished section Makotsevo—Kazanlik is estimated to cost about 800 million leva.

as everywhere else are proving formidable rivals to the railways. The line Kazanlik - Tulovo is hardly utilised by passengers proceeding or returning to and from Kazanlik—St. Zagora. They prefer to drive by motor car, the journey by road vehicle being more rapid and cheaper. Most of these short branch lines can serve no useful purpose and they will always be a financial burden to the railway system If so many short branch lines figure in the proposed programme of construction this should be attributed to the influences exerted by certain politicians, who always wish to gain popularity in a certain district by securing the construction of a railway line through it, without regard as to whether its construction will be profitable or not to the State. It would be by far more rational not to undertake the construction of such lines as Nos 9, 22, 26, 27,28, 30, 34, 35, 36, 38 and 39 and instead build good roads, it would be equally sensible too to suspend the running of complete trains on such short distances as Kazanlik—Tulovo, Sofia—Bankia, Lovets—Levski etc,, and replace them by light steam-driven units, or motor rail-cars which are practically omnibuses mounted on railway wheels[1]. It would thus be possible to have both a frequent and a speedy service, advantages now possessed by the road vehicles which are competing the railways most successfully on all short distance lines.

The railway system according to M. Ivan Dorossiev's "Financial Studies on the Bulgarian State railways," seems to suffer from another serious disability, that of being very carelessly constructed. In order to reduce the initial outlay, all technical work which could be dispensed with was avoided, with the result that there are too many gradients,

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[1] Four such railcars have been ordered on a compensation basis, and ten more will be provided for in the 1935 budget. The railway administration considers that it needs at least thirty more.

499 653 rendering the working of the line more costly than it need have been. According to the data furnished by this author, of the 2,205 km. existing in 1919, 26.30 % were level, 46 % with gradients varying between 1 and 10 per % and 27.6 % with gradients over 10 per %. The existence of so many steep gradients of more than 10 % in the net work is surprising, for even in Switzerland, the most mountainous country in Europe, the percentage of such gradients was only 20.4 % as compared with 27.6 % in Bulgaria, while in Rumania the percentage is only 7.2 %. The part of the network which has mainly contributed to increase this disadvantage is the section Tirnovo-St. Zagora which traverses the Balkans and which if it had been more carefully built could have proved of great value to the country since it could then have been utilised as an international trunk line, a function which in its present state it can not fulfil economically, as regards goods traffic, but can only compete for the carriage of passengers, and for the lighter and more valuable class of goods [1]

499 661 The history of this line is worth repeating as it illustrates to what extent politicians made light of their country's welfare and to what subterfuges and trickery they would have recourse to in order to further their own interests. The technical staff of the railway administration was utterly opposed to the construction of this trans-Balkan line in its present form. Their plan was to lay the line further east along the Haim Bogaz Pass, and this view was championed by the then Minister of Communications, M. Gatev, who was the only honest man in a cabinet composed of crooks, and presided over by an, arch-cynic Prime Minister, the late D. Petkov. The latter

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[1] Deputy D. Neikov stated on June 28, 1928 in the Sobranye: „This line was constructed against the advice of the most competent technicians, it has gradients of 30 %, and its upkeep and utilisation cause an excessive outlay to the railway administration".

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and some of his supporters, among whom Minister Ghenadiev and deputy St. Popov of Trevna, being interested in some coal mine concessions in the Trevna district, wished that the intended railway should be deflected from the projected course which the technical staff had recommended so as to traverse the region where the mines were located, thus enabling them to dispose very advantageously of their concessions. As the change in the original plan would have impaired the carrying capacity of the line, and would have increased considerably the cost of construction, M. Gatev resolutely opposed the idea, and refused to yield on the point. In order to overcome his obstruction, Petkov hit on the expedient of sending him on a mission abroad and temporarily took charge of the Ministry of Railways. No sooner had M. Gatev departed, than Petkov submitted a Bill for the construction of the railway, with the desired modification and had the Bill carried post-haste by his subservient supporters or „boys“ as they were familiarly termed by him. M. Gatev, as was to be expected of him, resigned as soon as he became acquainted with the trick which had been played on him, but Petkov remained nonplussed by the public disavowal inflicted on him by his colleague. He was wont to meet such happenings with such cynical outbursts: „I am so full of blots that a fresh stain will not show“. 499 661

At any rate he was not the only Minister to line his pockets out of the railways. His immediate successors in 1909 seem to have done remarkably well out of them. Dr. Sakarov, who until lately was the manager of the Agricultural Bank, wrote in a booklet in which he criticised the doings of the Democratic party, that while one of their leaders declared in the Sobranye on December, 15, 1908, that the railway net exploited by the Oriental Railway Company in Southern Bulgaria was not worth more than 19,135,923 gold francs; this party which was

499 again in power in 1909 paid as much as 42 millions for them, and that the person who supported this measure
661 with the greatest warmth was Liaptchev. It would seem that his advocacy brought him a net gain of two millions, according to the testimony of M. Sakarov, who cites Minister Pechev's „Memoirs" in support. Obviously there was a margin of some 22 millions between the real value of the lines and what was paid for them, and there must have been others who shared M. Liaptchev's good fortune. That the price paid was outrageously high is self-evident since in 1898 the company had agreed to cede the whole network for 24,850,863 gold francs, but the transaction fell through owing to the inability of the then Government to conclude a loan. This was not the only occasion on which the railways provided for the staging of shady affairs.

The Finance Minister in the Stoilov Cabinet (1894—1899) thought it would be a clever expedient to construct parallel lines to those exploited by the Oriental Railway Company, and thereby force it to sell out at a low price. Apparently this financial genius was not at all perturbed by the expenditure which the construction of the parallel lines would entail, for the scheme was to serve as a pretence to enrich his political friends. Judging from the discussions which followed in the Sobranye at the time, it would appear that several partisans of the Government had bought up land along the proposed lines and expected to make a very substantial profit by ceding it to the State. The proposal was carried through in spite of the protests of one of the Ministers, M. C. Velitchkov, who resigned. A legacy of this ill-considered policy is the line running north of the Maritsa, from Plovdiv to Tsirpan and Nova Zagora. Fortunately the section Plovdiv—Tatar Pazardjik was not built, but if this wild cat scheme was not proceeded with further, it is not their politicians the Bulgarian people have to thank but rather the foreign capitalists who would not

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KARLOVO: THE MARKET PLACE ON A SUNDAY

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KARLOVO: A REPAIRED ROMAN BRIDGE

[facing p. 225]

499 661 furnish the means wherewith it could be carried out. Which shows that all financiers will not play the part of Mephistopheles to the Bulgarian Faust by tempting him with endless loans, as has happened quite recently and as holders of League of Nations' Loans have learnt to their loss. This whimsical scheme caused the fall of the Stoilov Cabinet in 1899 and was mainly brought about by the intervention of Ferdinand who overtly accused his Finance Minister of realising seven million leva out of these dubious transactions. It must not be thought that Ferdinand was prompted in this act by a desire to safeguard from dilapidation the public purse. He must have certainly been coaxed on by the avidity of the Minister in question who probably wished to keep most of these seven millions for himself.

499 648 With regard to inter-Balkan communications, it may be said that all the palaver of the Balkan conferences has not led to any practical decision. The Bulgarian proposal for the construction of a bridge across the Danube at Rustchuk, to link up the Bulgarian and Rumanian railway system, has been repeatedly rejected by the Rumanians and it was only at the end of 1934 that they made a slight concession by acquiescing to the plying of a ferryboat between Rustchuk and Giurgiu. As navigation on the Danube is suspended during the winter and the level of the river varies very considerably when in spate, the utilisation of the ferry boat will only be possible for a few months in the year, and the advantages to be derived proportionately restricted. The Greeks too have not responded to the Bulgarian suggestion of linking up their railways through the valley of the Struma, though the Bulgarians are pushing on with the construction of a broad gauge railway which will shortly reach Gorna Djuma. The extension of this line to the Greek frontier is estimated as likely to cost 328.7 million leva. It is only the Yugoslav Government

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which has shown more consideraton to Bulgarian requirements and has agreed to join up its railways at two other points besides Tsaribrod, namely at Vidin and at Giushevo, the present terminus of the Sofia-Kustendil line which will be prolonged to Kumanovo. When the construction of this line will be achieved, the present railway journey Sofia — Salonica will be shortened by a third of its present duration by the avoidance of the long way round through Nisch.

Roads

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The total length of semi-permanent or macadamised roads in Bulgaria in 1934, was of 17071 klm. and there were another 7,125 klm. in construction. Of the existing milage, 8,397 klm. were reported to be in good condition, 4,991 klm. in medium condition, and 4,103 as in a bad condition. The new Government planned to construct another 4000 klm. of roads and contemplates spending a sum of two milliard leva on this project, completing every year some 400 klm. of new roads. It has created new taxes in order to provide the necessary funds, among which is a special road tax of 140 leva a year to be levied on all males between the ages of 20 and 55. Owners of motor cars will also contribute to the maintenance of the roads by paying increased sums for their driving licences. It is expected that some 300 million leva will be raised annually by these special taxes, ²/₃ of which are proposed to be spent on the building of the new roads and ¹/₃ for the upkeep of those already existing.

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It is proposed to construct at once an arterial road of 300 klm. between Sofia and Orhanie, trying different systems and materials in order to find out which is the most suitable for local conditions. It is aimed to have the new roads laid out properly, in order that they may not need repairing for the first ten years. The compulsory

labour service will be utilised in the building of the new roads all of which will be 9, 8, or 7 m. wide, according to their importance, and with trees planted along their entire course.

The road milage was reported to be 17,238 klm. by deputy I. Vultchev in the Sobranye on June 7, 1932, and he added that it would be necessary to construct some 70,000 klm. of roads in order to connect all villages with one another. The average expenditure for the upkeep of roads was about eighty million leva a year and this was inadequate. He estimated the cost of construction at one million leva per kilometre in mountainous country and at 600,000 in level country. This does not seem to be an excessive estimate since M. At. Yaranov in his book "Bulgaria to-day and to-morrow", assesses the cost per kilometre of a good road fit for motor traffic at 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 leva and that of an ordinary one at 1.000,000 leva per kilometre which is about as much as the cost of a railway line in Bulgaria. It would appear from the figures cited that the Government contemplates halving the cost of the roads it proposes to construct by utilising largely the compulary labour service.

EDUCATION

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In Bulgaria, as in other Balkan countries, complaints have been heard that the spread of education has resulted in the creation of a plethora of office-seekers. The reason for this is that while an excellent instruction is available, the training of character and of personality are neglected. Colleges, technical schools, and higher educational establishments have all been dominated by the idea that all education should be subordinated to place-hunting and not to the preparation of a more efficient citizenship in the life of the community. As a result restrictive measures are being taken to curtail the number of colleges and impede the admission of students to the higher schools and the universities. At present, students coming from rural districts are caught up in the whirlpool of urbanising influences and spurn the idea of returning to their native environment. They take on a false scale of values and, unable to secure public posts, fall by the way and become the easy victims of political propaganda. This could be remedied by making rural life more attractive, and by permeating all the educational institutions with the conception that an educated farmer is by far a more valuable asset to the community than either the public official or the urban worker. It is imperative for Bulgaria to evolve a system of education which will nurture a peasant-citizenry really in love with village life and the countryside, the same as has been achieved in Denmark. This is all the more necessary, as the transformation in Agriculture which is contemplated and which is equally an essential need, can best be achieved by better educated farmers, and by intensifying and modernising agriculture, increased employment would be provided for the educated. It would appear that "more education" ought to be the slogan in vogue, rather than the policy actually adopted. If there were more educated persons in the countryside there would be less inducement for the educated to congregate in towns. 871 369

It is an erroneous view to believe that Bulgaria is suffering from overeducation. What Bulgarians have a right to complain of is rather of a maldistribution of educated forces. It was the political system which rendered politics the best and easiest career to earn a livelihood, and thereby attracted the intellectuals to this mode of life. Politicians in their turn fostered this tendency since they utilised this intellectual proletariat from which to recruit their partisans. 871

M. Iordan Tabakov in his book "The political situation of Bulgaria after June 9", affirms that on questioning fifteen deputies elected while Stambuliiski was Prime Minister, it was found that eight had not read the Constitution and seven had read it partly, and yet all had taken the oath to govern after its spirit and to defend it! None knew what the capitals of Czechoslovakia and Switzerland were. When asked whether they considered themselves fit to be deputies, some admitted that they were not, for they had not received the requisite education, while some considered themselves worthy of the posts they held since "the people had chosen them". Dr. D. Gabrovski in his Illiterate Bulgaria," affirms that: the percentage of illiterate voters in 1920 was 52 %, and that the statistics of 1928 show that the percentage of illiterates in the country was 40 %. Many who have been to school, and had later lived in an uncultured environment could no longer read. Of the total population, only 2000 to 3000 read books, and about 30,000 nothing else save newspapers. School attendance was not very satisfactory. In the year 1929-30 there were 727,670 children of school going age, but of these only 670,872 attended school, while another 37,139 dropped off during the course of the year. Those who 871 646 212 871

871 should have attended the secondary school (progymnasia) aged 12 to 14 were 185,394 but of these 74,885 did not attend and some 12,433 attended only partly. Only 98,076 completed the course, and of the latter 62,855 were successful at their examinations. During the same year 5,016 college graduates applied for entry to the University, of these 4,392 were admitted and 624 failed to pass the tests, and ~~this, accor~~ding to Dr. Gabrovski, was a conclusive proof that there was too little education in Bulgaria, since out of some 700,000 attending the elementary schools less than 4,500 complete their secondary education.

The Minister of Education explained on June 11, 1932, the causes of non-attendance at school. Of the 56,788 children who had absented themselves from the elementary schools in the year 1929—30, 22,777 were living at places difficult of access and there were 1999 abnormal children. Turkish children provided the greatest percentage of non-attendance (26%), that relative to the Bulgarian being 5·5%. Deputy G. P. Ghenov speaking at the same date, affirmed that the annual contingent of graduates from colleges and higher training schools numbered about 10,000 of those only some 1500 are admitted to the University and the rest are unable to find situations. College graduates consider themselves as intellectuals and refuse to become farmers or craftsmen. In another speech

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647 delivered in March 1934, he laid stress on the fact that youths graduating at the University were not sure about securing Government employ; thus for sixty to eighty qualifying for judges, only four or five posts are available and the number of candidates to the public services thus increases yearly. Politicians take advantage of the situation, and secure recruits for their parties by promising posts to those who have not been appointed public functionaries.

If the number of aspirants to Government employ is now so greatly in excess of the available posts, it is not owing to the system of education, but rather owing to the fact that all the intellectuals from the Dobrudja, Macedonia, and Thrace have been driven to seek refuge in Bulgaria, and through the League of Nations abstaining from interfering on behalf of the Bulgarian minorities in the adjoining Balkan countries in order to secure the repatriation of these people. 871 647

Education is free and obligatory for all children between the ages of seven and fourteen. Approximately, 1/6 of the population is attending schools and about 8% of the children liable to compulsory obligation evade it for some reason or other. The urban population provides proportionally a greater percentage of school children, 25% as against 75% for the rural. The number of girls attending school is as large as that of boys. The following table shows the number of various educational establishments functioning during the year 1932 - 3, the number of professors and students: 871

		Pupils	Teachers
Kindergarten Schools	155	7,649	174
Elementary „	5518	705.443	18.478
Secondary „ (progymnasia)	1933	207,795	7,189
Colleges „	105	42.217	2,901
Special „	25	2.854	408
Professional „	321	25.261	1,821
Higher training	4	667	55
„ „ Colleges	7	10,419	500
Scools for abnormal chirdren	5	252	42
	8,073	1.002,555	30,758

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Of the 8073 educational establishment, 7093 were State schools and 980 private institutions, practically all belonging to various ethnic minorities and foreign missions, the number of pupils attending them, was 82,342 and that of the teaching staff 2,705. These last two figures are included in the total shown in the above table. The

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[815] The number of women teachers is larger than that of men teachers. There is one school to every 738 inhabitants 871 and this number is altogether inadequate To remedy this shortage of buildings, half of the pupils attend school in the morning from 8 to 12 a. m. and the other half in the afternoon, from 2 to 6 p. m. It was reported in the Sobranye on April 1, 1924, that only 39% of the school-buildings were fit to serve as such, and that some 220,000 children had to study in stuffy classrooms in which there was not sufficient air. Such adverse conditions naturally accounted for the abnormal spread of tuberculosis among school children. Deputy M. Stanev speaking in the Sobranye on June 11, 1932 stated that according to the inquiry [164] conducted by Dr. Rumenov, 60% of the children attending the first elementary class, were healthy and 40% tuberculous, but in the third elementary class, the percentage of the latter had increased to 62%, and in that of the first preparatory class to 73%. In the Stara-Zagora region, it was reported by the school authorities that 48% of all the children were tuberculous.

875 One of the probable reasons for the spread of tuberculosis were the teachers who were wretchedly under-511 paid and were not able to keep fit on their paltry stipends. Half of the public teachers received a salary of about 1700 leva monthly, but this was not all, for a large percentage of them were obliged to pay commissions to various political intercessors in order to obtain their posts, and had to refund to their protectors part of their slender emoluments. The minimum cost of living for a family of four members, each requiring 3000 calories a day was according to a scientific analysis made in Dr. Djidrov's *Stopanski Arhive*, 2563 leva per month for food only, light and heat necessitated an expenditure of 587, shoes and clothing 1320, rent 1500, and other needs 1130. or a total per month of 7100 leva. The emoluments offered

875 511 by the State to the teachers were therefore utterly inadequate, even for those not having family charges, especially in view of the fact that the teaching profession necessitated the most strenuous exertions. There is little doubt that if these deserving public servants were remunerated decently, and if they felt secure in their posts and not threatened with losing them every time there was a change of Government, as had been the case under the party system until recently in force, no only they would have been better adapted to carry on their difficult task, but they would have less reasons to become advocates of communism.

874 At the summit of the educational system are eleven higher training establishments, The State University, the Free University of Political and Economic Sciences, the Institute of Higher Commercial Studies of Varna, the Fine Arts school, the Musical Academy, the Military School, the Co-operative School, the Agricultural Schools of Pleven and Tatar-Pazardjik, and the State Teachers schools at Shumen and Plovdiv.

The students attending the University during the year 1931-4 and the number of the teaching staff were distributed as follows according to the studies followed:

	Teachers	Students	Number of students who graduated during 1932-3
Medicine	95	674	43
Letters	50	2219	134
Sciences	60	658	88
Law	30	2081	192
Agriculture	45	473	89
Theology	14	234	16
Veterinary Science . . .	21	333	27

The number of women students was 1908 and is included in the figures given above, while the number of women graduates in the year 1932-3 was 160 out of a total of 599. The budget of the University amounted to

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59,189,160 leva, 43 % of which was absorbed by the faculty of medicine. The number of students completing their studies at foreign universities is apparently equal, if not superior to those graduating at the Sofia University. In 1931, 1932, and 1933, 635, 644, and 703 graduates respectively of foreign universities applied for registration of their diplomas. In 1926-7 there were 2,524 students who went abroad to complete their studies, of these 721 went to Germany, 649 to France, 523 to Austria, 233 to Czechoslovakia, 180 to Italy, 87 to Belgium, 36 to Rumania, 25 to Poland, 19 to Switzerland, 11 to Yugoslavia and 40 to other countries. In 1933, 105 Bulgarians graduated in German Universities, 250 in French, 24 in Italian, 95 in Czechoslovakian, 55 in Austrian, and 174, in those of various countries.

It was affirmed that the upkeep of the number of students studying at the higher educational establishments necessitated an outlay of 350 million leva a year to the community, and that this was a charge beyond its means, and that moreover it was not possible to find employment for them, the places available being considerably less than the number of candidates.

The Free University was established at the initiative of Prof. St. Bobtchev and aims at providing educational facilities to public functionaries and those in employment. It contains three sections, politico-social, administrative and commercial, and young people already in employment by following its course, which are held after 6 p. m. may improve their chances of advancement in their careers. The teaching staff is composed of about 46 teachers mainly recruited from that of the State University, and the number of students inscribed averages 1250 annually.

The study of agriculture seems well organised, there are 15 Superior professional schools of Agriculture, and there is a link forward by examination to the Agricultural faculty of the Sofia University. Besides these there are 874 some 120 practical schools of Agriculture which all children of farmers after completing their studies at the secondary schools, are compelled to attend during two years, if they do not take up another profession. The period of attendance is from October to April and the curriculum is most appropriate to local coditions, but unfortunately it is not taken advantage of by the population. Special courses are also conducted during the winter months by trained agronomist, who travel from village to village and organise courses of lectures for a few weeks at a time and at which attendance is obligatory for all youths up to 18, and girls up to the age of 16. There are excellent technical and professional schools which provide practical training in all arts and crafts, but the technical and agricultural schools, have been dominated too by the idea of a Government job, and very often youths who have completed their studies in them are absorbed in the public services. Owing to the extreme 871 tolerance shown by the Bulgarian Government, foreign schools of all denominations and nationalities are allowed to function. The French religious missions have established such institutions in most of the larger towns, there are also German and Italian schools. The Americans keep up their traditional educational policy in the Near East by maintaining what may be deemed as model educational establishments, one for boys at Simeonovo, at the outskirts of Sofia, and another for girls at Lovetch. Another school due to American initiative is the Pordim Folk School, founded by the late Dr. Edward Haskell and his wife. Its object was to supply advice to the peasantry, teaching them hygiene, giving them practical demonstrations in poultry raising, dairy farming, cattle breeding etc. Its attempt fo uplift the peasantry in the Pordim district has met with an immense success which does honour to its philanthropic founders.

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Another cultural Institution which deserves mentioning is the National Library at Sofia which contains a magnificent collection of some 4,000 old Bulgarian monuscripts dating as far back as the 13th century, some 10,000 Arabian and Turkish manuscripts, containing a vast amount of material relative to the history of the Balkan peninsula, about 100,000 historical documents, letters, etc. The Library possesses some 200,000 volumes in Bulgarian, being copies of all books which have been published in Bulgaria, as well as a certain number of foreign works. The present premises are altogether too exiguous to lodge the collections of books and provide reading accomodation for the ever-pressing throng of students and visitors. The writer, who often visited the library and wishes to ackowledge the courtesy he has always met from its much harassed officials, was strongly impressed by the strenuous efforts visitors to the library used to make and the patience and perseverance they displayed in order to secure access to its very limited reading room. It is very much to be regretted that neither the Carnegie nor Rockfeller Foundations, which have endowed so many public libraries, which often remain whole days without visitors, should not have rendered some materiel assistance to this particular library which is perpetually overcrowded. It is a great pity also that the Bulgarian Government has not been able to provide some resources wherewith to remedy, at least partially, to this lack of accomodation, which hampers the work of all visitors to the library. There are national libraries at Plovdiv, Tirnovo and Shumen, and all municipalities of large towns have well organised public libraries, of which at least 200 function regularly throughout Bulgaria. Much has been done to organise public reading rooms in villages and in April 1934 it was reported that some 2,356 such public reading rooms had already been opened, of which 1243 were organised in one syndicate with a total membership of 103,000.

A PSIHOLOGICAL ESSAY

Owing to the lack of funds, the activities of these reading rooms, of which 1,208 are in rural districts, were rather circumscribed, their stock of books was reported to be 847,426, and the books purchased during the year numbered only 127,757. 217 658

The new educational reforms comtemplate the suppression of about two thirds of the existing colleges so as to impede access to the higher training establishments and the University. The colleges will be replaced by practical schools, after the German „real schule", a system which according to Prof. Yorga has concurred in dehumanising the youth of Germany. Only those students who posses exceptional endowments will be allowed to complete their college training and qualify for a University education. 871

A PSYCHOLOGICAL ESSAY

All who have come in close touch with the Bulgarian people have been impressed by such characteristic traits as their diligence, assiduousness, their fondness of labour and their persevering and indefatigable devotion to the land which they till. Frugal and abstemious in the extreme, the Bulgarian peasant provides for his modest needs from the produce of his farm. This form of life which tends to make him self-sufficing and independent of his neighhours has rendered him self-reliant and self-centred to an extreme degree and has militated strongly against the development of social virtues in him. He is capable of submitting to extreme privations, he scoffs at physical suffering, and is almost insensible to pain. He detests affectation and bragging, and takes pride only in collective achievements, national or military. In this he displays a striking similarity to the Japanese whom he 181

181 rivals in thriftiness and economical living. Such qualities render him a formidable competitor for his neighbours, all of whom he surpasses in these virtues, and who knowing that separately they can not hold the field against him, have leagued themselves together, to hold down this over-energetic and tenacious rival. Such qualities as the Bulgarian possesses do not win or attract, and consequently he has failed to inspire affection; he has only succeeded in securing the respect and esteem of the positively minded American and British, who refuse to be beguiled by superficial appearances and who by temperament are better able to appreciate such positive attributes as the Bulgarian has been endowed with.

This hard-toiling mode of life led for centuries by the Bulgarian peasantry has habituated them to live solely for themselves, to depend only on their own efforts, to be suspicious of those about them. They are stoics, without pity for themselves, whose sealed springs of sensibility cannot be set flowing for others. Their sense of sympathy seems blunted and the apathy they display for the wrongs suffered by others explains their inability to feel indignation at the committal of injustices when they are not personally affected. Such lack of sympathy and tenderness for others, is incompatible with the formation of an alert public opinion and the exercise of collective volition, which characterises nations endowed with better developed social instincts. The harshness and dourness which characterises the Bulgarian, implies an inherent weakness of what psychologists designate as the Tender emotion.

000 Tender emotion, which is closely related to the parental instinct, must be considered as one of the primary factors in our evolution. As we pass from the lower to the higher types of animals, we indiscriminately find that this instinct becomes more and more powerfully deve-

loped, and we must therefore come to the logical conclusion that its relative eminence and strength in any species or society must be taken as a criterium of the latter's inherent capacity and superiority. 000

This altruistic, or benevolent impulse which is a deeply rooted element of normal human nature is the source of all morality and therefore a puissant contributor to progress and to civilisation itself, and such an eminent psychologist as Al. Sutherland has given prominence to this aspect in his work on „The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct" p. 367. In his concluding remarks he states:

> „History will serve to show that in the main it has been the story of the subservience of races too litle sympathetic to form powerful unions and the emergence to power and dominance of peoples more capable of hearty consolidation. The law of sympathy has therefore been that of progress".

Kropotkin too, in his „Mutual Aid" lays equal stress on the benevolent impulse as a factor in human advance, for he affirms:

> „Compassion is a necessary outcome of social life. it means a considerable advance in general intelligence and sensibility. It is the first step towards the development of higher moral sentiments and a powerful factor in further evolution".

The social importance of Tender Emotion is made evident by the following authoritative comment of Wm. McDougall:

> „This intimate alliance between tender emotion and anger is of great importance for the social life of man and the right understanding of it is fundamental for a true theory of the moral sentiments; for the anger evoked in this way is the germ of all *moral indignation.* and on all *moral indignation justice and the greater part of public law are in the main founded*".

The importance of sympathy for our ethical, advancement has been stressed also by Max Nordau, who in his „Morals and the Evolution of Man", (p. 142) says:

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„To be moral we must feel in our own being at the time, or retrospectively, the subjective experiences of our neighbour, with the same quality of emotion that he feels; his pain must be our pain, as his pleasure must be our pleasure. For the man who cannot do this — who realises in his mind the circumstances of his neighbour only as an image, and without the concomitant note of feeling — it is impossible to rise to the height of morality . . . The lack of sympathy is a pitiable infirmity".

This infirmity was well known to Stoyan Mihailovski who never ceased to urge his compatriots to pay more heed to their moral education. He was wont to say:

„The Balkan people are capable of feasting by the side of the dead body of their starved neighbour. Turkish slavery has deprived them of self respect and left on their souls the seal of such vices as: selfcentredness, self-love and avidity. Though the emblems of Turkish dominion have vanished from the Balkans, the psychical stains caused by this slavery have not disappeared. So long as this selfcentredness is not changed to sympathy, self love to solidarity, and avidity to brotherly love, the foundations of a powerful community, can not be laid. Every reform must begin by that of the soul and of the conscience. Internal reconstruction must precede the creation of outward order. Without morality there can be no political liberty, and morality postulates emancipation from such sentiments as hatred and avidity. Reforms in government are useless, what is necessary is to hasten the psychic maturity of the people and this is a task of centuries. There can be no real democracy in Bulgaria so long as the Bulgarian does not feel love for his neighbour and has no sense of solidarity".

These were some of the hortatory counsels this great moralist and thinker kept giving to his countrymen, but apparently with little success. If we take into consideration the estimate Mihailovski formed of the Balkan peoples and the definition of democracy as expounded by the French historian Michelet, namely that „La démocratie, c'est la solidarité absolue, le devouement de chacun pour tous et de tous pour chacun", we can easily realise that democratic forms of government are not those best suited for the Balkan nations at their present stage of evolution

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and shall then be better able to appreciate Wm. Mc Dougall's pronouncement „that this ideal of political liberty is in a fair way to wreck certain of the less firmly organised nations." („The Group Mind" p. 185.)

The national poet and eminent author, Ivan Vazov, has depicted this trait of harshness in several of his short stories, namely in „An obscure hero", „A great man-bearing epoch." or „A corner of calmness and forgetfulness". he was painfully conscious of this defect for we find him declaring: „Oh; unfeeling people, the heroism of mercifulness is unknown to thy Soul; harshness is an inherent element in our nature, it has penetrated into our blood and flesh with the first breath of life".

Some years ago the opinion expressed by Dr G. le Bon that: La férocité est un élement de race, spécial à certaines peuples et que les siècles n'éffacent pas", was prevalent and apparently justified such pessimism as was expressed in a forceful apophthegm of Mihailovski which may be rendered by:

„Neither can dove ravens lead,
Nor bad peoples good leaders breed".

It also explains the not less pessimistic opinion held by P. R. Slaveikov of his countrymen, as expressed in his poem entitled the „Last Resolution".

The science of psychology however has made immense strides and to-day instincts which are socially undesirable are suppressed by building up sentiments incompatible with them, or alternative modes of expression for instinctive tendencies are provided. This is the process of deflection and psychoanalysts have used the word sublimation for a socially desirable deflection.

Harshness must have been originally of great survival value in a primitive and wild environment and this explains its persistance. One can easily realise that in a community

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in which each member had to fend for himself, and could not reckon on public assistance, it was the most selfish who was bound to succeed best, and that altruism in such circumstances, was a great handicap, and a source of weakness. We should be able therefore to explain why Bulgarians do not show sensitiveness to other persons' feelings and why they are more or less guided in their conduct by the maxim „Everyone for himself and the devil take the hindmost", and not attribute such natural propensities to any viciousness of character. This egoistic trait has now outlived its usefulness; in our modern societies such a quality is destructive, for society can only continue to exist if individuals learn to be considerate and benevolently disposed towards each other. It is necessary therefore to adopt measures by which these unsocial instincts are deflected, a task which is certainly difficult but not insuperable to an expert psychologist. And Bulgaria possesses in the person of Dr. N. Krestnikov an expert on this question, whose advice and guidance would be of immense value to the nation. His „Psychological analysis of our public life", lucid and masterly in its exposition, dwells at length on such unsocial instincts as distinguish the Bulgarian, and the treatment to which he as a psychiatrist subjected most of the extreme cases which came under his care. It is a book which ought to be in the hands of every educated Bulgarian, for besides its clear interpretation of the subject, it also contains valuable directions as to the remedies which should be adopted. Dr Krestnikov dwells mainly on avariciousness, or rather the acquisitive instinct, from an hypertrophy of which the great bulk of his countrymen suffer. In most of them the pursuit of wealth has become the dominating incentive in life, what Wm. Mc Dougall calls the master instinct, with the grievous consequence that other mental faculties, have been atrophied and the person suffering from

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such a taint shows a one sided development, a state equally prejudicial to the person affected and to a community composed mainly of individuals whose instinctive equipment is not properly balanced. Avarice is common to all peasant communities and is the natural consequence of this mode of life. People who are exposed to the fickleness of the elements have to be provident and parsimonious if they are to survive, and since individual innate tendencies are the natural outcome of the physical and social envinronment of the group and in harmony with them, it is obvious that in the course of centuries, individuals with altruistic tendencies should have been gradually weeded out in such an ethnical group as the Bulgarian. A curb to this tendency could be sought in legislative measures, such as the placing of a limit to private fortunes. If the British Labour Party thought fit to put forward such a scheme a few years ago and fix £5000 as the maximum amount of wealth to be held by an individual. why should not such a device be resorted to in Bulgaria, where its application would encounter little opposition and cause no disorganisation in private enterprises since they are all built on a modest scale? Such a plan would bridle politicians and prevent them from embezzling public funds, for it may be said that most of the large fortunes existing in Bulgaria have been acquired by diverting money in one way or another, from the State coffers to private ones. And it would be highly serviceable to the community at large that the activities of such persons should be curtailed, for by flaunting their ill-gotten wealth and their luxurious living, they not only incite others to imitate them but they set up an example of loose living which is highly demoralising and pernicious among a poor and austere people such as that in the midst of whom they live. It is largely the attempt to live after the higher standards set by those possessing ill-gotten

000 wealth that has corrupted a large number of the „intelligentsia". In their efforts to satisfy this insensate craving of altering their style of living and adopting luxurious manners, they have not hesitated to make a litter of all principles. Bulgaria being a poor country, there is no room within her precincts for Sybarites. In Spartan austerity and simplicity will she alone find salvation, for it is such qualities that breed the social virtues and devotion necessary for her renovation.

Of course there are other ways of attacking the evil spirit of acquisitiveness, namely by changing those parts of the social fabric which promote its growth, which is the socialist or communist way, or by setting an example of complete disinterestedness and the military who have been brought up in the stern school of austerity, living ascetic lives of service to the community, and who are in charge of the Government are just the most suitable men for this purpose. There is some chance therefore for them to succeed seeing that both Hitler, and Mussolini, owe mainly their success to their disinterestedness and not only to their effective leadership. It is the combination of both these qualities that have raised them in popular estimation in their respective countries, and it is to be hoped that Bulgaria's leaders will not fail altogether where others have triumphed.

181 Much has been said of the dourness, and suspicion of the average Bulgarian, but these traits are also due to the social environment in which he has hitherto grown. He necessarily had to hide his thoughts, and desires from his Turkish overlord, and keep these to himself. He thus became unsociable and uncommunicative, a world to himself, and even to-day his social self-consciousness does not extend beyond the narrow limits of his family. What is indispensable is the gradual extension of this sentiment of devotion beyond the family, in order that it might emb-

race a larger group, such as the nation. For much of the corruption, and avarice arise from a genuine conviction that one's first duty is to one's own family, a trait which the Bulgarians share with the Chinese, among whom owing to the Confucian philosophy, the same view prevails, and has done much to stunt the growth of public spirit. (see Bertrand Russell's, „The Problem of China“).

As the Bulgarian is certainly not defective in his attachment to his near kin, and this is patent by the extreme sacrifices which he readily makes in order to provide for the education of his children, the expansion of this existing sentiment so as to comprise the nation as a group would be possible, and the value of such an expanded sentiment can be easily grasped. Group self-consciousness and a sentiment developed about the idea of the group becomes a power capable of holding the group together in spite of all physical, and moral difficulties. It is indispensable therefore that such a socially valuable sentiment should be cultivated to the utmost, all the more so since even such an eminent psychologist as Wm. Mc Dougall („The Group Mind“ p. 79) does not hesitate to declare:

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> „The group spirit destroys the opposition and the conflict between the crudely individualistic and the primitive altruistic tendencies of our nature. — This is the peculiar merit and efficiency of the complex motives that arise from the group spirit; they bring the egoistic self-seeking impulses into the service of society and harmonise them with the altruistic tendencies. The group spirit secures that the egoistic and the altruistic tendencies of each man's nature instead of being in perpetual conflict, as they must be in its absence, shall harmoniously co-operate and re-enforce one another throughout a large part of the total field of human activity.
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> For it is of the essence of the group spirit that the individual identifies himself with the group more or less; that is to say, in technical language, his self-regarding sentiment becomes extended to the group more or less completely, so that he is moved to desire

000 and to work for its welfare, its success, its honour and glory, by the same motives which prompt him to desire and to work for his own welfare and success and honour.. . In this way, that is by extension to the group, the egoistic impulses are transmuted, sublimated and deprived of their individualistic selfish character and effects and are turned to public service".

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M. I. P. Kepov, a noted Bulgarian educationalist in his very informative book „Our actuality", not only sets out to lecture the intellectuals for their shortcomings pointing out to them several of their defects and the unfortunate concequences they have hitherto produced, but also dwells on their envy, their vindictivenecs, intolerance of others, their lack of idealism and attachment to traditions, their self-sufficiency and extreme materialism, and their contempt of the peasant class out of which they have all sprung. He has arraigned a formidable indictement against them, and he shares the view prevalent among the peasantry who ascribe to the intellectuals the main cause of their country's disasters. The book draws a very black picture of the social life of the Bulgarian, and unfortunately it can not be said that the author exaggerates. Such poverty in emotional life, mistrustfulness and self-centredness cannot but be devastating to the soul, and some device must be found to blow up the Chinese walls with which every Bulgarian seems to have encased himself. By participating more largely in social life, he might be made to share the satisfactions and enjoyments accruing to every participant in active group life, for nobody will dispute Wm. Mc. Dougall's (op. cit. p. 68.) statement that:

> „The consciousness of the group and of oneself as a member of it brings a sense of power and security, an assurance of sympathy and co-operation, a normal and physical support without which man can hardly face the world".

It is sad to record that the political institutions borrowed from the West, the extreme centralisation of the administration have been altogether uncongenial to th

Bulgarian and have stifled what public spirit existed among them at their liberation. The Turk was not the hard task-master he was reported to be, on the contrary he was tolerant enough to permit the Bulgarians to conduct their communal life on the lines they thought best. This communal semi-independence fostered the growth of a group spirit that readily manifested itself during the early years of the country's independence, examples of which have been often noted. M. Kepov also alludes to the kindly and well-meant efforts of the teaching profession in those years, to the enthusiasm and self-sacrifice they showed in their attempts to spread education amongst their countrymen, but the blight of politics soon froze this budding sociability. The politician in his endeavour to become omnipotent persecuted the teachers as likely to work up public opinion against him, and any manifestations of independent thought on their part was punished by dismissal. Thus the teaching profession was alienated and turned for consolation to socialism. Instead of working for the spread of views likely to strengthen the prestige of the State, they started spreading subversive notions utterly foreign to the traditional conceptions of the community they lived in and which the peasantry could not assimilate. Thus those who ought to have guided the people in their upward path completely estranged themselves both from those in authority and from the popular masses. The peasantry, as was to be expected, could not at all appreciate the Marxian gospel and began to view very suspiciously these missionaries in their midst especially when they attempted to undermine the national religion and customs, by the weapon of ridicule. The rest of the intellectuals looked upon the peasant masses with the same contempt and lack of interest. They took no notice of them until elections were drawing near when politicians would start visiting the

517 565 village and start inundating them in a spate of demagogic rhetoric. The orators of each political group would start vituperating and abusing their rivals, thus undermining completely the prestige of the intellectuals until the peasantry came to look on all with undisguised hatred and contempt. There has not been an example of such a deep cleavage within a people in recent times except in Tsarist Russia, with the well-known consequences, and if something is not done to assure the peasantry that the State will henceforth uphold and protect their interests, and instil in them the conviction that the abuses of the past are definitely over, we may well be anxious as to the future, for however self-sacrificing and patriotic the rulers of Bulgaria may be, the task they have shouldered is a stupendous one and the organs they must depend on for carrying it out are not as reliable as could be wished. And yet it is through the efforts of this „intelligentsia“ that the country will have to work its way upwards, for the salvation of countries, the evolution of which has been retarded, depends on the predominance of urban civilisation over rural backwardness.

181 641 It is of undoubted interest to record the views of one of the leaders of the sole political party which was actuated by a true conception of democratic principles and which persistently upheld them, but which failed to rally round it sufficient supporters to impose them because the Bulgarian elector expected to get some direct advantages in exchange for his vote, a practice the Bulgarian Radicals always denounced and fought against.

Thus M. Kosturkov speaking in the Sobranye on December 21, 1926 said among other things:

> „We are with servile souls. A nation impregnated with a sense of freedom and having a sense of self-respect does not allow the authorities to usurp its liberty and its rights. It is always ready to place its rulers in their due place. I am not indignant at the servi-

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lity of the masses but at that of the greater part of the intelligentsia, and it is in disgust that I hear their servile speeches when in presence of influential men. According to me none can equal our average man for his envy and our demagogues exploit to the utmost this sentiment. Instead of combatting this inherent defect we make capital out of it in our political struggles. Another national defect is our greed which we exploit and excite. We lack all sense of measure, we are extremists with an anarchic individualism that has no equal. All these defects are being fostered by our politicians and the Bulgarian who is by nature most peaceful is being made pugnacious by our dremagogues who rouse his low instincts and incite him against his brethren. Bulgarians love science and knowledge and they should be guided towards this goal, for while absorbed in creative work their bad instincts will slumber. Although very suspicious, if once confidence is instilled they become extremely credulous. So long as a government uses force there will be no pacification in Bulgaria. Only democracy will give a government of order. Violence and hatred does not create anything lasting but on the contrary will further deepen the existing chasm between rulers and ruled".

Unfortunately M. Kosturkov's prognostication as to the efficacy of democracy was wrong. Bulgaria secured in 1931 a really democratically elected government which to all appearance was perfectly democratic in its composition yet it brought and engendered disorder, and what was most surprising, it encompassed the overthrov of M. Kosturkov himself, who as all will admit, was the only true representative of democracy in the Cabinet. M. Sakuzov, the veteran leader of the Social-democrats was apparently better inspired when he admitted in the Sobranye on December 24, 1926: „Such popular forces as come to the surface are incapable of coordination and harmonious co-operation. The Agrarian regime dealt a stuning blow to the conception of a government by the popular masses".

The Bulgarian is characterised by a sense of fairness and honesty in his dealings with his fellow-men, this is in striking contrast with his attitude towards the State which he does not scruple to cheat or despoil because he believes

11: Logio S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

181 641 that he need not stand on ceremony with it since it has mercilessly exploited him. He is generally a man who will abide by his promise but he expects that others will likewise do so, and it is very often disregard for assumed obligations that leads the Bulgarian to wreak savage vengeance on the person who breaks a compact.

181 157 In spite of the fact that the Bulgarian people have been subjected for centuries to a rigorous negative selection, for all outstanding personalities were either exterminated by the Turks with whom they necessarily entered in conflict, or became denationalised by offering their services to more advanced nations, in the midst of which they alone could exert their talents, they, nevertheless may be considered as intellectually one of the most gifted of the Balkan peoples.

The value of a people is not gauged by the level of the average individual, but by that of the exceptional men belonging to it; such at least is the opinion of leading sociologists such as Dr. G. le Bon, and Wm. Mc. Dougall so that in this respect Bulgarians have little cause to envy their neighbours. The appearance of exceptional individuals amongst the Bulgarian people has been noted even by Prof. Jovan Cvijić, who writes in his „La Peninsule Balkanique“, p. 479:

> „De cette très ancienne histoire il y a un fait à retenir, c'est l'apparition d'individus doués d'une volonté extraordinairement puissante. . . La préponderance de ces fortes individualités nous frappe encore dans les époques plus récentes de l'histoire bulgare. même après la liberation. Le personnage le plus representatif à cet égard fut Stefan Stambulov. Les politiciens bulgares paraissent doués d'une force de volonté plus agissante que ceux des autres types yougoslaves etc“

If in one generation from amongst five million Bulgarians, arose at least three men of genius such as Slaveikoff, Vazoff and Mihailovski this proves that the Bulgarians are a stock worth conserving, not only for

itself, but also on account of the good that humanity 181
might ultimately derive from the flowering of such genius 157
as may arise from its midst. Many will retort that the above mentioned men though talented can in no way be considered as geniuses, but this assertion is obviously refutable, for one in forming a true appreciation of their value should first of all take into consideration the environment in which these men were nurtured. If in spite of the stunting influences which they encountered in the midst of which they have developed, they nevertheless attained such an indisputable preeminence, it cannot be denied that these men must have possessed exceptional mental attainments.

LITERATURE AND ART

There are few peoples who in such a brief space of 538
time have equalled the achievements of the Bulgarians in the domain of literature. Without any literary or artistic traditions, except perhaps for the writings of the poet-revolutionary, Christo Botev, without even a literary language, the Bulgarians within the half century of their independent existence as a State, have attained to a level of development in the realm of letters of which many older nations would have justly been proud, and which more than the remarkable material progress accomplished by them, marks them out as a higly endowed people worthy of our admiration and esteem..

Several decades ago, the translation into English of Ivan Vazov's novel "Under the Yoke", proved a revelation and evoked the unstinted applause of all critics. No less a person that Edmund Gosse wrote a most eulogious preface to the book. Yet this was one of Vazov's early works, written at a time he had not yet attained maturity, nor the perfection which distinguish some of his later productions, Vazov excels in those short stories of his in which he depicts nature and the lives of the common people His sincerity, outspokeness. vividness of delineation and absence of all pretentiousness, render his writings delightfully refreshing, and in full harmony with the simple, unadorned subjects on which he loves to dwell. It is impossible to resist the charm of his narrative, or the enchanting flow of his verse. Of course, one must not seek in his works any high flight or flow of ideas, but for simplicity, naivety, and a genuine portraiture of nature, he may be considered as a master, and as such he will ever retain his due place not only in Bulgarian, but also in international literature.

He was devotedly attached to his country, and the whole of his poetry has a living backround of Bulgaria. He never tired of singing his country's sorrows and woes, nor ever wavered in defending its cause. When during the world war, Bulgaria was stigmatised for entering the field against Russia, he vindicated his country's honour in a poem that will ever be remembered by his countrymen. and which ended with the following stanza:

„Wicked in her madness, guilty«
Rings the verdict far and wide:
But I see thee pure and holy
As the Saviour crucified.

Many of his short stories have been translated into several languages, even into Japanese. The following example of his poetry, translated in a masterly fashion by the late American missionary, Dr E. Haskell, the much regretted founder of the Pordim Folk School, will permit readers to appreciate the stirring, vibrating harmony, and simplicity of Vazov's verse

„Do they ask me where the dawning
Glinted first upon mine eyes?

LITERATURE AND ART

Do they ask me where's the country
That of all on earth I prize?

There, I'll answer, where the Danube
Rolls along its shining way;
Where the Black Sea to the eastward
Tosses up its gleaming spray:

Where, with head uplifted proudly,
Towereth Balkan's lordly chain;
Where Maritsa floweth softly
Through the level Thracian plain:

Where twixt flowery banks the Vardar
Doth its cool flood ever pour;
Where old Rila's summit shineth,
Where Lake Ochrid's blue waves roar.

There to-day injustice reigneth
O'er a race in bondage flung:
There they weep, and pray for freedom
In our common Bulgar tongue.

O Bulgaria, land beloved,
Land with every good replete,
Land that nursed me, my devotion
Lay I gladly at thy feet.

How I love thy mighty mountains!
Love thy forests and thy streams,
Love thy smiling dales and meadows
Where the Lord's abundance teems.

Love I thee in loss and anguish,
Cherishing thy past renown,
Hoping that a brighter future
May thy glorious mem'ries crown.

Wheresoever I may wander
Thoughts of thee within me burn:
As a free man in my birth-land
May my dust to thine return".

In striking contrast with Vazov is the poet Pentso Slaveikov. He has remained to this day unappreciated by his countrymen, owing to his extreme intellectualism and

538 his disparagement of the school of literature founded by Vazov. His poetical, and artistic conceptions were too far in advance of his time. He attempted to transpose German poetical conceptions in Bulgaria, and to raise the level of the native literature by creating a poetry of epics based on folklore, and popular songs. He succeeded in this latter object and his "Song of the blood" will remain a standing master piece, though both this, and his several volumes of lyrical poems, entitled "Songs", and "Dreams" make intolerable demands upon the reader's intellect and aestheticism.

He was "discovered" by that erudite scholar, Dr E. J. Dillon, when on a visit to Bulgaria in 1903, in company with Henry Bernard who were so impressed by Slaveikov's poetical talents that they translated a large section of the Bulgarian folksongs collected by him into English, and published them some thirty years ago in a now almost forgotten book entitled "Shade of the Balkans". Both these authors higly appreciated Slaveikov's talent and deplored the poverty of the environment in which he moved, a matter which obviously was an obstacle to the full flowering of his poetical genius. Such sentences as "curiously pathetic to see P. Slaveikov chained to the smallness of Sofia", or "the caged lion of Sofia" express the opinion they formed of him, which is likewise shared by a leading contemporary Serbian poet, Jovan Ducić, who states: "Slaveikov is the man of the future, a poet for future generations".

The outstanding personality in the world of Bulgarian letters remains the poet philosopher, Stoyan Mihailovski. Of him Prof N. C. Derjavine wrote in the Year book of the Leningrad Academy of Science (1932): "By the originality of his satyrical talent, by the sharpness of his writings and his thought, by his broad knowledge and interest in present day problems, Stoyan Mihailovski takes up in Bulgarian literature an exclusive and particular position".

Mihailovski was an intellectual giant, a man of untiring energy, who spent his life in unstinted efforts to purify public life. He was as fearless as he was scathing in his attacks on the corrupt practices ex-Tsar Ferdinand was fostering in Bulgaria, and most of his works, especially the one entitled "Book for the Bulgarian people", is an impetuous denunciation of a system which was undermining public morality. He possessed a profound knowledge of French literature, and of French political and social thought which he deftly made use of to educate his countrymen.

The impression his articles in the press (mainly the *Napred*), and his public lectures made, will ever remain memorable in Bulgaria. In a public lecture delivered before the Balkan wars he roundly denounced Ferdinand as an agent of Austria-Hungary. He trounced mercilessly politicians, journalists, intellectuals, and all and sundry, who showed signs of pandering to the wishes of the Crown, and for this reason he did not enjoy popularity among the leading official circles. Mihailovski was too engrossed in his self-imposed task of lecturing his misbehaving countrymen and chastising with his piercing satires the worst miscreants, and for this reason his literary creations are not as numerous as one would have expected and wished from such a powerful individuality. He has nevertheless left several admirable novels, as well as a drama which was staged at the Sofia National Theatre. Among his poems there are some which may be compared in profundity of thought with those of a Tennyson, or a de Vigny. Some of them are veritable gems, namely, "The incompleted temple" and "Onward". The latter has a certain resemblance with Longfellow's "Psalm of Life", and in it Mihailovski expresses in forceful rhyme the cult for labour which is a common Bulgarian trait.

The following verses written by him in French, depict the deep religious inspiration which urged him on in his thankless task of a moralist, and which may rank on a level with de Vigny's „Moïse“.

PRIERE

Ta main s'est abattue, O Seigneur, sur ma vie
Et tout ce qui fut beau rêve et jeunesse — en moi,
Tout s'écroula soudain! Frappe encore, chatie
Mon orgueil, Dieu puissant, mais donne-moi la foi.

Car tout me manque, espoir et courage, à cette heure,
Car je sens comme un vide immense dans mon coeur,
Car la haine, parfois m'obsède, et ma demeure,
Sombre prison a pour geôlier la douleur.

Ah, donne-moi la foi, Seigneur, la foi profonde,
Fais que je m'agenouille, humble, devant ta croix,
Afin que, sans abris, sans appui, seul au monde,
Je dise, triomphant: Je suis fort, car je crois!

Another work which has won a lasting place in the world of letters is that of Aleko Constantinov's "Baï Ganio". It is the Balkan counterpart of Cervantes "Don Quixote", and together with the latter has attained immortality. It is a satire on the national defects of the Bulgarians, and was written with the purpose of correcting these shortcomings by exposing them to ridicule. The book abounds with descriptions of local customs, humorous incidents deftly and cleverly portrayed provoke readers to laughter. The part depicting the political activities of the hero is unique in its kind as it opens up an inexhaustible mine of local wit There are excellent French and German translations, and even Greek and Serbian, the work in fact being the most popular Balkan literary production. "Baï Ganio" has a certain resemblance also with Alphonse Daudet's masterpiece, "Tartarin de Tarascon", but while the latter occasionally verges on buffoonery, "Baï Ganio"

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A GROUP OF PEASANT WOMEN

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From left to right: D-r T. Yankov, M. Ilia Gheorgov, and the author

[facing p. 257]

538 does not transcend the limits of what is comic and humourous, and remains from beginning to end thoroughly realistic.

Another distinguished prose writer is Eline Peline. His stories descriptive of rural life reveal not only his powerful narrative qualities, but also his ability to sketch in a few sentenses lasting portraits of the characters he depicts. He makes us live and share with the peasantry, their humour, their sentiments, and their preoccupations. Although Eline Peline paints nature as a poet, he does not idealise the peasantry. His portraiture of them is as realistic and true as it is vivid. He helps us to discover the ever-changing diversity of rural life and admire the sterling qualities of the Bulgarian peasantry, their devotion to duty and to work, though he doet not gloss over some of their defects which he delineates with an exquisite sense of humour. It is regrettable that none of his works has been translated into English, though several of his short stories equal in rank and resemble in style some of those of Alphonse Daudet.

Iordan Iovkov is another talented painter of rural life and scenes, which he describes with a true poetic sense and artistic sensibility that render them pregnant with reality.

Another group of writers has specialised in the portraiture of urban life. G. P. Stamatov is their most noteworthy representative. He has been likened to Guy de Maupassant, but he, unlike his French prototype, occasionally indulges in overt criticism of some of the ugly aspects of town life, which he sketches in a most realistic and attractive fashion. Tsilinghirov and Vlaikov are two other notable novelists who are, however, better known by their more serious contributions to Bulgarian letters.

Quite a number of men of letters, like D. Shishmanov, P. Djidrov, Strashimirov, and Dr T. Yankov, have

538 distinguished themselves by portraying the political life, and morals of the country under the guise of historical novels. In this they fully succeeded, especially the latter, who was the only prominent supporter of Radoslavov to side openly for the Entente, and who was in the secret of all the Palace's and cabinet's intrigues. His novel, „In the folds of life", is a faithful narrative of a period of Ferdinand's rule in which the leading political figures of the time are thinly disguised under assumed names. He also wrote a drama which met with great success when staged at Sofia, but though all the above mentioned writers have compiled historical, literary, and dramatic works of merit, owing to the restricted reading public, it is not surprising that they have not secured the recompense and appreciation they deserved. It would make a very long list indeed if one were to mention all the noteworthy works of Bulgarian historians, scientists etc, who have attained world-wide recognition, such as Prof Zlatarski, Boyan Penev etc., one however may be allowed to make a brief allusion to Symeon Radev's „Creators of Contemporary Bulgaria", a perusal of which is indispensable to those interested in Balkan affairs, and which, from both a literary, and a historical point ot view, may be said to be one of the most excellent productions in the Bulgarian language.

There has also been quite a flowering ol lyrical poets of real distinction like Constantine Velitchkov, who among other things translated Dante into Bulgarian and Cyril Christov, who after enriching Bulgarian literature with his own productions, in which he reveals himself as a first class lyrical poet, has added to his merits that of a translator of Shakespeare's Henry IV, of Schiller's William Tell, of Byron's Manfred, and of Silvio Pelico's Francesco of Rimini. Peyu Yavorov should likewise be mentioned among the best poets of Bulgaria, since his poetry approaches to some extent the perfection and emotional intensity of that of Slaveikov. 538

Another estimate of the literary activities of the Bulgarians may be formed by the number and serious character of the books that are being published. Thus in 1931, a total of 2222 different books was printed, of which 1782 were original productions, and 229 translations, some 201 of the former being in languages other than Bulgarian. The bulk of the works published dealt with scientific subjects. Thus 591 books were on economics, sociology and politics, 349 on culture and pedagogy, 301 on literature, 262 on applied sciences, 175 on medicine, 131 on religion, 97 on law, 84 on history, 44 on art, and 39 on geography and ethnography. 214

The number of newspapers which appeared in 1931 was stated to be 571, and the number of periodicals 352 of which 26 appeared in foreign languages.[1] The largest newspaper circulation was that of the *Utro*, a morning newspaper, which reached daily 60,000 copies, while that of its rival, and the more serious, *Zora*, attained 40,000. The *Mir*, under its able editor, Peev-Platskov, a graduate of Robert College, and an accomplished English scholar, is admittedly the leading newspaper with a daily sale of 20,000 copies. From among the periodicals the *Bulgarski Voin* had the largect number of subscribers, namely 41,300 (mainly reserve officers), while other excellent reviews, such as the *Philosophski Pregled*, and the *Journal of the Economic Association* boasted 3000 and 1400 subscribers respectively. 204

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[1] Among these is the „Bulgarian-British Review," a monthly periodical published in English chiefly aiming at promoting cultural and economic intercourse with Anglo-Saxon countries. This review offers to its American and English readers an accurate survey of Bulgarian life, and constitutes a much appreciated means of approach between the English-speaking communities and the Bulgarian people.

536 The theatre too has its votaries, and not only many prominent men of letters have contributed dramas and plays. but there are even some like M. Kostov, who devoted themselves exclusively to playwriting. The latter has won a well-deserved reputation as a comedy writer, which has transcended the narrow limits of his country, for such has been the success of his plays, that they have been translated into Rumanian and Serbian, and successfully staged both in Bucharest and Belgrade.

545 It would not be amiss to mention that the Bulgarians have succeeded in creating an opera and a theatre which compare very favourably with those of any of the larger provincial towns in western Europe, and this with an annual subsidy from the State of barely 12 million leva which is a most noteworthy feat. For a modest fee of one shilling, one may secure a most comfortable seat, and enjoy an excellent rendering of Wagner's Lohengrin, Verdi's Aïda, or Gounod's Faust, etc. It is regrettable that the best Bulgarian singers are often attracted by the lure of higher pay and appear more often in the opera houses of Prague and Paris, than that of Sofia, but the rendering of the choruses is always admirable. and compensates to a certain extent for the occasional absence of the protagonists. The staging too is perfect, and most modern, and is far ahead of what the average London theatre can offer.

532 In painting also, the Bulgarians have produced quite a number of really talented artists. The paintings of Mitov, Mirkvitska. etc were greatly admired at the Paris exhibition of 1900, and secured most flattering distinctions. It is to be deplored that few have kept to the real path of art and not gone astray allured by modern tendencies which have revolutionised artistic conceptions after the world war. Artists, like the portraitist Nicolaï Mihailov, who has not sacrificed his artistic convictions to these modern ideas has won a well-deserved international reputation

both in Europe and in America, those, however, who have set their sails to these withering winds have lost themselves in a maze of eccentricities which may be permissible on occasions to a genius, but which discredit the artist of average ability and expose him to be taken for an impostor and a charlatan. 532

Annual autumn shows are held in Sofia in which a picked review of total activity in painting is obtained, but except for a few gifted and devoted poets of colour and design, as well as for a few honest portraitists, exhibitors seem to excel in a sloppy diffuseness in still-life and landscape. Foreign visitors, who have no predilection for 'impressionism' or 'futurism', generally come away from these shows with the impression that they are rather exhibitions of misdirected energy, which for the very sake of the exhibitors themselves, a poverty-stricken community should not encourage.

ETHNOGRAPHY

000 In a chapter of Prof. Wm. McDougall's book the „Group Mind". consecrated to the study of the Mind of a Nation, the eminent sociologist dwells at length on the importance of both mental and racial homogeneity of a population as a condition for a harmonious development of national character and collective mental life. It must be regretfully admitted that in the case of the Bulgarian people, the conditions are extremely adverse and this will go a long way to explain its chequered historical career, the rather volcanic character of its politics, and the difficulties which wrecked the disinterested efforts of its patriots to appease and unite ever-warring and contending factions.

144 Prof. Pittard of Geneva, a reputed anthropologist, affirms:

> „Au point de vue anthropologique les Bulgares ne constituent pas nulle part, pas davantage dans le royaume que dans le Dobroudja une 'race' pure. Par tous leurs 'caractères morphologiques: la stature, le crâne, la face, ils marquent une hétérogénéité que les autres Etats balkaniques ne montrent pas au même degré. La nation Bulgare est un complex ethnique qui semble avoir été formé avec les éléments humains de toute la péninsule. „La Roumanie". p. 229).

Dr. Krum Drontsilov in his Etudes Anthropogéographiques, p. 136, published by the Sofia University 1923 admits: "The natives of western Bulgaria (Dragoman) like Bulgarians of other regions, do not represent a homogeneous group so far as their corporeal characteristics are concerned. One remarks among them several distinct national elements which have been mixed". In another essay published also under the auspices of the University of Sofia in 1921 he affirms:

> The Bulgarian people present a very great mixture, the crossing of types still continues but it has not yet created a uniform physical type. Observations and measurements show that in bodily

144 structure Bulgarians of different regions show great, even striking difference".

141 The author presents the results of his observations in Macedonia which show a very great variety in measurements as have been ascertained among the 491 cases which form the basis of his data. Natives of Western Macedonia are according to him distinctly brachycephalic, and differ considerably from those of Eastern Macedonia among whom the dolichocephalic predominate as may be seen form the appended table:

Dolichocephalic		**Mesocephalic**		**Brachycephalic**		**Huperbrachycephalic**	
Index: 68·3 to 75		75·1—80		80·1—85		85·1—98·1	
Western Macedonia	Eastern Macedonia	W.M.	E M.	W,M.	E.M.	W.M.	E.M.
Cases		Cases		Cases		Cases	
3	37	15	126	79	75	146	10

It is worth comparing these figures with those of A. C. Hadon, ("The races of man") who states that the cephalic index of the Bulgarians varies from 78 on the coast to 85 in the west, and gives as their average stature 1·69 m.

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175 These views ars confirmed by Prof. A. Ishirkov, who in his "Etude historicoethnographique sur la population du royaume de Bulgarie", remarks that there is no distinctive Bulgarian type and that the people are extremely differentiated. In his survey, he refers to some of the racial elements which have served to build up the Bulgarian people. Thracians, Greek settlers on the Black Sea coast and banks of the Danube, Persians who invaded and occupied Thrace as far as the Struma in 513 B. C., Scythians and the Ghettae, Macedonians, who under Lysimachus occupied all Danubian Bulgaria and the Dobrudja. In the 3rd century B. C. came an invasion of Celts who settled south of the Balkans and built their principal town Tile, in the valley of roses. (this settlement survives under the name of Tulovo) They gradually fell under Hellenic influ-

144 175 ence, their last king, Kavar, minted coins with Greek inscriptions. Some 100,000 Bastarni, a Germanic tribe were settled in Thrace about 280 A. D. by the Emperor Probus. For centuries Roman influence was predominant in the Balkans having penetrated into western Bulgaria as early as 229 B. C. The country was permanently occupied by 5 legions and as many auxiliary troops and many Roman towns founded. Bulgaria to the north of the Balkans was completely Romanised and a further influx of Romans took place on the evacuation of Dacia by the Emperor Aurelian. The historian Priscus affirms that Latin was widely spoken in Danubian Bulgaria in the 5th century. Later came the Goths and Slavs, who overran the whole peninsula, closely followed by the Bulgarians who gave their name to the country. There were two streams of Bulgarians one under Asparuch from Bessarabia and which settled in 679 in North Eastern Bulgaria, and another under Kubert from Pannonia, which settled in Macedonia near Monastir about 670 to 675.

Prof. Ishirkov's analysis is far from complete. Invasions of Moesia by Bulgarians are recorded by Theophanes (Bonnae p. 338/9) in the year 531. While in Marcellini Comitis Chronicon, Migne LI. and Theophylact Simocat VII. 4. references are made to Bulgarian settlements in the valley of the Yantra river in Northern Bulgaria about 535 and 585 respectively. This is explained by the fact that the Emperor Zeno according to John of Antioch. called in the Bulgarians to his help when at war with the Ostrogoths and that subsequently Vitallian also appealed to them for help against Anastassius. It is recorded that in 517, Kutrigurs or Bulgars, had appeared as far south as the Thermopylae, and Justinian is said to have received 2,000 of them, and to have settled them in Thrace. Towards the end of the first Bulgarian Empire however, still greater and more fundamental changes occurred in the ethnogra-

144 phic composition of the population so that one may safely declare that the Bulgarians have nothing Slavonic except 175 their language, and that they are in an overwhelming proportion descendants of various Hunnish tribes. On his advent in Bulgaria, Asparuch found it occupied partly by Slavs, of whom there were to all appearances seven small tribes (Theophanes, De Boor 359.12) which were finally subjugated by the Bulgarians. But the ranks of these Slavs must have been very much thinned since the Emperor Justinian II transferred some 30,000 to Asia Minor, while the Byzantine historians Nichephorus and Theophanes reported that in 761 another body of 208,000 Slavs also migrated from Bulgaria to Asia Minor. While the Slavs were being removed, numerous Syrian and Armenian colonists were being settled by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine V in Thrace and the plain of the Maritsa. Later in the 9th century, some 200,000 Armenians were settled around Philippopolis (Jovan Cvijić: "La Peninsule Balkanique" p 476).

The Slavs did not find in the Bulgarians congenial companions and they preferred to trek elsewhere because on the whole the Bulgarians were extremely warlike, while the Slavs were a pacific folk. In a letter of the Emperor Romanus Lecapenus to the Tsar Symeon, in which the former was advocating the necessity of concluding a treaty of peace between their respective countries, he stresses the fact that some 20,000 Bulgarians had fled their country in a year and sought refuge in the Byzantine Empire as they were disgusted with Symeon's warlike spirit. The weakening of the Slav element was further intensified by the policy of colonisation of the Slavonic districts in Macedonia by peoples from all parts of the Byzantine Empire which was inauguratsd in 809 by the Emperor Nicephorus. (Theophanes p. 486 10—23).

After the death of Symeon, Bulgaria completely

144 exhausted by the wars she had waged, rapidly collapsed. 175 Five Magyar incursions completely ravaged the country. On their heels came Sviatoslav's Russians in 967 who captured the great Bulgarian stronghold of Silistra and decimated the Bulgarians. It was only with the help of John Zimisces that they were finally driven off two years later and Bulgaria south of the Danube became a Byzantine province, and only the western part under the Tsar Samuel where the Bulgarian element survived in force, was able to ward off the Byzantines until 1018. But submission to the Byzantines did not secure for Eastern Bulgaria exemption from further invasions. In 1048 some 800,000 Petsenegs crossed the frozen Danube and the Byzantines settled them in the region around Sofia and Nisch and Ovtse Pole in Macedonia. In 1064, some 600.000 Kumans invaded Bulgaria and advanced into Thrace and Macedonia. These were veritable migrations affirms M. Yanko Sakuzov in his history of the Bulgarians (p. 121). He derives his figures from the eminent Russian historian Wassilievsky whose two book „The 2nd Bulgarian Empire", and „Byzantia and the Petsenegi" are the best documented on this particular period. In 1079 a yet further invasion of Petsenegs and Kumans took place, they penetrated into Thrace and even threatened Constantinople The Emperor Alexis Comnenus was so alarmed that he appealed to the west for help. These Petsenegs and Kumans must have completely swamped the Bulgarians and what few Slav remnants had survived until then in Bulgaria. The Crusaders when traversing Bulgaria in 1096 had to battle mainly with Petsenegs. Albertus, Bishop of Aix, who compiled a history of the expedition to Jerusalem from the year 1095 to 1121 makes vivid allusion to the „Petsenegs who live in Bulgaria".

This explains why the Byzantine chronicler Nikita Akominat who is the main source of documentation con-

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cerning the period relating to the restoration of the 2nd Bulgarian Empire, refers to Bulgarians as living mainly in Macedonia, while the inhabitants of present day Bulgaria he refers to as Vlachs or Wallachs. Other Byzantine writers however, such as G. Acropolites and G. Codinus mention that the population was composed of both Bulgarians and Vlachs, and this is to some extent confirmed by such chronicles as have been left by the Crusaders. Such as Ansberte's „Ystoria de expeditione Friderici imperatoris", though Ansberte in a passage referring to the military help which Tsar Peter offered to Frederick Barbarossa against Constantinople mentions only 40,000 Vlachs and Kumans and no Bulgarians Villehardouin again calls tne ruler of Bulgaria: „Johanis le Blac; li reis de Blaquie et de Bogrie", Professor Zlatarski, in a study published by the Bulgarian Academy in 1933 rightly expresses the view that the Assenide dynasty was of Kumanian stock. It was certainly owing to their close relationship with the Kumans that they were able to appeal for assistance to their kinsmen across the Danube, And it was only with their support that they successfully revolted against the Byzantines. Naturally the question arises whence this sudden apperance of Vlachs in Bulgaria? Must we accept as likely Weigand's theory that the Rumanian nationality was formed in Bulgaria between 600 and 900 and then gradually moved north across the Danube and that therefore these Vlach subjects of the Assenide dynasty were but a rearguard which had not yet trekked northward? It would be rather more logical to explain the use of the term Vlach as a synonym for Kuman, owing to the long cohabitation of these two peoples in Wallachia and to their being mistaken for one another.

The advent of the Petshenegs and Kumans in Bulgaria relegated henceforth the original Bulgarian invaders

144 to a back place, for the Kumanian Assenides were followed
175 yet by other Kumanian Tsars on the throne of
Bulgaria, those of the Terter dynasty and finally the
Shishmans. The Dobrudja too, became an independent
Kuman fief under the Kuman boliar Balik, from whom
the Black Sea port Baltchik derives its name, as does the
whole province from that of his son Dobrotitch. Other
invasions of Kumans are recorded, in 1233, and still later
after the Tartars had begun pressing them in their homeland
in Wallachia. In their wake the Tartars too made their appearance
in Bulgaria and repeatedly invaded the country, a
son of the famous Han Nogai, Tsaka, was crowned in
1299 at Tirnovo as Bulgarian ruler though his reign was
ephemeral. Soon after came the Turks who dominated
the country for five centuries. It is strange that students
of Bulgarian history have not taken seriously the irruption
of the Petsenegs and Kumans in Bulgaria in the 11th
century and still nourish the illusion that the Bulgarians
are Slavs. These mass migrations must have completely
metamorphosed the ethnic basis of the population. There
are no estimates of the Bulgarian population of that period,
but the first Turkish census reported by Ubicini places the
total population of the Danube vilayet in 1876 at 2,591,116
of whom 1,535,466 were recorded as Christians; this after
five centuries of relative peace and prosperity, so that it
may be easily assumed that the population of Bulgaria
prior to the irruption of over a million and a half of Petsenegs
and Kumans in the 11th century must have been
extremely sparse and practically overwhelmed by such an
197 influx. The greatest marvel is the survival of the Slav
tongue in their midst but this must be ascribed mainly
to its use in the Church, the clergy being the only cultural
force in existence at the time. We can easily gauge
its influence by what happened in Rumania where the
Slavonic liturgy had been adopted and used until the 18th

197 century. As a consequence the Rumanian language was slavicised to the extent of 2/5, while the Latin element was reduced to the proportion of only 1/5 of the total. (Cihac, „Dictionnaire d'étymologie Daco-Romane". Francfort S. M. 1879. Cf. its preface).

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103 The irruption and settlement of the Petsenegs and Kumans as was to be expected, left numerous traces in the topography of the country both to the north and south of the Danube. Such names as Petsenoge, Petsenevtse, Petseniaga, Petseneshka, Koman, Kumanitsa, Kymanovtsi, Comanca, Comani, Comanitsa, Comanesti, Comanca, Kumanovo and Gumendja abound and clearly indicate their origin. The Kuman tongue was akin to Turkish, and there is a written M. S. in it in Venice, the study of which would reveal that many words used in the Bulgarian and Rumanian languages and supposed to have been adopted from Turkish, were more probably borrowed direct from the Kuman tongue. This would be more evident in Rumanian where there was no direct contact between Rumanians and Turks, but where on the contrary Wallachs and Kumans lived side by side for centuries

162 According to the census of 1926 the ethnic minorities in Bulgaria were classified as follows according to race, language, and faith. At the time the total population was 5,478,741, including 4 3,011 foreigners, (mainly White Russians, 19,000).

Turks:	577,552	Turkish-Speaking:	588,105	Orthodox:	4,568,773
Gipsies:	134,844	Gipsy „	134,844	Moslems:	789,296
Rumanians:	69,080	Rumanian „	70,631	Jews:	46,431
Jews:	46,558	Judeo-Spanish „	46,322	Armeno-	
Armenians:	27,322	Armenian „	27,322	Gregorians	25,402
Greeks:	10,564	Greek „	10,564	Protestants	6,735
Tartars:	6,191			Various	1757
Gagauses:	4,362				
Kutso-Vlachs:	1,551				
Total	878,024				

THE FIRST BUIGARIAN EMPIRE

101 The name Bulgarian originally designated some of the Turki tribes which were component parts of the Hunnish Empire, and which were also occasionally known as Kutrigurs and Utrigurs The terminal of these two appelations has a close similarity with the term „Ugri", from which the Hungarians derive their name. The latter too formed part of the same Hunnish Empire and lived in close contact with the Bulgarians, who seem to have been at a much higher state of development since it was from them that the Hungarians, according to Prof. Geza Feher mainly derived their culture. Etymologists differ as to the interpretation of the term Bulgar. Some explain it as being derived from the name of the river Volga, and the word ur (är) signifying man, hense man of the Volga; others trace it to the syllable „bulg", the radical of the Turki verb „bulgamuk" meaning to mix, to trouble. This survives in the modern Turkish verb „bulamak" which has the same meaning. Both the Hungarian Orientalist Vambery, and the Rumanian Prof. Pârvan, interpret the word Bulgar as being an adjective in the Turki dialect and meaning mixed up, troubling, disturbing, an interpretation which will undoubtedly delight Bulgaria's neighbours since it offers a justification of their unneighbourly attitude towards her. The Czech historian W. Tomaschek holds that the word Bulgar means mixed, since the Bulgarians are a residuum of various Turki tribes which invaded Europe at different times. At any rate there is little doubt that Bulgar was a comprehensive term which covered both the Kutrigurs and Utrigurs, under which names the Bulgarians first appear in the records of Byzantine chroniclers The Bulgarians lived originally in the southern part of the Russian province of Perm. By the 5th century they had moved towards the Northern Caucasus, settling between the rivers Volga and Don.

THE FIRST BULGARIAN EMPIRE

Procopius (Caesariensis Opera Omnia, ed J. Hanry 101 x 1905 p. 501/3) as cited by Zlatarski, refers to Hunnish 175 people east of the river Don and of the Caspian, and to a ruler among them who had two sons Utrigur and Kutrigur, between whom the kingdom was subsequentily divided. These names came subsequently to designate these peoples. Prof. Zlatarski opines that this division which occurred about 438 caused the momentary suspension in the use of the name Bulgar by some of the Byzantine chroniclers, as the term was a generic one and applied to both branches of the same people. The Kutrigurs crossed the Don and moved west to the river Dnieper where they were in close touch with the remains of Attila's Huns after the latter's death in 452 and which thay incorporated. This would explain why the names of Huns and Bulgars were so often mixed up during the 6th century, as well as the increased activity of the latter and their spread both to the Balkans and Pannonia.

It was during the reign of the Emperor Zeno (474— 175x 491) that the Kutrigur branch of the Bulgarians made its first appearance in Moesia, where they were invited by the Byzantines as allies against the Ostrogoths. In this capacity they repeatedly crossed the Danube and having learnt the way continued to come even uninvited, their incursions extending as far south as the Thermopylae in 517. It was mainly in order to protect the suburbs of Constantinople from these foraging expeditions of the Kutrigurs, that the Emperor Anastasius (491—518) built the Long Walls forty miles to the west of the city, accross a territory 54 miles broad from the Black Sea to the Marmara. Outside this Long Wall the country seems to have passed mainly into the possession of the Kutrigurs early in the 6th century. Theophanes, Bonnae p. 338/9 relates that in 531 there were two Bulgarian kings in Scythia and Moesia, that the Romans besieged and killed

X 175 them, but that on their return another body of Bulgarians waylaid them, captured two Roman generals one of whom was subsequentl ransomed. In Marcellini Comitis Chronicon, Migne LI., mention is made of Bulgarians who inhabited the upper reaches of the river Yantra a tributary of the Danube at about 535.

In Justinian I's reign (527—565) the Kutrigurs seem to have been in close relations with the ruler of Constantinople. Their leader Grod was received there and baptised, while a body of his subjects were settled in Thrace apparently as allies. On his return to his homeland, north of the Danube, Grod was assassinated. His successor waged war with the Byzantines and captured from them the town of Kertch in the Crimea. After this exploit he continued to harass the Empire, carrying off in 539-40 as many as 120,009 prisoners. In 558 under their leader Zaberghan they Kutrigurs even proceeded to lay siege to Constantinople but were driven away by Belisarius who was especially recalled at the time from his enforced retirement. In order to secure some respite, Justinian appealed to the Eastern branch of the Bulgarians, the Utrigurs, and by promises and gifts succeeded in inducing the latter to invade the homeland of the Kutrigurs and inflict a serious defeat on them.

Theophylact Simocat VII. 4, writing about the Emperor Mauricius' (582-602) brother, Peter, who in the year 585 was heading an expedition against the Avars, mentions that after passing Novae (Svistov) he met and fought Bulgarians who protested that they were at peace with the Empire and who were finally allayed with presents. The Bulgarians seem to have been in force not only in Moesia, but even in Pannonia. Thus Cassiodorus (Migne LXIX 1274) states: „*Hoc Cos. virtute D. N. regis Theodorico victus Bulgaribus Syrmium recepit Italla*". and Jordanis („Romana & Getica, Monumenta Germaniae" p. 47) mentions the Bulgarians as devastating Illyrium in Justinian's reign: „*Illiricumque saepe ab Herulis Gipidisque et Bulgaris devastantibus per suos indices frequenter obstit, viriliterque cecedit*“. Enodius, Vicar of Ticino, also refers to Bulgarians in his panegyric to Theodoric and praises him for his victories on these so far unconquerable foes.

Owing to the rising power of the Avars, who extended their rule to Pannonia, the Kutrigurs fell under their domination, and it is recorded that in 569 the Avar Khan organised an expedition of 10,000 Kutrigurs, whom he sent against Dalmatia.

While the Kutrigurs had definitely passed into Europe, the Utrigurs remained in their homes in the Western part of Northern Caucasus, falling under the yoke of other Turki or Tartar tribes towards the seventh decade of the 6th century, but with the assistance of the Byzantines recovered their independence towards its close under the leadership of Kurt, better known as Kubrat, who united all the Bulgar tribes under his rule. According to a statement found in Nicephori, archiepiscopi Constantinopolitani, Opuscula historica, edit. C de Boor, Lipsiae 1880, p, 24, Kubrat had revolted against the Avars and had succeeded in driving them away westwards. He concluded an alliance with the Emperor Heraclius with whom he remained in close comradeship to the end of his life.

Prof. Zlatarski cites the Chronique of Jean, évèque de Nikiou, in which reference is made of Kubrat as having been baptised and educated in the Imperial Court at Constantinople. He remained in close comradeship with Heraclius (610—641) who had covered him with honours and awarded him the title of patrician so that even after his death, Kubrat remained attached to Heraclius' children and wife Martina. Probably Heraclius found in Kubrat a very useful ally against the Avars who had been devastating his Thracian provinces while he was engaged in his campaigns against the Persians

Kubrat died in 643 and left five sons. The elder, Bayan or Batbayan, remained to rule over his father's dominion, while the other brothers set out in different directions. The second son, Kotrag, went northwards along the Volga and founded a kingdom between it and its confluent, the Kama. By the 9th century these Bulgarians had adopted Mohamedanism and were using Arabic in their official writing. Most of their tombstones of the 12th and 13th century are in Arabic mixed however with words of the old Bulgarian language. These Volga Bulgarians seem to have exerted a considerable influence on the surrounding peoples. The „Tsuvaski" dialect spoken in that region may be said to be the modern form of old Bulgarian. The Agricultural terms it contains are distinctly old Bulgarian. They prove its ancientness, for the information can be traced prior to the settlement of the Bulgarians in Northern Caucasus, which tends to show that the Bulgarians ceased to be nomades from a very remote time.

Another son, Kubert, moved to Pannonia among the Avars. There is quite a legend woven about the doings of Kubert. While some assert that after revolting against the Avars he moved southwards with his followers and settled in Macedonia, in the Cormessian plain near Monastir, between 670 and 675 A. D., others see in him the founder of Croatia and the leader from whom the Croats or Hrvati, derive their name. Probably the Bulgarians of Pannonia under Kubert played the same role in Croatia as those under Asparuch in Bulgaria. In a paper due to Mr H. H Howarth F. S. A and published in the journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland Vol. XI 1882 on „The spread of the Slavs", Mr. Howorth in part IV deals with this subject, but unfortunately he seems to mix up the name of Kubert with that of his father Kubrat, and while giving certain highly interesting

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data yet owing to the lack of coherence in his narrative he fails to satisfy the curiosity he arouses in his readers. The following passages seem however worth reproducing:

"The native name of the Croats. given variously as Hr-wati, Horwati, cannot be surely a derivative of Khrebet, a mountain chain as often urged, but is clearly the same as the well known man's name Horvath, familiar to the readers of Hungarian history and no doubt the equivalent of the Khrubat or Kubrat of the Byzantine writers, which name is given by them not only to the stem father of the Bulgarian Kings, *but to one of the five brothers who led the Croat migration.*

I have also shown in previous papers of this series that the Croats were led by a caste of Hunnic race. These facts are very curious, and make it 'a priori' not improbable that they may have taken their names from Kubrat (Kubert) the leader of the Bulgarian revolt himself, and were in fact his subjects".

The youngest son. Altchek, moved on to Italy and took Pentapolis, near Ravenna, submitting finally to the Romans Towards 663 he migrated to the territory of Grimwald, the Longobardian King, who settled him and his followers in the district of Benevento, assigning to them the three villages-Sepinum. Bovianum, and Isernia.

It was the third son, Asparuch or Eshberuch, who was destined to found what we know as Bulgaria. Prior to his crossing the Danube in 679 he and his followers settled in Bessarabia and vestiges of their occupation still exist, such as that of an earthen wall running from the village of Leova on the Pruth to as far as the river Dniester, near Bender. The remains of another wall and ditch may be traced from a point to the south of the town of Cahul on the Pruth to the north western extremity of lake Condutul, leaving Bolgrad to the south, while traces of yet another wall may be found between the Pruth and Sereth, north of Galatz. These walls were considered until recently as having been erected by the Romans and in some maps are indicated as 'Roman walls'. Prof. Geza Feher has shown that the Bulgarians always contructed such walls along the

X 775 frontiers of their State, and that they took great pains to prevent anyone from crossing them, those guards who allowed people to make good their escape being punished with death. The Bulgarians after having occupied Bulgaria as far as the Isker erected similar walls and ditches from the Araba-Konak pass in the Balkans, to the village of Ostrovo on the Danube (to the west of the estuary of the Isker) traces of which are still visible in certain defiles. When the frontier was moved further west, a similar wall was constructed terminating at Kozlodyi, and subsequently another one ending at Lom on the Danube. They completed the defences of their realm by erecting in Rumania a similar wall running from the river Jiul, in a radius, to a point south of Braila. which was extended later from the river Jiul to the town of Turnu Severin on the Danube. Further extensive remains of fortifications covering an area of some 48.3 sq.klm. are to be found near the village of Nicolicel, which were erected preparatory to the Bulgarian invasion of the Dobrudja. It was the siege of Constantinople by the Arabs which lasted four years, which encouraged and enabled the Bulgarians to cross the Danube and conquer Moesia. The Emperor Constantine Pogonatus, though he armed a numerous expedition which he led in person against the Bulgarians who had fortified a position at the mouth of the Danube failed to dislodge them. The Byzantine Empire apparently being too exhausted after its long struggle with the Saracens under Moawiah to attempt such a task. It therefore acquiesced in their settlement and concluded a treaty in 679 ceding them the provinces of Moesia and Scythia Minor (the Dobrudja), even agreeing to paying a yearly tribute.

Prior to the arrival of Asparuch's Bulgarians in Moesia, the whole Balkan peninsula including the Peloponnesus had been overrun by various Slav tribes, but so far as Moesia itself is concerned, the Byzantine chhonicler Theophanes (De Boor 359·12) states that there were only seven small tribes, and there is nothing to warrant us to conclude that the numerous settlements of Kutrigurs in the peninsula made in the 6th and 7th centuries had disappeared. The presence of the latter would explain the rapid expansion and consolidation of Bulgarians in Moesia where they found remnants of a kindred population already established, and should be attributed to this fact, rather than to the supposed co-operation between Bulgarians and Slavs which Bulgarian historians like to emphasize. They thus unduly stress Theophanes' statement (Chronographia p. 359) that the seven Slav tribes were in alliance with the Bulgarians (ὑπὸ πάκτον ὄντας) while they pass over in silence the Tsatalar inscription in which Khan Omortag refers to the building of Plisca as intended to hold „both Greeks and Slavs" and which seems to be in contradiction with the former.

It seems also very difficult to admit as correct Prof. Zlatarski's view that the followers of Asparuch did not surpass 25,000, though his opinion is shared by most Bulgarian historians, some of whom go even to the extreme of asserting that this was a mere marauding band not more than 10000 strong and composed of both Slavs and Bulgarians. Such a contention is untenable, for obviously it is not such a threat that would have incited the Byzantines to arm and dispatch a powerful expedition under the leadership of their Emperor, and which Theophanes in his Chronographia p. 358 describes as numerous and multitudinous (ἀθρόον καί παμπληθές), while Nicephorus in his Opuscula historica p. 35 alludes to the hosts of cavalrymen and sailors it contained (ἱππικῶν καί πλοΐμων τὰ πλήθη) In spite of their numbers, the Byzantines were unable to storm the fortifications which the Bulgarians had erected at Nicolicel on the Danube south of Isaktcha, and which were of an area of 48. 3 sq. klm (yet another proof that the Bulgarians were well organised and numerous), and allowed themselves to be beaten and driven away to their ships. Tke ruins of Pliska and Preslav, the first capitals of the Bulgarians, also testify that the latter were a well organised people possessing a fairly advanced civilisation and that they had come in fairly large numbers.

At Pliska remains of a fortress of a trapezoid form of ½ klm. sq. in area with a round tower at each corner, a pentagonal tower at each of its four sides and each gate protected by two square towers have been unearthed. The walls are 2.6 m. in thickness, built of big square block stones and reminding one of the Persian Sassanid style of building. This fortress is in the centre of an entrenched camp 23·3 sq. klm. in area. The ruins of Preslav, the second capital, cover an area of 3½ sq. klm. with an interior fort of an area of ¼ sq. klm, with walls 2·10 m. in thickness.

The period from 679, the date of Asparuch's (644 – 702) crossing of the Danube to 688, the Bulgarians employed in consolidating and extending westward their dominions and no trouble arose with the Byzantines until 688 when the Emperor Justinian II (685—695 & 705—711) refused to continue the payment of tribute. A war followed in which he was defeated, and having been equally unsuccessful in his wars with the Saracens, was dethroned and expelled from his domains. In his peregrinations he found refuge with Khan Tervel, (702– 718/9) the successor of Asparuch, the latter having died in 792. Tervel lured by the promise of Justinian's daughter and of a monetary recompense, besieged Constantinople and restored it to its former master. In recompense the title of Caesar was bestowed on Tervel as well as considerable riches. Justinian however, soon forgot the aid he had received and declared war on Bulgaria, only to be defeated once more. In 716 Tervel concluded another treaty with Theodosius III (715—717) the latter ceding a portion of his Thracian domains to the Bulgarians, whose western frontier in Moesia, now was the river Timok. It was most fortunate for the Byzantines to have secured the friendship of Khan Tervel, for in 717 the Saracens once more, under Moslemah, the brother of the Caliph Suleiman, laid siege to Constantinople. The city was completely isolated by land and sea, the Saracens relying more on starving it out than on taking it by storm. In the spring of 718 a fresh fleet came up from Egypt to help the besiegers, while a large army arrived from Tarsus and occupied the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus. But at that critical moment Khan Tervel appeared on the scene at the call of the besieged Emperor Leo the Isaurian (717-740). The Bulgarians routed the covering army which protected the siege on the western side, killing more than 22,000 Saracens, by the testimony of the Arab historians themselves, and inspired such terror to the survivors that Moslemah ordered his fleet to ferry the rest of his army across to Asia. By delivering Constantinople and turning back from the East of Europe the tide of the Arab invasion Khan Tervel struck as hard a blow for the preservation of European civilisation and of Christendom as his contemporary, Charles Martel on the battlefield of Poitiers, though few have ever thought of giving him his due. Judging from the mighty controversy which arose between Prof. Yorga and Prof. Moutaftchiev concerning Khans Sabin and Pagan, both of whom the former declared to be of Latin ancestry, a fact the latter strongly contested, aligning a series of formidable arguments in opposition in a most interesting and readable treatise „Bulgares et Roumains dans l'histoire des Pays Danubiens'", one is inclined to ask how no other Trans-Danubian historian has had the ingenuity to claim Tervel, or Trebel, as a Latin compatriot, especially after his illustrious exploit. For the name has a striking similarity with that of Trebellianus, a

X 175 name borne by two well known individuals (C. Annius Trebellianus, a contemporary of Gallian and of Trebellianus Pollio who lived in the reign of Constantine). It is strange how certain historians should allow a free rein to their fancy and proceed to build up a whole system on fantasies, to wit such Russian historians like Uria Venelin, P. Butkov or Sergi Yvarov,[1] who by hook or crook wanted to make the Bulgarians pass for Slavs, and who have so much impressed modern Bulgarians with the myth of their supposed Slav origin that they are still unable to use their critical faculty on the subject and persist in upholding and defending an indefensible theory.

After the death of Khan Tervel an era of disturbances followed, the Bulgarians and Slavs far from living in harmony and concord, as Bulgarian historians would make us believe, started fighting each other. Even when collaborating with the Bulgarians they did not amalgamate with them. Theophanes states that Slavs and Bulgarians kept in distinct groups in Tervel's army. Apparenty the uncouth Bulgarians were too refractory and insensible to the mesmeric influence of the "charme slave" and 208,000 Slavs, in their disappointment at the rejection of their advances, turned their backs on Bulgaria and trekked to the Asiatic portion of the Byzantine Empire. These were not the first Slavs to cross over to Asia Minor, the Emperor Justinian II had facilitated another batch of 30,000 to do likewise. It appears that the Slavs were a pacific folk that resented the warlike policies which the Bulgarians wished to force upon them as confederates or allies and were inclined to remain at peace with the Byzantine Empire,

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[1] The following lines of S. Yvarov's „De Bulgarorum utrorumque origine" will serve as an example of his .prose., „Kubratus, cur Tataricum sonet nixio, quum jam cumulatae litterae consonantes idpotius slavicis vindicent dialectis, quae iis libenter utunturet potestas nominis slavica possit inveniri. Telizes sensum habet apertum — vitulem designat:"

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while the Bulgarians were desirous of pursuing an opposite policy. Most of the successors of Tervel, Sevar (725-740), Kormisos (740-756) Vineh (756-762), Telets (762-765), Sabin (765-767)) Toktu (767-772). and Pagan (772), followed a more or less pro-Byzantine policy and relied more on the Slavs for imposing it on the unwilling Bulgarian boliars or nobles. This led to feuds among the two peoples and revolts against the Khans who pursued this policy. The Emperor Constantine V Copronimus took advantage of these internal quarrels and undertook no fewer then eight campaigns against Kormisos and his successors, until finally he utterly routed the Bulgarians under Telets who was afterward killed, same as Kormisos, by his own subjects. Pagan was raised by the pro-Slav party to the throne, but as with Sabin, had to seek refuge finally in Constantinople. His successor Telerig (773-777) was elected by the Bulgarian boliars and by a cunning trick eliminated the pro-Byzantine sympathiters in Bulgaria. He wrote to the Emperor Constantine V in 774 pretending that he intended to seek refuge in Constantinople, and asked him to give him a list of his friends in order that he might warn them in time to flee with him. Constantine V unsuspectingly confided the names of his agents who were at once arrested and killed. By thus reducing the pro-Byzantine elements in Bulgaria both Telerig and his successor Kardam (777-803) were able to regain most of the influence their predecessors had lost. Kardam succeeded even in compelling the Empress Irene to renew the payment of an annual tribute to Bulgaria. So that Krum (803—814) on his advent to the throne found a consolidated realm and was able to turn his attention westwards and launch in a policy which, had it been persevered in, would have secured for Bulgaria an infinitely more important place in the history of Europe. The Avar Empire was collapsing under the advance

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of Charlemagne's Franks and its large mass of Bulgar subjects probably turned to Krum for help against these new invaders. The anonymous Magyar Chronicler who compiled his history in the first years of the 13th century relates that when the Magyars invaded Hungary they found the country between the Danube and the Theiss, and as far as the North-East Carpathians ruled by the Bulgarian prince Salanus (Zalan); another Bulgarian, Menumerout, ruled the country between the rivers Someş and Mureş. The former's country had been conquered by his grandfather „Keanus magnus, dux Bulgariae", who likewise settled in this region Bulgarians and Slavs from Bulria. This Keanus Magnus is no other than Krum. The Byzantine writer Suidas (Lexicon edition Bernhardi) likewise affirms that Krum conquered Eastern Hungary, and incorparated all the Avar lands to the east of the Theiss in his dominions.

Zalan when defeated by the Magyars under the leadership of Arpad, fled to Belgrade and sought the help of Tsar Simeon, but the latter dazzled by the mirage of Constantinople, the conquest of which he had set his heart on, paid no heed to these solicitations and unlike his great predecessor, Krum, permitted the Bulgar dominion in Pannonia to be brought to an end. Krum's chief preoccupation was the consolidation of his dominions in the West. While incorporating in them the Avars, he attempted

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[1] The Abbé F. Dvornik in his „Les slaves, Byzances et Rome", affirms that: „Krum était chef des Bulgares de Pannonie". And Mr. S. Runciman in his „History of the first Bulgarian Empire" p. 51, after reiterating the same thing adds: „How it happened we cannot tell. Probably the Balkan Bulgarians had always kept in touch with their cousins. Since Asparuch's day the Khan of Pliska had controlled the plains of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Pannonian Bulgars in Transylvania were not far off; only the Carpathians divided them". It is regrettable that both these authors should not mention how they have come to this conclusion since it is in opposition to Suidas' assertion.

to subjugate the Slavs who until then had been subordinated to them. The Byzantines were pursuing a similar policy of conquest towards the Slavs of Macedonia. The Emperor Nicephorus had ordered in 809 the colonisation of the Slavovic districts in Macedonia by peoples from all the themes of the Empire, (Theophanes p. 486 10—23) and this brought them into conflict with Krum who had captured Sofia in 809. The Emperor Nicephorus invaded Bulgaria in 811 and after sacking Krum's capital allowed himself and his army to be annihilated. Krum, it is said, fashioning a drinking cup out of the Emperor's skull. The Bulgarian ruler offered peace to Nicephorus'successor, Michael, but this was rejected, whereupon Krum invaded Thrace captured Colonia Deultus and again made overtures for peace. These being declined Krum threatened to take Mesembria, and as his proposal remained unanswered, captured this town, inflicted a heavy, defeat on Michael I and proceeded to lay siege to Constantinople. The discontent in the Byzantine army caused by its repeated defeats found vent in a mutiny and Leo the Armenian was proclaimed Emperor. He opened negotiations with Krum, but attempted to assassinate treacherously the latter in a conference. Enraged by this act of treachery, Krum laid waste the outskirts of the city, captured Adrianople and retired with a host of captives, among them the future Byzantine Emperor, Basil I. While preparing for another expedition against Constantinople, Krum was seized with apoplexy and died on April 13,811.

The numerous prisoners Krum had captured in his campaigns in Thrace and whom he partly settled in trans-Danubian Bulgaria and in Bulgaria proper (Scriptor Incertus p. 344-6) seem to have contributed to a great extent to the spread of arts. Several disaffected notable Byzantines also sought a refuge at Krum's Court, such as Constantine Patchik, who married Krum's sister, and Spatharius Evmatii.

+175 The Greek inscriptions on Bulgarian monuments may be probably traced to Byzantine artisans, from whom the Bulgarians learnt likewise to construct siege machines, the possession of which enabled them to storm the stronghold of Adrianople and Mesembria. Krum is mentioned to have been at the head of 30,000 mailed warriors (Scriptor Incertus p. 346), a matter which presupposes a considerable development in arts and industry. This is confirmed by the find of the so-called Attila's treasure at Nagy Szent Miklós made in 1799, which has since been recognised as Bulgarian in origin and dating from Krum's time or that of his successors. Krum is likewise known by his legislation, mention of which is made in „Responsa Nicolai Papae ad consulta bulgarorum", as well as in Suidas' lexicon. The latter affirms that Krum was influenced in passing such Draconian laws to suppress calumny, lying, robbery and drunkeness, by the statement of his Avar prisoners, who attributed the fall of their kingdom to the prevalence of these vices. He, and his son and successor Omortag were undoubtedly the greatest of Bulgaria's rulers, endowed with a true stateman's insight into their country's real needs, which was displayed by their determination not to let themselves get entangled into purposeless struggles with their Byzantine neighbours, but to direct all their attention to the west in order to preserve the large Bulgarian population in Transylvania and Pannonia from denationalisation[1]. Omortag (814-831) succeeded in concluding a thirty years peace with Leo the Armenian soon after his accession to the throne and turned his attention to his dominions in the west, where he exerted himself to stop the encroachments of the Franks.

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[1] It seems strange, yet the remnants of these Bulgarians still survive in the region of Vinga, between Arad & Temesvar (see „Die Südungarischen Bulgaren" by Prof. Gesa Czirbusz). According to Mikloshitch the actual Bulgarians of the Banat are not newcomers but the descendants of those who lived there even before the arrival of the Magyars. This is also confirmed by the local toponymy according to the Hungarian Slavicist Yanosh Melish. These Bulgarians when under Hungarian rule and prior to being incorporated in Rumania used to publish a paper at Vinga, „the Vingaska Narodna Nuvala", as well as a calendar the „Balgarski Denevnik".

The Slav tribes of the Brenishevi and Timoshani, occupying the region between the Danube, Morava and Timok, had demanded the support of the Franks. Omortag sent a mission to Louis the Pious requesting that the frontier between the two should be defined, but as he failed to secure an answer he invaded Croatia and replaced the dukes appointed by the Franks with Bulgarian chiefs. Owing to the internal struggles in the Carlovingian Empire following on Charlemagne's death, Omortag was able to install himself firmly in the plains of Slavonia and in Sirmium, and turn henceforth his attention to more peaceful tasks. Most of the surviving ancient Bulgarian monuments belong to the reign of Omortag. He enlarged the old capital of Pliska, built a fortress at Preslav which was subsequently chosen as capital by Tsar Symeon. A column with a commemorative inscription of the period and which was afterwards placed by the Tsar Ivan Assen into the church of Forty Martyrs in Tirnovo, where it is still extant and bears an inscription in Greek relating how Omortag erected a new palace on the Danube (near the village of Kadikey between Silistra and Tutrakan) and midway between this new palace and that of Pliska a famous hill (The Tumulus of Mumdjilar, which is supposed to contain Omortag's grave) and is at a distance of 42·5 k. from either of the two points mentioned. Another inscription discovered at the village of Tsatalar, now removed to the Sofia Museum and dating from 821—2 commemorates the building of a fortified palace on the river Titsa, near Pliska, destined to "hold both Greeks and Slavs" and refers to the placing of two lion statues and four columns in the fortress at Pliska. Several other tombal inscriptions commemorating the death of military commanders who perished on the rivers Theiss and Dniester in defence of Omortag's domains, prove beyond doubt how extensive the frontiers of Bulgaria were at the time, incorporating as they did the whole of present day Rumania. The inscription concerning Omortag's palace on the Danube which is at its shortest distance from the old capital Pliska, shows that is was used as a place of transhipment of the salt carried from the Transylvanian mines, by way of the Danube and from the disposal of which the Bulgarian State drew a large source of revenue. Another impressive monument is the equestrian statue of Krum engraved in the rock cliffs of Madara, near Shumen, the Greek inscription of which has been deciphered by the Hungarian Prof. Geza Feher.

In 1926 several gold ornaments similar in style to those found at Nagy Szent Miklòs were unearthed in north-eastern Bulgaria, and in 1927, two stone statues, similar to those placed on tombs in South Russia by the ancient Bulgarian settlers in the region of the Volga. The old Bulgarian letter signs found on bricks, tiles, blocks of stone and on the articles of the so-called Attila's treasure are similar to runes, but have not yet been diciphered, the sculptural inscriptions however, are all in Greek, with occasional old Bulgarian words mixed in the sentences. Prof. Feher has spent years in the study of the ancient Bulgarian culture and his books contain the most recent and best information on the subject. He considers the ancient Bulgarians to have been „the first settled people among uncultured nomad tribes", and to have formed „the basis of present East European culture". The explanation of their success in establishing an enduring State in Moesia, where none had existed before is to be found, according to him, in their developed organisation and material culture.

The successors of Omortag, Malamir (831-836) and

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Precian (836-852), continued to give most of their attention to the west. It was in the latter's reign that the Peace of Paderborn was concluded in 845, when the Emperor Louis of the Franks renounced his rights on Sirmia and part of Pannonian Croatia in favour of Bulgaria. The conquest of Serbia was attempted in order to secure easier communications between the Eastern and Western portions of the Empire, but Precian after waging a three years war and losing most of his troops gave up the attempt. (Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Admin. Imp.) An inscription relative to Precian was unearthed by the Ecole Francaise d'Athènes near Philippi, solemnising the successful campaign against the Slav tribe of Smolenes in the defile of the Struma about 847 when the Bulgarians advanced towards Salonica. Another similar Greco-Bulgarian inscription was found by the same archeologists in 1924, which Prof Iordan Ivanov in his „Bulgarian Antiquities of Macedonia" attributes likewise to Precian and which according to him establishes the fact that the Bulgarians had successfully penetrated to the Aegean seaboard, though only for a brief period, since by the beginning of the 10th century Philippi had again reverted to Byzantine rule.

The next Bulgarian ruler was Boris (852—889). The most important event of his reign was his conversion and that of his people to Christianity. The exact date of his baptism has now been established as having accurred in 866, a tablet bearing an inscription to this effect, having been unearthed at Balshi, 25 klm. south of Berat, in South Albania during the world war. Christianity had continued to spread in Bulgaria since the time Krum had settled thousands of Byzantine prisoners in his domains and since the time of his legislation which had tended to weaken the traditions and customs of his Bulgarian subjects. A brother of the Khan Malamir was put to death for having adopted Christianity. Boris first turned to Louis Germanicus, with x 175 whom he had concluded a treaty in 862, asking him to facilitate his conversion, and Pope Nicolas I was notified the following year about Boris'wish. In the meantime the Byzantine Emperor Michael III taking advantage of a great famine which raged in Bulgaria invaded the country. Boris not being in a position to resist sought peace and accepted Michael's terms which among other conditions stipulated for Boris' conversion to Christianity. Boris desired to create a native priesthood so as to eliminate the danger of the Grecisation of the clergy, but though the Greek Patriarch, Photius, agreed to the creation of an independent Bulgarian church, he insisted on being its supreme chief. This did not entirely please Boris who again turned to Rome and demanded that a Bulgarian patriarch should be ordained. The Pope replied by sending two bishops but no patriarch; Boris drove away the Greek priests hoping that eventually the Pope would yield on this point but the latter remained inflexible. Pope Nicolas' I decease and the accession of Basil I who had spent his youth in captivity in Bulgaria and was anxious to promote an understanding between that country and his, induced Boris to turn once more to Constantinople, all the more since an oecumenical council had been convoked in Constantinople in 869 to consecrate the Union of Rome and Byzantium and at this council it was decided that Bulgaria was to be attached to the Eastern Church, though with the right to possess an independent archbishop whereupon Boris opened anew Bulgaria to the Greek priesthood.

Both the Byzantine Emperors Michael III, and later, Basil I, had attempted to proselytize on a large scale the Slav tribes in Macedonia and further west so as to win them to their Empire. In this task they were seconded by the two brothers Constantine, better known under his monachal name of Cyril, and Methodius. The latter before becoming a missionary had been appointed Governor of the

11: Logio S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

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

A SHEPHERDESS NEAR BELOGRADTCHIK

[facing p. 289]

775 theme of Strymon in Macedonia and thus had come in close contact with the Slavs. In 862 Ratislav of Moravia after having unsuccessfully implored from Rome the dispatch of priests to hold the Christian rites in Slavonic, sent a mission on a similar quest to Constantinople and as the use of foreign languages in the church service was not prohibited in the Eastern Church, Michael III prevailed upon the two brothers Constantine and Methodius to undertake this mission, having already employed them on a similar errand among the Khazars. For this purpose Constantine devised a special alphabet, the glagolythic, and employed it in his translation of religious books into Slav. After an initial success in Moravia, Constantine and Methodius roused the opposition of the Germans who threw them into prison. They took refuge in Rome, where Constantine died. Pope John VIII sent Methodius anew to Moravia hoping that from there he could more easily succeed in winning over Bulgaria to Rome and to this effect he addressed several letters to Boris, the last dated 882, but without evoking a response.

Finally John VIII had to comply with the request of the Germans who insisted on Latin being used in the liturgy in Moravia, and expelled Methodius and his disciples. After the death of Methodius in 885, his disciples took refuge in Bulgaria, and Boris entrusted the most famous of them Clement, Naoum, and Anghelarii with the task of organising the Bulgarian Church. Clement was sent to evangelise Macedonia in 886, and it is mainly to the efforts of these missionaries that the Slav language which they used for officiating in the churches, became the dominant one in Bulgaria. As the Abbé F. Dvornik, the best authority on the life of Cyril and Methodius affirms :

> „Grâce à cette activité des prêtres slaves formés par les disciples de St. Methode, la Bulgarie devint peu à peu un pays com

pletement Slave, independant même au point de vue religieux. Simeon put enfin réaliser le rêve de son père et proclamer la fondation du partriarchat bulgare, le pays ayant desormais tous les élèments qui lui étaient necessaires pour cela". (Les Slaves, Byzance et Rome) p. 317.

The Emperor Basil I did his utmost to assist in this work of slavisation by inviting Methodius to Constantinople in 882 to consult with as to the best methods, after having helped in the work of converting the Serbs which took place in 879. He also opened a special church for the Slavs in Constantinople in 883, and in 887 he secured the release of another batch of Methodius' pupils who had taken refuge in Venice. But this missionary work of Methodius owing to the opposition it aroused in Rome after the advent of Pope Stephen V, would have given very meagre results had it not been for the support it obtained from Bulgaria, and to which the Abbé Dvornik attributes the maintenance of the majority of the Slavs within the fold of the Eastern Church[1]. The Bulgarians

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[1] The service thus rendered by Bulgaria is of very questionable value; on the whole, the attachment of the major part of Slavdom to the Eastern Church is to be regretted, for it hindered their cultural development and the only thing it furthered was Panslavism. As the distinguished French sociologist Alfred Fouillée wrote in his 'Esquisse psychologique des Peuple Européens' — „Les consequences de cet évenement sont bien connues, d'une part l'esprit Byzantin implanté en Russie, d'autre part, la civilisation romaine et occidentale fermée pour des siecles, le rite se substituant à tout le reste, l'orthodoxie jalouse étouffant l'essor de la pensée etc." The author then proceeds to draw a parallel between backward Orthodox Russia and progressive Catholic Poland, the varying degree of development attained by each being attributed to the different civilising currents which have fertilised these, two countries. „là byzantin et infécond, ici gréco-romain et de fécondité infinie. . . La lutte de la Russie et de la Pologne, c'est celle de deux civilisations contraires chez deux peuples de même origine, tant il est vrai, que les influences morales et sociales sont supérieures aux influences éthniques." (p. 421).

11: Logic S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

claim both Cyril and Methodius as of their own nationality and they base their claim on the fact that they had a profound knowledge of the Slav language as revealed by their translations of the ecclesiastical books; but this can hardly be said to be a convincing proof. The case of the writings of the late Joseph Conrad may be cited in support; who being a Pole by birth yet had a perfect command of the English tongue. Besides, the Abbé F. Dvornik who is the historian „par excellence" of the two missionary brothers, affirms in his newer book published in 1933 (Byzantinoslavica):

> „Constantin et Methode sont des Grecs passés au slavisme par l'amour de la langue et de l'âme slaves."

and judging from such existing records in Byzantine history and of the close association of Constantine with Mihael III and the Patriarch Photius one can hardly entertain any doubts on this matter.

Boris retired in 888 to a monastery; his son Vladimir (889-893) who succeeded him, sought to form an alliance with the Germans who had sent an embassy to win him over in order that Svetopol, King of Moravia, might be jointly attacked. The Germans demanded that the Bulgarians should cease supplying Svetopol with salt from the mines in Transylvania, which shows that the Bulgarian dominions still extended considerably to the north of the Danube, Vladimir desired to sunder all ties with the Byzantines and revert to Paganism. It is this which compelled Boris to leave his monastery and after crushing the boliars who had rallied round Vladimir, to place his younger son, Symeon on the throne. He then returned to his cloister and died in 907.

The reign of Symeon (893-927) is considered as the golden age of the Ist. Bulgarian Empire. Symeon, owing to his having been educated in Constantinople proved a patron of letters and with the assistance of the disciples

X 175 of Methodius, translations of works of ecclesiastical character continued. In this respect one must concede that Gibbon was right in stating that under Symeon's reign „Bulgaria assumed a rank among the civilised powers of the earth". Symeon however was devoured by an insensate ambition, that of overcoming the Byzantine Empire and creating a new Greco-Bulgarian realm, of which he himself would be the head. In the realisation of this highly ambitious plan he used up all the vital forces of his nation, which soon after his death, collapsed. No sooner was he on the throne than he picked a quarrel with the Greeks and proceeded to lay waste the whole of Thrace and Macedonia, plundering and killing the inhabitants and contemptuously restoring the Greek prisoners to their sovereign with their noses cut off. Mr. S. Runciman in his history of the „Emperor Romanus Lecapenus and his reign" (p. 91) writes: „Symeon, whose veneer of culture was always rather thin, had an attack of barbarism. He could not resist it, shocking and terrifying the Greeks by ravaging the countryside and burning one of their holiest sanctuaries, the Church of the Virgin at Pegae, built by Justinian, four centuries before", The Emperor Leo VI, the Wise, summoned to his aid the Magyars, who were living in Bessarabia and in 895 sent his fleet to transport them across the Danube. They attacked and defeated Symeon, forcing him to take refuge in Silistria while they ravaged the whole of Eastern Bulgaria. On their return march, Symeon, inflicted a defeat on them and with the help of the Petsenegs in the succeeding year proceeded to lay waste their homes while they were away on a campaign. This incited the Magyars to abandon Bessarabia and wander further west into the so far Bulgarian Pannonia in 896 which they subjugated and where they founded the kingdom of Hungary.

In 914 Symeon demanded that the young Emperor

Constantine Porphyrogenitus (912-958), a child of ten, should marry his daughter, hoping that by thus securing the title of Vassilopator he would obtain a dominant influence in Constantinople. His offer having been rejected, he undertook a fresh campaign, but in spite of his successes in the open, the walls of Constantinople proved an insuperable obstacle to his ambition. In order to satisfy this yearning he did not even hesitate to send emissaries to the Fatimite Caliph Al-Mahdi, urging him to send a fleet against the Imperial city which was to be attacked simultaneously by the Bulgarians by land, and the booty to be divided evenly, between the two The Arabs accepted these terms but on their return, the Bulgarian delegates were captured by the Byzantines who sent straightaway an embassy and dissuaded the Caliph from embarking on this project. The warlike policy of Symeon was so distasteful to the bulk of his subjects that a serious revolt broke out in Bulgaria in 923. As soon as it was stamped out, Symeon launched a campaign against Serbia with the object of placing a nominee of his, Tseslav, son of Klonimir, on the throne. He invited the Serbian Zupans to meet and confer with their new leader and when they came unsuspectingly to the conference put them treacherously to death and devastated the whole of Serbia, turning the land into a veritable desert. In 925 Symeon proceeded to proclaim himself Caesar and Emperor of all Bulgarians and Greeks, and demanded that this title should be recognised by the Greeks and that he should be allowed to enter Constantinople in triumph. The co-regent Emperor Romanus Lecapenus (919-945) answered these insolent demands in a most dignified manner. His letters to Symeon which were published in the „Δελτίον τῆς ἱστορικῆς καί ἐθνολογικῆς ἑταιρίας τῆς Ἑλλάδος", as well those of Nicholas the Mystic, the contemporary Patriarch who had acted as teacher to Symeon, exhorting the latter to conclude peace and give up his

175 desire of conquest, are models of patience, humility and common sense. Thus in one of his letters Romanus Lecapenus tells Symeon that he may call himself as he likes but that he had no right to the title of Caesar of all Greeks which he assumed, and that though he may call himself Emperor of those Greeks who have fallen into captivity the other will have nothing to do with him, that his occupation of Byzantine towns will only be a burden as he will be obliged to supply the inhabitants with food. Even Bulgarians flee from him and seek refuge in the Empire in numbers as great as 20,000. Such coolness seems to have enraged Symeon, for in answer to one of Nicholas the Mystic's letters, he stated that peace was possible only if Romanus Lecapenus would descend from the throne, and if the rulers and the people of Constantinople would acknowledge him as master. Unable to sooth his boundless ambition in this direction, he turned west and invaded Croatia in 925, but his armies were annihilated it 926 and Symeon appealed to Pope John X to intervene and conclude peace, demanding at the same time regal recognition from the latter. This supreme consolation was finally granted to him by the Greeks prior to his death in 927. It may be admitted that the epithets awarded to Symeon by the Byzantine chroniclers were well deserved. „Ἡγεμών ἀλαζών, ἄνομος, ἄδικος, δόλιος, ἐπίορκος, θηριογνώμων, αἱμόδιψος, ἅρπαξ, χρημάτων ἄπληστος". He proved a veritable scourge both to his neighbours and to his people. In order to secure the support of his nobles for his warlike policy he extended their privileges as well as those of the priesthood; and these two classes proceeded to despoil the peasantry of their lands and turned the masses into helots. The Church grew too wealthy and became demoralised. The monasteries with their immense revenues attracted large numbers of people, who sought shelter from the difficulties brought on by Symeon's endless campaigns.

THE FIRST BULGARIAN EMPIRE

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The exhaustion and wretchedness of the masses and the demoralisation of the Church furthered the spread of the Bogomile heresy which completed the undermining of the foundations of the State and prepared its ruin.

It is strange that the Bulgarians should have commemorated a few years ago the millenium of Symeon's death with such great ceremonial, and honoured the memory of a man whose sole distinction was vaunting and boundless ambition and whose unique achievement was the securing of the title of Tsar for himself and his successors. This empty distinction was paid by the final loss of Bulgarian Pannonia and that of the dominions to the north of the Danube,and by the creation of an inveterate enemy in the person of the Serbs, who until then as Constantine Porphyrogenitus writes in his book „On the Administration of the Empire", had lived peacefully with the Bulgarians and had loved each other as neighbours etc.

Viewing the recent history of Bulgaria, an unbiassed observer cannot but be struck by the peculiar repetition of a series of events that are singularly remindful of those which occurred in Symeon's reign. Then as now the burning ambition to secure the title of „Tsar" roused the suspicion of all neighbours of Bulgaria, Then as now the lure of Constantinople overclouded a ruler's intelligence and caused the prolongation of a campaign that exhausted Bulgaria, and when the morbid hankering after Constantinople could not be satisfied, it was sought to be appeased with the possession of Salonica, the „Bulgarian Mecca", involving Bulgaria in a conflict with her western neighbours which caused her to crumble to the ground. Theosophists who believe in the doctrine of reincarnation and profess that the human soul after a thousand years of Devachanic repose reappears again in another body, would probably attribute these coincidences to Symeon having again reappeared on the scene of his old exploits

X 175 under the guise of Ferdinand. We can only pray for Bulgaria that this demoniacal soul, either in its present or future embodiment will never come near her again, and all Bulgarians will probably join in an unanimous and heartfelt Amen!

Prior to his death, Symeon had appointed as his heir Peter (927-969), his eldest son by his second marriage, to the exclusion of Michael, his son by his first wife. Peter concluded an alliance with the Greeks, married the granddaughter of Romanus Lecapenus and secured the raising of the Archbishop of Silistra to the dignity of a Patriarch, The warlike nobles, however, were displeased with this pro-Byzantine policy as well as by the displacement of the rightful heir and fomented a revolt and attempted to place first Michael, and then Peter's younger brother on the throne; the movement however miscarried. Another revolt however broke out in 963 in Western Bulgaria led by a noble, Nicholas Shisman, who succeeded in forming a new State.

In 965 the Magyars began pressing on the frontiers of Bulgaria. Peter unable to defend himself, concluded an arrangement with them by which they secured the right to cross unhampered his domains and invade Thrace. The co-regent Emperor Nicephorus II Phocas (963-969) resented these incursions and unable to secure satisfaction from the helpless Peter, incited Svetoslav of Russia to invade Bulgaria. In 967 Svetoslav captured Silistra and made short work of such resistance as the Bulgarians could offer. Such was the progress of the Russians however, that Nicephorus hastened to conclude peace with Peter and help him to drive away the Russians. Boris II who succeeded his father Peter in 968, had to face another more formidable Russian invasion as this time Svetoslav came with the intention of staying. Both Boris II and his brother Romanus were taken prisoners by the Russians when they seized Preslav in 970. They then crossed the Balkans and captured Philippopolis after massacring 20,000 of its inhabitants. John Zimisces (969-976) who had just succeeded to the Byzantine throne hurried to the assistance of Bulgaria, laid siege to Preslav and after rescuing Boris II, laid siege to Silistra behind the walls of which town Svetotlav had sought shelter. He was finally forced to yield himself up in 971 on the terms that he and his men might return to Russia; whereupon John Zimisces deposed Boris II, who was offered as a consolation the post of an Imperial Magnate. It was only the western part of Bulgaria which under the four sons of Shisman retained yet its independence. By 976 only the younger brother, Samuel survived; two brothers having been killed, while the third, Aaron, had been assassinated by Samuel's orders because of his sympathies with the Greeks. Samuel began waging war against the Empire, invading Thessaly and capturing Larissa. The new Emperor Basil II (963-1025) determined to put a stop to this new threat to his Greek provinces, the insolent behaviour of Symeon had convinced the Byzantines that the existence of a strong Bulgaria was incompatible with their security and for forty years Basil II devoted all his energies to secure the complete subjugation of the Bulgarians. A series of campaigns in which victory inclined alternatively to the one or other side was waged, until finally Basil II was able, owing to the superior resources at his command, to deal a final blow in 1014 to his strenuous adversary near the Belasitsa mountains, when more than 15,000 prisoners fell on his hands. Basil had their eyes put out, allowing every hundredth man to retain one eye in order to guide back his mutilated comrades to his sovereign. When Samuel perceived this lamentable procession he was overpowered by the spectacle and fell in a swoon, dying a few days later. For a year Samuel's son Gabriel-Radomir courageously attempted to

X175 make a stand, but finally he was assassinated by his cousin Vladislav, the son of the murdered Aaron. The few surviving nobles endeavoured to prolong the uneven struggle in the mountains of Western Macedonia and Albania, but by 1018 Basil II, called the „Bulgarslayer" overcame all resistance and achieved the conquest of all Bulgaria.

THE BYZANTINE DOMINION AND THE BOGOMILE HERESY

Basil II did not deal harshly with Bulgaria after obtaining her submission and as he publicly proclaimed he maintained the existing order. Even the Bulgarian Church retained its independence with the difference that Basil II altered the title of its head from Patriarch to Archbishop. A few insurrections which broke out were easily suppressed except that of 1040 which was headed by Peter Delian, son of Gabriel-Radomir and which made considerable headway. But Vladislav's younger brother having gained Peter Delian's confidence invited him to a feast, during which he was seized and blinded, whereupon the movement deprived of its leader, collapsed. Except for these initial risings, Byzantine rule was comparatively undisturbed, it was characterised however by the irruption into Bulgaria and the settlement within her precincts of two numerous invaders, the Petsenegs and the Kumans, who appeared to have radically transformed the ethnic composition of the country except in the south western part.

The Bogomile heresy of which we first hear during the reign of Tsar Peter continued to spread and extended far beyond the frontiers of Bulgaria, making its way into Bosnia, Italy, and southern France. It may be traced to the Paulicians, a sect accused of Manicheanism, as well as to the presence of certain Syrian and Armenian colo-

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nists who were settled by the Byzantines in Thrace and southern Bulgaria in 755, during the reign of Constantine V Copronymus and subsequently. Theophanes even affirms that a whole colony of monophysites had been transferred from Syria to Thrace in 745 by the same Iconoclast Emperor as a consequence of his campaigns against image-worship. Bogomilism is a mixture of Persian, Syrian, Greek, and Christian religious tenets and its appearance was a natural reaction against the corruption of the Church. It was opposed at first to the State, because Tsar Peter was considered as an unlawful and an unjust ruler, favouring unduly the nobles and the clergy to the detriment of the people. The sect which continued to develop in strength ceased its opposition to the State when later a capable and just ruler like Ivan Assen (1218-1241) mounted the throne.

Pope Bogomil's creed was conceived in a true Christian spirit, it aimed at the spiritualisation of life and the soul of all that is material. Its cardinal doctrine was based on the dualism of a good and an evil deity, both emanating from God, personified by his two sons Satanael, master of the material world, and Christ, Lord of the spiritual. Satanael had been excluded from heaven owing to his vânity end exiled to the earth which he himself fashioned. He made a figure of a man but could not infuse life into it. Satanael implored God to help him, whereupon God agreed, on condition that he would retain command over the soul, God wishing to utilise the souls of men for the purpose of replenishing the ranks of his angels, while Satanael would dominate the body only. Satanael, however did not keep his word, and seduced by Eve, he became the father of Cain who murdered Abel, the son of Adam. From that time on, the children of Satanael persecuted and destroyed the children of God and the human species remained under the influence of Satanael during the

X175 whole period covered by the old Testament, (and for this reason probably, the Bogomiles rejected its teachings). God at last took pity and sent Christ who overcame Satanael, deprived him of his powers, and changed his name to Satan. Humanity had thereby secured the possibility of entering Heaven provided it chose to combat on earth what remained of evil influences. The perfect Bogomile might not destroy plants or kill animals for fear of hurting a particle of the holy Spirit which was incarnated in them and which might be the soul of a sinner completing the expiation of his sins. Death permitted the true Bogomile's soul to be absorbed into the eternal Spirit, the soul returned to its source and individuality ceased.

The Bogomiles considered the orthodox churches as the refuge of devils. The Church of Jerusalem was inhabited by Satanael, but when it was destroyed he took up his residence at St. Sophia.

On the whole this religious system was highly virtuous, it condemned slavery, tyranny and serfdom and stood up for the down-trodden. It is the Bogomiles who set in motion Western thought in the middle ages and forced Catholicism to reorganise and purify itself. And as that indefatigable worker, Prof. Iordan Ivanov, asserts in his most instructive book „Bogomile books and Legends" it equally gave rise to the foundation of the Dominican Order established to fight the Albigeois, and to the Inquisition which led to the Reformation. (There is an excellent study on Manicheism and the Bogomiles by V. N. Sharenkov, published in New York in 1927).

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THE SECOND BULGARIAN EMPIRE

THE SECOND BULGARIAN EMPIRE

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The revolt which led to the reestablishment of the Bulgarian State in 1186 was led by three brothers, Assen, Peter, and Kaloyan.

It was the weakening of the Byzantine Empire brought about by the Selzouk invasions, its struggles with the Crusaders, and the drain of its resources by Manuel I Comnenus, as well as the presence of such feeble and despicable rulers as Isaac and Alexius Angelus on the Imperial throne that made the restoration of the Bulgarian State possible. The military and financial disorganisation of the Byzantine realm, as well as the deplorable condition of the the civil administration provoked the rebellion, which if firmly treated would have been crushed with ease. The general sent to command the Imperial troops, however, instead of quelling the outbreak took advantage to revolt against his own sovereign. In spite of the concurrence of such fortuitous circumstances, the movement during the first year made little headway, and its leaders were obliged to appeal for aid to their Kuman kinsmen across the Danube, and it was with the support thus obtained that they finally succeeded in their object of overthrowing the Byzantine rule. Assen and Peter were assassinated ten years after they had raised the standard of revolt, but the third brother, Kaloyan, succeeded by his victories in imposing peace on the Greeks and forced them to give up formally the territory which he had captured from them.

Kaloyan's attempt to acquire recognition of his title by the Pope, and Innocent's III flattering allusion to the supposed Wallach, or Latin speaking, origin of Kaloyan as well as the assumption by the latter of the title of „Tsar of Bulgarians and Wallachs" has led to the inference that the founders of the second Bulgarian realm

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were of Wallach origin. Prof. Zlatarski, in a close study of the ancestry of the Assen family, published by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in 1933, and crammed with a wealth of documentation that is an enduring monument to this historian's untiring zeal, opines that they were of Kuman extraction. He seems at a loss to explain the wide use of the term Vlach by Byzantine and other chroniclers of the time whereby the then inhabitants of Bulgaria were designated. and interprets it as a pejorative term for Bulgarian. In support of this contention he discloses what a poor estimate the Byzantines had of the Vlachs, and cites in support the following passage from Cecaumeni Strategicon, edit. W. Wassiliensky and Jernstedt, Petropoli 1896 p. 74/5."

> „The lineage of the Vlachs is that of a false and degenerate people, which does not keep faith either with God or with the Emperor, with kinsman or with friend, but which tries to cheat everyone. The Vlachs are great liars and consumate thieves; they are ready to take the most solemn oaths to their friends and to repudiate them with the greatest ease. In order to cheat the foolish they conclude alliances and kinship but with none do they ever keep faith".

This argument of Prof, Zlatarsky does not appear valid, for the names Bulgar and Vlach are used concurrently by most of the authors cited. The inference to be drawn from all these writings is rather that the ethnic composition of the people inhabiting Bulgaria at the time had radically changed, and that the bulk was constituted of Vlachs and no longer of Bulgarians, the main body of the latter apparently being confined to Macedonia. It is questinable however, whether these reputed Vlachs were such. To all apperances, and judging from the vast migration of Kumans into Bulgaria which had recently occurred, the name Vlach or Wallach must have been used to designate the Kumans, who had lived previously in Wallachia. Such a view would be more in conformity wich the fact that the rulers of Bulgaria were of Kuman stock, and that the succeeding royal dynasties of the Terters and Shismans were likewise of Kuman lineage. If the majority of the people were not Kuman, it is not likely that they would have repeatedly chosen such for rulers. the Kuman people being newcomers and hardly enjoying sufficient prestige to impress and impose themselves on the Bulgarians. 175 X

Kaloyan's overtures to the Pope gave no practical results though he was crowned by a cardinal and the Bulgarian church was actually allied with Rome for a brief time. Koloyan offered to assist the crusaders, but they spurned his proposal and after their capture of Constantinople claimed for themselves Bulgaria as a constituent part of the Byzantine Empire. This led Koloyan to sink momentarily his differences with the Greeks and make common cause with them. In the battle of Adrianople fought on April 1205, Kaloyan, assisted by the Greeks, won an overwhelming victory over Baldwin of Flanders, the Emperor of the newly constituted Latin Empire of the East, whom Kaloyan captured and imprisoned in a tower on the ramparts of his capital of Tirnovo, Kaloyan was to succumb two years later at the hands of an assassin while laying siege to Salonica. He was succeeded by his nephew Boril who allied himself with the new Frank Emperor, Henry of Flanders, and undertook a fruitless campaign against Serbia; but by 1218, the son of Kaloyan, John Assen II, was able to drive him from the throne and assume his lawful heritage.

Under his rule, Bulgaria became the foremost State in the Balkan peninsua equalling that of Symeon in extent. Her trade must have been considerable, as a treaty was cancluded with Ragusa and both Venice and Genoa entertained commercial relations with her. John Assen II denounced the allegiance of the Bulgarian church to the Pope and raised the Primate to the dignity of a Patriarch, thus

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175x refounding the National Church of which he proved a most benevolent patron, building monasteries and endowing churches, but his devotion to the National Church did not prevent him from displaying extreme toleration for Bogomiles and Catholics. Among the monasteries he endowed is that of Vatoped, at St. Athos, which possesses a royal bull dating from about 1230 in which the donation is delineated, the edict bearing his name and the title of Tsar of Bulgars and Greeks. A somewhat similar document was granted to the Ragusans, consecrating their trading rights in Bulgaria soon after 1230 and likewise bears the royal name accompanied by the pompous title of Tsar of Bulgars and Greeks.

From John Assens's death in 1241 dates the gradual decline of the second Bulgarian Empire. His eldest son Kaliman I, (1241-1246) a boy of seven is said to have been poisoned, probably at the instigation of the second wife of John Assen II, who succeeded in placing her own son Michael Assen (1246-1257) on the throne. During their reigns Bulgaria was invaded by the Tartars who had already captured Kiev and Cracow, and was forced to pay tribute to them. At the same time the Greeks profited by the weakness of these rulers and captured back most of Macedonia and Thrace. Michael Assen was assassinated by his cousin Kaliman II, who endeavoured to consolidate his position on the throne by marrying the wife of his victim, but her father the Russian prince, Rostislav, who was in the employ of the Magyars, with their assistance invaded Bulgaria in order to free his daugther. Kaliman II was obliged to flee from Tirnovo sharing the usual fate of the Assen family, violent death. Rostislav with the help of the Magyars was able to install himself as overlord of western Bulgaria, styling himself „Imperator Bulgarorum". Another pretender to the throne, Mitso, the boliar, and son in law of John Assen II proclaimed himself Tsar but

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



[facing p. 305]

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failed to secure the throne to which the nobles elected Constantine, (1257-1277) a cousin of King Urosh of Serbia. In order to add to his prestige he married a grand daughter of John Assen II and began styling himself Constantine-Assen. His reign was spent in barren wars with the Magyars who invaded Bulgaria, defeating the Bulgarians at Pleven and advancing as far as Tirnovo, and overcoming the opposition of the boliar Mitso, who finally sought refuge with the Nicaean Emperor, Theodore I Lascaris, after handing over to the latter the town of Mesembria. Besides Rostislav, whose fief extended from Belgrade to Vidin and southwards to Nisch, the Magyars, had set up another Russian, Svetoslav, as overlord of the lands around Vidin, who likewise styled himself „Imperator Bulgarorum" Not content with all these troubles, Constantine was ill-advised enough to embark on a war with the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII, after the latter had regained Constantinople and in the course of which the Byzantines occupied all the lands to the south of the Balkans. To revenge himself on Michael VIII, Constantine sought the alliance first of the Tartars, and then of the King of Naples but without any beneft to his cause. Disabled in an accident, Constantine was obliged to leave the conduct of State affairs to his crafty wife who sowed intrigues among the nobles in order to secure the election of her boy, Michael to the throne. These internal divisions facilitated the attacks of the Tartars who began plundering Bulgaria. To repel these invasions the people gathered round Ivaïlo, a peasant leader whom they believed to be divinely inspired and whose successes against the Tartars rallied the whole country to his side. He marched against Tirnovo, and after defeating and killing Constantine laid siege to the town. The latter's widow surrendered it and agreed to marry Ivaïlo, his successes however, were at an end. A new pretender, a son of the boliar Mitso,

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supported by Greek troops invested Tirnovo, and the people believing that Ivaïlo had been killed while repulsing a Tartar invasion, opened the gates to him whereupon he was proclaimed Tsar, under the name of Ivan Assen III, (1278-9). His reign was soon over, Ivaïlo suddenly reappeared, and in spite of Byzantine reinforcements sent to succour Ivan Assen III, the latter gave up the struggle and sought shelter in Constantinople. Ivaïlo, however, was unable to regain the throne and fled to the Court of the Tartar Nogai who murdered him. The boliars chose from among themselves George Terter, a Kuman noble, noted for his bravery, and proclaimed him Tsar, but he was unable to stem the tide of Tartar invasions and in order te maintain himself on the throne he sent his son to the Court of the Tartar Nogai. and his daughter to the harem of the latter's son, Tsaka, and thereby obtained their favours. In the meantime the unity of the State disappeared, powerful nobles set themselves up as independent chieftains, thus Bulgaria was divided at the time among the following semi-independent rulers. 1. — Eltimir, brother of George Terter, in possession of a fief extending from Sliven to Kazanlik, south of the Balkans. 2. — Smilets, whose domain was conterminous on the west with that of Eltimir, and extended along the valley of the river Topolnitsa. 3. — Shisman, ruler of Vidin, and a Kuman by birth, who had replaced the Russian Svetoslav, and whose son eventually became the founder of the last Bulgarian royal dynasty. 4. — The brothers Derman and Kudemin, likewise of Kuman birth, who ruled over the Branitsevo region to the west of Vidin, and the valley of the Morava. 5 The Kuman chieftain Balik who ruled over the whole Dobrudja. With these various nobles intriguing against one another it was easy for the Tartars to impose themselves, and Tsaka soon invaded the country and got himself crowned in Tirnovo, His powerful father Nogai however, had been overthrown and the son of George Terter, Todor Svetoslav, who had married the daughter of a Tartar chief succeeded with the support of Toktai Han to overthrow Tsaka and mount the throne, after acknowledging the supremacy of the Tartar Golden Horde.

Todor Svetoslav (1295-1322) waged continuous wars against the various Bulgarian feudal chieftains, as well as against the Byzantines, and in the main was successful, until his uncle Eltimir made common cause with the Greeks. The appearance of the Frank Mercenaries of the „Grand Company“ in Thrace after the long war of the „Sicilian Vespers“ was over, put a stop to the fighting between Greeks and Bulgarians, and Todor Svetoslav was able to spend the last part of his reign in comparative peace. His son, George Terter II, began his rule by capturing Philippopolis from the Byzantines, but died within a year and Bulgaria was plunged once more in civil war. While the nobles elected Michael Shisman, son of the chieftain of Vidin as Tsar, Voislav, brother of the boliar Smilets, sought the support of Andronicus II and overran the whole of southern Bulgaria. Michael did not waste time but hurried with his troops across the Balkans and after a series of victories concluded peace with the Byzantine Emperor in 1323. Counting on the support of the latter, he got entangled in a war with the rising power of Serbia and was defeated and slain at the battle of Kustendil in 1330, before the Greek army sent to his support could arrive on the field of battle Bulgaria for a time became dependent on Serbia, and she imposed Stephen Shisman II as ruler who however, was unable to maintain himself. Ivan Alexander (1331-1371), a nephew of Michael Shisman and a brother-in-law of King Dushan of Serbia, finally secured the throne. He proved a capable ruler who enjoyed the reputation of an assiduous patron of literature. Translations

X 175 of various theological works were undertaken, as well as those of several Byzantine chronicles and romances, such as the Trojan War, Aesop's fables, Oedipus' story. The flourishing of this literature enabled the Bulgarians to exert subsequently a certain cultural influence in Wallachia, Serbia, and Russia. It was under the reign of Ivan Alexander that the Turks began their incursions in Bulgaria, capturing St. Zagora and Philippopolis from them in 1362. Before his death, Ivan Alexander, divided his realm between his two sons, giving Vidin to Ivan Strashimir, and Tirnovo, to Ivan Shishman. Within a year from his ascension to the throne the latter after being defeated at the battle of Tsermen became a vassal of Sultan Murad, whose favour he obtained by sending his sister as a hostage to the Imperial harem. This semi-independence was retained until Serbia was overthrown at the battle of Kossovo (1389), soon after the Turks laid siege to and captured Tirnovo in 1393. The Tsar Ivan Shishman withdrew to Nikopolis where he was captured and sent under convoy to Adrianople, but died on the way there at Pleven in 1395. In the following year the Hungarians and the Wallachs under the leadership of Sigismund and Mirtsea hastened to the succour of Bulgaria, but were defeated on the battlefield of Nikopolis, the Turks being supported by the Serbs under Stefan Lazarevitch. This foreign intervention helped to prolong the maintenance of Ivan Strashimir at Vidin until 1398, when he was expelled from his domain by the Turks, who thus completed the conquest of Bulgaria.

Bulgarian historians are unanimous in ascribing their country's fall to the disunity of the feudal nobles, who by leading a life of luxury completely estranged themselves from the mass of the people and readily lent themselves to foreign intrigues, to the corruption of the Church and the lamentable state of the peasantry, which caused the masses of the people to acclaim any foreign overlord who would secure to them a larger measure of justice and better and more peaceful administration.

BULGARIA UNDER THE TURKS

It is customary to depict the period of Turkish domination as one of oppression and exaction, but such a view is far from tallying with such records as subsist, at least in so far as the earlier centuries of Turkish rule are concerned. The Turkish conquest put a stop to a state of anarchy and oppression and its rapid spread is to be explained by the preference the local populations showed for the foreign invader, who was welcomed in order that an end might be put to the perpetual internecine wars, the revolts, the destructive rivalries of the nobles from which the peaceful toilers of the soil were continuously suffering. A very instructive narrative as to the conditions prevailing during the 15th century in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire is furnished by Michael Konstantinov's „Turkish History", originally published towards the beginning of the 16th century in Polish. The author was a Serbian, born in 1430 at Ostrovitsa. In 1454 he was taken prisoner by the Turks and made a janissary, and as such, participated in their campaign against Bosnia in 1463. A year later he was captured by the Hungarians and freed, when he wrote his memoirs in order to enlighten the Christians about the customs of the Turks. He describes them as equitable and just rulers, severe but humane; the taxation they imposed on their Christian subjects was much lighter than what the latter were used to pay to their own rulers prior to the Ottoman conquest. He ascribed the rapid expansion of the Ottoman dominion to the peace and security these conquerors brought in their wake. So that far from being disastrous, Ottoman x 175 rule permitted the Bulgarian people to reconstitute itself after the centuries of internecine wars inflicted on it by its native rulers and allowed it to recuperate, both materially and spiritually in an atmosphere of comparative peace. So long as the Ottoman Empire was in a prosperous condition all its subjects participated in its prosperity, it was only after the deflection of the trade routes to the Indies which brought about the simultaneous decline of the Italian city-States of Venice and Genoa, that the Ottoman Empire deprived of the main source of its revenues, the transit trade from the East, began to decay, disorganisation and corruption set in, and this brought as its natural repercussion a worsening of the condition of its Christian subjects. The most oppresive measure which Christians had to support was the carrying off of their boys every five years, to be trained for the corps of Janissaries, one out of every five Christian boys between the ages of six and nine being taken away.

After the unavailing effort of the Polish King Vladislav III to emancipate the Christians, which ended disastrously at the battle of Varna in 1444, Turkish dominion was consolidated, security increased and conditions improved. The Bulgarians retained for a time certain semi-independent rulers, a fresque drawing of one, the Voevod Radivoi, dating from 1493 is still visible at the Kremikovski Monastery, according to Prof. Zlatarski, who also mentions several other names of such notables.

Several classes were exempted from taxation, and retained considerable privileges, such as the population of certain villages which served as auxiliaries with the Turkish troops. And there were a few towns which were awarded the right of not allowing Moslems within their precincts, such as Gabrovo, Kotel, Kalofer, and Panagurishte. Certain artisans, comprising bridge-builders constructors of fountains, guides, rice-growers, miners, and ferry-men also enjoyed certain prerogatives. Certain communities retained all their privileges by accepting Islam. Whole districts in the Rhodope mountains were converted and left practically undisturbed, retaining still their native Bulgarian tongue in all its purity. Extensive trading facilities were also granted to the Ragusan traders, who exerted an immense cultural influence on the Bulgarians, with whom they were in intimate contact. They established depots at Varna, Provadia, Shumen, Tirnovo, Razgrad, Rustchuk, Silistra, Vidin, Sofia, Adrianople and Mesembria, and many Bulgarians who co-operated with these Ragusan traders enjoyed the privileges extended to their patrons. Prof. Zlatarski affirms that during the 15th and 16th centuries Bulgaria enjoyed, relatively, peace and prosperity and the Bulgarian language was even employed by the Turks as the official one both locally and in their correspondence with neighbouring countries. Pavel Georgitch of Ragusa writing in 1580, affirms that the Turks did not persecute the Bulgarians, but that they enjoyed a fair amount of liberty and that they were well off. If Bulgaria declined culturally this was due largely to the fact that after the fall and sack of Tirnovo in 1393, the most learned of the Bulgarian church dignitaries abandoned their flocks and sought refuge in Wallachia, where they founded several monasteries. Prof. Xenopol in his „Istoria Romanilor" vol. II p. 245 asserts that the monasteries of Voditsa, Neamts, Prislop, Motru and Tismana were founded during the 14th century mainly by emigrants from Bulgaria. The monastery of Bistritsa which was founded by Prince Alexander the Good of Moldavia (1400-1432) was built on the insistence of monks who had come from Bulgaria. This exodus resulted, as Prof. Bogdan remarks in his book „Romînî si Bulgari", p. 20, in a literary flowering that recalled the influence exerted by the Greek *emigrés* in Italy after the taking of Constantinople by the Turks, Ru-

X 175 mania becoming a centre of refuge and dissemination of Bulgarian culture and Slav Orthodoxy.

Towards the end of the 16th century the heroic exploits of Michael the Brave, prince of Wallachia, encouraged the Ragusan Georgitch to prepare a revolt. Seconded by the Greek Bishop of Tirnovo, Dionisius Rallis, who obtained the concourse of Michael the Brave, Georgitch and another Ragusan, Sarkotsevitch, solicited the aid of the Austrian Emperor Rudolf, who promised to dispatch 6000 men. Michael the Brave crossed the Danube at Nikopolis in 1598 and captured Vidin, Vratza, Rahovo and proceeded to march on Sofia. Under pressure from the Turks however, he was obliged to withdraw to Wallachia and the movement deprived of leadership flickered out, all hope of success vanishing by his untimely assassination in 1601. It is from the beginning of the 17th century that the situation of the Bulgarians began to grow worse as taxation increased, and the Greek clergy after the subordination of the see of Tirnovo to the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1394, began gradually to displace the native priesthood and exploit the peasantry. The victorious campaigns of Austria against the Turks in the course of the 17th century secured a privileged position for the Catholic Church and this led to its acquiring a certain influence in a few centres in Bulgaria where it succeeded in making converts, especially amongthe Paulicians. Catholic priests, in the absence of an educated native clergy contributed largely to the spread of knowledge, and even more than the Orthodox clergy to the awakening of the national conscience.[1] They intervened repeatedly on behalf

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[1] These villages which have adopted Catholicism show even to-day, a marked advance on those of the Orthodox faith. Their local life is more progressive, they possess more social amenities, and there is a more developed sense of solidarity among the villagers. The village priest enjoys a prestige of which his Orthodox colleague has been completely shorn and consequently is in a position to

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of Bulgaria's emancipation with the Austrian Emperor, the King of Poland, the Pope and with Venice. They opened schools in several places and often officiated in Bulgarian in their churches in order that they might be understood. The leading figures among them were Peter Partsevitch and Peter Bogdanov, who worked indefatigably for Bulgaria's cause, soliciting foreign aid, and preparing a revolt, the outbreak of which occured at Tsiprovets in 1688 after their death. The movement proved abortive owing to the Austrians withdrawing their troops from the western confines of Bulgaria which they had invaded. In 1689, the Austrians again advanced, occupying Nisch, Pirot and Dragoman, and with the help of the Serbians and Bulgarians, captured Kumanovo and Kotsani in Macedonia. At the time the Turks were also fighting the Venetians in Greece and Albania, and the Russians were engaged in a struggle with the Tartars of the Crimea; circumstances were extremely propitious for the occupation of the whole Balkan peninsula by the Austrians, which would have taken place to the great benefit of all the Balkan peoples and of the cause of peace. but for Louis XIV of France declaring war on Austria, in order to prevent the undue strengthening of the House of the Habsburgs.

Thus the intervention of the French prevented a timely and facile solution of a problem which has ever since troubled Europe. The Sultan Selim whose army had been reorganised by French officers (Ranke's History of Serbia p. 62) encouraged by the attitude of France succeeded in driving the Austrians beyond the Danube and put an end to the hopes of Austrian expansion in the Balkans

exert his authority for the wellbeing of his flock all the mere so since he is better educated for his task than the average Orthodox priest. Even the manners of Catholic villagers contrast with those of their Orthodox neighbours, they are kindlier, gentler and less suspicious ii: Logio S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

X 175 after the peace of Carlovitch in 1699. During the 18th century Turkey waged almost continuously wars against Austria and Russia with the results that the situation of the Christians grew steadily worse owing to the fact that the burden of the upkeep of the Turkish armies chiefly devolved on them. The success of Russia, consecrated by the peace of Kutchuk Kainardjik (1774) brought no amelioration to the lot of the Christians, but it made them look henceforth to Russia for freedom, since Russia had been acknowledged as the protectress of Orthodoxy and had assumed the right of interceding on their behalf. The wars undermined the Turkish Empire and the attempt of the Sultan to introduce certain reforms helped to spread anarchy, semi-independent Pashas, like Pasvantoglu and Ali, at the head of the redoubtable Kirdjalis who lived on plunder, established themselves at Vidin and Yanina, provoking conflicts with the central authorities and adding to the existing disorganisation. The increase of insecurity led to a great number of peasants giving up rural life and seeking refuge in towns many of which now became preponderately Bulgarian The worsening of the economic conditions was accompanied also by a gradual weakening of the national consciousness. The Patriarch Samuel succeeded in suppressing the Bulgarian archbishopric of Ochrida in 1767 and subordinating it to the Greek Patriarchate. He initiated a campaign of persecution against Bulgarian priests and notables, replacing Bulgarian by Greek priests. Greek schools were opened in the larger towns and with the preponderance the Phanariots acquired in Turkey, the knowledge of Greek became indispensable. Municipal and commercial affairs were conducted in Greek and since the leading ecclesiastic authorities were ignorant of Bulgarian the local notables were constrained to learn Greek in order to intercede with the clergy, until finally the better educated began to consider it a disgrace to name themselves Bulgarians and began letting themselves be assimilated by the Greeks. The taunt which was levelled at these Hellenised Bulgarians „Greeks from Gabrovo", is still remembered in Bulgaria. This Hellenising process provoked a reaction which grew with the appearance of the „History of the Bulgarian People", published by the monk Paisi in 1762 and which finally roused the dormant patriotism of the nation giving an impetus to the opening of Bulgarian schools which preceded the national awakening. The Greek education foisted for a time on the Bulgarians, was not without its good side however, in that it prepared men capable to serve as leaders.

The Bulgarian notables who co-operated with the Greek clergy and who were slowly being Hellenised by this contact, acquired a certain privileged situation, being often shielded against Turkish persecution by the all powerful Phanariots. Most of those who initiated the work of Bulgaria's emancipation had received their education in Greek schools and were actuated by the ideal they had acquired in that environment. Such were the brothers Miladinov, well known folklorists, H. Makariopolski, and Grigor Perlitchev, the latter an accomplished poet, who obtained a prize from the Athens Academy for his Greek epic poem „Ἀρματωλός" in 1860 and who translated the Iliad into Bulgarian. The attachment of the Bulgarians to the Greek cause became manifest on the outbreak of the Greek revolution in 1821. Prof. St. Bobtchev who wrote an essay on the participation of the Bulgarians in the Greek war of Independence gives in it an impressive list of names and further cites Jean Filimon, the author of a „Δοκίμιον ἱστορικόν τῆς ἑλληνικῆς ἐπαναστάσεως" who asserts that of the 15,000 insurgents who rose in arms in February 1821, some 8,000 were Serbians and Bulgarians, and that the lieutenants of Sava Kamenare, their leader, were the Bulgarians.

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Hadji Gentso and Hadji Prodan, both natives of Shumen. J. Filimon further affirms that the Greek revolutionary organisation, Φιλική έταιρία, had many branches in Bulgaria and tens of thousands of associates. Among them was the noted Bulgarian patriot Vasili Aprilov of Gabrovo, who subsequently devoted all his fortune to the endowing of the schools of his native town, and who acted as treasurer to this Greek revolutionary Committee in Odessa. Sp. Trikoupis in his history of the Greek revolution extols the Bulgarians Hadji Christo and Hadji Stefco as leaders of the Bulgarian cavalry and infantry, who interceded with the Greek leaders when the latter were quarrelling among themselves, and who prevented the outbreak of civil war among them. Later this Hadji Christo became an aide-de-camp to King Othon. The participation of the Bulgarians in the Greek revolution was far from being negligible, for as Cyprien Robert writes in his „The Slav Provinces of Turkey." (London, Harry G. Bohn. p. 491).

> „The Bulgarian Haiduks did not reappear until the noise of the Greek insurrection of 1821 reached their caverns. Suddenly aroused from their slumbers, they inundated Macedonia; whole battalions of those independent warriors were seen in the Morea, and it was they who by a final assault took the Acropolis of Athens. Botchar, one of these Slavs who was born at Vodena and had emigrated to Mount Sulion, has become famous throughout Europe under the Greek name of Botzaris."

Another Bulgarian Dr. Ivan Seliminski, who participated in the Greek struggle of independence and who left his memoirs, written in Greek, also alludes to Marko Botzaris as being a Bulgarian. The Bulgarian contribution to the Serbian wars of liberation against the Turks was equally notable. The legendary chief Haiduk Velko was a Bulgarian.[1] He was born in the region of Zaitchar which was originally Bulgaria and was only annexed by Serbia in 1833.

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[1] The Serbians are justified in claiming him as a Serbian since his birthplace is now in Serbia, but at the time of his birth this region was peopled solely by Bulgarians and Wallachs. The

Other Bulgarian revolutionaries like Rakovski, Hitov, Luben Karavelov, took an active part in the struggles between Serbians and Turks in 1862-1867 and the legion of Bulgarian volunteers which was under their command often distinguished itself. Rakovski's secretary, Ivan Kurshovski, has left some graphic details of these rude combats; he regretfully notes, that the Serbians though always professing a desire to help the Bulgarians to secure their independence, made use of them to consolidate their patrimony at their expense. Serbia and Rumania even concluded a Treaty in 1867 which provided for the eventual partition of Bulgaria between these two States after a common war against Turkey, as has been revealed by the French diplomat Enguelhart in the „Revue d'histoire diplomatique" in 1892.

It may be said that the revolutionary activities of the Bulgarians contributed a great deal more to further the independence of their neighbours than that of their own. It can hardly be said that they were encouraged to engage in revolutionary activity either by their neighbours or even Russia. After the Russo-Turkish war which ended by the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, the Bulgarian Mamartshev cammanding the Bulgarian volunteers who had joined the Russian army, attempted to raise the standard of revolt

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town of Zaitchar was founded by a Turk, a notable of Vidin, Said Vachar who settled there Bulgarians from the Balkan townlet of Teteven. The late Serbian Prime Minister Passitch was also a native of Zaitchar and he himself admitted when living as an emigrant in Sofia, that his parents were Bulgarians from Teteven, but he having received his education in a Serbian school felt a Serbian. This explains why he often mixed up Serbian with Bulgarian words and expressions in his speeches in the Skupchina, for which lapses, he was often laughed at and taunted for being a „Bugarash" or Bulgarian, by his Serbian compatriots.

X 175 supported by some 2000 men. He was arrested by the orders of the Russians and his volunteers forcibly disbanded. In 1835 he again succeeded in gaining the support of numerous Bulgarians and he contemplated organising an insurrection at Tirnovo, but someone betrayed the movement and he was arrested and exiled to Konia. The Sultan Mahmoud had an interview with him and asked him why he tried to foment a revolt. Mamartchev courageously replied that so long as the people were ill-treated they would always revolt. The Sultan was so surprised at this outspokeness that he granted him a pension but kept him in exile.

The few revolutionary bands which from time to time crossed the Danube from Rumania and attempted to instigate insurrections in Bulgaria always ended disastrously and had no other result than that of arousing the fanaticism ot the Moslem inhabitants. The latter vented their anger on the hapless villagers who had extended their hospitality to the insurgents, massacring them and burning their houses. It was in fact the height of naivety to imagine that a country with a population of 2·5 millions, of which over a million were Moslems, which was well garrisoned by Turkish troops, and the administration of which was in the hands of the dominant race, could possibly be wrested from it by a few hundred insurgents, however heroic they may have been. The failure of all these revolutionary attempts and the drastic punishments meted out by the authorities to all who attempted to aid them, rendered even the effort of that great heroic figure, Christo Botev, the poet-revolutionary, abortive. The local population had been cowed by the reprisals which such risings provoked and was afraid to extend its aid to him. The band Botev led across the Danule was only able to reach the Balkans where it was run to earth by the Turks and annihilated. One of Botev's companions, H. T. Obretenov, has published his memoirs which he concludes with the remarks that;

> "In the fastnesses of the Balkans they did not meet wild beasts but the local inhabitants' attitude was worse, for they endeavoured by all means to lure them and hand them over to the infuriated Turks who proceeded to cut off their heads".

He himself was captured and subsequently set free, which proves that the Turks were not so vindictive and cruel as one is wont to portray them. In fact judging from the Memoirs of the late Minister P. Pechev, and similar writings, depicting the state of affairs preceding Bulgaria's liberation, it may be said that they generally describe Turkish rule on the whole as mild and benevolent. Pechev's brother took an active part in an insurrectionary movement and was sent to the gallows, his relatives however, were in no way molested, and he himself admitted that the Turkish authorities acted on the whole with justice. It was rather by working ploddingly for the cultural development of the masses that the Bulgarians were approaching the goal of national independence instead of by brilliant feats of arms. After the granting of a charter by the Sultan Mahmoud II and the establishment by his equally liberal-minded successor Abdul Medjid, of provincial councils on which Christians sat, which reforms helped to secure to the Bulgarian peasantry the fruits of its toil, an era of prosperity set in which culminated in the appointment of Midhat Pasha as Governor of the vilayet of the Danube. This record of progress was occasionally marred by the policy of settling Circassian and Tartar refugees from Russia in Bulgaria, who committed all sorts of depredations on the Bulgarian peasantry; but, on the whole the latter began to live a more intensive life, taking an active part in the conduct ot its local affairs founding rural co-operative societies, which the liberal minded Midhat Pasha made use of to transform later into an Ag-

X 175 rarian State Bank, establishing industries based on the guild system which helped to bring prosperity to the country and to create a numerous class of artisans and merchants, 80,000 strong, established by the middle of the 19th century in Constantinople, which resolutely assumed the spiritual guidance of the nation.

The communal councils of the Bulgarians began to take an active part in educational questions and religious matters. As early as 1828 those of Samokov and Uskub began manifesting their spirit of independence by protesting to the Greek Patriarchate against the illegal acts of their bishops and by demanding their replacement by Bulgarians. The spiritual awakening of the people may be gauged by the rapid increase of Bulgarian schools due to the communal councils which organised their functioning and provided their upkeep. By 1836 there were 233 Bulgarian schools in Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia. By 1862 their numbers had grown to 809, and by 1867 to 1479, while in the adjoining principality of Serbia there were only 388. The agitation for the use of the Slavonic liturgy in the Church gradualy grew more intense but met wich the stubborn resistance of the Greek Patriarchate. In order to attain their goal the Bulgarians started negotiating with the Pope for transferring their allegiance to Rome. Under the leadership of Dragan Tsankov, who was to distinguish himself later by his rabid Russophilism, and that of the abbot Sokolsky, the Bulgarian Uniate Church, which uses the Slavonic ritual and permits the lower clergy to marry, was founded at Constantinople in 1860. Sokolsky was askowledged by the Sultan Abdul Medjid on June, 1861 as patriarch of the Bulgarian Uniates, of whom there were already some 60000 adherents, mainly in the Macedonian districts of Kukush, Vodena, Salonika, and at Constantinople and Sliven. But the rapid growth of the movement excited the

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[facing p. 321]

x 175 displeasure of the Russians who desired to maintain the Bulgarians in the fold of the Orthodox Church so as to be better able to exert their influence on them. By promising Sokolsky that they would also proclaim him patriarch, they enticed him to their embassy and thence kidnapped him to Russia.

The establishment of the Bulgarian Uniate Church and the threatened mass conversion of Bulgarians to Catholicism had thoroughly alarmed Russian political circles, and they set themselves to interfere with the Porte in order to obtain the recognition by it of an independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church This did not run counter to the interests of Turkey, for it was bound to weaken the Greek Patriarchate and curtail the privileges it had so far enjoyed, and as the Bulgarian notables professed implicit loyalty to the Sultan and even demanded that he should bear henceforth the title of Tsar of the Bulgarians, the Porte issued a firman on March 10, 1870 creating a Bulgarian Exarchate, the authority of which was to extend to all the territory inhabited by Bulgarians. No definite limits were fixed as to the dioceses it was to comprise, as is sufficed for two-thirds of the population of any commune to express its desire to adhere to the Exarchate for it to be included within the pale of the Bulgarian Church. However, on its formation, the Exarchate comprised the whole vilayet of the Danube, including the whole of the Dobrudja, and the dioceses of Rustchuk, Silistra, Shumen, Tirnovo, Sofia, Vratsa, Lovets, Vidin, Kustendil, Samokov, Veles, with only parts of those of Varna, Sliven, and Philippopolis, so that the Greek population in the last named regions was left under the authority of the Greek Patriarchate, as well as the dioceses of Pirot and Nisch which were then Turkish, without provoking a protest from Serbia. A fact which proves that the population of both Nisch and Pirot considered themselves Bulgarian at

X 175 the time, a matter which the Serbians then openly admitted. (See the Serbian newspaper *Vidcv Dan* of February 13th, 14th, and 18th, 1868, reproduced in the author's „Bulgaria, problems and politics", p. 246).

The creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate was an event of prime importance in the history of Bulgaria, it prepared and heralded the eventual emergence of Bulgaria as a political entity whenever its people would have acquired by gradual development sufficient strength to impose their recognition. Unfortunately these peaceful achievements were not considered sufficient by those who believed in the efficacity of violent acts. Desultory revolutionary outbreaks occurred at Panagurishte, Koprivtsitsa, etc, all of which were put down by the sword. Unfortunately they aroused the fanaticism of the Moslem masses already excited by the revolt in Bosnia and provoked the massacre of some 12000 peaceable people, the worst occurring at Batak. The cruelty with which these risings were suppressed aroused the indignation of Europe, Mr. Gladstone's famous pamphlet „The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East". contributing more than anything else in acquainting Europe with a well-nigh unknown people, the liberation of which became the burning question of the day. The first intimation of these massacres was transmited by Sir Edwin Pears of Constantinople through the *Daily News* and the fearlessness with which he disclosed these crimes, exposing himself to the persecution of the Turks, constitutes the highest testimonial as to his nobility of character. The work begun by Sir Edwin was completed by Mr. Macgahan and Mr. Schuyler, the United States Consul at Continople, who proceeded to investigate on the spot the atrocities committed by the Turks. The horrors disclosed were such that public opinion forced the Powers to exert pressure on the Porte in order that a repetition of the massacres should be rendered impossible, and this resulted in the Conference of Ambassadors being held in November, 1876 at Constantinopie with the object of drawinq up a programme of reforms for Turkey, and checking misrule by introducing self-government in those districts which had a predominant Bulgarian population.

The Conference decided on the formation of two Bulgarian provinces. The eastern was to have Tirnovo for its capital and to include the sanjaks of Rustchuk, Tirnovo, Tultcha, Varna, Sliven, Philippopolis, and the cazas of Kirk-Klisse, Mustapha-Pasha and Kizil-Agatch; while the western province, with Sofia for its capital, was intended to comprise the sanjaks of Sofia, Vidin Nisch, Uskub, Monastir, (except two cazas on the south), the three northern cazas of the sanjak of Serres, and the cazas of Strumitsa, Kukush, Tikvesh, Doiran, Veles and Kastoria[1]. The inclusion not only of Macedonia, but even of the Morava district and the entire Dobrudja in the proposed Bulgaria at the free will of the delegates who had come to take such a decision mainly after consulting men thoroughly conversant with local questions, such as Dr. Albert Long, Dr. G. Washburn, Mr. Schuyler, and Sir Edwin Pears, and prior to the formation of a Bulgarian State which could not possibly have exerted an influence on their decisions, shows conclusively that sixty years ago all these regions were indisputably Bulgarian in population.

The application of the proposed scheme of creating a semi-independent Bulgaria was unfortunately not carried out owing to the complications which survened. On March 1877 all the representatives of the Powers signed a protocol urging the necessity of carrying through the reforms. The Porte in its reply rejected it with contumely, which act compelled Russia to issue a declaration of war

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[1] Blue Book, Turkey, No. 2, 1877 and Documents diplomatiques, Affaires d'Orient, 1875—6—7, Paris 1877, annexe III au compte rendu No. 8.

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on April 24 1877. Russia's intervention transposed the question of Bulgaria's independence from the „locus standi" of a mere local problem for which a satisfactory solution had been devised, to that of a complicated international problem entailing the ruthless sacrifice of the more humble local interests on the altar of the then guiding principle of European diplomacy, the principle of the Balance of Power.

THE LIBERATION OF BULGARIA

The success of the Russian armies compelled Turkey to sue for peace, and this was consecrated by the Treaty of San Stefano, signed on March 3, 1878. This Treaty provided for the creation of an independent Bulgaria, the frontiers of which were practically identical with those proposed by the Conference of Ambassadors of 1876 for their project of two Bulgarian provinces, and coincided with the limits assigned to the Bulgarian Church by the firman of 1870, and were therefore in conformity with the principle of nationality. It is most regrettable that the unreasoned dread of Russia which prevailed at the time in England should have led its government to infer that a Great Bulgaria would be a mere appanage of Russia, constituting a permanent threat to the British Empire in India and implying a non-distant Russian occupation of Constantinople. It was in the main such baseless cosiderations, concomitant with an utter disregard of the rights of the people concerned, that led to the Treaty of San Stefano being torn up and that of Berlin substituted in its place four months later. The delimitation of Bulgaria had been decided upon between Great Britain and Austria by a secret arrangement signed in Vienna on June 6, 1878 and which stipulated that the frontiers of the principality would not extend to the south of the Balkans, while

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Austria was assured of British support as to the attitude she would adopt at the Congress of Berlin as regards Bosnia. Both States pledged themselves also to oppose the transfer of the Dobrudja to Russia. Even prior to this date, Shuvalov, the Russian Ambassador in London, according to the Russian archives (№ 59), had agreed with Lord Salisbury and both signed a convention on May 29, 1878 by which the Balkans were fixed as Bulgaria's frontiers on the south, while an autonomous province was to be created in the valley of the Maritsa, but no mention was made of Macedonia as this interested more directly Austria. The Austrian archives disclose that while Count Ignatiev was in Vienna after the signature of the Treaty of San Stefano and prior to the signature of the above arrangement in London, he was sounded by Count Andrassy as to the creation of an autonomous province of all the territory peopled by Bulgarians in the valley of the Vardar, but that he rejected this proposal, fearing probably that it would result in Austria's securing a predominating influence in this region. This fact would conclusively prove that even the most Bulgarophile of Russians did not work for the liberation of Bulgaria for her own sake, but simply because of the hoped for advantages which would accrue to Russia from the creation of an extensive Bulgaria in the eastern part of the Balkan peninsula. The late Dr. George Washburn, director of Robert College, who was better placed than all the diplomats of the Berlin Congress to judge of the rights of this case wrote as follows in his „Fifty Years in Constantinople":

> „The Treaty of San-Stefano was, of course a hard, one for Turkey, but it would have been better for England and for all the peoples of Europe and Turkey if it had been allowed to stand.
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> The Sultan himself had no reason to thank England or Austria for their intervention. The secret convention by which England acquired Cyprus was little better than a theatrical trick of Lord Beaconsfield's. The Treaty of Berlin, which was signed on July 13, 1878, was one

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of the most, important events of the nineteenth century in European history, but it was not made in the interest of any one in the Turkish Empire. I do not know that it professed to be, although Lord Beaconsfield congratulated himself on having consolidated, the Empire, an euphemism for having reduced the size of it. Each Power sought only to further its own interests and ambitions, and for the people chiefly concerned the result has been a succession of wars, revolutions, and massacres, down to the present day.

. . . This is not the place to discuss the Treaty, but we may take a single illustration from the people in whom the College was most interested at that time, the Bulgarians. The Treaty of San-Stefano had created a Bulgaria essentially on the lines agreed to by the Powers at the Conference of Constantinople. The Treaty of Berlin divided the Bulgarians into five sections, giving one part to Serbia, one to Rumania, one to an autonomous province called East Roumelia, one to Turkey (Macedonia), and one to constitute the Principality of Bulgaria under the suzerainty of the Sultan; and it was England especially that insisted upon this and also upon the right of Turkey to occupy and fortify the range of the Balkans, all with the object of making it impossible for the Bulgarians to form a viable state which might be friendly to Russia. The Englishmen who know Bulgaria, all our friends, understood the folly and wickedness of this at the time. All England has learned it since.

Thus far the results have been the revolution of 1885, which resulted in the union of Bulgaria and East Roumelia, the war with Serbia, the insurrection in Macedonia and province of Adrianople, and all the massacres and unspeakable horrors of the last thirty-nine years in Macedonia, to say nothing of what Bulgaria has suffered from the intrigues of foreign Powers ever since the Treaty of Berlin. The awful massacres and persecutions from which the Armenians have suffered since 1886 have been equally the result of this Treaty".

This just criticism of British policy in the Near East has nothing untoward; unbiassed persons will generally agree that it has consistently distinguished itself by always „backing“ as Lord Salisbury once affirmed „the wrong horse“. It was certainly not consideration of the rights of Greece, or of any other Balkan State, that led to the curtailement of Bulgaria's frontiers, for in 1829 this same apprehension of Russia led Great Britain to reduce the territory assigned to Greece, as in 1877 it frustrated the

Greek attempt to take advantage of the Russo-Turkish struggle in order to annex Thessaly and Crete. And this belief which was entertained in Great Britain that either Greece or Bulgaria would willingly further Russian expansion in the Near East, prior to the Russian revolution, only testifies to the utter lack of understanding of the ideals of Balkan nationalities by British politicians.

The autonomous and tributary principality created by the treaty of Berlin was limited to the south by the Balkans, which separated it from the semi-independent province of Eastern Rumelia left under the suzerainty of the Sultan. The Bulgarian speaking districts of Macedonia were left outside its frontiers, as well as part of the Dobrudja which was handed to Rumania to compensate the latter for the loss of Bessarabia annexed by Russia, and the disricts of Nisch and Pirot were awarded to Serbia. Russian officials were dispatched to set up the administration of the newly established principality, while Russian officers were sent to organise its army. A Constituent Assembly met in 1878 to accept a Constitution presented by the Russian Commissary, Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, and based on extremely liberal principles which soon proved unworkable.

The Assembly, after deliberating for two months finally accepted the Constitution, and selecting Sofia as capital, was dissolved and an extraordinary Sobranye, or Chamber. was elected according to the new Constitution in order to proceed with the choice of a prince. The Tsar Alexander II privately intimated that he designated as candidate his nephew Prince Alexander of Battenberg who was accordingly unanimously elected. The choice was not particularly happy, for the prince was only twenty-two and utterly inexperienced in the conduct of State affairs. So long as Alexander II was alive, the Prince's position was comparatively easy, for he could always count on his powerful patron for support, but after the accession of Alexander III to the throne, his position was rendered untenable by the growing hostility which he met from Russian Court circles. The Prince chose his first ministers among the few moderate Bulgarian politicians and ignored the more numerous section of his people which stood for a more radical policy. In the new Chamber, which was elected without pressure, the Opposition obtained an enormous majority and a deadlock ensued. This was in the main brought aboht by the tactlessness of the Prince. He insisted on being designated as Highness, while the Constitution stipulated that he would be addressed as Excellency. His Ministers submitted to this princely whim, but the War Minister, Perensov, a Russian, declared that he would not comply with such a caprice so long as the Constitution did not sanction this title. This furnished a weapon to the Opposition for launching a savage and utterly unjustified attack on the Ministry. The unfriendly attitude of the Russian member of the Ministry may probably be explained by other motives, than mere respect for the Constitution. The Prince had hinted thaf he desired to engage Prussian officers to organise his army, with the object of neutralising Russian influence and this had naturally evoked the resentment of General Perensov. Another cause of friction was the construction of railways. While the Russians were insisting on the laying of a line from Rustchuk to Sofia, the other Powers were demanding that the construction of the Bulgarian section of the international railway, Vienna-Contantinople should be first completed. The first Chamber proving unworkable, the Prince proceeded to dissolve it, and appointed bishop Clement, well-known for his pro-Russian sympathies as Prime Minister, in the hope this would assuage the Opposition. While the elections were being prepared the Prince visited Russia and obtained from Tsar Alexander II the recall of his insubordinate War Minister. The elections however, brought a more numerous Opposition to the new Chamber and Clement handed in his resignation. The Prince was compelled to give way and he entrusted Dragan Tsankov, the leader of the Opposition, to constitute a government. The new government hastened to confer on the Prince his much coveted title of Highness, but was unable to co-operate harmoniously with him. Tsankov disagreed with Turkey as to the delimitation of frontiers, rejected England's demand for the purchase of the Rustchuk-Varna railway line, and provoked the hostility of Austria by his refusal to proceed with the construction of the Bulgarian section of the international railway as provided by the Treaty of Berlin, owing to which attitude, he was forced to resign.

Soon after, the liberty-loving Tsar Alexander II was assassinated, and the Prince hastened to Russia to take advantage of the discredit cast by this assassination on Liberal ideals in order to solicit from the new Tsar the right to suspend the Bulgarian Constitution, taking care to portray all Bulgarian Liberals as dangerous extremists, which was nothing short of calumny, since neither Stambulov, nor Karavelov were inclined to Nihilism. After securing Tsar Alexander's III consent, the Prince on his return to Bulgaria appointed a new Ministry and proceeded to convoke a new Extraordinary Chamber with the object of approving the suspension of the Constitution for a period of seven years. As the Prince had made it known that he would abdicate if his wish was not conceded, and as all Russian officials spread the rumour that the change was desired by the Russian Government and that if it were not carried through both Prince and Russians would leave the country and allow it to be reoccupied by the Turks, the Assembly passed the needed amendment, securing thereby full powers to the Prince. The Prince soon found 'x 175

out that the elimination of the natives merely strengthened the position of the Russians who were manoeuvring to take complete control of the country's affairs. Russian officials openly flouted him, declaring that they took their orders from the Tsar. The Prince's dislike of Russia was intensified by her attempt to thwart his projected marriage with the Princess Victoria of Prussia, for which purpose even the support of Bismarck had deen enlisted by Russia. The checkmating of this long-cherished matrimonial project may account for the Prince's growing estrangement from Russia and the manifest hostility with which he treated Russian interests. Both the people and the army were growing restive under their new Russian masters, and after an abortive attempt by Russian officers to kidnap the Prince, the latter decided to restore the Constitution but with certain restrictions. He accordingly entrusted once more Tsankov to form a coalition Ministry to carry though this project. At the elections which followed, the majority of Tsankov's followers disagreed with this programme, and instead, Karavelov, round whom rallied the greater number of deputies assumed the premiership. Karavelov had strongly disapproved of the suspension of the Constitution and had at the time been obliged to take refuge in Eastern Rumelia, where he had actively participated in politics and strenuously worked to further the union of this province with Bulgaria.

On his assuming power, his friends in Eastern Rumelia thought that this was a propitious occasion for carrying through this scheme since they erroneously hoped that they could count on his support, and they straightaway took steps to proclaim the union without even consulting the Prince and his advisers. The initiators of the movement supported by the officer corps, militia and populace, seized Gavril Pasha, the governor of the province, on September 18, 1885, and proclaimed its union with Bulgaria under

Prince Alexander. The movement met with no opposition, for even Gavril Pasha on being arrested had declared. „I am a Bulgarian and shall not call in the Turks. I wish happiness to the Bulgarian People". Prince Alexander who was staying at the time at Varna was completely taken aback. A few months earlier he had promised the Russian Minister Giers that he would not disturb the *status quo*, and at first he attempted to struggle against the popular resolve. but the enthusiasm which the proclamation had evoked throughout Bulgaria and the numerous deputations which flocked to him pressing him to accept the union convinced him that he could not oppose the national wish, though he could hardly have had any illusions as to the resentment such a decision would rouse in Russia after the promise he had given. In fact it was considered there as a case of gross insubordination which rendered henceforth his presence in Bulgaria highly undesirable from the Russian point of view, and everything was put in motion to have him removed. It cannot be denied that the proclamation of the union was a tactless act which served to arouse the suspicion of Bulgaria's neighbours. Russia was working at the time for the return of the Dobrudja to Bulgaria, and wished this to take place before the union with Eastern Rumelia (Cf. Geheime Dokumente der Russischen Orient-Politik 1881-1890, № 55). Isvolski and other Russian statesmen since affirmed that they were waiting to secure autonomy for Macedonia before furthering Bulgaria's union with Eastern Rumelia. By precipitating the conclusion of the union and by enrolling the interested support of certain Powers, Bulgaria alienated Russia without securing in exchange the permanent support of any other Power. Even such help as Bulgaria elicited had often to be paid for very dearly, and the case of the purchase of the Rustchuk-Varna railway line may be cited in support. So that the Russophobe policy fol-

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sted on Bulgaria can hardly be considered as having been advantageous. It finally led Russia to support Serbia as more amenable to her will

The Bulgarians were expecting that Turkey as suzerain Power would not acquiesce without a struggle in an act which impaired her rights; they set about mobilising their forces and concentrating them in view of an eventual encounter on the Turkish frontier. But Turkey did not show herself resentful and did nothing to oppose the movement; on the contrary it was Russia that manifested extreme disapproval, considering herself slighted by the independence shown by Bulgaria in this matter. To mark his displeasure, Tsar Alexander III struck Prince Alexander's name out of the army list and recalled all the Russian instructors in the Bulgarian army. In contrast, the attitude of the Western Powers was friendly to Bulgaria, their aim being to detach her from Russia and free her as much as possible from Russia's tutelage The patronage they thus extended to Bulgaria however, was interpreted by Russian circles as an attempt to undermine their predominant position, and led to relations between Russia and Bulgaria becoming extremely strained, the former going even to the length of urging the Porte to re-occupy Eastern Rumelia. It was while the Bulgarians were anticipating a Turkish attack that Serbia suddenly declared war on Bulgaria, alleging as a pretext the aggrandisement of Bulgaria which tended to upset the existing equilibrium in the Balkans. King Milan of Serbia at the time of the coup d'etat was taking the waters in Austria and at the first news of the proclaimed union hastenend to visit the Emperor of Austria and his foreign Minister, Kalnoky, after which he left for Serbia and prepared the mobilisation of his troops.

Austria had concluded an alliance with Serbia in 1881 with the object of diverting the letter's attention from Bosnia, and turning it to Macedonia. she therefore felt under an obligation to do something. In order to placate her protégé, Kalnoky hinted to the Powers that Bulgaria ought to grant the town of Vidin to Serbia as compensation for her annexation of Eastern Rumelia, but Russia, in spite of her displeasure at Bulgaria's act, vetoed the scheme, and this decided Milan to attempt to win Vidin by his own sword. In spite of the inexperience of the Bulgarian officers and the circumspection of Prince Alexander who had counselled even the evacuation of Sofia so as to give time to the troops from Eastern Rumelia to arrive, the Bulgarian officers disregarded this advice and attacked the Serbians at Slivnitsa constraining them to beat a hurried retreat. The Bulgarians invaded Serbia and after inflicting another defeat on their adversary at Pirot were preparing to continue their advance when Khevenhüller, the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, appeared, ordering them to stop as otherwise they would be confronted with Austrian troops. Bulgaria had to yield, and though she gained nothing from Serbia in the Treaty of Bucarest which was signed in March 1886 and restored peace between the two countries, her military success had solved the question of Eastern Rumelia. The Sultan had agreed in the meantime to recognise the Prince as Governor-General for five years and promised to reappoint him on the expiration of this term if peace and order were maintained. It was further agreed between Bulgaria and Turkey that they would mutually give each other military support if attacked by a third party, but this pact had to be annulled owing to the strenuous opposition it encountered from Russia and on its withdrawal, the union was finally recognised.

The economic crisis which the war had caused and which was accentuated owing to the inability of the Bulgarian Government to pay for what it had requisitioned x 175 from the peasantry during the war, had engendered much dissatisfaction, and this was taken advantage of by Russian agents and the pro-Russians in the country to create a feeling of displeasure against the Prince who was pointed out as the obstacle to a close understanding between the two countries. The supporters of the Government on the other hand had begun quarrelling amongst themselves. The dissidents had grouped themselves around Radoslavov, and began criticising Karavelov for his ceding to Turkey the district of Kirdjali in the Rhodopes, and insisted on the representatives of Eastern Rumelia sitting henceforth in the Sobranye. Soon after elections took place in order that deputies from Eastern Rumelia might be sent to Sofia. In his opening speech the Prince made no mention of Russia and this excited the wrath of the Russians who began actively intriguing against him. The rumour that Milan was preparing actively for a new invasion of Bulgaria was circulated, apparently with some ground, and the pro-Russian elements took advantage of this to convince the people that so long as the Prince remained, no reconciliation with Russia was possible, and that the country would therefore be devoid of a protector and liable to foreign attack. These intrigues led some officers to conclude that the supreme interest of the State dictated the Prince's removal, and accordingly in the night of August 21, 1886, they broke into the palace and after forcing him to sign his abdication hustled him out of the country. These officers had acted thoughtlessly, but nothing warranted Lord Salisbury to denounce them as having-been „debauched by foreign gold". Indeed, General Radko Dimitriev who was one of the ringleaders, was of a most chivalrous nature and was idolised by his troops. He was profoundly conscious of the services Russia had rendered to his country, and when Bulgaria sided with the Central Empires he offered his services to Russia rather than be obliged to fight against her or her allies.

11: Logio S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

The conspirators soon perceived that they had no serious backing, and in order to mislead public opinion they issued a manifesto purported to be signed by Karavelov, informing the people that the Prince had abdicated and a provisional Government had been formed. Karavelov sharply reprobated them for their act and refused to have any dealings with them. Unable to gain the support of even a section of the population, the ringleaders fled within three days of the commital of their exploit. The President of the Chamber, Stambulov, and the commander of the troops at Plovdiv took easily control of the situation and got into touch with the Prince whom they at once solicited to return, On Angust 29 the Prince landed in Rustchuk but was prevailed upon by the Russian Consul of that town to address a telegram to the Tsar couched in abject terms and placing his abdication at his hands. This was a most inconsiderate and tactless move on the part of the Prince for he ought to have been aware that Russia would not tolerate him and that he would have to maintain himself henceforth in Bulgaria in opposition to Russia. As was to be expected, his supplication evoked a brutal reply from the Tsar who notified him that he disapproved of his return and counselled him to withdraw from Bulgaria. The Prince aware that his departure alone would appease the Tsar, and conscious that Bulgaria'e pacification and wellbeing could hardly be attained without Russia's assistance, resolved to renounce the throne, and after appointing a regency composed of Stambulov, Karavelov and Mutkurov, departed for Austria.

Bismarck for a time attempted to make capital out of Prince Bettenberg's abdication in order to bring pressure to bear on Russia and induce her to sign the secret Treaty of June 18, 1887, known as the Reinsurance Treaty. He sent delegates to Battenberg and to Stoilov, the Bulgarian delegate at Vienna, informing them that if

X 175 the Bulgarians wanted Prince Alexander they could choose him anew, and that Germany would, together with Austria, oppose Russia from occupying Bulgaria in order to depose him.

This proposal was approved by both the Prince and the Bulgarian regency, but the Prince insisted on Bulgaria declaring her independence prior to his return This condition was found unacceptable both by the Bulgarian regents and by Austria, as it constituted an infringement of the Treaty of Berlin, which neither would countenance at the time. This caused the scheme to be dropped, but it helped Bismarck to attain his end by threatening Russia with a possible change in the traditional Balkan policy of Germany.

The Reinsurance Treaty which was secured mainly by this stratagem contained an additional and very secret protocol which ran:

> „Germany, as in the past, will lend her assistance to Russia to re-establish a regular and legal Government in Bulgaria and promises not to consent to the restoration of the Prince of Battemberg".

The regency acted very leniently towards those who had supported the conspiracy. It convoked the Sobranye, which at its request, addressed a telegram to the Tsar beseeching him to take Bulgaria under his protection. This elicited the dispatch of General Kaulbars as an extraordinary delegate of the Tsar to Sofia, who announced to the regents that Russia had not forgotten Bulgaria, but that she expected that the latter would now show her gratitude not only in words but also in deeds.

The Regents had decreed that an extraordinary Sobranye should be convoked in order to elect a new prince according to the stipulations of the Constitution, but this evoked a counter order from General Kaulbars who demanded that the carrying out of this decree should be postponed, and that his orders should be published in the

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THE ROSE PLANTATIONS IN JUNE

PLOVDIV, FROM THE MARITSA
[facing p. 337]

local press. He further did not hesitate to organise meetings in order to stir up public opinion in favour of Russia and in support of his own views, but this did not prevent the announced elections from taking place. The people resenting the domineering attitude of the Russians, elected deputies who were in their great majority for the policy pursued by the regency; General Kaulbars failed to attain his end, but in order to cover his discomfiture he declared the elections invalid on the pretence that riots had occurred.

The Government however, took no notice, opened the Chamber and proceeded to elect Waldemar of Denmark as Prince, an honour which Prince Waldemar declined. Kaulbars considered himself slighted by this overt transgression of his orders and left in protest, followed by all the Russian officials.

It was with some difficulty that another candidate for a prince was at last found, in the person of Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, but the circumstances in which the Bulgarian delegation had made his acquaintance did not commend him to the regents who endeavoured to sound the Powers. Austria gave a half-hearted approval, but counselled procrastination. Russia, however, was inflexible in her opposition and further endeavoured to foment trouble in the principality in order to frustrate the prince's election. Russian agents provoked two serious military revolts in Rustchuk and Silistra which were quelled and the ringleaders shot, while in Constantinople, Tsankov at the head of other Russophiles emigrants, was inciting the Turks to take energetic measures against the Sofia government. It dawned on the regents that they could circumvent the difficulty by electing the Sultan as Prince of Bulgaria, and Stambulov instructed the Bulgarian representative in Constantinople to propose such a personal union to Abdul Hamid, which would have solved for good

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the Eastern question. After considering this plan for three days the Sultan rejected it owing to the likelihood of its provoking the hostility of Russia. Stambulov next turned to Rumania and offered the Bulgarian throne to King Charles of Rumania, but met with a refusal accompanied by a similar explanation, for Russia had intimated to Rumania that she would not countenance such a solution. The plan of electing King Charles of Rumania as Prince of Bulgaria had been already broached by Charles himself during an interview with Count N. P. Ignatiev on February 2, 1878 (Cf. the latter's memoirs p. 58—63), but this scheme was shelved owing to the conflict which arose between Russia and Rumania when the former proceeded to annex the Rumanian province of Bessarabia shortly afterwards.

It was only then that it was decided to proceed with the election of Prince Ferdinand. An extraordinary Sobranye was convoked in Tirnovo on July 7, 1887 which sanctioned the appointment and deputed a delegation to inform Ferdinand of his election. The Porte was also notified and asked to intervene with the Powers in order that the Prince might secure their recognition. Russia, however, refused to acknowlegge him and the other Powers took up a waiting attitude. Stambulov, harassed by the prevailing uncertainty threatened that he would proclaim a republic if the Prince was not forthcoming, and thereby forced Austria's hand. Kalnoky, after consulting with the German Emperor, advised Ferdinand to leave for Bulgaria where he took the oath to the Constitution on August 14, 1887, with the tacit consent of the Powers and of the Porte, but with the overt hostility of Russia which threatened to eject the Prince and appoint a Russian General in his stead, and it was only owing to the championing of the Bulgarian cause by Austria, England and Italy, which concluded a special convention on December 12, 1887, that the threat of a Russian intervention was removed,

THE LIBERATION OF BULGARIA

On the accession of Ferdinand the regents resigned, but at the insistance of the Prince, Stambulov was persuaded to remain in charge of the administration, and his first act was to convoke the Chamber. The election campaign showed that there was a considerable number of malcontents headed by Tsankov, who overtly sided with Russia and demanded the Prince's removal, while a more moderate group, presided by Karavelov agitated for reconciliation with Russia. Stambulov however had taken steps to secure the return of his candidates at the urns, so that his opponents were practically exluded from the Chamber.

Intrigues and conspiracies fomented by Russia followed one another, keeping public opinion in effervescence and exciting passions to paroxysm, a state of affairs that may be best gauged by the fact that even the bishops were drawn into the fray and openly refused to mention the Prince's name in the public prayers, but instead named the Tsar of Russia. This provocative attitude created scandals in the places of worship, to put a stop to which Stambulov had recourse to a high handed measure, that of interning some of these strong-headed ecclesiastics. What proved far more serious however, were the revolutionary outbreaks which were organised by Russian agents with the complicity of Bulgarian Russophiles. Those of the later who had taken refuge in Constantinople organised a filibustering expedition under the leadership of the Russian Captain Nabokov, who had previously planned an unsuccessful rising at Sliven. The expedition, after landing to the south of Burgas attempted to penetrate into Bulgaria but was overwhelmed by Bulgarian troops and dispersed. In 1890 a more serious conspiracy was discovered headed by Major Panitsa who had brought to naught Captain Nabokov's mutiny. Panitsa was supported mainly by Macedonians, dissatisfied with the Turcophile policy of

X 175 Stambolov, and who aimed chiefly at furthering Bulgaria's reconciliation with Russia in order that Macedonia might be freed with Russian support. The ringleaders were promptly arrested and imprisoned while Panitsa was court-martialed and shot. [1]

Unable to attain their end by conspiracies Stambulov's adversaries next tried assassination. While he was walking with the Minister of Finance, Beltchev, several shot were fired at them killing the latter. Stambulov convinced himself that he was now a marked man. He had never been of a gentle disposition, but henceforth he showed extreme heartlessness in his conduct towards his political opponents and the utter brutality which he displayed in his relations to them explains the intense detestation with which he began to be viewed by all liberal minded and intellectual circles in Bulgaria. A year later another colleague of Stambulov, the Bulgarian representative at Constantinople, Dr. Vulkovitch, was shot by these terrorists. As a reply to these murders the former regent Karavelov and some eighteen of his supporters were thrown into prison and tortured in order to extort confessions. Though altogether innocent of the crime imputed to them, several were condemned to death, while others received lengthy sentences. Friends of Karavelov, who had been mercilessly beaten and tortured appealed to the legations of the Powers and begged them to interfere, but when the foreign representatives visited Karavelov in prison in order to ascertain the facts, he courageously denied having been maltreated, as he did not wish to cast a slur on his country's administrative methods. Among the friends of

[1] According to the 'Geheime Documente der russischen Orient Politik 1831-1890' edited by R. Leonov in 1893, Berlin, Panitsa was subsidised by the Russians, he wanted to foment a rising in Macedonia after overthrowing the Government and replacing the Prince by a candidate appointed by Russia. (Documents No. 171 and 213).

Karavelov who were condemned to death was Ilia Gheorgov, one of the founders of the Radical party and a prominent parliamentarian, who is still alive and one of the most popular figures in Bulgaria, owing to the devotion with which he has served his country and the promptness and readiness with which he has helped all deserving causes. He owed his life to Stambulov's fall from power.

While seditions and conspiracies were being continuously hatched, and internal order was being maintained by growingly repressive measures, Stambulov obtained marked success in his foreign policy. His attempt to convince Turkey that it was to her interest to be on friendly terms with Bulgaria was approved by the Sultan who hastened to mark his appreciation by the appointment of Bulgarian bishops in Macedonia. Russia in order to thwart this growing understanding between them, dispatched the Serbian politician Passitch[1] in 1889 to Sofia in order to entice Stambulov into concluding an alliance between their two countries which would be primarily aimed against Turkey, on the basis of a partition of Macedonia. This offer was rejected by Stambulov who justified himself by saying that the fate of Macedonia should be decided by its own inhabitants and not by outsiders. A similar proposal made by the Greek Premier, Tricoupis in 1891 was equally declined. The following year Stambulov was received in audience by the Sultan to whom he again proposed a formal alliance and a customs union between their two countries und though he did not obtain the latter's adherence to the scheme, yet he succeeded in wresting several privileges for the Exarchate which facilitated Bulgarian cultural expansion in Macedonia. Prince Ferdinand had simultaneously been received by the Emperor Francis Joseph and Queen Victoria. The Pope's consent to Ferdinand's intended marriage with Princess Marie Louise of Parma was made possible by Stambulov's intervention in the Sobranye. which was prevailed upon to consent to an alteration in the Constitution which would permit the heir to the throne to be brought up in the Catholic instead of in the Orthodox faith. But this last measure aroused intense opposition in the Bulgarian Church as well as in the mass of the public and did much to undermine what popularity Stambulov still enjoyed.

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[1] According to Geheime Documente etc. Op. cit. № 91, the Rustchuk Russian Consulate was instructed to pay 6000 roubles to Passitch on December 3, 1885, which shows that he was in close contact with Russia.

The birth of an heir to the throne in 1894 convinced Ferdinand that he was now secure enough to enfranchise himself from the tutelage of Stambulov, and in this he was naturally encouraged by the latter's ever growing number of opponents who poisoned the prince's mind against him. In this design Ferdinand received encouragement even from Kaiser Wilhelm who spurred him on by the remark „I got rid of my chancellor, when will you get rid of Yours ?" Stambulov would have no doubt found means to checkmate Ferdinand, but in the rivalry which had developed between the two, Stambulov was handicapped by the fear of the prince threatening to abdicate. Ferdinand, believing that he could not secure his recognition from Russia without removing Stambulov from power, decided finally to compel him to give up his office by openly favouring the leaders of the Opposition and advising them to present a united front against Stambulov. A hint they could scarcely neglect since they knew that if Stambulov emerged victorious from his struggle with Ferdinand, he would not hesitate to crush them. Ferdinand started secret negotiations with Russia and when this came to the knowledge of Stambulov, the latter offered his resignation, hoping that the prince would not dare to accept it for fear of losing his

11: Logic S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

throne. Ferdinand had grown to have greater confidence in his powers however, for he had just worsted in a last passage at arms his premier. Stambulov foreseeing the inevitable struggle between himself and the prince, had attempted to curtail the latter's prerogative of disposing of all promotions and appointments in the army which helped Ferdinand to form a body of officers devoted to his orders.

This measure would have been carried out with the support of General Savov, the War Minister, and would have rendered the Prince a mere puppet, but a domestic scandal engineered by Ferdinand embroiled Stambulov with his colleague and was taken advantage of by Ferdinand to install at the War Office one of his own creatures, the notorious General Ratso Petrov, who was sentenced several times subsequently for embezzlement and who to the great misfortune of the country succeeded in obstructing the adoption of this measure which would have effectively removed the army from all Court influences. Stambulov was taken by complete surprise when notified that his resignation had been accepted, and in a fit of resentment attempted to overawe Ferdinand by organising meetings and demonstrations. But the police, was no longer under his control, and these manifestations were easily suppressed, all the more so since the whole populace arose to demonstrate its joy at the overthrow of the man who whatever his services, had marked his period of government by bloody terrorism. Stambulov shut himself up at his house and troops had to guard him against the attacks of the infuriated mob which sought to tear him to pieces. His fall was acclaimed as a second liberation of Bulgaria from a worse tyranny than that of the Turks, and Ferdinand for a brief time enjoyed great popularity for having dismissed him. Had Stambulov contented himself with undertaking a campaign against his successor in office and abstained from rousing the ire of Ferdinand by publishing violent diatribes in the foreign Press against him, it is possible that by biding his time he might have again been called to play a decisive part in his country's destinies, for the politicians Ferdinand had called to power were as disregardful of the law as Stambulov had been, and moreover were far from having anything like his ability. He chose, however, to take revenge on the prince by publishing a venomous attack on him in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, which provoked the implacable animosity of Ferdinand.

Stoilov, the next president ot the Council, attempted to create a powerful political party by fusing in one body all those who had opposed Stambulov, and who by their mutual antagonism had so far facilitated the latter's maintenance in power. This was an exceedingly delicate task owing to the mutual mistrust of the Russophobe groups of Radoslavov and Tontchev for the Russophile colleagues of Stoilov. The latter was soon to surpass Stambulov in arbitrariness; he began by dismissing en masse functionaries and the police, in order to replace them by people subservient to his will, who would assist him in securing the return of his candidates at the elections which were timed to take place in September 1894. He refused to amnesty Karavelov and Tsankov, and kept the former in prison for fear that he would supplant him, while Tsankov remained in exile. The latter was nevertheless returned at the elections in spite of the pressure exerted by the police, but his election was invalidated. The elections were marked by disgraceful excesses. The newspaper *Suglasie* of September 11, 1894, published the text of Stoilov's orders to the prefects urging them to use force and falsify the poll whenever it was unfavourable to the Government candidates. One of the Ministers, the poet Const. Velitchkov, was courageous enough to express his regrets in the Sobranye at the writer Aleko Constantinov's partisans at Svistov, having been put to flight by the police instead of the electors showing more pluck and dispersing these over-zealous Government officials. Minister Pechev, in his Memoirs wrote:

> „In 1896 soldiers of the Sevlievo artillery regiment drove us away with whips from the urns." p. 137,

The relentless determination with which Stoilov harassed his opponents may also be illustrated by his treatment of Kosta Arseniev, a friend of Karavelov.

Elected in 1894 his mandate was invalidated, when he presented himself anew at a by-election in 1895, his supporters were dispersed by troops, and he only succeeded in April 1899, after Stoilov's fall. to secure his return at Lom, 86% of the electorate voting for him, in spite of his belonging to the Opposition, which fact may serve to gauge the popularity Arseniev justly enjoyed. And Dragan Tsankov, another adversary, was treated equally shabbily. Stoilov hastened to enact a law for the prosecution of officials who had illegaly enriched themselves, the object of which was to persecute Stambulov's followers; it served as a pretext to government supporters to commit reprisals on their political adversaries and a whole series of crimes followed. Stambulov himself was prosecuted and his properties seized. One of the charges brought up against him was that he himself had engineered the murder of Beltchev in order to have a ready pretext for annihilating his political adversaries and it was only at the intervention of the foreign legations that this utterly baseless charge was withdrawn. The cynicism and unscrupulousness of the members of this cabinet may be gauged by the fact that while attempting to incriminate Stambulov for the murder of his colleague Beltchev, they kept in prison their opponent Karavelov who had been imprisoned by Stambulov for his alleged participation in this assassination, and who was obviously innocent. The latter showed a rare sense of dignity by refusing to sign a petition for his reprieve, and by insisting on being set free without having to humiliate himself. Stambulov's trial on the other charges which had been brought against him continued ; it was revealed, however, thet several of the Ministers in office who had been also colleagues of Stambulov, would be equally incriminated if these charges were substantiated, and for this reason the Sobranye finally voted an amnesty on December 23, 1896.

In the meantime, Stambulov was endevouring to leave Bulgaria in order to recruit his shattered health at Carlsbad, but the Government refused to allow him to leave the country so long as his trial had not been concluded, fearing that he would start a press campaign abroad against them and the prince. It was under these circumstances that Stambulov was set upon and savagely murdered in one of the principal streets of Sofia on July 15,1895. He was wearing a mail shirt and his murderers were only able to hack off his arms and slash at his head with their yatagans. [1] He survived his wounds for three days and before expiring he [illegible]ed two Macedonians as his agressors and deno[illegible] the prince as the moral instrigator of the crime. He was not spared even when dead, There were scandalous scenes at his funeral. Hooligans thrice endeavoured to throw down and break open the coffin and dismember the corpse. Even a bomb was thrown at the funeral convoy creating a panic, in the course of which the Turkish consul. and the Rumanian and Greek vice-consuls were wounded, while subsequently the mob tried to rush the British, German, and Austro-Hungarian legations. There is not the slightest doubt that the government was fully aware of the plans of the assassins and that it had given orders to the police to aid them in their gruesome task. This became evident by the facts revealed in the course of the interpellation deputy T. Tabakov addressed to Stoilov on February 3,1896, and Richard von Mach who was an eye witness of most of these events and in Stambulov's confidence, corroborates these facts in his book, 'Aus bewegter Balkanzeit'.

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[1] One of his death-bed remarks was that Bulgarians would forgive him for everything save for having brought Ferdinand to Bulgaria, a remark which subsequent events have fully justified

Stephen Stambulov was undoubtedly one of the ablest statesmen Bulgaria has produced. He suppressed brigandage which was rife, created an efficient army, organised the basis of an educational system of which Bulgarians are justly proud, created order out of prevailing anarchy, maintained his country's independence by courageously warding off Russia's attack, the underhand policy of which was revealed to him by Jacobson, a dragoman of the Russian Legation at Bucarest, who communicated to him its secret archives which were later published in Berlin by Leonov under the title „Geheime Dokumente der Russischen Orient-Politik 1881-1890". He undertook the building of railways and ports and took steps to develop the resources of the country, the remarkable progress of which was fully recognised by all foreign visitors of the Plovdiv exhibition of 1892. Unfortunately his talents and qualities were marred by his boundless egotism and the utter brutality he displayed towards all who dared differ from him. He knew no measure in the ruthlessness he displayed towards his adversaries; he flooded the country with his spies and terrorised all opponents. At the elections, both army and police were regularly employed to dragoon the electors, and police prefects were held responsible for any weakness on their part in case government candidates were not returned. Such orders as these were responsible for some 35 people being fired at and killed at Pleven and Gorna Orehovitsa during the elections of 1887. He x

175 did not hesitate to interfere even with the course of Justice as the revolting procedure at the trial of the Metropolite Clement at Tirnovo revealed.

Certain Bulgarians[1] affirm that Stambulov's antagonism to Russia was not dictated by patriotism and that he was willing to compromise with her in order to get rid of Ferdinand. In support they mention certain documents issued by the Russian Asiatic Deparment, the genuiness of which could be ascertained now that the Russian archives are open to foreign Investigators. At any rate Stambulov had always affirmed that his main object was to maintain Ferdinand in power, but after his fall, he showed himself ready to overthrow the dynasty even with Russian help, and this proves that he had no scruples and was ready to sacrifice all for personal considerations. It is doubtful whether Russia would have shown herself so aggressive had she not been so heedlessly provoked. Indeed, had a more tactful politician, like Karavelov been in charge of Bulgaria's destinies many of these difficulties which Stambulov created by his own impetuosity and at the instigation of other foreign Powers would have been avoided. In spite of the eminent services Stambulov rendered to his country at a time of great stress and continuous upheavals, which may be invoked as attenuating circumstances in his favour, the utter disregard of the law, the lack of fairness and the abuse of justice by which his administration was characterised, completely undermined the prestige of the State in the eyes of the people, and created most deplorable precedents. These disreputable methods, copied as they were by his successors, all of whom were by far behind him in experience and ability, came to be taken as a standard after which the administration was conducted. The disregard of principles which followed depraved the politicians, who lost all moral authority and sank to the rank of mere pawns in the hands of Ferdinand, who then assumed complete control of the State This will go some way to explain why Bulgarians who have made such remarkable progress in so many directions, have so far shown themselves incapable of creating a decent administrative machine worthy of a civilised State.

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[1] Cf. Veltso T. Veltchev's „Stambulov and Ferdinand". Sofia 1922.

The one noteworthy success of the Stoilov Cabinet was to have obtained Russia's recognition of the Prince. This was rendered easy by the demise of Tsar Alexander III on November 1, 1894, and the accession of a less acrimonious monarch to the Russian throne. Tsar Nicholas II agreed to recognise Ferdinand on condition that the heir to the Bulgarian throne should be received into the fold of the Orthodox Church, and this price Ferdinand showed his willingness to pay, even at the risk of excommunication with which the Pope threatened him. The conversion of Prince Boris was followed by the granting of an amnesty to all Russophiles who had taken refuge in Russia, and who hastened to return to their country headed by the politician Dragan Tsankov.

As a counterweight to this success the friendship with Turkey cooled off very perceptibly. Turkey felt she could no longer rely on Bulgaria and instead she sought to gain the friendship of Serbia, by inducing King Alexander Obrenovitch to visit Constantinople. The Greco-Turkish war of 1897 was not taken advantage of by Bulgaria, though Greece attempted to purchase Bulgarian help by the offer of a partition of Macedonia and the granting of the port of Cavala. The Sultan staved off this threat by the timely granting of the bishoprics of Deber and Strumitsa to the Bulgarian Exarchate, which concessions proved sufficient to quieten Sofia at the time.

A notable improvement set in in the relations between Bulgaria and Serbia, King Alexander Obrenovitch visited

Sofia in 1897 and a customs union was concluded between the two States. Austro-Hungary however, threatened to declare a customs war on Serbia and Alexander was consequently forced to abrogate the arrangement, dismiss his Prime Minister, Grouitch, and replace him by the Austrophile Vladan Georgevitch Austria threatened to recall her representative in Sofia and Stoilov was obliged to apologise and acknowledge the legitimate" influence of Austria in Bulgaria.

Internally, the Stoilov administration proved itself more corrupt than that of Stambulov and given to the committal of even worse abuses. The Cabinet resigned in January 1899, Stoilov vacating his post eight days after the publication of the budget, yet he did not hesitate to appropriate from the secret funds allotted to his Ministry 74,500 gold leva, leaving at the disposal of his successor for the rest of the year the meagre sum of 5,000 gold leva.

His colleagues in the Cabinet did likewise. Their successors in office were in a fume and the acrimonious discussions which followed on the opening of the first session of the tenth Sobranye do not make very edifying reading. Naturally the new Ministers hastened to vote new credits to replenish the emptied ministerial coffers, and passed a Bill enacting that the money which Stoilov and his colleagues had so hastily pocketed should be paid back to the State, this resolution however was never enforced, though the inculpated Ministers could have easily been constrained to disgorge these misappropriated funds, since they had voted to themselves the respectable sum of 700,000 gold leva also in 1898 in the guise of secret funds. Yet another case of peculation was committed by Stoilov's Cabinet which was revealed in the Sobranye at the end of 1897 by one of the most chivalrous politicians Bulgaria has ever had, the deputy Naitso Tsanov, who exposed how it had been decided to create a Bulgarian Navy with the apparent object of abetting the embezzlement of public money.

It was while the Stoilov Ministry was in power that another heinous crime was committed by government adherents, namely the shooting ot one of the most gifted of Bulgarian writers, Aleko Coestantinov, while he was driving with a political friend, M, Takev, both being supporters of Karavelov. Subsequently it was revealed that the fatal shots were intended for Takev. The committal of this crime stirred up intense indignation. The *Missel* in its May, 1897 number did not hesitate to write:

> „Of the thousand crimes committed by Bulgarian Governments on the Bulgarian people, this was if not the greatest, at least the ugliest".

A somewhat premature verdict, for alas, worse things were to follow- The Stoilov regime was depicted by Daniel Yrukov in his „Souvenirs from the political life of Bulgaria", as follows:

> „Stambulov governed, while Stoilov was governed. Stambulov had all the courage of a gentleman-bucaneer and the severity of a tyrant, while Stoilov was a mere courtier, an unscrupulous weak-willed vizier".

There were harsher critics, for we read in the *Sfoboda* of December 11,1896:

> „Our country is not a State but a nest of brigands and bloodsuckers. What is called the Government, those who are lauded as rulers are hangmen They are more loathsome and terrible than the most notorious brigands".

In short, the Government, if it did help by some measures to advance the material prosperity of the country neglected entirely its moral improvement. And the example of corruption it set, unchecked owing to the absence of an educated middle-class. helped to undermine public morality, and facilitated the assumption of all real authority by the Crown.

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BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

65 The attempt of Stoilov to merge into one body all the opponents of Stambulov did not meet with success.[7] The various groups were too heterogeneous to coalesce, and the national or popular party into which they had been fused, soon broke up again into its constituent elements.

It was in the Constituent Assembly of 1879 that the first manifestations of differences of opinion took place. One group headed by the clergy, and those who had received a more advanced education, or had lived abroad, such as Natsevitch, Grekov, Balabanov, Burmov and Stoilov, advocated the granting of more restrained rights to the people, the adoption of a property or educative qualification for electors, and the creation of a senate. These were opposed by Karavelov, Dragan Tsankov, and Stambulov, all of whom insisted on the people being endowed with full sovereign rights without any restrictions whatever. They were supported by the revolutionaries, teachers, functionaries and the mass of the people and completely dominated the assembly, as they were both more numerous and more noisy than the few educated and more refined conservatively minded individuals who opposed them. It is this multitudinous mass, which styled itself Liberal, that was responsible for the adoption of a Constitution extremely liberal in form, which was soon to prove both inappropriate and unworkable.

These two groups originally designated as Conservatives and Liberals, soon broke up into a multiplicity of fractions, bitterly opposed one to another, and incapable of co-operation except for the sole purpose of overthrowing the party which happened to be in office. In 1884 the first scission was recorded in the Liberal ranks, giving rise to two parties led respectively by Karavelov and

[7] [For historical background of this period see Cal. 116, pp. 324-351 — [illegible]]

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

KUSTENDIL

[facing p. 353]

Dragan Tsankov. The former was to become known subsequently as the Democratic party under the leadership of Malinov, while the latter assumed the title of Progressive with Danev at its head. After the dethronement of Prince Alexander and when Karavelov was unjustly cast into prison his followers split up into two sections, one headed by Stambulov, and the other by Radoslavov. The first group styling itself national-liberal, and the second liberal. The latter was soon to give birth to an offshoot in the form of the so-styled Young Liberal party under Tontchev.

All these three groups were characterised by their anti-Russian attitude, and by their utter disregard of constitutional methods. They hesitated at nothing in order to secure their return to power, and whenever they were in office and their organs supervised the election, they were distinguished by extreme acts of brutality and violence. They were several times indicted and condemned for illegalities and embezzlements, but always amnestied because ex-Tsar Ferdinand found in them the most subservient of tools wherewith to carry on his personal policy; for unable to depend on popular support they were obliged to seek that of the Crown, which they elicited through their abject servility. The programmes of these three groups had no fundamental differences and they co-operated whenever Ferdinand expressed such a desire.

The reason for the inordinate subdivision of Bulgarian parties was the desire of the politicians to secure Ministerial seats. As the number of such posts was limited, whenever a group grew to have an undue number of aspirants to these honours which it could not satisfy simultaneously, it split and a readjustment was effected based on a more equitable proportion of the number of posts and favours available for distribution to the number of candidates enrolled in the party. This

665 fissiparous tendency was naturally greatly encouraged formerly by Ferdinand, who was not slow to realise that the weakening of the political parties and their mutual hostilities constituted the best guarantee for the maintenance of his dominating position in the country.

Party spirit was extremely virulent and political intrigue had no limits; antagonism between political parties and politicians was bitter and uncompromising because their conflicts were not due to divergences in ideals, but mainly caused by sordid material interests or personal animosity. The mainspring of political activity consisted in the quest of well paid posts and sinecures which provided means for amassing fortunes. Such base and narrow aims engendered venomous rivalries and mortal envies, because politicians aware of the motives which impelled them, could hardly ascribe to their antagonists any higher aims, which could command respect. As Dr. Seton-Watson remarked very appropriately in his „Europe in the Melting-pot, p. 358:

> „The secret of Ferdinand's power has lain in his skill in calculating the psychological moment for driving each batch of swine from the trough of power and still more in his policy, pursued with a relentless and uncanny mastery of detail, of supervising their diet".

What rendered these politicians still more contemptible, was their readiness to hire themselves indiscriminately to the service of any foreign bidder. A foreign bank or industrial establishment would appoint a prominent politician as director or legal adviser, and in exchange for the emoluments he received, he would lend his support and that of his party to further the interests of the institution, however these might clash with those of his wretched country. Though a law had been enacted forbidding deputies to participate in the management of enterprises likely to have dealings with the State, the law was seldom respected. M. Tsolakov-Zarin, a former director of the

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National Bank, in one of his numerous writings („Dans le tourbillon de la Haute Spoliation") cites several cases of infringement by prominent members of the Democratic party.

The leadership of the National or popular party was assumed by I. E, Gueshov after Stoilov's death, and its foreign policy was characterised by a moderate friendship for Russia. Some of its prominent members were the veteran politicians, M. Madjarov, St. Bobtchev and the late T. Todorov. Political parties in Bulgaria were, prior to the war, mainly distinguished by the measure of sympathy or suspicion they professed for Russia. The Democratic party avowed itself equally Russophile, but was more amenable to Court influence and on occasions ready to follow a pro-Austrian policy at the request of Ferdinand. In a public address its leader had declared to Ferdinand that he was the party's load star and that its programme could be summarised in the following words: „With you, by you, and for you." Some of its best known members were. Malinov. the late Liaptchev, Mushanov, Dr. Ghirghinov, and Stefanov.

While the Democratic party was still presided over by Karavelov, its most idealistic followers seceded on a question of principle and formed the Radical party, which together with the Socialists, formed what may be styled as the „ginger" groups in the Sobranye, Both, leaders and rank and file of this party were distinguished by their integrity and idealism. Its founder, Naitso Tsanov, was the noblest political figure Bulgaria possessed, and his attractive and kindly personality was assisted by powerful gifts of reasoning and exposition. He was the only politician who declared that he would refuse to accept office from Ferdinand if this request did not emanate also from a majority in the Chamber. He never wearied in his scathing condemnation of the arbitrary and unconstitutional acts of

665 Ferdinand, but in spite of the exemplary attitude of its leaders, the Radical party failed to attract the masses to its orbit, because it was always opposed to the practice followed by the other parties, which promised favours and offices in advance to those who would support them at the elections and secure their return to power. The existence of the Radical party proves that it was not for lack of leaders that parliamentarism failed in Bulgaria, but owing to the unwillingness or inability of the masses to perceive where their true interests lay. They preferred to sell their votes to the higher bidder, and naturally it was the bigger demagogues who imposed themselves by their cleverness and astuteness. M. Naitso Tsanov was supported by some very able colleagues among whom were, Ilia Gheorgov, Stoyan Kosturkov, Dr. Patev, Anghel Stankov, G. T. Vlaikov and Ivan Kepov, the distinguished writers, Dr. Burilkov, the president of the Temperance League, Peter Todorov, former Minister of Finance, and one of the most promising young intellectuals and parliamentarians, Prof. G. P. Ghenov. It is sad to reflect that the centrifugal forces so conspicuous in Bulgarian politics, made themselves felt even among this group of idealists, and that dissent was not always absent from their ranks. Discord, the cardinal vice in Bulgarian politics could not be eradicated even emong those whose programme was based on harmony and co-operation and who were the pioneers of true democracy in Bulgaria. And if this most progressive and idealistic party succumbed to this canker, one may justly infer that the democratic form of government is not the appropriate one to the Bulgarian temperament.

The Progressive party led by Danev was distinguished by its extreme Russophilism. „We have no secrets from Russia". Danev used to affirm, he however, does not seem to have kept consistently to this principle at the time of the Balkan wars and this would go a long way to explain

the disaster which followed and which made him then 665
declare that his „policy had gone bankrupt".

Just as the despotism of Stambulov brought into 665
being the Socialist party, so the oppressive measures
adopted by the Radoslavov, or Liberal party, caused while 668
it was in power during the years 1899/1901, the formation of the Agrarian. The Radoslavov Government unable to raise a foreign loan attempted to introduce anew the tithe in 1900. The country had suffered from a series of bad harvests during the preceding years, and the peasantry was expecting to make up for its losses by the abundant harvest of 1900 when it learnt to its consternation that the government had decided to divest it of the fruits of its labour. Incited by the Opposition parties the peasantry rose in several districts and the Government had recourse to violence in order to crush the outbreaks. The disorders which ensued caused such indignation that the Cabinet had to resign. Having thus taken cognizance of its force, the peasantry started to organise itself under the guidance of certain teachers, like D. Draghiev, Tsanko Bakalov and Zabunov. Despised, exploited, imposed upon by the political parties, which only thought of the peasantry when elections were approaching in order to wrest from them their votes throught the most misleading promises and ensnaring artifices, the peasantry attempted to free itself from this political and economic servitude by creating an organisation which would defend its rights. At first it was in the form of a strictly professional or syndicalist organisation, aiming at the defence of the interests of the rural population, and it did not at all aim at securing office. Their desiderata were: the curtailment of the growing powers of the Crown, retrenchment and economy in all branches of the administration, the disbanding of the army, the creation in its stead of a militia and the relinquishment of Ferdinand's Imperialistic policy. So long as the move-

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ment was in control of Draghiev, a man of the most austere morality, and leading the life of a Christian apostle, the agrarian movement could be regarded as the most hopeful portend in the public life of the country, as it seemed capable of regenerating the body politic by the eventual dominating position which the Agrarian party would have obtained owing to its vast numerical preponderance. Draghiev, and some of those who seconded him, like St. Montchev, were protestants, and lived a life of Spartan simplicity and of exemplary virtue, which enabled Draghiev to exert, owing to the respect and prestige he enjoyed, a strict discipline on his followers. Unfortunately when the world war broke out, the Entente Powers attempted to suborn some of the Agrarian deputies by commissioning them to buy up the wheat supply on their behalf. The cupidity of these peasant deputies having been aroused, it continued to be exploited by the then Radoslavov Government, with the object of enlisting their support. Those among the Agrarians who had had dealings with the Entente agent, Des Closiéres, were threatened with being courtmartialed if they would not agree to support the Government, while if they did not show themselves recalcitrant, they were offered opportunities for participating in profitable speculations. Intimidation and cupidity thus brought about disintegration in the party. The Spartan Draghiev refused to tolerate these manifest infractions of the moral principles and rigorous discipline he had imposed on the party, and finding himself in a minority seceded and established a new party. Though many of the inculpated members offered to make amends, Draghiev was adamant and refused to readmit them to the fold, declaring that after their moral degradation they could no longer represent the Agrarian organisation and that their fall should be judged by the Party Congress at the end of the war.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

A party tribunal was in fact set up, and it passed severe sentences on those inculpated. Had the verdicts been upheld, the Agrarian party, cleansed of all tainted elements might have proved a decisive factor in regenerating public life in Bulgaria. Unfortunately Stambuliiski, the former secretary of the party, who had been imprisoned during the war, and who was making capital out of his incarceration by assuming the aureole of a martyr, thought it opportune to make use of his influence to mitigate these sentences in order to gain the support of the incriminated members and of their sympathisers, and oust Draghiev and his adherents from the party. This unhappily was achieved, and the Agrarian party having thrown overboard its moral ballast, rapidly degenerated into an organisation of professional office-seekers and demagogues, who while in office outdid all their predecessors in the committal of excesses and abuses. All right-thinking men in Bulgaria are at one in admitting that the Agrarian regime of Stambuliiski completed the work of demoralisation introduced by Ferdinand, and that the havoc and devastation it has caused are such that the work of moral recuperation now requires superhuman energies if it is to be tackled with some chance of success. When after Stambuliiski's death, Draghiev was approached and invited by the Agrarians to re-organise the party, he blankly refused to have anything further to do with them, declaring in their faces that they were:

> Without Christian and civic consciousness, that they placed above all their personal ambitions, interests and happiness, and that if Stambuliiski was gone, new adventurers were ready to spring up from among their ranks rendering his immixture in their affairs superfluous."

The autocratic regime of Stambulov brought into being in 1890 the Socialist party, the founders of which were Sakuzov and Blagoev. They initiated a spirited campaign

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against the dictatorial methods in vogue at the time, and rallied a large number of intellectuals around them. The doctrine of Karl Marx, however, was not appropriate to Bulgarian conditions owing to the lack of an industrial proletariat. In its absence, the Socialists attempted to recruit adherents from among the State functionaries. The class which showed the greatest proneness to support this movement was the teaching profession which embraced the new doctrine with enthusiasm and became fanatical votaries of this new gospel. These well meaning but uncritical enthusiasts in their zeal to spread their new faith met with the stolid opposition and incredulity of the peasant mass, among whom they lived, and to whom these strange new doctrines appeared more than heretical. In order to make these tenets acceptable to the mass it was thought that the best method was to undermine existing beliefs and traditions, and the teachers thus began sowing the seeds of disintegration instead of working for the awakening and consolidation of the national consciousness. They heaped ridicule and abuse on the Church, the State and such „bourgeois" conceptions as duty and morality, and thereby contributed to arouse the suspicion and hatred of the peasantry for all intellectuals. Even among the urban working classes, the influence of the Socialists was nefarious, for they endeavoured to indoctrinate their supporters with a savage hatred for the bourgeois, denouncing the present order and holding it up to execration as the only obstacle to the realisation of the messianic conditions which were to prevail on the advent of the Socialist State. The adoption of such wild beliefs by an uncritical and uneducated mass had on the whole a disintegrating effect on the nation, and though most of the leaders of the Socialist movement hold leading places among the elite of the Bulgarian intelligentsia, they were too far removed above the level of the mass of their supporters to make themselves understood. They rather chose to leave the task of guiding their partisans to the more demagogically inclined among them, who excelled in the art of invective, and abuse [1] while they themselves reserved their exertions for parliamentary work. In this their activity was both commendable and fruitful, and their criticisms mostly opportune, and helped to raise the general level of the debates in the Sobranye. Sakuzov and his colleagues, Dr. Djidrov, Assen Tsankov, and Yannulov have equally distinguished themselves in the literary field, especially Dr. Djidrov who is the editor of one of the leading Bulgarian reviews on economics. Other prominent adherents of the party were Pastuhov and Kazazov, the latter having played a prominent part in the coup d'état of June 9, 1923 and having since persistently worked for a rapprochement between his country and Yugoslavia, owing to which he has now been fittingly appointed Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade. Long before the suppression of the parliamentary regime in Bulgaria, dislocation set in among the ranks of the Socialists and its most prominent members seceded from the party, which was weakened to such an extent that it practically ceased to exert any influence on politics, Already in 1903, a cleavage had taken place in the party and the more doctrinaire partisans seceded to form the group of the so-called „Narrow" socialists under Blagoev, and who gradually merged themselves with the communists. Their influence from every point

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[1] This explains how campaigns of slander and diffamation against political opponents who were on the whole respectable, were often indulged in by the Socialist party, though they often ended to the clear injury of the initiators. The most resounding one, was the electoral campaign against Prof. P. Stoyanov, a radical candidate, when the Socialists did not hesitate to publish on the eve of the election a forged letter purporting to be his, giving him no time to dispel the imputations levelled at him.

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of view was disastrous, for instead of lending their support to the more progressive elements in the country, they sided with the most disreputable, in order to enhance disorder and dissatisfaction and thereby hasten the advent of the proletarian revolution.

"The worse, the better for us", seemed to have been their motto. The impact of these advanced doctrines on half-cultured and uncritical minds has been most detrimental to the latter, They consider themselves as outright enemies of the community within which they live and they work for its destruction instead of for its advancement, and this forces the authorities to deal drastically with these fanatics. Their ranks were swollen by a large proportion of the teaching profession and of the lower grades of public functionaries. In the revolutionary outbreak of September 1923, over 1000 teachers joined the revolutionary bands. M. D. Kazazov, who for a short time acted as Minister of Railways, declared in the Sobranye on February 27, 1925 that prior to the revolutionary outbreak of September 1923, the railways and the telegraphs were in complete control of the communist party and that some 700 functionaries had to be dismissed from these State departments owing to their fanaticism which rendered them unreliable. Many among the teachers, and even women teachers, are fanatical converts of communism. One often hears of teachers who forbid their pupils to read the works of the poet Vazov, as being too patriotic, or who make blasphemous discourses to the students. One should not feel surprised at the astounding spread of Communism in Bulgaria, because all idealistically minded young people have nothing else to turn to. The corruption, venality and debasement of the political parties repelled all but the most prosaic. The only other focus of attraction, the Radical party, abstained from all misleading propaganda, and instead of holding out the lure of an early advent to power, openly prepared for a long peregrination in the wilderness, which was enough to benumb the enthusiasm of the less intrepid. The intensive propaganda carried on by the Russian Bolsheviki, the close relations existing between Bulgarian Communist leaders and their Russian colleagues[1], the similarity of the language, and the immense influence which Russian literature has exerted on the Bulgarian intelligentsia for generations, makes the Bulgarians the most promising adepts of Bolshevism. Except for a mere handful of the well-off, all the rest of the people are either fervently hoping for the advent of Bolshevism or indifferent to its coming. They are convinced that the present system has brought only disillusion; Bolshevism, even if it did not improve matters could hardly make them worse, and it would certainly bring in its wake a much needed relief, that of the emancipation of a third of the Bulgarian people from the intolerable foreign servitude it has been placed under. The existing 'Bourgeois' regime has no countervailing attraction to offer. Maladministration, crushing taxation, and exploitation, not only by the local pillars of the bourgeoisie, but also by the representatives of the Western States. French bondholders extort from the starving Bulgarian peasant five times more for what he owes them than they are permitted to exact from their own co-nationals. And this crying injustice is complacently looked upon by the League of Nations, which equally tolerates the persecution and victimisation of the Bulgarian minorities incorporated in the adjoining Balkan States, despite the Treaties which

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[1] One of the moving spirits of the Russian revolution was the Bulgarian Rakovski. The Russian *Pravda* recently affirmed that there were over 600 Bulgarians occupying responsible posts in the Russian administration among whom may be cited, Stomaniakov, assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Telalov, adviser of the Soviet Minister in China, Peitchev and Petrunov, secretaries of the Soviet Legations in Paris and London etc.

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665 666 guarantee certain elementary human rights, the enjoyment of which the League of Nations has never attempted to secure for these minorities.

At the elections of 1931, in spite of the fact that the Communist party had been outlawed and the endless persecution it was exposed to, yet it succeeded in sending 12% of the deputies elected to the Sobranye camouflaged as working men.

The extreme wretchedness of the bulk of the nation and the mass of destitute refugees have created new foci for Communist proselytism, and the country is to-day literally honeycombed with Bolshevism which only awaits a favourable opportunity to break out. Until quite recently, Communism was openly professed to be the coming form of government, and both peasant families and bourgeois, hastened alike to enroll officially some of their members in this party in order to secure an eventual protector on its advent which was considered imminent.

FERDINAND AT THE HELM

661 648 Having with the support of the united Opposition got rid of the man who brough him to Bulgaria and who consolidated his throne, and having in turn made use of its services in order to reconcile himself with Russia, Ferdinand hastened to sow discord and suspicion among the members of the Stoilov Cabinet, so as to get rid of them now that with their help he had achieved his purpose. He thus intrigued against Gueshov, Madjarov and Stoilov, complaining alternatively to each of his other colleagues. using insinuations, slander and insult.[1]

In 1899 Grekov was entrusted with the formation of a new Ministry with the support of the Radoslavovists who far outnumbered his adherents. At the elections the Rado-

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[1] Cf. V. T. Veltchev's: „Pages of our new political history".

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slavovists secured a big majority and they insisted on 661
Radoslavov becoming Prime Minister. Ferdinand however,
in order to disunite the party insisted and obtained the 648
nomination of Todor Ivantsev to the post. This administration was characterised by the boisterous atmosphere it created both internally and externally. By its financial measures it provoked the peasantry to revolt, while in its foreign relations, Bulgaria was involved in a very severe conflict with Rumania which brought the two countries to the verge of war. The dispute arose through the activities of the Macedonians in Rumania. They murdered in Bucarest a Rumanian propaganda agent who worked in Macedonia against the Bulgaro-Macedonians. Another incident provoked by these same Macedonians intensified the dispute. In order to raise funds for their revolutionary campaign in Macedonia they rifled the safe of a wealthy Rumanian, but were unable to utilise the stolen banknotes and bonds in Rumania. They then hit on an ingenious though sacrilegious device for smuggling their booty out of the country. They approached the Bulgarian Government and persuaded it that it was highly desirable that the remains of the revolutionary Rakovski which were lying in Bucarest should be transported and interred in Bulgaria. This demand when formulated by the Bulgarian authorities was readily conceded by the Rumanian Government. The Macedonians hid in the coffin under the remains of Rakovski the stolen valuables and safely transferred them to Bulgaria, whence they attempted to negotiate them, but were found out by the police and arrested. The Bulgarian Government, by refunding the amount involved, finally put an end to the incident.

Early in 1901 this Ministry was dismissed, and Ferdinand confided to General Ratso Petrov the task of supervising the holding of elections in order that a new 661

661 government should be formed. Petrov attempted to form a party of his own, but his right hand man, Yovev, became compromised in a shady affair together with other would-be supporters who had organised the emission of spurious revenue stamps and the evolution of this highly „progressive" party was thus nipped in the bud. Thus unable to elect his own men, Petrov thought it expedient to allow full liberty to his opponents, and for once free elections were held in Bulgaria. They resulted in the formation of a coalition government composed of the followers of Karavelov and Danev, the two most numerous parties. Owing to the opposition which the projected creation of a tobacco monopoly aroused, Karavelov resigned and Danev assumed sole control after holding fresh elections which secured for him a majority in the Sobranye. He instituted proceedings against the Radoslavov administration and secured the condemnation of Radoslavov and of several of his colleagues for the abuses they committed during their short term of office. He enacted a law guaranteeing stability in the tenure of office for public functionaries, a measure which had it been maintained would have rendered the parliamentary regime operative in Bulgaria by eliminating most of the disadvantages it otherwise gave rise to.

648 During Danev's tenure of office, a military convention was signed with Russia in 1902, clearly defined as a counter-measure to the one concluded between Austria-Hungary and Rumania in 1901. It was stipulated that the convention was not aimed against any other State save the above two, Russia guaranteed the integrity of Bulgarian terrritory and Bulgaria agreed that the Commander-in-chief, and chief of the general staff, of the Bulgarian army, would be nominated with the approval of the Tsar, while a Russian staff officer would be attached to every Bulgarian army corps.

FERDINAND AT THE HELM

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The 25th anniversary of Bulgaria's liberation was celebrated with great ceremony, and a magnificent church erected at the Shipka Pass, was consecrated in the presence of Russian dignitaries and veterans of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, in honour of whom an extensive concentration of Bulgarian troops had taken place. The Macedonians were hoping that after the Shipka ceremonies the signal would be given for the troops to invade and liberate Macedonia, but Danev at the instigation of the Russian Minister, Lamsdorf, took measures to repress this agitation since Russia was unable to lend her help while entangled in the Far East.

The unconditional subjection of Danev to Russian guidance was not requited by Russian support to the Bulgarian cause. Lamsdorf attempted to win over Serbia by pressing the Sultan to nominate a Serbian bishop at Uskub and this was considered in Bulgaria as a formal abandonment by Russia of the programme she had set forth in the Treaty of San Stefano. When the edict announcing the appointment of the new Serbian bishop was issued, mass meetings were held all over Bulgaria and Danev was forced to resign in May 1903, having lost much of his popularity. Ferdinand, perceiving that besides his recognition he could not extort any other advantage from Russia, executed a complete political somersault by placing the Austrophile Stambulovist party in power, then under the leadership of Stambulov's lieutenant, D. Petkov, though for the first few years Ferdinand imposed as Prime Minister his favourite, General Ratso Petrov. The Stambulovists unable to secure a majority at the polls now that the police and State functionaries could not be dismissed without cause, thanks to the law passed by Danev, rescinded this measure with the approval of Ferdinand, and after filling the administrative posts with their nominees, proceeded to carry elections according to the old system.

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648 At the request of Ferdinand, the new Sobranye hastened to vote an amnesty, exonerating Radoslavov and his colleagues of the delinquencies for which they had been condemned. Hardly had the elections taken place than a revolution broke out in Macedonia. Measures had been taken by the Powers to introduce certain reforms in Macedonia and by 1903 the Sultan appointed Hilmi Pasha as inspector-General. These concessions made by the Turks brought no amelioration and in July 1903 the Macedonians rose in revolt, in the hope of forcing the hand of Europe for they were conscious that without outside support they stood no chance against the Turks. This decision was taken by the revolutionaries in the absence, and against the desire, of the great Macedonian chief, Gotse Deltsev, who considered such an insurrection as inopportune. Some 12000 Macedonians and 2000 Thracians took up arms, and after obtaining certain initial successes were completely crushed by the Turkish troops. The outcome was that 201 villages and 12,444 houses were burnt, 4694 people killed, 70,835 rendered homeless, and 30,000 forced to seek shelter in Bulgaria. (Cf. Chr. Silianov: „The 1903 Revolution in Macedonia"). After this disaster, the Powers decided to impose the so-called Mürzsteg programme of reforms in Macedonia, which was divided into five zones each of which was placed under the surveillance of a great Power.

661 The turmoil in the Turkish provinces provided an unprecedented opportunity to Ferdinand for indulging in his petty scheme of creating an enriched class on whose support he might count in exchange for the favours bestowed on them. Large orders for war material were placed, out of which the favourites of Ferdinand reaped big profits in the form of bribes or commissions. The chronicles of those years are filled with the echoes of a resounding affair known as the „Charles-Jean" trial, which revealed the

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MESEMBRIA

IN THE PIRIN MOUNTAINS

[facing p. 369]

extensive malversations committed at the expense of the State by two favourites of Ferdinand, Generals Ratso Petrov and Michael Savov, who were however left to enjoy undisturbed their ill-gotten wealth. It could hardly be otherwise, for in this matter Ferdinand himself set the pace, as General Savov affirmed to a personal friend of the writer, Ferdinand always insisted on retaining for himself 90 % of the bribes given whenever State loans or armament supplies were being negotiated, and only handed the balance of 10 % for distribution among his Ministers. This princely practice was often complained of by the late Generalissimo of the Bulgarian armies, who found that the percentage allotted to him was not commensurate with his rank, and it is probably the stinginess of his sovereign that must have goaded General Savov to supplement this source of revenue by indulging in a series of embezzlements.

General Ratso Petrov became such an expert in the art of prevarication and collusion, that his achievements formed the subject of the ribald songs in vogue at the time. In one of them the General was described as making out of the horses supplied to the army a gold napoleon apiece, and out of every fortification erected on the frontiers of the country a prop for himself;

(„отъ конче — по наполеонче. И отъ всѣко укрѣпление — подкрѣпление")

Misappropriation of public funds and peculation in connection with Government contracts were rampant. A premium was set on dishonesty by the knowledge that all crimes committed by supporters of the Government would eventually be reprieved by a timely amnesty voted by the Sobranye. Thus by widespread corruption, and by making promotion in the army and in the civil service conditional on the amount of servility displayed, Ferdinand succeeded to a large extent in rendering a numerous class subservient to his will. His success in this respect could be gau-

661 ged by the rapid growth of the Bulgarian capital, which was built mainly by those who enriched themselves at the expense of the State. As Stoyan Mihailovski made one of his figures remark at the time:

> „Do you see this pretty, coquettish Bulgarian capital? It it built out of plunder and robbery! Do you recollect what a dirty village it used to be some twenty-five years ago? Now it shines, it attracts like a Parisienne. . . Well, to me, it is a thousand times filthier, filthy in the purity of its atmosphere, foul in the cleanliness of its streets and courtyards, foul because it is a living proof that the history of young Bulgaria has begun by spoliation".

The Stambulovist regime of 1903-8 was characterised not only by an orgy of peculation and abuse, but by a violent persecution of the Greek element throughout Bulgaria in 1906, organised mainly by Macedonian refugees at the instigation of the late Minister Ghenadiev. Greek churches, schools and property were ruthlessly seized and the town of Anhiallo completely destroyed. These pogroms were followed by a general strike of the railway men supported by other functionaries who went out on strike in order to force the government to improve the situation of its employees. The Socialists and students sided with the strikers with the result that rioting occurred, followed by student demonstations against Ferdinand, who had to be appeased by the closing of the Sofia University and the dismissal of all its professors. The manifold misdeeds of the Government provoked widespread indignation. Stoyan Mihailovski foreseeing the deplorable trend politics were taking had appealed to Ferdinand, exhorting him to introduce real parliamentary methods in the governing of the country, but as his appeal remained unanswered he delivered a public address on March 7, 1904, emphasizing the necessity of bringing up the people democratically, and adjured the political parties to refuse to accept office direct from Ferdinand without previously obtaining the support of the electorate. His admonitions which were reinforced by the countless derelictions committed by the Government, brought about the creation of a strong coalition block composed of the greater part of the Opposition forces, which finally succeeded in bringing about the fall of the Stambulovist regime a few months after the assassination of the Prime Minister, Petkov in 1907. 661

Except for the Macedonian revolution and the ensuing straining of Turco-Bulgarian relations, the only other event with regard to Bulgaria's foreign policy was the conclusion of an agreement with Serbia in 1905. Both countries feeling isolated while Russia was engaged in a war with Japan, sought to protect themselves mutually. Bulgaria facilitated the access of Serbian goods to the sea through her territory, and in exchange obtained a mitigation of Serbian propaganda in Macedonia. Austria-Hungary however, did not at all approve of this rapprochement between the two Balkan States and persuaded Serbia to abrogate the convention with Bulgaria in exchange for facilities for her imports of cattle in the Danubian monarchy. 648

Early in 1908 the Democratic party under Malinov, who had succeeded to the leadership after Karavelov's death, assumed power. This party though it formed part of the Opposition block, which had pledged itself not to accept office direct from the palace forgot all about this solemn pledge when it was invited to assume power. The most noteworthy occurrences during its stay in office were, the Young Turk revolution which was precipitated by the Anglo-Russian agreement at Reval, and the emergence of a nationalistic government in Turkey which stultified all efforts at a rapprochement between it and its Balkan neighbours. By their arrogant attitude and by threatening to incorporate anew both Bulgaria and Bosnia within the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks forced Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria to concert together and decide on the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria and on

Bulgaria declaring its independence. This course of action was probably decided on between the Emperor Francis-Joseph and Ferdinand at a meeting in Budapest on September 22, 1908, where Ferdinand had been received with royal honours.

The slighting of the Bulgarian envoy at Constantinople furnished a pretext for Bulgaria to proclaim her independence at Tirnovo on October 5, 1908, when Ferdinand assumed the title of Tsar of all Bulgarians. The Turkish Government at the instigation of its French creditors demanded that the tribute payable by Bulgaria should be paid in order that her independence should be recognised. This brought on a retort by Malinov that "one's independence is not purchased with money". Ferdinand hastened to disavow his Prime Minister by instructing his envoy in Paris to declare that "Bulgaria was a good payer". This calmed the Turks, and negotiations were opened as to the amount to be paid. The divergence of opinions seemed unbridgeable, Turkey began demanding territorial concessions and Bulgaria decreed a partial mobilisation of her army, fearing a Turkish attack. It was then that Russia intervened in Constantinople agreeing to pay to Turkey the sum she was claiming from Bulgaria and reducing the Turkish debt to Russia by an equivalent amount, while accepting from Bulgaria the sum the latter was offering, namely 82 million leva. The incident was thus settled, and Bulgaria's independence acknowledged first by Russia and then by all the other Powers. The service rendered by Russia encouraged the Malinov Ministry to make overtures to the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolsky, for an understanding between the two countries which would eventually facilitate the realisation of Bulgaria's aspirations. Izvolsky submitted a scheme according to which Bulgaria bound herself to place at the disposal of Russia all her military forces in case of Russia being

648 at war with Germany, Austria, Rumania and Turkey. In case Rumania or Turkey attacked Bulgaria, she was to be succoured by Russia. In the event of a successful war against Austria and Rumania, Russia bound herself to help Bulgaria to recover all the Dobrudja, in case of a war against Turkey, Bulgaria could count on Russia's support for securing territorial expansion within the limits fixed by the San Stefano Treaty.

In the beginning of 1910 Malinov visited Izvolsky at St. Petersburg and the negotiations were pursued. Malinov demanded the inclusion of Adrianople and Salonica within the territory claimed by Bulgaria. Izvolsky, while agreeing to the inclusion of Salonica, rejected the demand for a Bulgarian expansion to the east, and this caused a hitch in the negotiations which were not resumed. The Bulgarian Government desired that a date should be fixed for declaring war on Turkey as it could not wait indefinitely and see its co-nationals exterminated in Turkey. Russia however, was not prepared for a war in the near future and demanded that the moment should be chosen by her. The Malinov Cabinet simultaneously made efforts to come to an understanting with Greece and Serbia about Macedonia, but without any practical results. Serbia wished for its partition, while the Bulgarian Government aimed at merely securing autonomy for it. Subsequently, Ferdinand attempted to negotiate on his own accord with Austria, but as these dealings were violently denounced by Izvolsky in the Duma, they were discontinued.

*661 Internally there was an improvement in the administration, though the partisan spirit was alway manifest. The Minister of the Interior, Takev, did not hesitate to tout electors with such promises as: "Vote for us and we shall give you free access to the forests to cut down as much timber as you like". An incident of small impor-

*[During the administration of the Malinov Cabinet — Analyst]

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641 tance which occurred at Rustchuk in 1909 led to the army being ordered to fire and sabre the civilian population, over thirty innocent people being killed and a hundred wounded owing to the crazy orders issued by the Government. A strike which occurred on the Oriental Railways was taken advantage of by the Government to take over the lines in south Bulgaria and henceforth these were exploited in common with the State railways. The elevation of Bulgaria to the rank of a kingdom postulated certain alterations in the Constitution of the country which had to be legalised by an extraordinary Sobranye, and a coalition Cabinet presided over by Gueshov and Danev was entrusted with the task of convoking it in the summer of 1911 in order to approve of the changes and simultaneously to concede to the King the right to conclude secret treaties with foreign States. This last measure was deemed necessary for a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations the Balkan States were pursuing amongst themselves for the purpose of putting a stop to the persecution of their co-nationals in Turkey. For since the advent to power of the Young Turks who aimed at the forcible denationalisation of the Christians in Turkey, the lot of the latter had become intolerable and had convinced the rulers of the Balkan States that it was imperative to arrive at a common agreement whereby their interests might be properly safeguarded.

THE BALKAN ALLIANCE AND WARS

648 Bulgaria had always been a partisan of the indivisibility of Macedonia and as she was unable to annex it without coming to a clash with her neighbours, she staunchly supported the plan of creating an autonomous Macedonia in which the prepoderance of the Bulgarian element would

assure her mastery. This was the reason why the repeated advances made so far by Greece and Serbia as to undertaking a joint action against Turkey had always been cold-shouldered by Bulgaria, who preferred instead to be on good terms with Turkey and to cultivate friendly relations with the Sultan in order to secure for her Bulgarian co-nationals in Turkey fair treatment and better chances for their cultural development. 648

The change of regime in Turkey and the Bulgarian declaration of independence rendered the pursuit of the policy hitherto followed, almost impossible. The close commercial relations between vassal and suzerain were sundered. Turkey, which was the best market for Bulgarian produce was closed, while persecution to which Bulgarians in Turkey were subjected grew daily worse. The Greeks who were among the most numerous ethnic minorities in the Ottoman Empire were likewise oppressed, and with the advent of Venizelos to power in Athens, who had taken an active part in emancipating his native Crete from the Turkish yoke, it was not surprising that he should have done his utmost to approach Bulgaria in order to convince her of the advisability of united action against a common foe. Taking advantage of the presence in Athens of Mr. Bourchier, the *Times* Balkan correspondent in the spring of 1911, Venizelos submitted to Ferdinand and Gueshov a proposal for a defensive alliance between Bulgaria and Greece. Serbia, since the Bosnian crisis had repeatedly sought the support of Bulgaria, but it was only in October 1911 that Gueshov responded to the advances made by the Serbian Premier Milovanovitch. The two rival theses, autonomy and partition, each stubbornly supported by Bulgaria and Serbia seemed irreconcilable, though Milovanovich did his utmost to win Gueschov to his view by holding out to him the assurance that Bulgaria would only have to cede the Uskub district to Serbia and would retain

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for herself the larger part of Macedonia and the whole vilayet of Adrianople. It was then that another factor, the influential Russian Minister at Belgrade, Hartwig, intervened and made agreement possible after months of stubborn negotiations. Russia, through her ambassador Tsarykov had proposed to Turkey in the autumn of 1911 a scheme under which she would influence the Balkan States to maintain friendly relations with her and would equally guarantee her capital in return for which she asked of Turkey to open the Straits to Russian warships. This proposal had been turned down by Turkey, and this prompted Russia to seek another solution by furthering an understanding between the Balkan States wherely she might reach a more favourable settlement of the question of the Straits. A treaty between Bulgaria and Serbia was signed in March 1912 promising mutual support and providing for common action against Turkey. The distribution of territorial gains was specified.

All territory to the east of the Struma was to revert to Bulgaria, and that west of the Shar mountains to Serbia, while Macedonia proper was divided into three zones; two zones respectively Serbian and Bulgarian, and a contested one which would be subject to the arbitration of the Tsar. A Treaty with Greece was concluded in May 1912, but the mutual claims of the two contracting parties were not defined. These arrangements were completed by an agrement with Montenegro, Bulgaria engaging herself to pay for the upkeep of the men Montenegro would mobilise. It appears that the conclusion of this Balkan league was not to the liking of Tsar Ferdinand owing to the fact that it was distinctly anti-Austrian, and he had to be cajoled into accepting it by the granting of a solatium in the guise of an advance of 3,000,000 francs by Russia, which were secured by a mortgage on his country estate at Vranya. This was revealed by deputy N. Harlakov in the Sobranye on

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March 3,1918, and reiterated by a communist deputy on May 25,1932. Ferdinand did not sign the mobilisation order until the money was advanced to him.[1] 648

The Powers to whom the existence of the Balkan Alliance had become known, made a belated attempt to impose the acceptance of reforms on Turkey in order to avoid the threatened war, and even Sazonov, at the instigation of France ,did his best to restrain the combative mood of the Balkan States which he had encouraged, but an Albanian revolt, and a massacre of Bulgarians in the Macedonian town of Kotsana, followed by the massing of Turkish troops in Thrace, forced the hands of the Balkan States, which replied by hurriedly mobilising their armies. On October 8, Montenegro declared war on Turkey, the Porte followed by declaring war on Serbia and Bulgaria on the 17th, and finally Greece declared war on Turkey on the 18th. The Bulgarian victories in Thrace were not utilised to the full owing to the mutual jealousies of the commanding generals. General Kutintchev, the commander of the first army refused to lend his support to the third army under General Radko Dimitriev at Lule Burgas because he had been frustrated in his hopes that both the first and third army 721

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[1] A few years ago a Communist interpellated the German government in the Reichstag as to the disbursements which were being made to Ferdinand, and it was then revealed that this modern Judas had received thirty million marks in order to involve Bulgaria in the world war on the side of the Central Powers, and that moreover he was drawing a yearly allowance. In a resounding interview published in the Austro-German press immediately after his abdication, Ferdinand had boasted that for thirty years he had faithfully served the interests of the Central Empires so that there is nothing untoward if the Germans are now granting him a pension.

Madol in his "Ferdinand of Bulgaria" p. 233 attempts to dispel the depressing impression caused by these revelations of the contemptible behaviour of his patron by offering what could only be a very lame apology.

721 would have been placed under his command. After the fall of Kirk-Kilisse, General R. Dimitriev was prevented from pursuing the retreating enemy, and instead was ordered by Head Quarters to stop and entrench. This permitted the Turks to make a further stand at Visa and Lule Burgas. After defeating them at the latter place he was again prevented from following them up and ordered to entrench in spite of his assurances that the Turks were in full flight. The Turks themselves admit that had the Bulgarians followed up their success at Kirk-Kilisse they would have reached Constantinople before them. (Cf. Sherif Pasha's „Quelques reflections sur la Guerre," p. 28) Bulgarian Head Quarters could not forgive General R. Dimitriev his brilliant victories. (Cf. V, T. Veltchev's „Towards the Pogrom").

728 The Turks had been so cowed by their defeats that their ambassador in St. Petersburgh demanded on October 22, Russia's mediation in order that the Bulgarians might not enter Constantinople. The Ministerial Council received on October 29 from the Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha an offer for the conclusion of an armisrice and preliminary peace, approved of it and transmitted it to Ferdinand who replied only on November 1, forbidding them to transmit it to the allies of Bulgaria, and only allowed this offer to be communicated to them after ordering the attack on the Tchataldja lines. The megalomania of Ferdinand may be gauged by the text of his reply: „Deeply grieved by the Grand Vizier soliciting peace, I, as leader of the victorious and indomitable Bulgarian armies encamped under the walls of Constantinople in the name and for the honour of our country forbid the government to communicate the Turkish offer to our Allies. No steps to be taken until I consult with the leaders of the army . . . no one can oppose the desire of a 300,000 army". The Bulgarian staff however, was able to restrain to some

extent Ferdinand's vanity and the Bulgarian Government was accordingly allowed to negotiate with the object of gaining time; thus, instead of submitting its terms to the Turks who were asking for peace, it asked for them to enunciate their conditions. When asked to give his approval as to the terms on which the preliminary peace was to be concluded Ferdinand kept silent and the Government, though it had received from Serbia her answer to the Turkish demands, kept on waiting for Ferdinand's condescension to send it on! In spite of the fact that General Fitchev was opposed to an attack being delivered on the Tchataldja lines, Ferdinand, having made up his mind that he must enter Constantinople, ordered General Savov to launch an assault. The latter was bound to humour his master because his fate depended solely on his good will. In his late capacity of War Minister he had been gravely inculpated and was awaiting trial. According to the law, he ought not to have been placed on activve service until he had been amnestied by the Sobranye, for his nomination to the post of assistant commander-in chief paralysed the prosecution against him.

On November 5, after the failure of the attack on the Tchatatdja positions Tsar Ferdinand wired to the Government to accept the Turkish offer. The Bulgarian delegates were not empowered to conclude peace, but only an armistice, for Ferdinand still cherished the plan of entering Constantinople.

The Government had notified him that he was free to renew operations against Turkey if he so approved. When the armistice was finally signed by Turkey with Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro-Greece refused to sign before she occupied Yannina — the whole of European Turkey, except the four towns of Adrianople, Constantinople Scutari, and Yannina, were in the possession of the Balkan Allies. The negotiations for peace were transferred to London, where the Balkan delegates were convened owing to the simultaneous sitting of the delegates of the Great Powers. As early as December 19, the Bulgarian delegates were instructed by their Government to insist on the cession of all territory by Turkey to the west of the line Midia-Rodosto, and if necessary to break off negotiations. On December 14 the delegates were informed that the Bulgarian army was in a position to renew military operations in four to five days and that there was no reason to fear the breaking off of the negotiations. All this however, was bluff. Generel Fitchev, the head of the General Staff came to see Gueshov and reported to him that it would be senseless to expose the army by renewing the war. Gueshov immediately communistated this to the Bulgarian delegates in London, who protested at not having been informed earlier of the situation. When Ferdinand came to hear of this he expressed to Gueshov.

> "His profound indignation of the unworthy and treacherous declaration of General Fitchev, which you had the weakness to communicate to Danev. I foresee that the honour of our country has been irreparably compromised. I demand the return of our delegation from London" (Cf. Peter Todorov: "The pogroms of Bulgaria" vol. p. 158).

This will go a long way to explain the obdurate intransigeance of the Bulgarian delegates and the breaking up of the Conferance in spite of the counsels for moderation bestowed on Bulgaria from all sides. Sazonov wired to Nekludov, the Russian Minister in Sofia on January 18:

> "Sofia does not follow our advice. We shall be unable to save her from all the misfortunes whichw ill follow through her disobeying us. She does not heed our insistent warnings to avoid taking the initiative of a rupture with Turkey. A new war with Turkey will bring no advantages to Bulgaria but only sacrifices".

In spite of the uncompromising attitude of the Young Turks who had turned out the Old Turk Cabinet of Kiamil

Pasha on January 24, an arrangement with Turkey was possible as may be surmised from General Savov's reply to the Bulgarian Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, had the Bulgarians showed themselves moderate in their demands. But as Peter Todorov remarks in his most informative work on this period of Bulgarian history, cited above: "modesty and restraint were not the characteristic traits of our politicians at the time". (p. 160) And he rightly defines the resumption of hostilities on February 3, 1913 as „a war on behalf of foreign interests". After their defeat at Bulair, the Turks became more resigned to make concessions and with the pressure exerted by the Great Powers to bring the campaign to a close, there were no obstacles to the conclusion of a peace save the immoderate demands of Bulgaria, which was now claiming an oultlet on the Marmara, at Rodosto, in spite of the opposition of all the Great Powers to this extravagant demand. By the middle of February, in their earnest desire to put a stop to the war, the Great Powers were assuring Bulgaria that she could reckon on their support for securing the line Midia-Enos, but Ferdinand had not yet given up all hope to make a victorious entry into Constantinople, and the claim to Rodosto consequently would not be waived, while thousands of lives were needlessly sacrificed in undertaking an attack on Adrianople, the attribution of which to Bulgaria had already been decided by the Powers. The irrepresible lure of Constantinople seems to have utterly blinded Ferdinand and led him on to perdition, just as it did his prototype, Tsar Symeon. It was in vain that Sazonov warned the Bulgarians after the battle of Lule-Burgas not to seek to enter Constantinople as they would thereby raise innumerable difficulties, and even when Russia clearly intimated in March 1913 that she could not countenance Bulgaria obtaining an outlet on the sea of Marmara, Ferdinand and his entourage still remained obdurate.

The thwarting of Ferdinand's ambition led to the engineering of a bitter and most unjustifiable campaign among the military circles devoted to Ferdinand against Russia, in spite of the fact that Russia had done both diplomatically and materially a great deal to assist Bulgaria in her struggle against Turkey.

The outcry against Russia was provoked not only by her not countenancing Ferdinand's desire to enter Constantinople and secure an outlet at Rodosto on the Marmara, but also because Russia was unable to hinder Rumania from putting forth claims against Bulgaria. The latter pretended that the 1902 convention was in force, though the Russians had warned her that it had lapsed and that short of provoking a European war they were not in a position to exert pressure on Rumania.

After the first Bulgarian successes Rumania had begun pressing for the cession from Bulgaria of the whole quadrilateral, delimitated by the towns of Silistra, Rustchuk, Shumen and Varna, apparently as compensation for her inactivity. It was with the utmost difficulty that Russia through her intervention succeeded in whittling down these demands and settling them with the cession of Silistra only. With the temporary removal of the Rumanian menace, the Bulgarians became more exacting in their demands, and when the peace negotiations were renewed in London on April 16, progress was exceedingly slow. Both Serbia and Greece encouraged Bulgaria to make excessive demands on Turkey so as to protract the negotiations and utilise the time thus gained in strenghtening their respective positions in the territories occupied by their armies, while the Bulgarian army was engaged in facing singlehanded the Turks in Thrace.

These diplomatic intrigues finally exhausted the patience of Sir Edward Grey, who, in order fo secure the signing of the preliminary treaty had to intervene and forcibly intimate to the delegates that:

"Those who are willing to sign without any alterations should do so immediately. Those who are not disposed to sign had better leave London". 728

On May 30 the Treaty was signed, Turkey ceding all territory to the east of the Midia-Enos line to the Balkan Allies.

Long before the settlement with Turkey was arrived at, it became evident that there was a serious threat of conflict breaking out among the Allies over the spoils. The Serbians had first excited the distrust of Bulgarian circles when Passitch sent a circular letter on September 28, 1912, to Serbian representives in the European capitals, urging them to make known to the governments to which they had been accredited, that the term "Old Serbia" included the towns of Uskub, Kumanovo, Tetovo, Deber, Prilep and Ochrida. The first four of which were in the contested, and the last two in the incontested zone. It was a clear indication that certain Serbian circles did not mean to abide by the treaty and this propensity was intensified when it became evident that Austria-Hungary and Italy would not permit Serbia to secure an outlet on the Adriatic. The Serbians when they found that Bulgaria was harbouring the ambition to enter Constantinople and was for this purpose unduly protracting the war instead of concluding an advantageous peace with Turkey, suggested a revision of the Treaty in their favour. So justified did they consider their demands, and in this they were encouraged by Mr. Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, that they proceeded to expel the Bulgarian priests and schoolmasters in that part of Macedonia which according, to the Treaty was to revert to Bulgaria.

This behaviour of the Serbians naturally incensed 648 the Bulgarians, who, though hard bargainers, are in contrast with other Balkan peoples, most scrupulously strict in fulfilling any undertaking they assume, and naturally expect

648 that others should carry out their part of the bargain. Passions would certainly not have flamed up as they did if it had not been for the Macedonian immigrants in Bulgaria, who exerted themselves to their utmost to incite the Bulgarians against their allies, rejecting every idea of compromise and insisting on the integral attribution of 563] their native country to Bulgaria. It should be remembered that the Macedonians formed a most influential element in the political life of Bulgaria. They occupied commanding posts in all the branches of the administration and in the army, in which were some 800 officers of Macedonian origin, while the number of those who enlisted for service in the war against Turkey reached 15,000. They had always carried on a persistent propaganda in favour of involving Bulgaria in a war for the liberation of their country and the most arduous task of Bulgarian governments has been to bridle their attempts to brew trouble with the suzerain Power in Macedonia. Fanatically inspired by the idea of liberating their native country, they were utterly deaf to all counsels of prudence. Having been driven away from their native land their sole aspiration was to see it liberated so that they might return to it. Their uncompromising spirit may be gauged by the attitude of D. Rizov (the Bulgarian diplomatic agent in Rome at the time, and later nominated to the same post in Berlin), which is revealed in the Report of the Parliamentary Commision of Inquiry, vol. I p. 455. He wired to Gueshov on April 25, 1913, not to concede anything to the Serbs and repulse them to the north of the Shar mountains even though this was to be achieved through a war with both Serbians and Greeks. Other Macedonians did not hesitate to threaten both Danev and Ferdinand with death whenever the former showed himself inclined to accept Russia's arbitration. There were hotheads even among the Bulgarians, like the national poet

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TSAM KORIA

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A PLOUGHMAN

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[facing p. 385]

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Vazov, who published a fiery poem invoking eternal damnation on "the hand which would sign away Macedonia."

The unpardonable error of the Bulgarians was in neglecting to come to an understanding with the Greeks, especially since Venizelos showed himself most conciliatory towards the Bulgarians and repeatedly offered to cede Cavalla to them, and only insisted, on retaining Salonica for Greece. Even Sazonov warned Bulgaria to hasten and conclude an agreement with Greece as this would facilitate him in his efforts to render Serbia more amenable to reason. The Greek Government, as early as November 18, invited Bulgaria to submit the question of the repartition of territories to the Entente Powers, but Bulgaria answered evasively. Before the dispatch of the Balkan delegates to London, Venizelos offered to meet Gueshov, but the latter declined. When the Greek Premier learnt in London that Bulgaria was claiming Salonica, he endeavoured to meet all the Bulgarian demands, and only refused to yield up that town. But the Bulgarians were unyielding on this point and not only refused to negotiate with the Greeks but even rejected Sazonov's expostulations to allow this matter to be arbitrated on. The pig-headed Danev threw all restraint to the winds and dared declare to Sazonov at St. Petersburgh on March 13, 1913, „that we shall take Salonica in spite of the opposition of Greece and Serbia." (Report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry vol. I. p. 590.) In a conversation with Izvolsky in Paris, T. Todorov, the then Minister of Finance, declared that the Bulgarian Government had decided not to resort to the services either of Russia or of the Entente Powers for arbitration with Greece, while Danev informed Isvolsky that Bulgaria would accept to resort to arbitration only in case Russia would guarantee beforehand the award of Salonica to Bulgaria. (Op. cit. vol. I. p. 481 and 493). Such intransigeance on

648 the part of the Bulgarian Ministers is explained by the fact that Ferdinand having lost all hopes of capturing Constantinople had set his heart on securing Salonica which hs declared to be the Mecca of the Bulgarians. This helped to throw the Greeks into the arms of the Serbians, to the despair of Venizelos, who was ready to make the utmost sacrifices in order to maintain the Balkan League. [1]

The secret Greco-Serbian protocol signed on May 19, which resulted, stiffened the obduracy of the Serbians and further exasperated the Bulgarians who looked on it as an open plot to deprive them of the fruits of their victory. Each side made feverish preparations for war. Gueshov in his deposition to the Commission of Inquiry (op. cit. vol. I. p. 145), asserts that prior to deciding as to whether Bulgaria was to accept arbitration the Ministerial Council convoked early in April the military chiefs in order to consult them as to whether the Bulgarian army was in a position to overcome the united forces of the Greeks and Serbians. All answered affirmatively, except General Fitchev. Venizelos likewise sounded the Greek Staff as to the chances of Bulgaria's success in a struggle against the united Serbian and Greek army and it is reported that these were assessed at 60°/o, which may account to a certain extent for his moderation. The Bulgarian Premier, from the first, did nothing to curtail the interference of the Crown in the conduct of the military operations and in the diplomatic negotiations. Instead of taking advantage of Kiamil Pasha's offer of peace on October 29, to put a stop to the war, he allowed Ferdinand to intervene and protract it needlessly, wasting thereby Bulgaria's manhood and encouraging her allies and neighbours in their desire to despoil her. He did not react when Ferdinand sent secretly a delegate to treat with the Turks in December 1912, behind the backs of the Government and without consulting it.[1] He did nothing to bridle the warlike incitings of Ferdinand to prolong the war with Turkey even when Rumania was threatening to invade **Bulgaria.** On December 28 1912 Ferdinand grandiloquently declared to his ministers: "the threats of Rumania may frighten you, but not me . . . salvation lies in our renewing military operations against Turkey", etc. All this proves that the Ministers were mere puppets in Ferdinand's hands. Even the quiescence of Gueshov did not suffice to placate Ferdinand and was tolerated only up to a certain time.

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[1] Prince Nicolas of Greece who is a confirmed adversary of Venizelos wrote in his "My fifty Years": The intolerable arrogance of Bulgarian pretentions, experienced by Greece and Serbia, brought about as a natural consequence a closer understanding between Greece and Serbia, and these cordial relations grew stronger as the Bulgarian attitude grew more agressive. Baluktsitch (the Serbian Minister in Athens) came to see me and stated the necessity of an alliance. When Venizelos returned from London he was painfully surprised. Though desiring to ward off a rupture he was averse to any secret intelligence with Serbia and was disposed to make all kinds of concessions to Bulgaria in the hope of appeasing her insatiable demands. Venizelos had shown considerable reluctance to the idea of a secret alliance with Serbia; his one desire was that of maintaining at all costs a permanent Balkan coalition". p. p. 236—244.

When he could not be coerced into emitting more strident war cries in harmony with the diapason adopted by the military orchestra under the command of the Tsar of the Bulgarians, the latter and General Savov intimated to Gueshov that he had better get out of the way and make room for an instrument capable of vibrating in response to the tunes emitted by them. Gueshov retired without uttering a warning or a protest, apparently pleased at being relieved of such responsibilities for which he was obviously not cut out, and with the advent of Danev, whose intractability and pig-headedness have seldom been equalled, every moderating influence in Bulgaria disappeared. The perusal of the books [1] which best describe how Bulgaria was driven into the maelstrom of the second Balkan war under the direction imparted to her policy by her maleficent ruler and his crew of hellhags, makes exceedingly sad reading. Such utter lack of αἰδώς (moderation), and consideration for the feelings, claims, and rights of other men, such ὕβρις (arrogance) was bound to bring on the inevitable νέμεσις (retribution) and the denouement was a tragedy worthy of Aeschylus and his immoral theology, for the ire of the Gods vented itself on the innocent, while the culprits escaped scatheless in order to repeat their sinister exploits. Hardly had Danev been nominated as Premier on June 2, than he started bombarding the Russian Government with his impudent notes:

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[1] It would appear that Ferdinand offered to sign an alliance with Turkey in order to chain down the Serbs, and this was mentioned by the German Emperor in a telegram to the German Foreign Office.

> "The full application of the Treaty by Serbia is the sole means of avoiding war". "If Serbia does not accept the Treaty, war is inevitable". "If Russia does not force Serbia to accept the terms of the Treaty, Bulgaria declines all responsibility for the consequences".

The culminating point of this spate of insolence was reached on June 22 when the Tsar of Russia was informed that he was given seven days within which to issue his arbitral decision. Dr. A. Ghirghinov in his "National Catastrophe", p. 352—366 unequivocally recounts how the attack of June 29 which precipitated the second Balkan war, was staged. It was an effort to "Copenhagen" the Serbian and Greek armies, somewhat after the manner Canning dealt with the Danish fleet in 1807. A paralysing blow was to be dealt simultaneously at both the adversaries and certain strategical points seized on the very day the Tsar of Russia was timed to issue his verdict which naturally would be influenced thereby, but if contrary to expectations, the award had gone against Bulgaria, then the situation created would be such that she could dispense with the necessity of bowing to an unfavourable decision. On June 28, Danev was still undecided as to his going to St. Petersburgh. On the 30th, he handed the Bulgarian memoir to Nekludov, the Russian Minister in Sofia, with the request that it be forwarded at the earliest, and made it known that he was ready to leave for Russia on the following day. This was wired to the Bulgarian Legations in Paris, London, Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburgh. It was a diplomatic move to mask Danev's real intentions and minimise his responsibilities for the starting of military operations. The order to begin the attack was issued on June 28 with the consent of the Cabinet, otherwise Danev's change of view within two days concerning his visiting St. Petersburgh is incomprehensible. He only decided to go when he had made sure that the attack had been launched, and that the successes he was discounting would force the Tsar of Russia to support Bulgaria's standpoint. For this reason the Cabinet, which knew what was going on took no action when the Greek and Serbian verbal notes of protest against the Bulgarian attack were delivered to it on June 30, and it was only on the following day when it was advised that the 4th Bulgarian army did not attain its objectives that it took notice of them. Dr. Ghirginov depicts how Danev spent the day of June 30 in hiding a few miles out of Sofia at the headquartes of the 3rd army corps.

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[1] Peter Todorov's: The Pogroms of Bulgaria.— Dr. Alexander Ghirghinov's: The National Catastrophe, — V. T. Veltchev's: Towards the Pogrom.

> Danev entered the office of General Dimitriev where Colonel Jostov was also present, smiling and exclaimed: ‘Be glad, the advance has started this morning, and in two days I shall accompany Tsar Ferdinand to Salonica. There, let the Greek and Serbian Pre-

miers come and meet me, instead of their dragging me to Petersburgh... I have come here, because I am hiding to day from the representatives of the foreign Powers, because we wish to deceive them and make them believe that we did not start a war against the Greeks and Serbians, and that it was the commander-in-chief who began it without the consent of the Government'."

There were no divergences between the views of General Savov and those of the Cabinet, for on July 1 the latter wired to Savov in most polite terms, instructing him to stop the military operations without addressing him a single word of reprimand. .The Bulgarian Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, in spite of its desire to whitewash the responsible persons, had to conclude that the fatal order to attack was issued *Not without the knowledge of Danev.* General Savov testified that Ferdinand had commanded him to order the attack, and as the latter was, according to the Constitution, irresponsible, no one was prosecuted. It must not be thought that the wily Ferdinand embarked on this adventure without having received certain assurances and encouragements from Austria. General Savov affirmed to Von Mach, (Op. cit. p. 235) that Ferdinand had assured him that as soon as Bulgaria declared war on Serbia, an Austrian army corps would cross the Danube into Serbia. This is why Ferdinand made light of the Rumanian threat of invasion, and scoffingly remarked to his ministers "this may frighten you, but not me". Nor should it be forgotten that on the eve of the second Balkan war the Hungarian premier, Count Tisza, declared that Austria-Hungary stood for the independence of the Balkan States, that they were "free to choose their own methods of settling their differences and that no other State would be allowed to acquire special prerogatives in the Balkans". This resounding speech further confirmed the warlike in their decision to have recourse to the sword. M. P. Todorov/ in his "The Pogroms of Bulgaria vol. I p. 182/3, narrates at length the efforts of Austria[1] to convince the Bulgarian Cabinet that she would support the Bulgarian claim to Salonica, that Rumania would take up a friendly position, that in case of a conflict with Serbia some 50,000 Albanians would invade the latter country and that if Bulgaria showed herself disposed to cede Ochrida and Struga to Serbia, Austria would proceed to include them in Albania. On June 28, Tochev, the Bulgarian ambassador at Vienna wired to his government: „From a most authoritative source I learn that Rumania will not mobilise against Bulgaria nor will she act conjointly with Serbia and Greece against Bulgaria". That Austria was premeditating an attack on Serbia conjointly with Bulgaria becomes evident from San Giuliano's (the Italian foreign Minister) telegram to Giolitti, the Prime Minister, who was absent at the time from Rome. „Austria has informed us and Germany of her intention to take action against Serbia and describes it as defensive, hoping to establish the *casus foederis,* which I consider inapplicable I am trying to concert with Germany to prevent this action". etc.

When Austria perceived that her allies were not supporting her she was obliged to postpone her reckoning with Serbia and could not do otherwise than leave Bulgaria in the lurch That Bulgaria was following the bid of Austria had become evident from the arrogant demeanour of the upstart Danev, for obviously he was not of the stuff to hold such provocative language to

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[1] „Shortly before resigning, Gueshov sounded the Austrian Minister in Sofia, Count Tarnowski, as to what would be Austria's attitude in case of a conflict breaking out between Bulgaria and Serbia. On June 2 the same question was put to the Minister. Tarnowski read a report from Vienna according to which Austria would support Bulgaria to take all lands in Macedonia, but that she should come to an understanding with Rumania, For some of our responsible governing circles this assurance was sufficient", (op. cit. vol. II p. 91).

648 Russia if he felt himself unsupported, and Sazonov readily sensed this when he replied on June 25 to Bobtchev, the Bulgarian Minister in St. Petersburgh:

> „You are following Austria's counsels, you are free ... The Emperor did not expect an ultimatum as to a time limit in his decision in the dispute. After your declaration, expect nothing from us, forget that some responsibility may devolve on us through the Treaty of 1902".

In fact Russia had clearly intimated to Bulgaria as late as June 24, that she would not arbitrate in the Bulgaro-Serbian dispute so long as Bulgaria refused to submit to arbitration her difference with Greece (Russian Orange Book, document No. 251). Danev as late as June 28 wired to Bobtchev: „I shall negotiate alone if I come. Please do not talk of any arbitration concerning Greece." This shows that Danev had never accepted Russia's conditions and that he was playing for time. In fact the Bulgarian Cabinet had agreed on June 22 that it would accept Russian arbitration provided the Tsar agreed to issue his verdict by June 29, and within the stipulations of the Bulgaro-Serbian Treaty, and these conditions Russia declined to comply with, so that Gueshov's contention that Bulgaria had accepted the arbitration of the Tsar of Russia can not be upheld. Events would certainly have taken another turn if the arbitrator had been a more energetic person that the late Tsar Nicolas II and if he had interceded firmly and not allowed the quarrel to drag on and become envenomed.

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72! In a public lecture delivered in Sofia on April 23, 1933, General Kovatchev, the commander of the 4th Bulgarian army, which attacked the Serbians on June 29, 1913, gave some striking details which illustrate the morbid ambition which haunted Ferdinand concerning Constantinople, his abnormal treatment of his subordinates, and a narrative of the events which led to the issuing of the

fatal order to attack Though his version does not agree in all particulars with others. General Kovatchev also concluded that Danev was bound to know of what was brewing. The lecture may be summarised as follows:

The General began by narrating how Ferdinand attempted to excite the anger of the officer corps against Russia, presenting the latter as the sole obstacle to Bulgaria's securing an outlet on the sea of Marmara. In an interview which Kovatchev had on February 8, 1913, Ferdinand complained to him of Generals Savov, Nikiforov and Fitchev and made most disparaging remarks about them. At a Cabinet meeting held after the Easter holidays, all the army commanders save Fitchev expressed the opinion that the Bulgarian army was in a position to wage war on Serbia and Greece, and that while Gueshov's partisans were for a peaceful solution, Danev's supporters were warlike. General Savov related to the speaker that the conflict which arose between him and Tsar Ferdinand was due to the latter's resolve not to end the war without securing Rodosto on the Marmara Ferdinand ordered him on April 8 to write to the Prime Minister, Gueshov, in the name of the army, that it refused to conclude peace until the above object had been attained. Savov answered that he could not agree to this demand and expose the army's prestige needlessly. Ferdinand reiterated his demand which Savov again categorically rejected, whereupon Ferdinand convoked him in his presence and began reprobating him for his insubordination reviling him and accusing him of ingratitude, since he had taken him out of the dock and placed him in this high post, and instead of showing gratitude, he was discrediting him in the eyes of the army. This flow of invective put Savov out of humour and he coolly replied that when he would be tried he would not hesitate to unravel matters which would clearly reveal who of the two was responsible for the misdeeds which were being ascribed to him, after which Savov bowed and withdrew. Kovatsev met Savov again on May 31 and was told that the army was now being moved to the west in order to impress Russia, France and England into coercing Serbia to accept the Treaty stipulations, as these three Powers were most anxious to maintain the Balkan Alliance. Concerning the issuing of the order to attack, General Kovatsev affirms that both Ferdinand and Savov did not want to provoke war, but that they were seeking to impress not only the Serbians and Greeks, but also the Tsar of Russia, in order that the latter might arbitrate in favour of Bulgaria. Savov had not informed Danev of the intended attack, but he supposed that

Tsar Ferdinand had done so. Savov could hardly assume that th two had not acted in concert, for Danev was kept imformed of matters of even a more delicate nature, so that he could not be ignorant of what was happening, since Palace circles were cognisant, and they would have reported it to him. Another proof that Danev was acquainted with what was occurring, was the telegrams which he addressed on the morning of June 30 to the Bulgarian representatives abroad to the effect that the attack had been started by the Serbians and Greeks and not by the Bulgarians, and secondly the order Danev transmitted simultaneously to the military censors to prevent the publication of any news concerning what was happening at the front.

When the attack miscarried, the Cabinet attempted to disculpate itself by showing that it knew nothing of the attack. After consulting with the Russian Minister in Sofia, it ordered the suspension of hostilities, without making sure whether the Serbian and Greek armies would condescend to do likewise. Russia promised to put a stop to the fratricidal war if Bulgaria would accept the territory between the Bregalnitsa and Vardar, the Belassitsa Mountains and the Struma, with the towns of Kotshana, Radovitch Pehtsevo, Drama, Cavalla and possibly Serres, but Danev refused and resigned, declaring that „his policy had gone bankrupt". His resignation and the advent of the Austrophile Cabinet of Radoslavov brought about the failure of Russia's effort to help Bulgaria out of the mess she had got in. Tsar Ferdinand immediately suspended General Savov from his functions for having obeyed the injunctions of the Government. The Serbians who were so long spoiling for a fight, now that they had been offered an excellent justification for doing so [1] rejected all offers for an armistice, and turned a deaf ear to Russia's injunctions 648 counterattacked the Bulgarians who had been ordered to 721 cease fighting and badly mauled them. It took some time for the Bulgarian army to recover from these initial rebuffs, but in a few weeks under the able leadership of general R. Dimitriev, the situation had been retrieved. The Bulgarians were advancing on Nisch and threatening to cut the communications of the Serbian army in Macedonia, while the Greek army seemed as if it would suffer a Sedan in the Kresna defile but all these efforts of the troops were unavailing. The Rumanian army unrestrained by Russia, which could not allow Serbia to be crushed, had invaded Bulgaria and was advancing unopposed on Sofia, while Turkey, following the example set by Rumania, reoccupied Adrianople. Bulgaria was forced to capitulate and throw herself on the mercy of her vindictive enemies.

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[1] The Serbian military circles had formally declared to the Serbian Government that they had definitely resolved to retain the lands they occupied and that they would not yield them up. Proclamations declaring war on Bulgaria in which the date was left blank were seized on Serbian prisoners and this shows that the Serbians were contemplating to declare war on Bulgaria and were waiting for a favourable occasion; the Bulgarians merely forestalled

By the ensuing Treaty of Bucarest signed on August 728 10, Bulgaria was deprived of all share in Macedonia save the upper part of the valley of the river Struma, and received as her share of the spoils wrung from Turkey, a short stretch of coast line of the Aegean, between the rivers Mesta and Maritsa with its hinterland, the mountainous region of the Rhodopes. She was obliged to cede to Rumania the whole of the southern Dobrudja in spite of the fact that this region of 7609 sq. klm. with a population of 290000 souls contained only 2.2% of Rumanians One would have expected that both the Balkan States and the Great Powers would have at least exerted themselves a little in order to secure for Bulgaria that part of Thrace up

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an attack on their allies. Sazonov in his „Fateful Years", p. 95, admits that it was Russia who prevented Serbia from opening hostilities: „The army was confident of success. I replied that I did not consider myself in a position to offer strategic advice, but from a political no less than a moral point of view, such a policy would cause irreparable damage to Serbia, damage for which no military success could compensate her.

to the Midia—Enos line, which had been ceded by Turkey to the Balkan Allies, as this territorial acquisition might console to a certain extent the Bulgarians for their losses in other directions. But in her hour of need and humiliation no one would do anything for Bulgaria. Only Russia, in spite of the provocations and insults she had received from the puny politicians of Sofia, endeavoured to succour Bulgaria by offering to coerce Turkey into evacuating that part of Thrace which she had ceded by the Treaty of London, provided another Power seconded her in her efforts But none would do so, not even England who had a moral obligation to insist on the upholding of a Treaty concluded under her sponsorship. Sir Edward Grey was busy negotiating with the Grand Vizier over the Bagdad railway, and the Turks had to be humoured, for economic considerations take precedence over moral in politics. Dr Seton Watson, in his „Europe in the melting pot" p. 96, rightly remarks:

> This abandonment of Bulgaria, rankled fatally in the minds of king Ferdinand and his statesmen, and explains as much as anything else, the distrust with which they have regarded British diplomacy, and which finally decided them to adhere to the Central Powers".

Even the Greeks attempted to create additional difficulties for the Bulgarians. They evacuated Western Thrace without waiting for the Bulgarians to take over the administration and encouraged the local Turks to set up an autonomous government with the purpose of eventually transferring this region to Turkey, Politis[1], that pillar of the Geneva Assembly, in order to win the goodwill of Turkey, advised in August 1913 the Turkish representative at Berne that it would be politic to take advantage of Bulgaria's difficulties in order to expel from Thrace the Bulgarian element which would always be a menace to the retention of this province by Turkey. This „humane" advice was communicated in code from Berne on August 21 to the Grand Vizier, Said Halil, and promptly acted upon; a large section of the Bulgarian population being uprooted and driven out from Eastern Thrace into Bulgaria. 728

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[1] This was revealed in the Bulgarian Chamber on March 29 1928, by the Macedonian deputy Kulishev. Greece may well ponde over the advisability of retaining in her employ such an astute an clever personality utterly devoid of moral scruples, whom S Cosmi in his „L'Entente et la Grèce" (vol II. p. 133 & 193-4) has not hesi tated to denounce as a turncoat and a falsifier of dispatches an documents. Sir Basil Thompson in his „Allied Secret Service i

The indifference shown by her former Allies and the Powers of the Entente for Bulgaria's rights in Thrace, constrained her to come to terms with Turkey and even to begin negotiations with her for the conclusion of a treaty of alliance, the object of which was to attack Greece. In the autumn of 1913 General Savov was dispatched to Constantinople to conduct these negotiations and arrive at an arrangement concerning the delimitation of the Bulgaro-Turkish frontier. It may be affirmed that the disregard of Bulgaria's rights in Thrace imparted the first impetus to the policy of collaboration between Bulgaria and Turkey. Had Russia, on the other hand been supported in her attempt to champion Bulgaria's claims against Turkey, it is certain that there would have been little cause for Bulgaria being drawn into Turkey's orbit, which paved the way for her adhesion to the Central Alliance. 648

Tsar Ferdinand hastened to replace Danev by Radoslavov, supported by Tontchev and Ghenadiev. Radoslavov on June 22 had convoked a big public meeting, which passed a resolution in favour of declaring war on Serbia

Greece", also refers to „the mischievous tendency to distortion which characterised that gentleman". p. 103. The advice Politis so readily proffered to Turkey, was acted upon not only in connection with the Bulgarians, but later also with regards the Greeks, and Greece has to a certain extent to thank Politis for the million and a half of hapless refugees who were dumped a few years later on her soil.

and Greece. These three politicians, in an open letter dated July 5, 1913, addressed to Ferdinand, had declared: „We think to-day, as we thought then. that the salvation of our State can only be found in a policy of intimate friendship with Austria-Hungary“ This was a clear avowal that Bulgaria would henceforth pursue an Austrophile policy. This was rendered possible by the lack of coherence among the remaining political parties, which at that critical moment declined to sink their differences and impose on Ferdinand a national policy

THE WORLD WAR

The mischievous and equivocal declaration made by Danev on resigning, namely „that our policy has gone bankrupt“ was interpreted by all in Bulgaria as a public avowal that the friendliness displayed to Russia was the cause of the disaster which befell Bulgaria. Such a statement coming from the leader of the most Russophile party in the country helped to lend colour to the insinuations circulated by the circles devoted to Tsar Ferdinand, to the effect that Russia had sought to thwart the realisation of Bulgaria's aspirations. Danev's policy, it is true, had failed disastrously, but the cause was that he had swerved from the Russophile policy he had always declared to have pursued. This deviation, however, he would not acknowledge, as it implied his assumption of a great share in Bulgaria's catastrophe. In order to exculpate himself, he preferred to throw the onus of the disaster on the pro-Russian policy which he pretended to have followed devotedly. This pusillanimous attitude helped to intensify the eclipse which the Russophile elements suffered after the Balkan wars, and facilitated Tsar Ferdinand's task of maintaining in power the Radoslavov Cabinet, composed of some of the worst blackguards Bulgaria had produced This Ministry was entirely out of sympathy with the nation, and in spite of all the terrorism it exerted repeatedly at the elections, was unable to secure a majority at the polls. Thus at the elections, which took place in December 1913, the votes cast for the Government and the Opposition numbered respectively 202,363 and 329,320. Unfortunately the Opposition was divided into seven antagonistic groups and was unable to impose itself, in spite of the fact that it had 110 deputies against 94 belonging to the Government in the Sobranye. Radoslavov took advantage to dissolve the Chamber and to hold fresh elections early in March 1914, after having recourse to an artifice, that of extending the franchise to the inhabitants of the territories allocated to Bulgaria at the conclusion of the Balkan wars This was a clear infringement of the Constitution, for the incorporation of this territory had not yet been voted by the Legislative Assembly. This stratagem permitted Radoslavov's supporters to secure the return of 126 deputies to the new Sobranye, while the Opposition deputies numbered only 119, though the votes cast were 345,730 for the Governent and 418,058 for the Opposition. Among the Goverment deputies were forty Moslems, thirteen of whom had been returned from the newly annexed territories in Thrace and who were subservient tools of the Young Turkish party holding power in Constantinople, and who naturally were able to exert their influence on Radoslavov and impose on him the adoption of a pro-Turkish attitude. The conclusion of a loan in Germany, further strengthened the ascendancy the Austro-Germans were beginning to exert, and though it has been repeatedly asseverated that no political clauses were attached to the conclusion of the loan, yet it may be assumed that certain tacit assurances were given. This is corroborated by a statement made by von Tschirsky to the Bulgarian Ambassador in

648 Vienna, which is recorded in the Bulgarian Orange Book (Document 735): „Even when the loan was advanced to you, it was understood that your policy would assume an unhesitating course“. A similar affirmation is ascribed to Radoslavov who assured the German ambassador in Sofia on July 15, 1914, after the voting of the loan, that the Cabinet felt itself secure and that it would begin to plan Bulgaria's attachment to the Triple Alliance. („Kautsky's documents vol I. p. 162). While Peter Todorov affirms:

> „The political character of the financial assistance secured from German capital is emphasized by the instructions sent by our Finance Minister when he directed our Minister in Vienna (in 1913) to request the Austrian Banks not to charge more that 8% interest because the service rendered was also of a political character“. (op. cit. vol II p. 229).

6[illegible] The new Chamber[1] hastened to appoint a Parliamentary commission to inquire into the activities of the Gueshov and Danev Cabinets. The government accused them of being responsible of the misfortunes which befell Bulgaria in the late wars This was clearly a clever ruse of Radoslavov aimed at discrediting his political opponents and curtailing their activities, for he himself being devoid of all popular support, was fearful lest his opponents by arousing the slumbering consciousness of the nation should come to dislodge him from office in which he was maintaining himself uniquely with the patronage of the Crown. Radoslavov was not even sure of all his supporters. The Stambulovists, comprising 28 deputies, and the second group in numbers supporting the Goverment, was headed by Ghenadiev, one of the most clever and unscrupulous politicians Bulgaria has had, who was playing a double game. The Stambulovists had been indicted for a series of illegalities committed by them while in office during the period 1903—8, and were awaiting trial. Radoslavov, whenever Ghenadiev showed any sign of resisting the pro-German policy which was being foisted on the Bul-

[1] Elected in December 1913, see vol. 116,
[illegible]



THE RILA MOUNTAINS

THE RILA AND ONE OF ITS LAKES

SHEPHERDS IN THE MAKING

[facing p. 401]

garian people, used the expedient of intimidation and by threatening Ghenadiev and his friends that he would order the resumption of their trial, coerced them into submission with this handy weapon. This state trial eventually took place, and several Ministers, among whom were Generals Ratso Petrov and Savov, Gudev, Ghenadiev, Payakov, etc, were arraigned.

The most piquant fact revealed in its course was that the Finance Minister Payakov, in collusion with the delegate of the French bondholders in Bulgaria, Bousquet, [1] whose mission was supposed to consist in looking after their interests, an employee in the French Legation, and the chief secretary of the Ministry, had conspired to defraud the Bulgarian exchequer. (T. G. Vlaikov, „Functionaries and Rulers." p. 135).

After the signing of the Treaty of Bucarest, Ferdinand did everything to foster the campaign of mutual recrimination which broke out among Bulgarian politicians each of whom endeavoured to ascribe to his adversaries the major part of responsibility for what had happened. After the loss of prestige he had suffered, Ferdinand grasped that his sole chance of maintaining himself on the

[1] There is nothing surprising in this, for the venality of the French politician does not lag behind that of his Bulgarian confrére; It may even be affirmed that the latter has simply copied the former. In the winter of 1934 some leading functionaries of the French Legation in Sofia were apprehended carrying on an extensive smuggling enterprise. Early in 1935, a former French Premier, Francois Marshall, was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for embezzlement, and Mr. Sisley Huddlestone, writing in the Contemporary Review about recent events in France, (January 1935) affirms: „the complacency and complicity of Ministers, of Deputies, of Senators, in crooked financial affairs, has been vastly increased., official or near-official connections and approval have made possible the career, of notorious swindlers. It has been shown that the police of the Sureté are involved. That there are lawyers who use their influence in Parliament to obtain immunity for their clients is amply proved".

661 throne lay in sowing discord among his subjects, and he devoted himself wholeheartedly to achieve this aim by encouraging mutual distrust and enmity both in political and military circles. He incited General Fitchev to murder General Savov, he upbraided Minister Ghenadiev for not permitting the murder of Minister T. Todorov, while he condemned the war Minister K. Naidenov for not arranging the assassination of Ghenadiev. (Protocols of State Trials pp. 596-601-979) While he[7] thus set his politi-
648 cians and officers by the ears, he applied himself to come to a close understanding with the Central Empires, these being the sole Powers which would condescend to support him in his morbid desire to wreak vengeance on Serbia and Russia, which in his imagination had dared interfere with the realisation of his ambitious aims. During the prolonged stay he made in Austria-Hungary in the autumn of 1913, it seems that the Emperor Francis-Joseph must have given him assurances that he would soon have an opportunity of retrieving his ill-luck. Ferdinand in exchange pledged himself to support the policy of the Central Powers. This accounts for his determination to persist in the pro-Austrian policy he had initiated, and in maintaining the Radoslavov Cabinet, the only one amenable to such a course, in spite of the repeated rebuffs it suffered when the electorate was consulted. On March 1, 1929, the *Mir* published an article signed by I. St. Gueshov, a former Bulgarian diplomat. who affirmed that in the autumn of 1913 Ferdinand at Vienna, and General Savov and Natsevitch at Constantinople, had promised Francis-Joseph, and the Grand Vizier, that whatever would happen, Bulgaria would support the Central Powers and Turkey, and Gueshov even affirms that draft treaties to this effect were signed. That the Emperor of Austria fully relied on these promises of Tsar Ferdinand becomes obvious from the handwritten letter the former addressed to the Kaiser

[7] [i.e. Tsar Ferdinand — Analyst]

on July 4. 1914. and which he entrusted to Count Hoyos to convey to Germany. In it an important role was assigned to Bulgaria as a thoroughly reliable element in the impending struggle with Serbia[1]. (Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Documents 1919 № 1) As soon as Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, the Emperor called upon Ferdinand to co-operate at once with him as if he were a trusty ally, and Ferdinand hastened to instruct Radoslavov to begin negotiations for the conclusion of an alliance with the Central Empires, as is confirmed by a report addressed to the German Government by the German Minister in Sofia on August 2, 1914. (Die deutschen dokumente zum Kriegsansbruch Vol. III and IV Nos. 673 and 697) These negotiations were pursued and Bulgaria given a free hand to annex all territory she claimed from those of her neighbours who had not adhered to the Central Alliance; while Radoslavov and his colleague Tontchev, gave assurances that Bulgaria would not undertake anything against Rumania if the latter performed her duty to her allies. (Kautsky's Diplomatic Documents Vol. III. pp. 55 & 143) On October 9, 1914, Radoslavov sounded the War Minister, Fitchev, as to the conclusion of a military convention which was to complete the Treaty of Alliance, and a few weeks later Ferdinand hinted to the same person that he ought to learn German because Bulgaria's place was with the Central Alliance. (Protocols of the State Trial of the Radoslavov Cabinet p. 453.) The reason why Bulgaria was not involved in the struggle at that early date may be inferred from a telegram addressed by Radoslavov to the

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[1] The following passage from it is indicative of the reliance Austria placed in the Radoslavov Cabinet: „The efforts of my Government must in future be directed towards the isolation and diminution of Serbia. The first step in this direction should be to strengthen the position of the present Bulgarian Government, in order that Bulgaria whose real interests are identical with our own. may be preserved from a relapse into a Russophile policy".

11: Logio S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

648 Bulgarian Minister in Berlin in December 1914. (Bulgarian Orange Book, Document No. 593)...

> „It is not yet time for Bulgaria to infringe her neutrality, because materially she is weak, and also because our military supplies are not being delivered, even Austria-Hungary having placed an embargo on our rifles. Greece and Rumania, as in 1913, are awaiting our intervention in order to attack us".

Though no formal alliance was signed until September 6, 1915, Bulgaria's adhesion to the Central Alliance was a foregone conclusion, and this is confirmed by her Government's divergent attitude towards each of the two groups of Powers. While everything was done to facilitate the passage through Bulgarian territory of army supplies destined to Turkey, Russian requests for dispatching help to Serbia through Bulgaria were rejected on the plea that they would constitute an infringement of Bulgarian neutrality. The protocols of the State Trial of the Radoslavov Cabinet abound with evidence as to the systematic smuggling through of armaments to Turkey. The act of accusation itself cites an official letter of Radoslavov in which he affirms that at the beginning of 1915 relations between Turkey and Bulgaria were not only friendly but those of two allies. Richard Von Mach in his „Aus Bewegter Balkanzeit", affirms that these States had bound themselves to assist each other against an attack by any Balkan State, on August 1914. And minister Pechev in his diary, notes, August 7, 1914:

> „My colleagues remained in the Ministerial Council until after 1. a, m. and together with Talat and Halil Bey signed a treaty between Bulgaria and Turkey".

Diplomatist of the Central Alliance in their conversations with their Bulgarian colleagues refer to a concluded pact between their respective countries, much to the surprise of the latter who ignore, or pretend to be ignorant of it. (Bulgarian Orange Book. vol. I. Documents 772, 782, 799, 860, 998) Both Ferdinand and Radoslavov did their utmost to withhold from the public all knowledge of the contents of the offers the Entente Powers were making, while they persistently magnified any corresponding offer the Central Powers would put forth.

In spite of the pro-Russian feelings of the masses, which Savinsky, the Russian Minister in Sofia repeatedly alludes to in his „Recollections of a Russian Diplomat", pp. 203 and 250, the national will remained voiceless, for the political parties, the function of which was to give expression to it, were too disunited and too absorbed in the campaign they were conducting of mutual recrimination and vituperation. Whatever a politically untrained community could do[1] to prevent itself being drawn into a struggle against its will, appears to have been accomplished, but the masses, devoid of capable leaders and receiving no outside support, had to bow down before the organised forces of the State and follow meekly along the path that was being traced for them. Only on one occasion did Bulgaria's rulers vacillate in their resolution to side with Germany, and that was in the spring of 1915, when there was a fair prospect of the Dardanelles being forced, and when the Russian successes in Galicia made even the most Germanophile among them begin to entertain serious doubts as to the invincibility of the Central Powers. At that crucial moment Radoslavov intimated unequivocally to Savinsky that Bulgaria would side with the Entente if she were aided in taking this step.

> „I sent to Sazonov a personal telegram on April 7, stating: Radoslavov assures me he was only waiting for a favourable moment to join in with Russia.... he then gave me to understand that he

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[1] For a fuller narrative of the events leading up to Bulgaria's intervention in the World War and after, see the writer's, „Bulgaria, problems and politics", and his contribution to „Bulgaria and Rumania", in the Series of the „Nations of To.Day", published by *Hodder and Stoughton.*

would prefer Bulgaria to be forced into action and the Government to be placed before an accomplished fact. Seeing what he was driving at, I asked him what the Bulgarian Government's answer would be if a definite reply-„yes or no" was now demanded from them by the Allies? To this he said that he would answer 'yes'. I then asked him to what extent the words of his brother-in-law, (a member of the Nationat Assembly) had heen correctly reported to me. namely, that if the Russians landed on the Black Sea coast .and the French and British at Dede-Agatch, Bulgaria would immedietely join them? To that Radoslavov answered: „Two landings would be unnecessary, the Russian landing should suffice. Knowing it was not directed against us, we would accept it gladly and leave the details to be settled later on of a common accord.'" (Recollections of a Russian Diplomat. Op. cit. p. 259/61).

What was most symplomatic was that Ferdinand repeatedly dispatched his private secretary and Count Marshal to affirm to Savinsky that „Bulgaria was only waiting for the moment she could repay to Russia her debt of gratitude". The Russian Minister further wrote:

> „Seeing the reversal of attitude that had taken place both in the Palace and in Government spheres, I telegraphed to Sazonov on April 10, that just now we have reached the psychological moment when it is necessary to act,.., I believe that further hasitation might be dangerous to success... the position of the King and of the Government would be made easier by the accomplished fact, whereas the people and the army would enthusiastically hail the appearance of Russian uniforms. The presence of a comparatively small contingent would draw out the whole country against Turkey". etc. Op. Cit.).

Unfortunately Savinsky's recommendations were not followed. Sazonov at the prompting of his western Allies requested his Minister in a telegram dated April 20, to shut off steam: „Conforming to the desire of Delcassé refrain from the prescribed action pending further instructions".

At that critical period Radoslavov even approached the late Mr. Bourchier and commissioned him to transmit to the British Foreign office an offer for Bulgaria's co-operation on terms remarkable for their moderation. The draft of this telegram was published in Lady Grogan's „The Life J. D. Bourchier", p. 165:

> „If three Powers give mandate Bulgaria occupation Serbian Macedonia to line treaty 1912 with guarantee against molestation part Rumania Greece Bulgarian premier declares Bulgaria would place forces our disposal would acquiesce similar guarantees to Rumania Greece (against Bulgarian aggression) thus liberating respectively Rumania for invasion Transylvania Greece for operations Asia Minor".

Instead of taking the bull by the horns however, the propitious moments were allowed to pass by irremediably:

> „Entente diplomacy was placing great hopes on the impending Italian intervention and on the success of the Dardanelles campaign. Under these circumstances it felt in a position to dispense with the help of the Balkan States, and accordingly treated them with scant courtesy. The prospect of acting without the co-operation of these greedy, clamorous, intemperate, would-be customers must certainly have proved alluring to many politicians". (the writer's „Bulgaria, problems and Politics", p. 117.)

According to an article which appeared in the *Revue de France* (September 15. 1933) „L'intervention Bulgare dans la Grande Guérre" Russia had decided to land troops at Burgas, this plan having been approved by Sazonov and Delcassé, but Sir Edward Grey expressed himself on March 19, 1915, that this was undesirable without Bulgaria's explicit consent, and that Sir Edward persisted in his opposition even when Radoslavov had declared to the Russian ambassador in Sofia that Bulgaria would close her eyes to such action. The attitude of Sir Edward at this period is indefensible, his angle of vision must have been utterly distorted if he came to consider that it did not matter substantially on which side Bulgaria threw her weight. And to all appearance he displayed supreme indifference for Bulgaria when she came knocking at our door. A few phrases from the note he transmitted to Sofia on April 15 1915 (Bulgarian Orange Book vol. I No. 801) could hardly be surpassed in effectiveness as a damper:

> „Le Gouvernement Britannique avait reçu des indications que Sa Majesté Ferdinand regardait la Triple Entente avec malveillance et il ne pouvait ni inviter le concours de la Bulgarie ni formuler des offres précises avant de recevoir une assurance définitive que le roi des Bulgares et le Gouvernement bulgare étaient prêts à s'allier avec la Triple Entente sous des conditions raisonnables."

The Bulgarian Minister in London having expressed certain apprehensions as to an eventual hostile attitude of Greece and Rumania towards Bulgaria, Sir Edward concluded his dispatch with this patronising assurance:

> „L'Angleterre désirait une entente balkanique: elle ne désirait pas une nouvelle guèrre balkanique. Tant que le Gouvernement bulgare se montrerait bien disposé envers l'Angleterre, le Gouvernement Britannique refuserait de s'associer à des dispositions hostiles à la Bulgarie".

Prior to the receipt of this impressive diplomatic missive, Ferdinand had sent an autograph letter to King George, probably in order to confirm Radoslavov's overtures, but according to Dr. Seton Watson, it was not answered, and the distinguished historian appositely depicts what ensued by remarking:

> „For the next six months Sir Edward Grey played with the idea of a Serbo-Bulgarian Agreement; and after the Russian retreat and the Suvla Bay disasters, the Bulgarians responded by playing with Sir Edward Grey". (Europe in the Melting pot. 110).

It was a great misfortune for Great Britain that at this critical period of the war her Foreign Secretary should have been so ill advised as to have deliberately cold-shouldered both Bulgaria and Greece when they were most anxious to join us, and from prospective willing allies to have turned them into open or covert enemies. When reading Sir Edward's „Twenty five Years", a student of history is astounded at the lameness of the defence he puts in for his policy towards these two States. (Vol. II pp. 172 and 197) and marvels at the utter ignorance of local conditions which he displays. A Minister of Foreign Affairs should know better than affirm that:

> „Bulgaria had in 1913... been deprived of any outlet on the Aegean", (vol. II p. 174). „Bulgaria wanted a port on the Aegean and her claims in Macedonia". (vol. II p. 194).

For Bulgaria had a stretch of coast line on the Aegean at the time. One however, can not help admiring Sir Edward's frankness when he proceeds to admit that the inducements offered to Bulgaria at a later period for her participation in the war on our side were inadequate:

> „The utmost, then, that we could say to Bulgaria was, that if it came to be in our power to win great gains for Serbia, we should make it a condition of her acquiring those gains that she should concede what we thought fair claims of Bulgaria. This still left it open to Serbia to say that she would rather not have the new gains that give up Monastir". Vol. II p, 197.

Serbian intractability, however, to which allusion is made in the above text should to a large measure be ascribed to the concessions which were being made to Italy at the time. Lloyd George in his „War Memoirs" Vol. I p. 400 cites a letter of Mr. George Trevelyan dated Sofia Jan. 15 1915, in which that eminent historian affirms:

> „In general, however, we can say from numerous conversations with Serbians from the Crown Prince downwards that the more Yugoslavia and Adriatic expansion are dwelt upon the more Serbians will be willing to concede to (in ?) Macedonia".

An Sazonov likewise. wrote on the subject in his „Fateful Years". p. 264:

> „It cost me a great effort to sacrifice to the advantage of the Italian Alliance the interest of the Serbian people, whose desires could be realised only through the Great War. Serbia would, in any case have an outlet to the sea, but a considerable part of the Serbian population would be excluded from their own country"

BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

Had the Entente, early in 1915 attempted to win over Bulgaria and even Greece instead of Italy, it would have found that this could have been done with less concessions, fewer difficulties, and incomparably more conclusive results. Within a week of its conclusion, the Treaty of London, signed on April 28 1915 became known to the Serbians, and they were justly furious at the transfer of Jugoslav territory behind their backs. M. Passitch declared that Serbians were being treated worse than Africans.

The coolness with which the Bulgarian advances were received in London confirmed the Bulgarians in their doubts as to our sincerity concerning our alleged readiness to award Constantinople and the Straits to Russia. They came to infer that our aloofness was dictated by duplicity, and that secretly we were doing our level best to prevent such a consummation, and that we really did not wish to see them intervene on our side. This view probably gained ground also through the attitude of our official representative, Sir Henry Bax-Ironside, of whom Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. D. Napier wrote in his „Experiences of a Military Attache in the Balkans" (p. 28): „was of opinion at this time that it was not only impossible but also undesirable to win her (Bulgaria) over to our side." Minister Pechev, the only honest person in the Radoslavov Ministry, has two entries in his diary concerning Sir Henry Bax-Ironside, which throw much light on the mentality of Bulgarian official circles and which permit us to grasp the beliefs they were then entertaining about British official policy, February 4 (O. S.) 1915:

> „Bax-Ironside stated to Radoslavov that Sir Edward Grey was content with Bulgarian neutrality, and he added that personally he considered that Bulgaria should not let herself be influenced by advice emanating from Russia and France aiming at involving her in the war".

THE WORLD WAR

June 26, (O. S.) 1915: „Bax-Ironside leaves for England. After expressing several times England's desire to see Bulgaria participate in the war, he privately, and intimately spoke to Radoslavov that Bulgaria did well to remain neutral. He gave the same advice to Agrarian deputies who came to visit him".[1]

From this it was easy for the Bulgarians to infer that so far as England was concerned, Byron's exhortations still held good: —

„Better still serve the haughty Mussulman.
Than swell the Cosaque's prowling caravan;"

The Bulgarians who had seen their country dismemberd in 1878 at the instigation of Great Britain, in order that Russia might not secure an outpost towards Constantinople, could not come to believe that in 1915 England would so completely alter her point of view as to permit and even facilitate her rival's instalment at such a post of vantage. Even the failure of the Dardanelles expedition was not interpreted as such in Bulgaria, and to-day there are intelligent Bulgarians who still uphold that it was a staged up affair and that the British really never seriously tried to force the Straits, because they did not wish to hand them over to Russia.[2]

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[1] Madol in his „Ferdinand of Bulgaria" p. 285 writes: „Ironside feared Anglo-Russian complications on account of Constantinople if the Bulgarians were to aid in the conquest of Turkey. Thus to the surprise of Radoslavov, Ironside advised him, when the Entente issued their ultimatum to Bulgaria, not to make a rash decision as no one could foretell the issue of the war; he added that Bulgaria was not in a fit state to undertake a war. Radoslavov, who was unable to explain the Briton's visit, consulted the leaders of the Opposition. The latter mobilised the French and Russian representatives who protested against Ironside's action, and obtained his recall. Whether Ironside's attitude has been dictated by Downing Street or not, this incident shows the nature of British thoughts and misgivings with regard to Constantinople".

[2] It seems strange, but the attitude of certain British circles towards Turkey during the war had something mysterious about it.

This conviction which was largely held in Bulgaria, and which we were unable to shake subsequently, when we started rather late in the day to win over Bulgaria with offers, explains how we helped to pour grist into Ferdinand's mill and facilitate his task of involving his country on the side of Germany. Far from being justified in charging Bulgaria with duplicity, as some persons have done, it is rather the Bulgarians who with some apparent justification might accuse us of inducing them into a fatal error. This belief in our insincerity was further confirmed by an article in the organ of the Russian War Ministry, the „*Ruski Invalid*" in August 1915, in which bitter complaints were made against the British and French for their inactivity at a time when the Russian front in Poland was collapsing under the hammer blows delivered by Hindenburg and Ludendorf. Russia, it was declared had sacrificed the flower of her troops in Masuria, in order to prevent the fall of Paris in 1914, but now her allies did nothing to succour her in her hour of need. This was an excellent opportunity offered to the pro-Germans and they made the most of it to convince the Bulgarians that the Western Powers were leaving Russia to exhaust herself in order that at the end of the war

Mr. Lloyd George in his War Memoirs, Vol. IV, p. 2247 writes: „It was part of the War Office game to pretend that the Turks had formidable forces with ample reserves and if they were attacked seriously the Germans would rush to their succour and beat us off. They may have believed it, but if so, either their information was defective or they were easily taken in. In either event it was a failure of intelligence". Mr. Lloyd George lays stress on his affirmation by publishing a report by the military council at Versailles drawn up at the end of 1916, in which it was stated that the condition of Turkey was one of almost complete material and moral exhaustion etc. The Bulgarians naturally were quite aware of Turkey's weakness and inability to defend herself, and they could not interprete the Allies lack of enterprise in the Near East except by ascribing it to England's unwillingness to hand over the Straits to Russia.

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they might deprive her of Constantinople. And if Russia was thus left in the lurch it was easy to infer what would happen to Bulgaria if by misfortune she joined the Entente and was simultaneously attacked by both the Austro-Germans and her neighbours.

The first concrete offer to Bulgaria was made on May 29, but it was an aleatory one since in exchange for her intervention, the territorial gains promised in Macedonia were to materialise only when, and if, Serbia received Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Central Powers responded by a counter offer of the whole of Macedonia in exchange for Bulgaria's neutrality. A further offer by the Entente was made on August 3, and a final one on September 14. The latter guaranteed the 1912 incontested zone in Macedonia to Bulgaria at the end of the war, the Enos-Midia line in Thrace, and diplomatic support for the transfer of the Cavalla region and southern Dobroudja; but when Serbia's consent to these concessions became known, it was found that they were hedged in with certain reservations which robbed the offer of most of its value. However, it came too late, for Ferdinand had already signed on September 6, an alliance with Germany and pledged himself jointly with the Central Powers to attack Serbia. If this Bulgarian attack was staved off for so long it was solely owing to the doubts the Bulgarian Government entertained as to the attitude of Greece and Rumania, both of which had at first declared that they would not countenance a Bulgarian aggression on Serbia. Later, however, their attitude radically changed, and both encouraged Bulgaria to attack her western neighbour. (Cf. Bulgarian Orange Book vol. I. Nos. 347, 381, 577. 1099, 1107). King Constantine's assurances that he would allow a free hand to Bulgaria were transmitted through German official circles; he had telegraphed to the Kaiser that he would not attack Germany's allies unless they attacked him, but subsequently his messages to Bulgarian representatives were marked with such cordiality that Ferdinand annotated one with the significant words: „La conduite du roi Constantin est vraiment irreprochable". (Bulgarian Orange Book vol. II, No. 108. In an interview with Major Kableshkov, the Bulgarian military attache in Athens, Constantine affirmed:

> That he was not opposed to the entry of Bulgarian troops in Greece, that their conduct was excellent and that he had complete confidence in the Bulgarian Government. The good conduct of the Bulgarian troops would prevent Venizelos making capital out of their presence in Greek territory. The Entente was all talk and no action, it was Germany alone that showed initiative. As for the English army, it was a mob of undisciplined and untrained men. His brother Prince Andrew had bought a horse for fifty drachmae from a British soldier. others had bought motor cycles for twelve drachmae, British soldiers would sell thair pants in order to procure drinks. (Bulgarian Orange Book vol. II № 220).

In a previous interview with Passarov, the Bulgarian Minister in Athens, on August 19, 1915, Constantine had stated:

> „According to the information I possess, you will side with Germany. We shall follow the same policy, because I shall not. permit a different one, since both our nations will be with Germany, even this most difficult question of Cavalla will be solved satisfactorily for both sides".

The King had begun his conversation with a long diatribe against Serbian intransigeance, and by expressing his conviction that Serbia was by far a more dangerous neighbour than Bulgaria. (Bulgarian Orange Book. vol. I. No. 1049).

No one was ever deluded about the professed Ententophilism, either of King Constantine or of the sundry Rumanian politicians [1] who at different times made fleeting appearances on the political chess-board, and no one should be surprised at their efforts to involve Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers; for the elimination of a rival among those who curried the favours of the Entente would correspondingly enhance the price of those who still remained neutral. After the fiasco of the Dardanelles expedition, there was no apparent reason for being in a hurry; on the contrary, the more the Great Powers exhausted themselves, the greater became the market value of each prospective ally, and each of these could bide its time. What, however, provokes the indignation of all honest men is that Greece and Rumania should have been allowed after the war to make capital out ot their pretended Ententophilism to the detriment of Bulgaria, when it is they who by the encouragements they gave to Bulgaria enabled the latter to launch her attack on Serbia and protract the war by at least two years.

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[1] Rumania, on September 11, 1914 had actually offered to take an active part against Russia if the territory of Suczawa were ceded

The negotiations with Germany were conducted in complete secrecy and behind the backs of most of the Ministers. General Fitchev, the Minister of War, was dismissed from his post on August 17, 1915 in order that he might not be apprised of the activities of those of his subordinates who owing to their devotion to Ferdinand had been entrusted with the drawing up of the military convention. Chief among these was Gantchev, an officer compromised in several disreputable affairs and a criminal, who owed his position and liberty to his master. (Protocols of the State Trial p. 660 etc.) All the military leaders who had distinguished themselves during the Balkan wars were replaced by younger officers, who had actively encouraged Ferdinand in attacking Serbia and Greece in 1913, like Generals Jekov and Jostov, the new comman-

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to her in reward. After the battle of the Marne the offer was suppressed, before it could be accepted. (Cf. Winston S. Churchill. The World Crisis, the Eastern Front p. 222).

648 der-in-chief and chief of the army staff, whose participation in enginering the attack on June 29, 1913 is graphically described in Minister Pechev's Memoirs. Some 30,000 Macedonians were enrolled and trained long before the publication of the mobilisation decree on the night of September 21, in order that they might be used if necessary as a bludgeon to overawe the Bulgarians into accepting the policy which had been decided on. The Macedonians had made repeated efforts to convince the Allies of the necessity of transferring their native land to Bulgaria, but disgusted at the irresoluteness the Entente displayed, they finally threw in their lot with the Germans and actively assisted the latter in putting into operation their plans. Dr. Vladov one of their leaders had approached at an early date Savinsky, the Russian ambassador in Sofia and told him:

> „If only you succeed in obtaining for Bulgaria the Macedonian territories which should be hers according to the Bulgaro-Serbian agreement of 1912, the whole country will be up in arms and fight at your side. Should the Government try and oppose us, we would force them to desist: as to the King, we who have more than once faced death, would not hesitate to do away with him should he attempt to thwart our political ambitions". (Recollections of a Russian diplomat. p. 204).

648 721 The ministers of the Triple Entente presented an ultimatum on October 4 summoning Bulgaria to break off relations with the Central Powers, to which Radoslavov replied with an indignant protest of innocence that could hardly be surpassed in duplicity; this having been considered as unsatisfactory, the Entente representatives severed diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and left on October 7. A few days later the Bulgarian army, as it had been prearranged, crossed into Serbia in order to support the Austro-German attack on that country which had already begun.[1]

[1] (For details of the military operations see the writer's contribution to „Bulgaria & Rumania." in the Nations of to-day series, published by Hodder & Stoughton).

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[facing P. 417]



RUSTCHUK, FROM THE DANUBE



A ROMAN GATEWAY AT HISSAR

A DEFILE NEAR TRN

11: Logio 5-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE

721 The occupation of Macedonia did not render the Radoslavov Gevernment any the more popular in the eyes of the people. The chief brunt of the fighting fell on the Bulgarians, because the Germans after reaching Kragujevats withdrew their forces and left only one army corps to support Bulgaria. This relieved to some extent the pressure on the Serbian army and enabled it to retreat through Albania to the Adriatic. Apparently von Mackensen's plan was to open up communications with Turkey and did not consist of annihilating the Serbian army which would have involved much greater sacrifices for the Germans. After completing the conquest of Macedonia, the Bulgarian army leaders insisted on occupying Salonica, so as to eliminate an eventual enemy thrust from that quarter in order that they might then proceed to the partial demobilisation of the army; to this demand, however, the Germans opposed a resolute refusal. They considered that the maintenance of the Salonica front suited best their purpose, for the Bulgarian army which could not be employed in th west, could be used to tie down a corresponding number of Entente troops which would necessarily be detached from the Western front where otherwise they would have to be faced by Germans. Radoslavov in his „Bulgaria and the world crisis", p.137/8, affirms that:

> „The attack on Salonica was not undertaken because it was believed that Greece would eventually join the Central Alliance. She had already permitted the taking of Rupel, Drama, and Cavalla according to a written prearranged plan. Early in 1916 von Falkenhayn decided not to take Salonica and was supported by Hindenburg though General Conrad von Hötzendorf held the contrary view. Soon after the occupation of Serbia, serious divergences arose between Bulgaria and Austria over Prizren and Prishtina, both States demanding their incorporation into their respective territory".

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648 Serious difficulties were created also through the Germans attempting to lay hands on all available supplies in Bulgaria and through their forcing the Bulgarian army

724/648 commissariat to furnish provisions far beyond those necessary for the limited number of German troops on the Macedonian front. In the State Trial of the Radoslavov Cabinet it was revealed that while the Germans had between 16,000 and 18,000 troops on the Southern front they were drawing rations for over 100,000 men. The balance above their requirements was sent to Germany. Each German soldier had the right to send 5kg of foodstuffs a week home, and for this purpose there was a perpetual stream of German soldiers arriving in Bulgaria from occupied Serbia buying up provisions and returning. This extensive draining of the resources of Bulgaria, increased through the illicit export of provisions systematically undertaken by the Ministers and their supporters, caused a serious dearth. Minister Pechev notes in his Memoirs, 22. XII. 1935:

> „To Ghendovitch and other deputies was being granted a licence to export 200 truck-loads of flour. Shameful. Often the names of Ministers figure in the minutes of Cabinet sittings at which export licences have been granted, though the Ministers were not present“

These malpractices took such a scandalous form that they even impressed a former Prussian Minister of War, General Dr. Stein, who alludes to them in his „Erlebnisse und Betrachtungen aus der Zeit des Weltkrieges“, published in Leipzig in 1919. In order to protect the food supply of the troops, General Jostov, the chief of the Staff, notified von Mackensen, without consulting the Government, that no more German troops were to be sent to Macedonia owing to the difficulty of providing them with supplies. Radoslavov in his book (Op. cit. p. 139) affirms that this was a pretext, and that Jostov considered that the aim of the war having been attained, Bulgaria ought 721/648 to seek to conclude peace with the Entente. When Rumania declared war against Austria-Hungary, influential circles in Bulgaria attempted to maintain Bulgaria neutral in the conflict. The Rumanian Minister in Sofia gave assurances that Rumania would support Bulgaria's claim to Macedonia, that she would retrocede southern Dobrudja, and that she would intervene in order that a separate peace be concluded with the Entente, and that finally, Bulgaria would secure the Midia-Enos line in Thrace. The Opposition did its best to convince Radoslavov of the expediency of this policy, it also sent delegates to Ferdinand to plead in favour of the adoption of this plan, but Ferdinand rejected them with contumely and ordered Radoslavov to declare war on Rumania which was done on September 1, 1916, four days later than Germany. 721/648

After the occupation of the Dobrudja, the Germans started requisitioning all the available supplies and this gave rise to continuous incidents between the Bulgarians and the Germans The occupation of the railway lines and the installing of German administrative authorities in certain parts of the Dobrudja which was claimed in its entirety by Bulgaria, caused a very grave conflict between the two allied governments, and strained relations almost to breaking point. 727

In the early spring of 1917, General Sarrail showed activity on the Salonica front and on July 2, Greece, after King Constantine's expulsion, officially declared war on Bulgaria. The Bulgarians appealed for assistance to Germany but received nothing save the advice to shorten their front by retreating. The dearth of foodstuffs and the ever-increasing pressure of the enemy on the Salonica front was rendering the situation in Bulgaria desperate. General Jekov was often in complete disagreement with the Government and refused to take orders from it. On September 20 the Agrarians sent a letter to the commander-in-chief proposing to him to overthrow the Radoslavov Government and assuring him of their willingness to continue the policy of co-operation with Germany. 722

722 The manifesto was signed by Tsanko Bakalov, Omartsevski, Al. Dimitrov and N. Atanassov. subsequently appointed ministers in the Stambuliiski Cabinet, This was not the first manifestation of open revolt against Radoslavov. In July 1916, while the budget was being voted, the Opposition and the adherents of Ghenadiev declared themselves against it and the Government would have been overthrown if Gueshov's party, bribed by the promise of securing the amnesty of three of its prominent members, compromised in the Des Closières, affair, turned round and voted in support of the Government. At the end of 1917, the Stambulovist wing had openly seceded from the Government and the latter was barely maintaining itself by various artifices. The conclusion of peace with Bolshevik [728] Russia on February 9, 1918, did not improve the situation, for a grave conflict arose over the Dobrudja and the signing of peace with Rumania was being purposely postponed. The Germans refused to concede Northern Dobrudja and the Turks were demanding the retrocession of Western Thrace up to the Mesta river. When peace was signed at Bucarest on May 6, 1918 Northern Dobrudja was adjudjed a condominium until the disputes between the allies were settled.

This temporary solution exacerbated to the utmost the army circles and the civilians against Radoslavov. After the military success obtained by the Greek troops on May 30, General Jekov presented a scathing report on the administration accusing it of demoralising the army through its incapacity, corruption and inability to impose on the Germans the carrying out of their promises to support Bulgaria. The Bulgarian soldiers were described as being clothed in rags, destitute of food and short of artillery munitions. Ferdinand, in view of the seriouseness of the situation was forced to part with his favourite and on June 21 a coalition Cabinet headed by Malinov and Kosturkov, the leaders of the Democrats and Radicals was constituted in the hope 722 of appeasing the army and public opinion. It was generally believed that the new Cabinet would attempt to conclude a separate peace with the Entente, but this was not within the domain of the possible, for the Cabinet could not count on the army which was entirely in the hands of the Germans and of Ferdinand. Besides, the railways were practically under the control of the Germans who could easily have flooded the country with their troops quartered in the adjoining regions. All Malinov could do was to insist on the Germans carrying out the stipulations of the Treaty, in order to secure some relief for the Bulgarian troops, and to improve the food supply while endeavouring to promote the conclusion of peace by supporting Austria in her endeavours. To this effect Malinov addressed on August 12 1918 a strongly worded note to the Central Powers complaining that since February, Bulgaria had ceased receiving war supplies, protesting against the stopping of the subsidy of 50 millions which had been so far granted to Bulgaria every three months, and demanding the dispatch of Germans reinforcements in order to strengthen the Salonica front where the Entente was continually massing troops. This note met apparently with some success since the Bulgarian representative in Berlin advised Malinov that the Germans would resume payment of the subsidy, forward munitions, and would despatch one German division to Macedonia. (Bulgarian Orange Book. vol II № 1542).

Ferdinand was resolutely opposed to the conclusion 722 648 of a separate peace with the Entente. According to the deposition of the Bulgarian Minister in Vienna, Tochev, at the State Trial of the Radoslavov Cabinet, Ferdinand had declared to him in 1916: „That the war was lost, but that he would not conclude a separate peace and become a traitor to his allies".

BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

Ferdinand had no illusions about the outcome of the struggle: On June 11, 1918, he addressed a telegram to General Jekov expressing his forebodings as to the impending close of his activity in the Near East. 'Jekov replied that a change in the Government might raise the drooping morale of the troops, but the newly constituted Malinov Cabinet, though it was aware of the difficult position the army was in, was not helped by Ferdinand in its desire to conclude a separate peace. It would perhaps have acted more energetically if it had been a broad coalition Cabinet instead of being composed of two parties only, the remainig parties not appearing desirous of assuming any responsibility at the time. In spite of the reluctance of Ferdinand to the conclusion of a separate peace, the Cabinet entrusted seveval persons abroad with the task of sounding Entente circles as to the possibility of coming to terms. President Wilson was the only person to respond favourably to these advances by dispatching Mr. Murphy to Sofia in order to facilitate the Bulgarian Government's task in its efforts to conclude peace. Both Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Robert Cecil were favourably disposed to the conclusion of a separate peace with Bulgaria and at the conferences which took place in Paris during July 1918 expressed themselves in support of this idea, but the French, were utterly opposed; General Guillaumat, who had a short time previously been relieved from his post of commander of the Salonica army, expressed the view that the Bulgarians could be easily beaten and that it was useless to make concessions to them. Mr, Lloyd George was finally won over to the opinions of General Guillaumat, and early in September the British, who were previously opposed to the undertaking of an offensive in Macedonia, gave their consent and General Franchet d'Esperay, the new commander-in-chief, hastened to carry out the plan which had been prepared by his predecessor several months previously.

THE WORLD WAR

Though the situation of the Bulgarian army was 726
known to be critical, yet no one in Sofia foresaw that disaster was imminent. The offensive, undertaken in September 15, against the Bulgarian positions at Dobro Pole met with complete success, the defence was overwhelmed and a complete breach through secured, which permitted the Entente troops to advance unopposed up the Vardar valley, attaining Veles by September 26. But apparently the extent of the disaster was not fully realised in Sofia. Malinov telegraphed to the Bulgarian representative in Berlin on September 19, insisting on the Germans conceding the Bulgarian demands on the Dobrubja in order that the morale of the troops might be raised. On September 21 Ferdinand who was in Uskub, was advised of the critical position of the army and that there was little hope of help arriving from Germany in time to retrieve the situation. It was only on September 23 that the Bulgarian army Headquarters informed the Government that some 10 divisions with artillery would be needed to stop the gap made by the enemy. A ministerial council was convoked, and on September 23 without the consent of Ferdinand, decided to demand the cessation of military activities. A
Bulgarian delegation left for the front and on September 728
29 an armistice was concluded at Salonica. Malinov ha- 669
stened to advise the German Minister in Sofia on September 26 of these intentions of his Government, and that it was useless to send help from Germany as it would arrive too late. Demoralisation had set in meanwhile in the army; the Government attempted to induce the troops to hold their positions until the conclusion of the Armistice by dispatching certain Agrarian deputies to the front headed by Stambuliiski who was purposely set free from prison, where he had been kept since the beginning of hostilities, and on September 27, Stambuliiski proclaimed a republic and made preparations for overthrowing the Go-

728 669 vernment, but was unable to carry through his plan for lack of support. People were averse to any change in the Government at this critical time fearing lest the delegates sent to Salonica might be prevented from coming to terms with the Entente through the invalidation of their credentials brought about by such a change. In spite of the disapproval of this plan, the mutinied troops headed by Stambuliiski's colleague, R. Daskalov, attempted to march on Sofia but were dispersed on its outskirts by the few loyal troops which rallied to the support of the Government and with the assistance of some Germans who had just arrived from Odessa. On October 1, the delegation sent to Salonica returned; on the following day a conference of the leaders of all the political parties took place and Malinov was commissioned to inform Ferdinand that he owed a certain reparation to Bulgaria. With great reluctance and after vain pleading Ferdinand was persuaded to abdicate in favour of his heir, signing a manifesto to this purpose on October 3 and left for Germany followed by Radoslavov under the protection of German troops.

728 The demobilisation of the army to some extent appeased the existing discontent, in spite of the difficulties the Government was meeting through the exhaustion of foodstuffs. The dearth was relieved through the timely arrival of flour from the United States. The Malinov Cabinet resigned on November 19 as a protest against the Entente's decision to cede southern Dobrudja to Rumania, contrary to the stipulations of the Salonica Armistice. It was succeeded by a broad coalition ministry presided over by T. Todorov. In May the Cabinet was reconstructed with the participation of Stambuliiski in view of the holding of elections on August 17 at which however, no party obtained a majority. The Agrarians being the most numerous party in the new Chamber assumed the task of con-

stituting the new Cabinet with the support of Gueshov's and Danev's parties. On October 6, Stambuliiski assumed the Premiership and subsequently left for Paris where he signed the Treaty of Neuilly on November 27, 1919.

THE TREATY OF NEUILLY

The terms imposed on Bulgaria constitute a negation of all the principles for the triumph of which the best part of the youth of the western democracies had been sacrificed during the terrible yet expectant years of the Great War. The greatest evil wrought by the imposition of such a Treaty, was the destruction ot the indispensable basis of peace — the mutual trust of the peoples in each other which would have been secured by the application of stern justice in the settlement of their claims. Not only the principle of nationality was completely disregarded, but concrete promises such as were made to Bulgaria on the signing of the Salonica Armistice, were ruthlessly repudiated and the country delivered over helpless to the greed of its predatory neighbours.

It was expected that Macedonia, for which Bulgaria had repeatedly gone to war would be definitely lost to her, in spite of the fact that, had a plebiscite been held, the bulk of the population would have elected to remain Bulgarian. But on the outbreak of the war, Macedonia was a constituent part of Serbia, and the Serbians had preferred to undergo the horrors of an invasion and run the risk of annihilation, rather than give up this debatable region. It could easily be grasped that in their hour of triumph, none of their allies would be willing to bring pressure to bear on the Serbians to restitute to a beaten foe a territory they had defended with such determination and such valour. This was well realised in Bulgaria, for when the late Liaptchev returned from signing the Salonica Armistice, he declared: „I, the son of Macedonia, have inscribed the tombstone of my motherland." What the Entente Powers were morally bound to do in order to mitigate this unavoidable wrong was to insist on the safeguarding of that minimum of elemental rights which the Minority Treaties were supposed to secure to ethnic minorities. This however, was never done, and the League of Nations, which is supposed to supervise the execution of these Treaties, by the passivity it has shown in the matter, and despite the numerous protests lodged with it by the various oppressed minorities, has largely contributed in encouraging the denationalising policy followed by certain States. The callous indifference it has shown for the sufferings endured by the minorities largely justifies such severe pronouncements as that of Prof. F. C. S. Schiller, of Oxford, passed on it, namely „that it serves to disguise by its chicaneries and makebeliefs the violence of the strong and the subservience of the weak".

The greatest obstruction to an amelioration of the status of the minorities was the attitude of France and its satellites as the *Manchester Guardian* aptly remarked on October 3, 1930:

> „France has played the part of a wrecker . . . The French delegation has led the opposition to any improvement in the procedure concerning minorities".

What are crying wrongs utterly unjustifiable in themselves, because they could have been easily avoided, if the slightest sense of justice had prevailed among those who drafted the Treaties, were the amputation of Southern Dobrudja, that of Western Thrace and of certain frontier districts in Western Bulgaria.

These territorial mutilations became all the more rankling because, owing to remissness and indifference shown by the League of Nations, the cultural life of the Bulgarian minorities was completely suspended by the closing of both their schools and churches. And these schools and churches were in most cases extant prior to the emancipation of the Bulgarian State in 1878, so that their functioning can not be imputed to propaganda purposes. The following table shows what a heavy and unjust blow the Treaty of Neuilly has dealt to the Bulgarian people as a whole, and what a retrograde instrument the Treaty has proved, since some of its direct and immediate consequences have been the closing of some 1,594 schools and the forfeiture of the right of 97,720 children to study in their mother tongue.

	In Yugeslav Macedonia	In Greek Macedonia	In Greek Thrace	In the Dobrudja	In the Western Confines	Total
Schools . .	641	340	215	276	122	1594
Teachers . .	1013	750	333	584	269	2949
Pupils . . .	37000	19000	11877	21951	7892	97720
Churches .	761	378	326	125	45	1635
Priests . .	833	300	238	[1]	42	1413

The Dobrudja which had been ravished by Rumania in 1913 and which contained a Rumanian minority of only 2·2% in its population, had been restored to Bulgaria by the Treaty of May 7, 1917, and Rumania given Bessarabia in compensation. (Cf. Nowak's „Collapse of Central Europe") The Allies had no moral right whatever to act unilaterally and constrain Bulgaria to renounce the benefits which this Treaty had conferred on her, without simultaneously demanding of the other contracting party an equivalent renunciation. The Rumanian Government when declaring for a second time war on Germany, on November 9, 1918, alleged that the latter had violated this Treaty, admitting thereby that it was a valid instrument. Besides, when the Salonica Armistice was signed, Bulgaria was distinctly given to understand that she would retain the Dobrudja. When

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[1] In the Dobrudja, the Rumanian authorities permitted the Bulgarian clergy to remain, but at their death they are replaced by Rumanian priests.

728 she was finally ordered to hand over the Dobrujda to Rumania, the Bulgarian Government resigned in protest at this manifest violation of the pledges it had received.

Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. D. Napier, in his „Experiences of a Military Attachè in the Balkans", affirms:

> „Certain promises and hopes were held out to the Bulgars at that time (Salonica Armistice) which little by little were gradually whittled away, thereby damaging the reputation of the Entente for honest dealing".

Other well-informed writers also affirm that we have treated the Bulgarians unfairly. Thus, Colonel Repincton in his „After the War" p. 368 asserts:

> „Colonel Baird", (the British military attaché at Sofia) deplores our propaganda at the end of the war. He has some of the leaflets dropped by our airmen and says that they told the Bulgarians that if they stopped fighting they would be given the territory that was Bulgarian, whereas, what with Macedonia, the Dobrudja, Tsaribrod, Thrace, and other places, nearly as many Bulgarians were now under alien rule as there were in Bulgaria herself, and unfortunately all the people in these parts were totally devoid of the faculty of conciliation. and not one of them could rule over another".

The Dobrudja, from the time of the foundation of the first Bulgarian Empire, had always been considered as forming part of Bulgaria. When after the Russo-Turkish war its northern part was forced on Rumania by the Russians in exchange for Bessarabia which the latter detached from Rumania, all Rumanians were united in decrying the injustice which was being committed. The Senate and Chamber passed resolutions in protest and the Press unanimously declared that Rumania was opposed to annexing a region which was utterly foreign. The *Steaua României* in its issue of June 23, 1878 wrote:

> „Geographically and etnographically, the Dobrudja does not form a part of our territory; being on the other side of the Danube it is a prolongation of Bulgaria,.. In the future the Dobrudja will be an open wound, a cause of discord between Rumania and Bulgaria, which will be made use of by those who have an interest to embroil the two countries".

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Could not these facts have been recalled, and the Rumanian delegates confronted with these when they were claiming the possession of the Southern Dobrudja at the Peace Conference? Bessarabia had been restored to Rumania, no one disputed her retention of Northern Dobrudja, why then permit her to incorporate Southern Dobrudja after she herself had restored it to Bulgaria by the Treaty of May 7, 1917?

Southern Dobrudja had formed part of the Bulgarian body politic for some forty years, and it was a case of supreme injustice to thrust it under an alien rule without regard to the wishes of the native population. At a time when Rumania was invoking the principle of nationality in order to secure her ethnic unification, her Press did not hesitate to declare:

> „Sooner or later in applying the principle of nationality on which we ourselves rely for the realisation of our nation's unification we shall have to return to the Bulgarians the quadrilateral (Southern Dobrudja) which we took from them. This is a certainty." (The Bucarest *Universul*. June 15, 1915.)

Unfortunately for Bulgaria, and also for Europe, the men whom we entrusted with the task of preparing the Peace Treaties were moved by passions and prejudices, which blunted whatever native discernement they had, and made them act as if they were completely devoid of all moral sense; though some are inclined to take a more lenient view, and like the *Manchester Guardian* (May 18, 1918) explain such regrettable shortcomings by the admission that: „Diplomatists are men who seem to specialise in ignorance of foreign countries." That Great Britain is to a large extent responsible for the injustices inflicted on Bulgaria is obvious since she apparently neglected to appoint as her representatives, or delegates, to the Paris Conference men who could act without bias and who had a sense of fairness. It is a painful surprise to find out that one of the leading functionaries of our Foreign Office portrayed his emotions at the time as follows:

> „For the Bulgarians I cherished feelings of contempt. Their traditions, their history, their actual obligations should have bound them to the cause of Russia and the Entente. They had behaved treacherously in 1913, and in the Great War they had repeated this act of perfidy. Inspired by the most material motives of acquisition thay had joined with Germany and by so doing lengthened the war by two whole years. I did not feel that Bulgaria deserved more mercy than she would herself have been prepared, in similar circumstances, to accord." (Harold Nicolson: „Peacemaking 1919" p. 3 /5.)

A person actuated by such sentiments could not possibly act with sufficient detachment and impartiality, in adjudicating problems relevant to Bulgaria, yet he was allowed to influence such decisions as were taken in connection with that country, and one may well express doubts as to the fairness of the verdicts arrived at. Had Mr. Nicolson been a disciple of von Treischke, and like the latter treated all the Balkan peoples with the same all embracing contempt („und wie diese Schweintreibende Völker alle heissen mögen") one would have nothing to say; but that he should single out and vent his ill humour on the Bulgarians while heaping favours on their neighbours. is hardly a mark of the fairness by which the British are usually distinguished.

Mr. Nicolson finds that their traditions, history, and the actual obligations of Bulgarians should have bound them to the cause of Russia and the Entente. All these captious assertions show that „Diplomatists are men who seem to specialise in ignorance of foreign countries". Russo-Bulgarian antagonism in the Balkans dates back from 967,. and Mr. Nicolson's predecessors at the Foreign Office took a hand at fomenting and fostering this latent and slumbering antithesis at the time of Stambulov, so that if it ever reappeared, British diplomatists ought rather to congratulate themselves on the belated fruition of their own efforts. As to the Bulgarians' obligations which should have bound them to the cause of the Entente, Dr. Seton Watson whose perspective and outline have always remained unclouded, and who is our standing historical authority in East European questions, takes a diametrically opposed view to that of Mr. Nicolson, since he justifies the distrust with which British diplomacy was regarded in Bulgaria (Cf. p. 396). Another authority, Sir Thomas Holdich, in his „Boundaries in Europe and the Near East" p. 84, writes: „Bulgaria undoubtedly had a justifiable grievance" and referring to her adherence to the Central Powers he adds: „no other course would possibly have been expected of her". Mr. Nicolson in contrast with another leading man of letters, Mr. Harold Spender, who in his „Cauldron of Europe" speaks of „the community of characteristics which draws Briton and Bulgar together", is far from ascribing as Mr. Nicolson does, treachery and perfidy to the Bulgarians. This is nothing short of slander, for among Balkan peoples, it is the Bulgarians who possess the most developed sense of fairness, and it may be asserted that it was the Serbian disregard of solemnly assumed pledges which aroused the righteous indignation of the Bulgarians in 1913 and made possible the fratricidal second Balkan war. To attribute it to mere treachery is a gross travesty of truth, as is that of accusing Bulgarians of perfidy for siding with the Germans in 1915. Bulgaria was a free factor, bound by no Treaty as were Greece and Rumania. The former was bound by Treaty to succour Serbia and yet she left her ally in the lurch, while Rumania was attached to the Central Powers by an Alliance which was valid until 1920, yet she treated it as a scrap of paper. Prof. Harry N. Howard Norman in his „The Partition of Turkey", p. 176, does not hesitate to denounce Rumania's disloyalty as follows:

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> „The formal assurances which Bratianu and King Ferdinan gave to the Central Powers only two days before they entered th lists against them are a worse blot on the Rumanian scutcheon thai their exaggerated claims to the Banat and the Tisza frontier".

Why then distort events and impute treachery and perfidy to Bulgaria, when these charges should be levelled rather at her neighbours? Is it in order to obscure public discernement and justify an altogether indefensible verdict, which Mr. Nicolson contributed in bringing about? The undisguised truth is that in dismembering Bulgaria at Neuilly, not only did we commit a crying injustice at the expense of the Bulgarian people, but we went out ot our way and recompensed Greece and Rumania, both of whom manifested in their behaviour during the World War, a greater disregard for solemn compacts than Bulgaria.

It is clear that if Bulgaria was deprived of Western Thrace and of her free access to the Aegean it was merely to placate M, Venizelos. Lieut. Colonel the Hon. H. D. Napier relates (op. cit. p. 243) how he remonstrated with Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George's secretary, over the threatening exclusion of Bulgaria from the Aegean and how Mr. Kerr justified himself by replying that:

> „M. Venizelos had done more that any single person to further Entente action in the Near East during the war, and intimated that whatever he asked for must be granted".[1]

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[1] Mr Robert Lansing in his "The Big Four & Others at the Peace Conference" p. 148 writes: "the American position was frankly adverse to the Greek claims, not because of any unfriendliness for Greece or of friendliness for her enemies, but because the cession of areas inhabited by large hostile populations creates conditions which threaten the future peace of the world... Except for the personal influence of M. Venizelos. I am convinced that the extention of Greek sovereignty could not have been so great as it was under the treaties. What he asked was granted because *he* asked it". Obviously, if the personal factor was allowed to play such a prominent part, principles did not weigh heavy in the balance,

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

TIRNOVO AND THE RIVER YANTRA

[facing p.433]

A singularly lame justification. For if there was a man who made possible Bulgaria's adherence to the Central Powers that person was Venizelos. He had issued orders for the coaling of the Goeben and the Breslau which enabled these German ships of war to escape pursuit and arrive safely at Constantinople.[1]

This secured the mastery of the Black Sea to Turkey and removed the threat of a Russian descent on the Bulgarian coast, which constituted the strongest deterrent to a Bulgarian attack on Serbia. Sir Basil Thompson published in his book a facsimile of M. Venizelos' autograph order and adds that it brought Turkey into the war against the Allies. We must agree with Mr. Kerr that no single person stimulated the Entente to such intense action in the Near East as M. Venizelos, but all these sacrifices and efforts would probably have been avoided but for that mischievous order of his. Those who are so ecstatic about this supremely clever man had better consult M. Frangulis' richly documented work „la Gréce et la Crise Mondiale“, or Cosmin's „L'Entente et la Gréce pendant la Grande Guerre“, 1914-1917, or a more recent book by S. Cosmetatos, entitled „The Tragedy of Greece“, in which its author has effectively proceeded to the debunking of the Cretan Statesman.[2] Assuredly, and setting all morality

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[1] Cf. Sir Basil Thomson's „The Allied Secret Service in Greece“ p. 39.

[2] The following incident related in the latter book (p. 305) is sufficient to prove that M. Venizelos was a narrow-minded partisan rather than a Patriot. „The offensive against Kemal in June 1920 was singularly fortunate. The Greek troops advanced rapidly. They were on the point of dealing the enemy a decisive blow when France and Italy alarmed at their success. demanded from Venizelos, on penalty of withdrawing their mandate, the immediate suspension of military operations. The purpose of the demand was to save Turkey, for the partition of Turkey constituted according to the *Temps*, a diminution of the French estate in the East. Venizelos, instead of simply considering his country's interest and ridding it for ever of the Kemalist peril by sacrificing himself, if necessary, preferred to bow to the wishes of the French, whose help was indispensable to him in the civil conflict in Greece“.

728 aside. it was not worth while inflicting a wrong on Bulgaria in order to recompense M. Venizelos for his disputable services to the Allied cause, for if all of them could be assessed at their true value it would be found that the debit side of the account somewhat exceeds the credit one.

The amputation of Western Thrace from Bulgaria was apparently dictated by purely mercenary considerations. Venizelos must have secured French support in exchange for the aid of a few Greek brigades at Odessa. Mr. Nicolson (op. cit. p. 260) notes in his diary February 9, 1919:

> „The Italians are really determined to a separate deal with Greece by which they will obtain for their Albanian protectorate the Greek districts in the south, thereby covering the Corfu Channel. The Americans are determined not to accept this deal which to them savours of the Congress of Vienna. As regards Thrace they are still pro-Bulgar".

We may be allowed to presume that the „deal" referred to was the acceptence by Greece of the Italian point of view in Albania against Italian support for the Greek claim to Western Thrace, for diplomats excel in such underhand transactions One wonders what were the considerations which made British politicians dispose so generously of Bulgarian teritory at the time. Mr. Nicolson speaks of *his* „Arda line", (op. cit. p. 272) so that he wanted to foist on the Greeks more territory than they eventually got. His own appreciation of the manner in which his chiefs were attending to their work is illuminating:

> „It is appalling that these ignorant and irresponsible men should be cutting Asia Minor to bits as if they were dividing a cake. And with no one there except me, who incidentally have nothing whatsoever to do with Asia Minor. Isn't it terrible, the happiness of millions being decided in that way, while for the last two months we were praying 'and begging the Council to give us time to work out a scheme". (op. cit. p. 337).

It is with such levity that supreme decisions, involving the future destiny of whole peoples were taken. And all this triviality, paltriness and inanity, wrapped up in diplomatic flummery, was presented to the deluded peoples as the quintessence of the wisdom of the denizens of the new Olympus. Secrosanct covenants, indeed, before which the nations should kneel for all eternity![1]

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[1] The disreputable methods used at the Peace Conference make revolting reading. To wit, the mean manoeuvres employed to defraud the Italians of their promised share in Asia Minor as revealed in Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson's Diary, Vol. II. pp. 189 191, — „Lloyd George got hold of me and Venizelos and told us the three Frocks (President Wilson, Clemenceau. & Lloyd George) had just decided to put the Greeks into Smyrna at once. . . and they are not going to tell either Italy or Turkey until the whole thing is well on the way. . . I begged Lloyd George to tell the Italians. I told him that nobody could understand our not telling one of our greatest Allies, and that no one could defend the three Frocks having secret meetings to carry out this coup . . What rotten behaviour to a friend and Ally".

Another unedifying chapter is that of the sordid Franco British wranglings over Arabia and the oil fields of Mossoul which estranged the two allies and made them wage a war by proxy, using the Turks and Greeks as such. Even Mr. Nicolson in his latest book „Curzon", p. 104, admits: „that the British Government had drifted over the Arab question into a position which was very false indeed". This initial disloyalty led France to make light of her commitments to her Ally and treat her with the same disregard as she had experienced. The pan-Arabic agitation of some British circles and their intrigues against the French in Syria still continue, as has been revealed in P. Coblentz' „The silence of Sarrail," pp. 250—1. France was not slow in responding by committing as big a perfidy. Mr. E. H. Bierstadt in his „The Great Betrayal,„ writes: „France in handing Cilicia to Turkey did not even consult her allies though she held this territory under a mandate from the League of Nations. She betrayed her trust for the sake of economic gain and then she herself was betrayed". As for the pretended humanitarianism which actuated our dealings with regard to the Arabs, Mr. Alexander Powell in his book „The Struggle for Power in Moslem Asia," says: »The people of Mesopotamia were tricked and deceived from the very beginning and forced to accept as their King an alien, belonging to another creed etc".

Mr. Oliver Baldwin, the son of our Prime Minister, in his

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The Americans who are at a distance which permits them to judge dispassionately of our shabby squabbles, and who desired above all to establish an enduring foundation for the pacification of Europe, had an altogether different conception as to the treatment which should have been meted out to Bulgaria. The „Outline of a Tentative Report", prepared by the American experts under Prof. Munro, discloses that not only did they insist on the holding of a plebiscite in Macedonia, but also recommended that both Western Thrace and Southern Dobrudja should be left to Bulgaria, while her southeastern frontier should be extended to the Midia-Enos line. When they could not carry their point with regard to Western Thrace, they insisted on this region being made into an autonomous province, like the Saar, or Dantsig, and this is the reason why in the Treaty of Neuilly. Section III art. 48, Bulgaria

book „The Questing Beast" writes thus about our activities in the Near East: „We were so busy at the Versailles Conference that we forgot all about Turkey, and when it was obvious what had happened we told the Armenians to attack them (the Turks) from the east, and the Greeks from the west. Certain of our support, these two nations did so with disastrous consequences. . . To some it may now be clear why the phrase „Albion perfide", was coined... General Agha Petros, commander-in-chief of the Assyro-Chaldeans in 1915 had been promised independence for his country by the British, French and Russians on condition he threw in his lot with the Allies instead of the Turks. This he did, and the result is that to-day he has been exiled by the British from his own country, denied repayment of money owed to him by the British Government, etc". After these innumerable examples of chicanery on the part of the supercilious „Kulturträger", to pick out the Bulgarians, who have not yet mastered the A. B. C. of diplomatic astuteness and craftiness, and to express contempt for them on account of their alleged „perfidy and treachery", is nothing else but another instance of brazen-faced, flippant swagger. Obviously, Prof. Gilbert Murray was right when he stated that: The greatest distinguishing characteristic of our modern civilisation was its hypocricy" and this applies more to the West than to the semi-primitive Balkan communities.

was asked to renounce in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and title to this territory. Later when the Americans had departed from the Peace Conference and in contravention to the decision taken in common, the Entente decided in April 1920, at San Remo, to transfer Western Thrace to Greece. This was a clear breach of the pledges given both to the Americans and to Bulgaria and was not warranted by any ethnological considerations whatever, for according to the census taken under the supervision of the French, who were in occupation prior to the handing over of the territory to Greece, its population comprised: 69,155 Bulgarians, 11,739 Pomaks or Bulgarian Mohammedans, 73 220 Turks, 51,706 Greeks, 3000 Jews, 1,969 Armenians and 1,834 Gipsies. It should be noted that among the 51,706 Greeks there must have been a large percentage of Bulgarian patriarchists, who owing to their allegiance to the Greek Partiarchate, could, with the latitude inherent in elastic consciences be made to figure as Greeks. Indeed, according to the Bulgarian census taken during the world war, the Bulgarian Patriarchists figure as 30,374, while the Greeks as only 9,600.

Though by the Salonica Armistice, Bulgaria was to retain the Strumitsa valley, yet at Neuilly she was forced to cede it to Serbia, with certain other regions in Western Bulgaria, of a total area of 2,566 sq. klm. with a population of 91,888 which Serbia claimed for strategic reasons, a most flimsy pretence, since Bulgaria had been completely disarmed and rendered defenceless. Most of this territory is cut off from Serbia by inaccessible mountains and has its natural outlets in Bulgaria from which it has been severed, to the immense suffering of the local population, which has been cut off from its markets.

According to the secret clauses of the Salonica convention Bulgarian troops were assigned certain definite aims in view of an eventual co-operation with the Entente troops. M. Poincaré in his Memoirs (p. 374) related a conversation he had with Clemenceau in 1918 in which reference was made to three Bulgarian divisions and to Greece's unwillingness to make use of them. M. Poincaré concluded with the remark: „Pour y reussir, il ne faut pas laisser les Bulgares se mêler à notre expédition contre la Turquie". Bulgaria was to be treated as a benevolent neutral and even as a prospective ally. Had these views prevailed, both Great Britain and Greece could have reckoned on Bulgarian support. Mr. Lloyd George would not have then had to suffer the fiasco of his Grecian policy, nor Greece to rue the Asia Minor disaster.

It was indeed a great pity that the example set by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman towards the Boers was not followed anew towards the Bulgarians. Both Mr. Lloyd George and M. Venizelos would have found out that there is some fundamental truth in the golden old maxim „οὐδέν γὰρ οὕτω μεγαλοφροσύνης ποιητικόν". Or in Burke's words, „Magnanimity is not seldom the truest wisdom". Had it been applied, Great Britain would not have had to abandon the dominant position she occupied at the Straits which had cost her so much blood and treasure to acquire and she would not be to day on sufferance at Mossoul, the precarious hold on which she owes entirely to the oportune dispatch of a few Italian brigades to Rhodes by Signor Mussolini at the time Mossoul's fate was hanging in the balance.

THE AGRARIAN REGIME

Stambuliiski on his return from Neuilly was confronted with a serious situation. The Opposition parties at the end of December 1919 organised demonstrations against the Government, and certain parties fomented a general strike of the railway and telegraph officials which paralysed the transport service for two months. In order to curtail this agitation against his Government, Stambuliiski proceeded to dissolve the Chamber though its mandate had not yet lapsed and ordained new elections to be held on March 28. In spite of the intimidation and violence used by Government agents, only 38 % of the votes cast were in favour of the Agrarians, and in order to obtain a fictitious majority in the new Chamber, the Government had to have recourse to the device of invalidating the election of certain Opposition deputies, but even this expedient only secured them a majority of two. The Agrarians who had already arraigned the members the Radoslavov Cabinet before a State Court for declaring war without consulting the Sobranye. and for their corrupt practices during their tenure of office, now decided to put out of action the rest of the Bourgeois parties. In order to impart an air of popularity to the prosecution a referendum was instituted as to whether the members of the Gueshov, Danev, and Malinov-Kosturkov Cabinets should be indicted or not, the former two for embarking on the Balkan Wars, and the last for not concluding a separate peace in time. This was an altogether arbitrary and unconstitutional procedure. The Balkan Alliance had been applauded at the time of its conclusion in the Sobranye by all, save M. Sakuzov, the Socialist leader, while the report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry clearly indicated that the responsibility for the second Balkan War weighed mainly on Tsar Ferdinand who issued the order to attack Bulgaria's quandam allies on June 29, 1913. As for the accusation brought against the Malinov-Kosturkov Ministry, it was simply preposterous, for they had not assumed office for the express purpose of concluding a separate peace, and no one had entrusted them with such a mandate. This last indictement did not lack a certain gusto, for some of the Agrarian Ministers in power had themselves written in 1917 to the Commander-in-chief advocating the continuation of the struggle on the side of Germany. Stambuliiski had recourse to the referendum in order to throw all blame for prosecuting his adversaries on the people, by pretending that the masses demanded their punishment. He further made it known that those electoral constituencies which would vote for the acquittal of these politicians would alone have to defray the costs of reparations imposed on Bulgaria by the Entente, and this naturally influenced the electorate to vote to the extent of two-thirds in favour of the ex-Ministers being tried for High Treason. As a consequence, the leaders of the Opposition were arrested in September 1922 and thrown into the Shumen prison. where they were confined under miserable conditions. Most of the legislation passed by the Agrarians, aimed at ruining or despoiling their political adversaries, and the details revealed by a perusal of the minutes of the Sobranye disclose an unparalleled brutality without the slightest trace of idealism to temper or redeem it, as is wont in the case of certain fanatical doctrinaires of certain political faiths, of whom it may at least be pleaded in extenuation that their discernment has been obscured by their extreme devotion to their creeds. It is true that the peasantry had been shamefully exploited by the urban classes, which had so far battened on their toil, but the remedy of this evil was not the committal of a greater and worse wrong, that of inflaming the lowest passions of the peasantry and letting them loose on the urban classes.

THE AGRARIAN REGIME

As an example of the confiscatory legislation enacted the law allowing the State and Municipal bodies to expropriate any building may be cited. The law was made use of by the Agrarians to seize the property of their adversaries and to ruin them. Prof. Stainov, speaking in the Sobranye on March 17, 1924 gave details of a building in Gabrovo fetching an annual rent of 120,000 leva, which had been expropriated for merely 68,000, though the State immediately insured it for 500,000. An hotel at Shumen which had cost 8 millions had been expropriated for 370,000 leva, though the owners had been told that if they paid over 500,000 leva to the then Minister of the Interior (Al. Dimitrov,) the expropriation order would be rescinded. For the sake of an Agrarian partisan any building could be expropriated, concluded M. Stainov. The crowning injustice of this confiscatory measure was that a mortgage on such an expropriated building had still to be paid off by the original owner, as was explained by M. Madjarov in the same sitting of the Chamber. In fact, Agrarian deputies, such as Duparinov and Thomas Veltchev had unequivocally declared in the Sobranye: „The time has come for us to take from the rich whatever thay have, after they had lived for forty years on the sweat of the people". But robbery and spoliation was nothing in the face of the campaign of organised assassination and the deliberate policy of extermination of their adversaries pursued by the Agrarians. The application of such unjust laws and the disrespect of the rights of property they entailed, fostered communism. At the last elections held by the Agrarians in 1921, when the election of Communists was not hindered, the latter secured 21 % of the total poll, coming second after the Agrarians, who obtained 38 % of the total votes cast. The success of the Communists was remarkable in comparison with that of the Agrarians, for the latter held power, and this implies a great access of neutral votes.

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In Bulgaria a considerable number of constituencies invariably return Government nominees, such electoral divisions being mainly composed of Moslem or Jewish electors, whose chief aim is to secure a representative enjoying the Government's goodwill. For favouritism is so deep-seated in the State organism that an electoral district lacking a political intercessor can have little hope of receiving help from the State. The constituencies voting invariably for the Government are collectively designated by a very appropriate term, that of „the Government's dowry." If we deduct the number of votes representing the „dowry" from the percentage accruing to the Agrarians, it would probably be found that the Communists polled more votes than the Government.

When in prison, Stambuliski had made the acquaintance of a certain Prudkin, whom he nominated as police prefect of Sofia. Prudkin set about to prepare outrages and plots in order to do away with the bourgeois politicians. The worst plot was that of the attempted blowing up of the Odeon theatre in Sofia, on March 3, 1920, when a Russian journalist intended to lecture, and at which it was known that Gueshov, Malinov, Liaptchev, T. Todorov and Burov would be present. The bombs exploded prematurely before the arrival of the ex-Ministers and only innocent people were killed and wounded and the Sobranye on April 23, 1926 had to vote pensions to some of the relatives of the victims. Prudkin had likewise attempted to blow up railway bridges, certain railway sidings. and to destroy the electric light installation of Sofia at the time of the big railway strike early in 1920, in order to compromise the strikers and justify the carrying out of retaliatory measures by the Agrarian Government He likewise set bombs to explode at two churches in Sofia as was revealed in the Sobranye on June 26, 1924. Minister Pechev in his „Historical Events and Actors", p. 719 records that when he was thrown into prison he came to know several criminals whom the Agrarians employed at times to murder or terrorise their political adversaries. The Agrarians would recompense them by granting them temporarily freedom and monetary gifts, but later they always arrested and executed them lest they should divulge the crimes they had been incited to commit. The Agrarians sought equally to circumcribe the influence of the Macedonians and accordingly had deputy Meltsankov and the Voivod Kotsanski assassinated, in retaliation for which the Agrarian Minister Al. Dimitrov was murdered on October 22, 1921. The late Minister Pechev also accused them of organising the murder of Alexander Grecov, the editor of the *Slovo*, and of a judge, for criticising and denouncing their crimes (op. cit. p. 377) and this was confirmed in the Sobranye by deputy G. Vassilev, May 26, 1924.

The Agrarian Ministers were nothing else but a gang of confirmed criminals ready to commit any crime. They quarrelled once among themselves and Al. Dimitrov, Stambuliiski and Stoyanov decided to assassinate their colleagues Manolov and Tomov. They set hired assassins to way-lay them while they were driving back from the mineral-bath establishment of Bankia. The assassins however, fired on the wrong car, and an innocent woman was killed instead. (Parliamentary minutes, June 26, 1924).

Having no partisans among the State functionaries they set about to nominate a vast number of new public servants wholly unfit for such an occupation and recruited from among the riff-raff of the population after offering their allegiance to the Agrarian organisation. Stambuliiski, not being oversure about the army set about organising an armed force recruited from among the peasantry. These so-called Orange guards were called out to oppose the Macedonians who had seized Kustendil on December 1922, for the purpose of dealing stern justice to some traitors

661 to their cause. The Macedonians after carrying out their aim, dispersed within two days, the Orange guards, however, took advantage to plunder shops at Mezdra, Tserven-Breg and Sofia, and subsequently the Sobranye had to vote indemnities for the sufferers. Dr Rumenov described in the Sobranye on May 28. 1924, how the staff of the Alexandrovska hospital in Sofia, composed at the time mainly of Agrarian partisans, joined the pillaging bands and how they brought the loot to the hospital to divide it among themselves. Excepting those who derived directly some benefits from the spoils of office, all felt a profound aversion for the system introduced by Stambuliiski. Not only the urban classes, but even a section of the peasantry, the more independently minded and those less addicted to partisanship felt they had enough of it as may be inferred from the following resolution passed at the general congress of the Socialist party held in Sofia on September 1922.

> "All labouring people feel crushed by the growing cost of living due to the remissness of the authorities who do nothing to check speculation. The Government is sunk in vice, crime and peculation and has provoked the aversion of all classes and professions. Stambuliiski's government represents the predatory instincts of an uncultured band of corrupt office seekers, bribed renegades and amnestied criminals. In order to maintain itself in power, the government is decided to resort to blood and fire. in order to crush every national movement, etc.
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> The Sofia population declares that it will continue its struggle and will not hesitate to sacrifice everything until this Government is overthrown".

Stambuliiski had a domineering and brutal temperament which brooked no opposition. He persecuted all outside the Communists, whom he called his "faithful hounds"; the Church, the army, the Macedonians, the political parties, the intellectuals and the mercantile classes. He owed his strength to his ability to pander to the lowest instincts of the peasantry and inflame them against the intellectuals and the officials, whom he denounced as social parasites. He 661 hated and envied all who were his betters; he refused the admission of intellectuals to the Agrarian party "because they could at a certain moment abandon it and go elsewhere", "we shall guard our union from that demoralising element, the barrister profession". Stambuliiski who had been supported by his wife while studying had a very poor opinion of the fair sex. He affirmed that:

> "Marriage, woman and family are thraldom to man: a mass of heroes succumbs daily owing to their being led astray by woman, who may be likened to a veritable floating mine placed in the stream of life".

He earnestly believed that Europe had only two courses to follow, either to adopt Bolshevism or copy Agrarian Bulgaria. His self-complacency had apparently no bounds since he stated that:

> „My profound belief is that the Bulgarian peasantry with its sane spirit of reform will set an example to great nations, which though they may possess a great economic culture are nevertheless very backward in political conciousness".

He certainly showed signs of unbalanced judgment in 661 his last years. He proceeded to subsidise an Agrarian party newspaper in Bucarest, giving thereby offence to the 648 Rumanian Government. He dispatched a certain Groskov to conduct secret pourparlers with Angora, arousing the suspicion of the British Government, which had not yet settled its differences with Kemalist Turkey; nominated relatives and acquaintances to the post of Ministers abroad who were utterly unfit for the missions entrusted to them etc. The one sensible idea he seemed to have at heart was that of working for a close understanding whith Yugoslavia, but even this may have had an interested motive, for frindship with this country was incompatible with fraternisation with the Communists, and Stambuliiski had often declared that if he were ever forced to yield up

661 648 the reins of power he would only hand them over to the Communists, „my faithful hounds“, as he aptly styled them. This open flirtation with the Soviets estranged him from the more sensible leaders of the Green international and this prevented him from heading this movement. When the Bolsheviki were on the outskirts of Warsaw in the summer of 1920, he became so elated at their success as to remark to a group of intimate friends that it would not be long before he would administer to the Entente the lesson it deserved. In April 1923 it became known that he contemplated celebrating his jubilee on August 30, when an extraordinary congress of the Agrarian Union was to be convoked for the purpose. In May he declared that he was about to convene an extraordinary Sobranye for the purpose of altering the Constitution and proclaiming a republic. He withdrew secretly 100 million leva from the Bulgarian National Bank for the pretended purpose of bribing the members of the Reparation Commission at 669 Sofia and obtaining their consent. The threat of a republican move was taken advantage of by Stambuliiski's numerous opponents to persuade Tsar Boris to give his consent to the overthrow of his too domineering Prime Minister, and on June 9, 1923, the Agrarian regime was unexpectedly overthrown, after Tsankov, Smilov and Kazazov had obtained from Tsar Boris the signature of the decrees appointing the new Government, (Cf. Gr. Tsesmedjiev's“, Rays of light on the mystery of the conspiracy“).

No one was averse to this consummation, and even foreign governments made it known that they would acquiesce in this move owing to the deplorable effects the Agrarian regime was having on such foreign capital as was invested in Bulgaria as well as on the public finances of the country. In fact after the fall of the regime, criminal proceedings were instituted against practically all the members of the Agrarian Government, who were indicted for appropriating public funds, issuing false documents and violating the Constitution. The minutes of the Sobranye sittings of July 1924 are full of details about the malpractices committed by the Agrarian regime. When the budget for 1924 came up for discussion, the Minister of Finance, M. Peter Todorov, announced that 70 million leva had been found in Stambuliiski's home, but that Stambuliiski must have appropriated at least 120 millions. That there had been an item of 6 million gold francs in the budget of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, destined for propaganda, (this will explain the dithyrambic peans sung by foreign journalists on the activities of these *sui-generis* Agrarian reformers) and what of this sum was not spent abroad was divided up among the Ministers. It was stated that Stambuliiski was shot down on June 14 while trying to flee from his capturers. Minister Pechev in his „Historical Events and Actors", relates that he was cut down in his own vineyard where he was buried. In order that his corpse might not be found it was subsequently removed and hidden on the banks of the Maritsa, from which hiding place his father was allowed later to fetch it and bury it at the village of Tsangarly.

Stambuliiski had attempted to oppose the coup d'état. According to the version of deputy S.Vassilev, he rallied some peasants to his support and marched at their head to seize the town of Tatar-Pazardjik where regular troops easily overwhelmed him, for most of the peasantry made common cause with the army and turned against him. He was being convoyed to Sofia and while traversing his village was killed in a fray provoked by the villagers, but it is not known whether they had sought to kill or to liberate him. The only other place where the Agrarians displayed some resistance was at Pleven, under the leadership of Obov, a colleague of Stambuliiski. A few weeks previously, so sure was the latter of his position that he had declared: „The Agrarian Union will govern Bulgaria for at least forty years more".

It must not be thought that Stambuliiski remained to the last the favourite of the peasantry. His popularity was on the wane. The relative freedom from taxation enjoyed by the rural masses under his regime was offset by the arbitrary exactions of his local henchmen. What kept him in power so long was his reckless appeals to the prejudices of the ignorant rural masses and his reiterated bombastic assurances that they were predestined to break up and replace the collapsing urban culture through the Green International, (the international peasant federation).

RECENT HISTORY: 1923—1935

The coup d'etat of June 9 1923 was brought about by a handful of patriots supported by the army with the object of restoring the political liberties of the population which had been suppressed by the Agrarians, and one of the first acts of the new Government, presided over by Prof. Alexander Tsankov, was to release all the Incarcerated politicians from their prison at Shumen. The Tsankov Government believed that it could achieve the pacification of the country by restoring constitutional methods and on its advent to power, it went out of its way in endeavouring to govern according to prescribed parliamentary forms. For this reason, it wasted most of its energy in attempting to fuse under its sponsorship the various political parties into one and thus obtain an imposing majority in the new Chamber. It overlooked however, one essential fact, namely that the masses after having tasted power would no longer allow themselves to be governed by a small minority, such as the urban population, however well intentioned the latter might be. The rural masses had got drunk on the spoils of office and were decided not to renounce such advantages as detention of power conferred on them. Democratic government was no longer possible in Bulgaria, now that the masses had become conscious of their power, except in the form of a semi-Bolshevik dictature as had just been experienced, (the writer does not wish to cast a slur on the Russians by comparing them to the Bulgarian Agrarians, for the former are certainly idealists and therefore worthy of respect even if we do not share all their views), or in that of a Communist commonwealth. Had Tsankov attempted to govern as a dictator, and proclaimed martial Law at the time of his advent to power he would have discouraged both Agrarians and their friends and allies, the Communists, from lifting their heads; but by reiterating as he did, his devotion to constitutionalism he simply incited Agrarians and Communists to regain office.

Tsankov and his colleagues among whom the most prominent were the Radical Peter Todorov, Minister of Finance, and the Socialist D. Kazazov, Minister of Railways, were still convinced devotees of democratic forms. They had not yet drawn the logical inferences from recent events which had effectively demonstrated the dangers inherent in the exercise of power by an untutored democracy and they had evidently not heard of the salutary counsel Sir Norman Angell had recently dispensed, namely that: „We may hope to make democracy safe if we face squarely the fact that the voice of the people is usually the voice of Satan.“

If Democracy were to be maintained in an undiluted form, the Agrarians and Communists forming the vast majority of the people. had every title to the privileges of office, and consequently Tsankov and his supporters were simply wasting their time in a vain attempt to clothe themselves in the garb of legality. So sure were the Communists of securing with the support of the Agrarians an overwhelming majority at the new elections which had been fixed to take place in November, that Vasil Kolarov, the secretary of the Moscow International, and a Bulgarian by birth, who had been dispatched by Zinoviev to stir up a revolution in Bulgaria, on the fall of the Agrarian regime disregarded these orders, for Bulgarian Communists convinced him that the eventual triumph of the social revolution in Bulgaria was assured of itself. The growing agitation of the Communists, finally alarmed the Tsankov Government and induced it to arrest the leaders, and the Communists fearing they would thereby be seriously handicapped in the approaching electoral struggle decided to revolt in September 1923. The movement miscarried because the bulk of industrial workers as well as its intellectual urban leaders refused to rise[1] and only the rural teachers, who were fanatical devotees of Communism and who had succeeded in imparting their convictions to the Agrarian masses amongst whom they moved, answered the call. These deluded idealists were convinced that the Soviet army would come to their help and in heroic abnegation, worthy of a better cause, placed themselves at the

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[1] Mr. Iordan Tabakov, who has written some very enlightening books on social questions does not entertain a very high opinion of the professional political leaders of the Communist party. According to him, most of the subsidies they received from the Soviets they used for building houses for themselves. As for the rank and file, their main incentive was plunder. In September 1923 the Communist bands which went to attack the town of Lom and were dispersed, abandoned in their flight a big quantity of bags which they had brought with them in order to carry away loot. (Cf. „Causes of Social Chaos in Bulgaria.") This proves convincingly that these Bulgarian candidates for Communism are far from being adjusted to it, and that consequently they are not fit for any less chaotic social order than our own.

11: Logio S-4 (no date) 1936 EEl Bulgaria EEl

head of youthful peasant converts and set about capturing 669 municipalities, evicting the mayors and proclaiming the commune in anticipation of the advent of the Russians who never came. Considerable damage was caused and some 3,000 were killed in this outbreak. Some 2,500 of those who participated in these risings had fled into Yugoslavia and persisted in carrying on an active agitation against the Tsankov Government which was continually provoked by an underhand campaign conducted by both Agrarians and Communists. M. Malinov, who was the leader of the legal Opposition in the Sobranye, far from criticising Tsankov for the measures he took to repress this agitation, on the contrary approved them. Speaking in the Sobranye on September 10, 1924 about a manifesto circulated by the Communists and Agrarians in which a new insurrection to be followed by an irruption of the political refugees in Yugoslavia was being preached, he affirmed that this was a provocation and a challenge which no Government could allow to pass unheeded and that it ought to be taken up and drastically dealt with. The Socialist leader Sakuzov who followed, fully agreed with Malinov and admitted that the policy of repression adopted by the Government had been forced upon it by the Agrarians.

The Government was now giving all its attention to 665 the merging of all the political parties into one, that of the Democratic Entente. But in so doing they overlooked the necessity of sifting the wheat from the chaff and allowed the incorporation in the newly created political amalgam, of compromised politicians who prevented it from coalescing into a workable entity, and whose presence moreover, obstructed the inclusion of a certain number of more idealistically disposed politicians who refused to co-operate with these discredited individuals. As a result, the much-striven after unity was only temporarily and partially attained. The Democratic, Radical, and Socialist parties continued to

665 subsist, though, in a weakened form, their individuality having been sucked out of them as several of their members transferred their allegiance to the Democratic Entente, into which other political parties with a worse record allowed themselves to be wholly absorbed as they had little chance of surviving as distinct entities. This effort of Tsankov to rejuvenate parliamentarism by creating a new political force miscarried. Since it only succeeded in forming a desiccated body without a soul which was nothing else save a combination of interests and appetites. It dealt a fatal blow to the existing democratic forces by undermining the stability of such existing political parties as the Democrats, Radicals and Socialists, which it had taken half a century of efforts to develop, and which, on the whole, were promising political forces. The Govern-
669 ment dissolved the Communist party in 1924 and declared it illegal, forcing thereby its activities into underground channels. Both Agrarians and Communists were now openly receiving subsidies from Yugoslavia and they started a campaign against the Macedonian organisation, assassinating its famous leader, Todor Alexandrov, on August, 1924. Retaliatory murders followed and prominent Communists were executed by the Macedonians. The Communisst, and Agrarians constituted a common front and organised brigand bands which terrorised the country, amply supplied with arms and money from Russia and Yugoslavia. The official organ of the Agrarians, the *Zemledelsko Zname*, which was now being published in Yugoslavia early in June began inserting incendiary articles foretelling the near outbreak of a revolution in Bulgaria and inviting Tsar Boris to leave the country. The police was helpless to put a stop to the prevailing terrorism, the intensity of which may be gauged by General Russev's, (The Minister of the Interior) declaration in the Sobranye on June 17, 1924: „I walk in the streets of Sofia with the same feeling

as when I was visiting the trenches during the war". Between October 1923 and the end of April 1925 there had been thirty two armed incursions into Bulgaria by the emigrant Agrarians in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless the Cabinet in spite of all this provocation did not apply any extraordinary repressive measures and it was only after the attempt on the life of Tsar Boris and the blowing up of the cathedral in which the whole Cabinet, the officer corps and prominent members of Sofia society were present on April 16, 1925, for the funeral of a general who had been murdered by Communists, (in which outrage 128 were killed and several hundred wounded) that martial law was proclaimed and the Government proceeded to deal with a heavy hand with its opponents. But the revolt which followed can hardly be ascribed to the belated severity of the Tsankov Government, for the Agrarians had not ceased to declare the imminence of an outbreak aiming at the overthrow of the Government. The revolt was ruthlessly quelled and unwonted violence shown on both sides; for a few months a veritable reign of terror prevailed. It is computed that over 20,000 were killed and serious destruction to property was inflicted. But no Government could have done otherwise after the provocation it had received, and the incitements to vengeance on the part of the relatives of the victims of the outrage of April 16, with which it was besieged. Taking advantage of the unrest which obtained, the Greek dictator Pangalos seized the occasion to invade distraught Bulgaria hoping to win thereby easy laurels and enhance his prestige. Fortunately the League of Nations supported by the Great Powers rushed in to stamp out a new conflagration and not only forced Pangalos to beat a hasty retreat but made him disburse an indemnity of 30,000,000 leva for the damage caused by his troops in the Petritch district.[1]

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[1] Had the League intervened in the conflict which arose between Italy and Greece in 1923 and prevented the Italian bombard-

BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

648 On the whole Tsankov had been faced with an extremely heavy task and although supported by one of the most intelligent Chambers Bulgaria had so far had, was not able to accomplish anything of importance His activities were absorbed in creating a new party, suppressing revolts, tracking down conspirators and finally he took to limiting political rights and freedom when all pretence of idealism disappeared. In the foreign field Tsankov was equally unfortunate, in the hope of renewing commercial relations with Turkey he concluded a Treaty which was ratified on October 18, 1925 by which Bulgaria secured certain privileges for her exports, but these advantages proved illusory, for when the Treaty expired a year later the Turks refused to renew it and in the meanwhile Bulgaria had agreed to an exchange of populations abandoning to Turkey, property belonging to her nationals, valued at 10 milliard leva, which the Turks never paid for, as is their wont. Tsankov likewise attempted to win the friendship of Yugoslavia by paying a personal visit to Belgrade, but was not successful, for his Agrarian opponents who were hand in glove with the Yugoslav Government poisoned the atmosphere against him and rendered the conclusion of such ties nugatory. This flirtation with Yugoslavia does not seem to have met with the approval of Court circles and suddenly Tsankov was relegated to the post of president of the Sobranye and replaced early in January 1926 by Liaptchev, supported by Burov and Mollov, 661 all three members of the Democratic Entente. Tsankov had been unjustly accused of introducing a regime of White Terror in Bulgaria; those mostly responsiple for the brutalities which were certainly committed were his military supporters and advisers, General Vulkov, the Pa-

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000 ment of Corfu, General Pangalos would have certainly not formed the opinion that the League was a broken reed, and that in his turn he could bully disarmed Bulgaria.

RECENT HISTORY: 1923-1935

lace favourite, and General Russev, the Minister of the Interior. Impartial politicians in Bulgaria generally absolve Tsankov of this violence. Thus, M. Muchanov speaking in the Sobranye on April 1, 1926 stated: 661

> „1924 and 1925 were not normal years. Never before had we such internal unrest and such fratricidal struggles in Bulgaria. I understand the mentality of those who were administering the country at the time. In many cases they carried out their duty in a worthy manner, but at many placed certain exaggerations occurred, but I personally, shall abstain from blaming the Minister of the Interior for these."

And the Radical leader Kosturkov, who was one of the most outspoken critics of the Tsankov administration equally admitted in the Sobranye on December 21, 1926: „The Tsankov Government had been provoked by the Agrarians and Communists and the blood it shed was in self-defence".

The advent of the Liaptchev administration coincided with the temporary exhaustion of the Agrarians and for some time relative tranquillity prevailed which permitted the Government to devote its attention to the pursuance of its financial programme and the raising of loans, which can hardly be said to have aided the country, as may be inferred from a perusal of the chapter devoted to the story of the League of Nation's loans.[2] 643

Another act by which this administration is likely to be remembered was the voting in 1929 of a large amnesty which included Radoslavov and Tontchev, rightly comdemned by a State Court for violating the Constitution and facilitating Tsar Ferdinand's efforts to plunge Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Central Powers in opposition to the manifest desire of the people. The other colleagues of Radoslavov had already benefited from a previous amnesty, but public opinion at the time was utterly opposed to the inclusion in it of these two ex-Ministers. By granting an amnesty to these two discredited politicians who 643 697

[2] [cf. cat. 110, pp. 84–118 —Analyst]

643 697 had stopped at no crime in order to further their nefarious designs, the Government dealt a heavy blow to the prestige of Justice and undermined among the people confidence in law and morality. The real aim of the Goverment in passing this measure was to emancipate itself from the threat of finding itself placed in a minority through the defection of its more idealistically minded supporters, who very often disapproved of its policy. By winning over the partisans of Radoslavov by the grant of an amnesty to their leaders, the Government was hoping that it would ward off such a threat by eventually replacing their disgruntled followers by the Radoslavovists. Apparently the moral code of the trinity at the head of the government was not a very strict one as is manifest from the financial policy it foisted on the country and the liabilities it so lightheartedly assumed.

669 The commuting of punishments, and the granting of amnesties does not seem to have appeased either the Agrarians or the Communists, for towards the end of 1929 there was a distinct recrudescence in their activities. Armed bands penetrated from Yugoslavia and committed depredations and murders. A train was stopped and the passengers robbed, a number of judges were arrested and brutally shot near Sevlievo, the leader of the criminal band, responsible for these crimes, the notorious Dontso Uzunov, later took refuge in France, and though the Bulgarian Government applied for his extradition, this was refused on the pretext that the crime committed was of
661 a political character. The Government and its supporters paid little heed to the needs of the country, they were too intent on dividing among themselves the spoils of office. The booty was abundant, as it had been increased by the foreign loans recently concluded and there was enough for all their hungry followers. Millions were being showered upon prominent supporters of the Government

who had been appointed to arbitrate in various disputes with contractors of public works or to various sinecures. 661

The Socialist organ *Narod* in its issue of July 7,1931 gives some samples of the profligacy of the Liaptchev Cabinet:

> „In Albania where there is one Bulgarian school, a special inspector has been sent with a monthly salary of 20,000 leva. A special delegation was sent to the Budapest mint in order to supervise and receive the silver coins ordered there. though these coins could have been easily controlled on their delivery here. Ministers Burov and Mollov have wasted millions of public money in their endless peregrinations abroad, Minister Mollov even had his decorations sent to Geneva with a special messenger in order to put them on at an official banquet etc".

Another newspaper decried the practice of granting 200 Swiss francs per day to Government delegates sent on missions abroad when delegates of other nations receive much less. (Americans were said to be paid $ 8, and Italians $ 12 per diem) Opposition newspapers daily filled their columns with details of the prevailing corruption among government circles and laid stress on the utter apathy of Liaptchev as to the consequences. The latter was reported to have said in justification: „Our foreign creditors will de obliged to come and save their investments in Bulgaria, and then they will put our finances right".

The governmental structure had for some time been shaken by internal convulsions and dangerous fissures were making themselves visible. That political amalgam, the Democratic Entente, was slowly disintegrating into its heterogeneous component parts. The Liaptchev Cabinet was never a popular one; at the legislative elections held in 1927, it received a total of 495,000 votes against 556,000 given to the Opposition parties, but succeeded in getting 163 deputies elected as against the 86 obtained by the Opposition, owing to the latter being disunited, and owing 666

666 to the majoritarian voting system being in use. There were only three districts in which it obtained clear majorities, the Rustchuk, Shumen and Plovdiv regions, in which large Moslem populations exist which invariably vote for the Government. In 1931 the mandate of the Chamber was expiring. Liaptchev felt that his Government needed new blood, and Malinov was approached and sounded as to an eventual co-operation. He demanded five ministerial portfolios. This was deemed too much. After protracted bargaining, Liaptchev was entrusted by Tsar Boris to supervise the new elections timed to be held on June 21, 1931, much to the annoyance of the general public which desired that a neutral, or coalition government, should be specially nominated to superintend this function in order that the national will might find expression and not be falsified by the usual electoral artifices and malpractices in vogue. The elections much to the surprise of all concerned, proved a success to the four Opposition parties which united to fight in common, namely the Agrarians, Democrats, Liberals and Radicals, their common lists secured the majority of the poll, the Democratic Entente was beaten, and made way for a government presided over by Malinov and later by Mushanov.

665 The advent of the new coalition government was hailed by all as a great triumph of the democratic forces and great hopes were raised. It was not fit, however, for team work and from the first it became evident that it was divided against itself by fundamental and unbridgeable divergences. The Democrats and Radicals though differing on the economic programme (the former favouring the maintenance of the existing high protective dues, the latter their revision, for the purpose of bringing prices down to the level of agricultural produce) could, had they been by themselves, have co-operated harmoniously and done much to restore order in the administration. In the eyes of the

more orthodox members of these two parties, the election 665 pact concluded with the Agrarians and Liberals was looked at askance. There were even Radicals who seceded from their party rather than co-operate with the discredited Liberals, whose former leader was the abhorred Radoslavov. The views of the Agrarians on the now predominant economic questions coincided with those of the Radicals, while those of the Liberals were identical with the opinions of the Democrats. But there was another basic notion which radically separated Democrats and Radicals, from Agrarian and Liberals. The two former 661 parties had a certain conception of their duties and at 665 least made some efforts to govern decently and honestly, the latter two however, were out for loot and made no pretence about the aims which actuated them. The groups were too miscellaneous in origin, too self-seeking and rotten by private animosities and had neither the internal nor the external discipline required to make good their promises to the electorate, The post of Minister of Justice devolved on a Liberal and within a year there were grave complaints of his tampering with the course of Justice, formulated by the unions of judges, and by that of the legal profession. An Opposition deputy, M. Dumanov interpellated the government on December 22, 1932, and the scandals revealed were so grave, that the incriminated Minister was forced to resign. He was replaced by another Liberal, who refused to deviate from the line of conduct of his predecessor, and naturally, recriminations and complaints were not slow to appear. (Cf. *Mir* 7. VI. 1933, 13. IX. 1933 and 10. X. 1933).

The Liberals soon split up into three antagonistic fractions owing to their inability to divide equitably the spoils they derived from such offices as they occupied. Those who had been ousted from office were waging a surreptitious campaign against their nominal colleagues, 661 even going to the extent of plotting with the Opposition to bring about the fall of the Cabinet. The Agrarians from 665 the first were divided into some five groups, three of which published party newspapers called the *Zemledelsko Zname*, and each of which pretended to be the official organ of this splintered up party. A bitter and uncompromising campaign was being conducted among the warring fractions. Some Agrarians were openly in receipt of subsidies from Yugoslavia and France, and endeavouring to foist on the country a policy which was considered antinational. One of the Agrarian leaders Obov, was accused of receiving 100,000 francs monthly from France. The most revolting and scandalous exposures were daily being made as to the activities of the Agrarians by their mutually antagonistic Press. The most disgusting tales were circulated which completely undermined the prestige of the Government. The Agrarian Ministers had accepted a gift of 800,000 leva for the election campaign from Obov and K. Todorov, who for years had been at the service of the Yugoslav government, but when they secured their nomination to office, they turned their backs on these donators[1]. They were no longer needed now that they could

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[1] Most of these Agrarians politicians seem to form the scum of the community. After Stambolilski's fall they went abroad and worked in close intelligence with their country's enemies. As revealed in the Sobranye in November 1927, they accepted 5 million drachmae from the Greeks, promising in exchange that when they would seize power they would renounce the Bulgarian claim to an outlet on the Aegean, Later they transferred their activities to Belgrade living there at the expense of the Yugoslav Government which utilised them to foment troubles in Bulgaria. A letter was read in the Sobranye on Dec. 24, 1931 purporting to be written by the brother of Obov to a murdered Opposition deputy in 1924, and which contained the following remarks: „Before we return to Sofia many of our prominent adversaries will be killed. It will be well if you wrote us what persons we must murder... I want from you a list of persons who have to be murdered, numbers of Sofia garrison, police etc...

dabble unchecked in the State coffers. A scathing exposure of one of the Agrarian Ministers, appeared in the Belgrade *Politika* on June 16, 1933 which was widely reproduced in the Bulgarian Press.

Virgil Dimov was accused of having concluded a pact with the Macedonian Committee, promising to reverse the pro-Serbian policy hitherto followed by the Agrarian organisation and to adopt a strictly nationalistic one, such as was approved of by Italy. In exchange he and his friends would receive, the support of the Macedonians, and subsidies from a foreign country, Italy. He was further accused of having in a very short time amassed a considerable fortune. This scandal reached its culmination on November 10, 1933, when the president of the Sobranye, N. Zachariev, another Agrarian, rose up and declared: „I was a colleague of V. Dimov, who was a poor man. But for two years he has been a minister and to-day he is a millionaire. I can no longer associate with these people“. All attempts to maintain a semblance of unity disappeared, the Agrarians threatened to force a new election campaign by overthrowing the Government and proceeded accordingly to work up the peasant electorate, inciting it to avoid paying taxes and promising to absolve it from such payments if the Agrarians were returned. A final attempt was made to maintain the tottering Cabinet by throwing over the Radical Minister Kosturkov and dividing among Agrarians and Liberals the emoluments and benefits which this additional ministry would assure to its occupants. Democracy had deteriorated to such a degree that it became a farse and a make-belief,

we must destroy this government and create a friendly Bulgaria and a confederation with Serbia“. The most revolting revelations were made concerning all the colleagues of the late Stambuliiski in the Sobranye on Jan. 4, 1932.

665 which no one could further trust. One of the leading
661 Sofia newspapers, the *Mir*, wrote on May 12, 1934 :

> „In Bulgaria there is no longer any State authority. At the head of the State are puny uncultured people who destroy and are incapable of constructing. And all these petty personalities are asking for more offices, more ministerial porfolios, more public funds for their political friends. Our Government is not a democracy, but purely and simply an organisation of marauding bands. The patient and submissive citizen asks how long will this state of affairs last?

668 Against this canker of demoralisation the reserve
701 officers, the only organised and patriotic force in the country, had several times protested and drawn the attention of the Government. They dispatched a deputation on January 18, 1933 to the Prime Minister recommending the adoption of certain measures which would curtail existing abuses. At the end of April 1933, they held a congress and they passed a resolution appealing to all men of goodwill to group themselves together and form a non-party government which might extricate the country from the bog in which it was wallowing. In another congress held at the end of 1933, they again insisted on the formation of a non-party Cabinet in order that the people might be saved from the prevailing demoralisation which had set in among the political parties. These reminders however, had been disregarded.

When in May 1934, the Radical member of the Cabinet was so rudely unhorsed by his colleagues, it became apparent that the Mushanov Cabinet was at the end of its tether. There were only two political forces powerful enough to replace it. The Agrarians, and Tsankov's Democratic Entente. They were utterly hostile to one another and each intent on excluding its rival from all participation in office. The advent of either to power meant the outbreak of a civil war, more bitter than that which had been waged in 1925. To prevent this calamity, the

military decided much against their will to assume control 668
of State affairs. This was done by the coup d'ètat of 701
May 19, 1934, which met with the apparent approval of the bulk of the population, heartily sick of the disgusting squabbles of the political parties.

The military had warned in time the politicians that 668
they should sink their quarrels and attend to the proper 642
governing of the country; they had insisted on the necessity of the civilians combining to form a decent government, 701
and seeing that their objurgations remained unheeded they had taken at last the task in their own hands. Even when they assumed power and in contrast with the politicians, they manifested no anxiety to fill the public offices with their adherents; they still appealed to certain civilians who enjoyed the reputation of being honest and capable men and entrusted them with responsible positions in the Government. The new Cabinet presided over by Kimon Gheorghiev had a distinctly civilian appearance, the military contented themselves with back seats, but they kept vigilant and alert and for once the rusty State machine began to function at a pace it had not experienced for years. In a manifesto to the people, drawn up in concise and blunt terms, the Government made known the reasons for which the army had decided to act, and exposed the programme it was intent on applying. The Government had learnt from the experiment of Tsankov that it was futile to seek the fusion of political parties in order to work with their support and by prescribed parliamentary methods; it therefore proceeded to dissolve both the Chamber and the political parties, declaring that the latter had outlived their usefulness. It made it known that it contemplated working out a scheme for the creation of a corporative Parliament in which all professions would be represented as well as certain political currents, but this was a matter for the future and in the meanwhile

668 642 701 the Cabinet would govern by decrees. The Gheorghiev Cabinet fully justified the hopes placed in it. Never since its liberation did Bulgaria have such and efficient government; the reforms, improvements and innovations accomplished were most commendable and efficacious, and for this reason when its resignation was announced on January 22, 1935 the news caused deep disillusion and painful surprise to all those who had Bulgaria's wellbeing at heart.

668 701 General Zlatev, the new Premier, was Minister of War in the Gheorghiev Cabinet; in a public speech delivered on February 24, 1935, while affirming that the programme of the Government remained identical with that proclaimed in the manifesto of May 19, he explained some of the reasons which had brought about his predecessor's resignation. According to him, his predecessors had somewhat swerved from the wishes of the army which had set them in power. Instead of prosecuting and suppressing indiscriminately all Macedonian organisations they had dissolved only the Michailovist wing (alleged to be subsidised by Italy) while the Protogerovist section (pro-Yugoslav) was allowed full liberty of action. M. Kimon Gheorghiev was alleged to have sought inordinate powers for himself, wishing to wield an authority like that of Signor Mussolini! For this purpose he had demanded that certain prerogatives of the Crown should be curtailed. These views had hurt the loyalist feelings of the army which was profoundly attached to Tsar Boris, and it had therefore decided on the Cabinet's reconstruction as a measure likely to cement the unity of the army which was threatened by the enunciation, of such views. Those who know M. Kimon Gheorghiev and his colleagues, all of whom are distinguished by their extreme modesty have some difficulty in believing that either he, or any of his collaborators aspired or contemplated to don the mantle of a dictator. What they de-

sired was to restrain such powers as the Crown possessed which had rendered its intervention often disastrous in the past, as had been the case for example on June 29, 1913[1]. It is with misgivings therefore that friends of Bulgaria have seen her drop these trusty pilots who have been quite gratuitously charged with fostering disunity in the army[2].

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[1] The desire to abrogate such prerogatives of the Crown as that of disposing of all promotions and appointments in the army, and of nominating the war Minister, was a thoroughly democratic conception, for Tsar Ferdinand had largely abused of these privileges and had rendered the exercise of democracy illusory.

The breed of reptilian personalities which unfortunately abounds in Bulgaria and to which the consolidation af a regime, like that of K. Gheorghiev, spells disaster, has done its utmost to poison the mind of Tsar Boris against the promoters of such a liberal scheme, and especially against Colonel Damian Veltchev, to whose courage and abnegation he largely owes his maintenance on the throne, for it must not de forgotten that Colonel D. Veltchev was one of the chief organisers of the coup d'état of June 9, 1923 which averted the proclamation of a republic by Stambuliiski.

That the retention of such rights by the Crown is a dangerous weapon becomes obvious from the fact that in October 1935 some 80 capable officers were forcibly retired, for no other reason save that of being suspected of sympathising with Colonel D. Veltchev and his colleagues.

The breaking of the careers of so many promising young officers is not likely to promote the unity which Bulgarians are vainly striving to attain; on the contrary, such arbitrary measures are likely to gravely compromise the popularity which the Crown has hitherto enjoyed and nullify one of the few centripetal forces which so far have helped to bind the nation together.

[2] To all appearances the brief spell of decent government ushered in by M. K. Gheorghiev and his colleagues will remain a unique episode in Bulgarian history and future Bulgarian poets will probably celebrate its memory after the style of Byron's effusions on Miltiades:

> The tyrant of the Chersonese
> Was freedom's best and bravest friend
> That tyrant was Miltiades!
> Oh! that the present hour would lend
> Another despot of the kind!
> Such chains as his were sure to bind".

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Unity and concord unhappily are not the distinguishing virtues of the Bulgarians, and they are not likely to be fostered by the elimination of such devoted and courageous men as M. Kimon Gheorghiev's colleagues from office. It was rumoured that Colonel Veltchev, the able supporter and adviser of the former Cabinet, aimed at dispensing with the monarchy, (this was a deliberate lie, for the new Constitution which was being prepared provided for its maintenance) that the older officers resented this and that with their aid Tsar Boris had been able to turn the tables, taking advantage of the unfavourable report of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations on the financial reforms of the Government. Whatever the intimate wishes of Colonel Damian Veltchev, former director of the military academy, and one of the most intelligent, chivalrous, and progressive officers in the Bulgarian army, it is certainly not he who can be accused of sowing disharmony in the ranks of the army. Some six years ago when he was forced to resign from his post, he published an open letter in which he made it clear that certain army circles were intent on doing away with him. This letter created a sensation. The Sofia Press at the time (October 1929) declared that:

> „The facts exposed profoundly revolted the public. No one could have suspected that behind the curtains such disgusting and black intrigues could be carried on in Bulgaria, and that even if only a fourth of what had been divulged were true, the letter constituted a crushing condemnation for a community which could not guarantee security to its distinguished members".

When this document is recollected it would appear that the older officers reared in the school of Tsar Ferdinand and most of whom had not been asked to participate in the „coup d'état" of May 19, because of their participation in that of Prof. A. Tsankov had proved the undoing of his movement, resented the independence shown by their younger colleagues, and had engineered

11: Logic S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

BULGARIA-PAST & PRESENT

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a cabal by which they succeeded in removing them from power. The principle of hierarchy and military discipline which had apparently been infringed on May 19, 1934 especially since this „coup" was carried out without considering the wishes of Tsar Boris, the supreme head of the army, was thus vindicated and restored. But whether unity will be promoted by such methods in the army remains to be seen. For there is another point of cleavage; Colonel Veltchev favoured a policy of reconciliation with Yugoslavia and was supported by the junior officers, as well as by the organisation of the non-commissioned officers of the reserve, while the older officers sided with General Vulkov, of rather sinister fame, former minister in the Tsankov Cabinet, and later minister in Rome, who is held to be a favourite of the Court and headed the pro-Italian wing of the army. The fact that he was dismissed from his post at Rome on the accession to power of the Gheorghiev Cabinet is indicative of the existing tension between the two groups into which the military are divided. Unity and harmony seem to be foreign to the mentality of the Bulgarians; there must always be some disunity and scission; as of old, the political parties were split into Russophiles and Austrophiles, so now there are slowly evolving pro-Italian and pro-Yugoslav currents into the vortex of which both the army and the Macedonian organisation are being steadily drawn.[1] These senior officers are, as may be expected, rather of too conservative tendencies, and one may, question the advisability for a little country like Bulgaria embaking on an intensely nationalistic educational programme as had been decided upon at this belated hour. The utility of such methods is disputable even for large States like Germany; but for small

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[1] It is fortunate indeed for Bulgaria that at the time of writing Italy and Yugoslavia seem to be composing their senseless quarrel so that they will cease fomenting disunity in Bulgaria.

countries like Bulgaria the adoption of such an outgrown policy may prove suicidal. Dictatorship aims at achieving unity and submission by appealing not to reason, but to sentiment, hence the praise of nationality and the fostering of patriotism which is one of the most powerful sentiments. But the Bulgarians are an unemotional folk, and the attempt to play on their feelings will probably miscarry. They can only be won over by more positive performances and the certainty of an impending improvement of their lot, which at this time of crisis is altogether a more complicated and difficult task, which may well strain beyond measure any dictatorship. It is admissible that every dictatorship which wishes to perpetuate itself is confronted with the problem of remoulding the mentality of its subject population and adjusting it to the regime under which it is to live. If it can not turn out men fit for its purposes, confiding in its ideals, approving in its methods, and capable of responding enthusiastically to its exhortations, it will collapse for lack of men willing and apt to work under it. But such men have to be *grown* and they need a special environment in which they can be carefully nurtured. It is not by such antidotes that the all pervading Bolshevik virus will be combated. Those who believe that Bulgaria, being a country of smallholders, has nothing to fear from communism are ignorant of the profound transformation which has lately happened. One of the most serious Sofia newspapers, the *Mir*, was writing as follows on August 24, 1933:

> „Is it not true that 30°/₀ of our people is clearly bolshevised and that a large part of the remainder has no faith and no guiding principles and does not know how to think and how to act?

At the municipal elections held in Sofia in September 1932 out of a total poll of 47,823; 16,000 votes were recorded in favour of the Communists who remain in spite of all the persecution they have been subjected to, the only disciplined force outside the army. And the communist conspiracies and cells which are almost daily discovered among all layers of Bulgarian society, are convincing proofs that communism is a theory which exerts an irresistible attraction for this long suffering people. An effective antidote to this doctrine is not conservatism, but an enlightened liberal policy which would release the community from the restrictive legacies and entanglements of the past. Such a forward looking policy was the one inspiring the colleagues of Kimon Gheorghiev who constituted a group of public-minded men, courageous enough to break with tradition, and capable of creating common interests with Bulgaria's western neighbour to replace the separate interests which had hitherto divided the two States. They tried to release Bulgaria from the crippling tradition of national sovereignty, from the economic exploitation of her parasitic industrialists and from the strangulation of her crushing and inelastic debts. Vested interests, local and foreign, leagued themselves to plot their overthrow. But Bulgaria is at the cross-roads, the path which she has just engaged herself in leads backwards to the past. A living society cannot afford to live on the past, it has to face new situations, it must evolve new ways of thinking, forge new instruments for new struggles, it has to adapt itself to new circumstances otherwise it is apt to go under. If Bulgaria wishes to go forward and ahead she must retrieve her steps and stride along the road indicated by Kimon Gheorghiev and his colleagues, or choose the only alternative course, the broad avenue leading to Bolshevism. 668

Since the above was written owing to the lack of unity among the officer corps, their attempt at reform missed fire. General Zlatev, having resorted to the high-handed measure of arresting Colonel K. Gheorghiev and 642

642 Prof. A. Tsankov, was disavowed by his colleagues, who tendered their resignations and this brought about the fall of the Cabinet.

Tsar Boris entrusted on April 1935 M. A. Tochev, a close associate of ex-Tsar Ferdinand, whose former activities are recorded at length in the Bulgarian Orange book, and who had not a little share in precipitating the second Balkan war and encouraging the subsequent pro-German attitude of Bulgaria, to assume office. That T. Tochev has not wavered in his pro-German sympathies is proved by the enthusiastic welcome his Government extended to General Göring during the latter's visit to Sofia. Simultaneously a proclamation was issued promising the Bulgarian people a new Constitution more in harmony with national traditions and with the views set forth by the army in the manifesto of May 19, 1934. The proclamation ended with a formal assurance that no return to the party system would be tolerated. This was merely to allay the susceptibilities of the military, for everything points to a gradual return to the old system under a modified form.

648 The appointment of one of the most dexterous rope-dancers of the old Ferdinand circus as chief counsellor to the Crown was not a judicious act, and it has certainly not enhanced the prestige and authority of the State, nor contributed to the promotion of concord in the country. Much of the good work initiated by the Gheorghiev Government has been undone and the principles of its foreign policy are being gradually abandoned. The close association of Bulgaria with Yugoslavia was the cardinal aim of the colleagues of K. Gheorghiev and would have eventually aided the political union of the two countries, since Bulgaria in her present amputated form is unable to maintain the costly administrative mechanism of a modern State.

This ideal is now in grave danger of being frustrated.

This policy is not to the liking of that great army of 648 functionaries, supported by the old politicians, and of the palace circles, to all of whom self-interest suggests opposition to anything even remotely suggesting a curtailment of their country's sovereignty. To them the strained political situation in Europe has come as a gift of the Gods, for it holds out the promise of a turn in the wheel of fortune and of a means of retrieving what was lost in the war. This implies an adventurous policy and entails some carefully prepared preliminary steps. Such a policy must be made to appeal to the masses as likely to ameliorate their present difficult lot and at the same time, the feeling of patriotism has to be exorcised in order to make war appear once more an invigorating and lucrative pursuit.

Hence the persistent circulation of such mendacious reports to the effect that Gt. Britain was opposed to the policy of a close understanding between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and that she has decided to impress Bulgaria into her service and confide to the latter the defence of British interests in the Near East. „We are navigating in British waters" is the general comment on the present situation with which one is greeted in Sofia. And the prospect of the British Pactolus pouring its goldbearing stream on the barren fields of Bulgaria makes all and sundry beam with smiles. At the same time feverish efforts are being made to instill some patriotic ardour in the masses by intensive flag-waiving and drum-beating. There were never so many parades, patriotic speeches, and celebrations of commemorations of victories, ridiculous in themselves, since they all ended in a catastrophe, as there have been during the past few months.

The direct cosequence of entrusting the government 661 to compromised personalities is that official statements and acts are regarded with mistrust.

661 The arrival of Colonel D. Veltchev, the able colleague and supporter of K. Gheorghiev from abroad early in October 1935 at the instigation of two Cabinet Ministers, was seized upon by the Government as a pretext for dealing a crushing blow to its adversaries. Both, with many of their sympathisers and supporters, have been arrested on a charge of plotting against the Goverment and the Crown. In view of the fact that such charges as have been levelled against Col. Veltchev and K. Gheorghiev, namely, that they were co-operating with the left wing of the Agrarians and with the brigand chief, Dontso Usunov, have proved utterly unfounded, one may logically infer that this pretended plot is a staged-up affair aiming at the crushing of the only people who would resolutely oppose any attempt of involving Bulgaria in a new adventure and whom the force of circumstances would in all probability have again placed in power now that „Russia's significance as a beacon of hope for the forces of violent discontent seems likely to diminish to the vanishing point".

600 What all self-respecting Englishmen are bound to resent most strongly is the shameless misuse which is being made of their country's name, and in view of the utter revulsion in all circles in Gt. Britain for any policy even remotely endangering peace, it is incumbent on authoritative circles ar home to issue a formal and categorical disclaimer of the baseless reports which are being circulated in Sofia. This is all the more imperative remembering the tragic consequences of the misunderstandings which arose in 1915 through the interpretation given to British policy in Bulgaria. (Cf. p. 410),

Such a disavowal would take the wind out of the scandal mongers and plotters, and would help honest and patriotic Bulgarians to restore order, tranquillity, and concord in their long-suffering country.

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[1] The figures in the fourth column should read as if there were one unit less, thus the total sum should be read as 4 469,998·7 hectares.

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